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prefa ce

T

HE

pr=nt study developed out of a de><rre to

understand the character of liberalism and conservatism in Prussia on
the eve of German unification. Who were the liberals? Who were the
Conservatives? What were their ideals and how did they conduct
themselves in public? How powerful was each group in the state?
In conflict throughout the Nineteenth Century, the opponents reached
the peak of their antagonism in the years between 1858 and 1866, the
the years of the New Era, the constitutional conflict, and the first
two wars of German unification. Fundamental social, economic, and
political ideals were at stake. One group would have aligned the
country with the West; the other sought to preserve the Old Regime.
Since the story of Bismarck's crushing defeat of the liberals by his
Realpolitik after 1864 is well known, the present analysis concentrates
upon the internal crisis of 1858 to 1864 within Prussia; and in keeping
with the nature of the subject, the method of treatment is topical
rather than chronological.
Analyses of social and institutional forces in conflict in the past
century and a half should be made for each of the European countries.
The Old Regime survived over much of the continent well into the
Twentieth Century, and controversies like the one in Prussia occurred
in every state. The present study can be justified not merely as a
treatment of a crucial period in German history but as an essential
chapter in the history of modern Europe. It should help toward
making possible a comparative analysis of society and institutions in
the modern world, by means of which we should, for example, be able
to explain the remarkable difference between the course of development of Europe and that of the United States.
ii

The preliminary research for the present volume was done in Germany over two decades ago. The long delay in completing the work
is to be explained first by the author's study of the Stein-Hardenberg
period and then by government service. A Social Science Research
Fellowship in 1930-31 and further financial assistance from the Research Council of the University of Nebraska have aided substantially
in the writing of this book. In addition, the University has made
possible its publication. The author wishes to express his gratitude
to both organizations.
The extent to which his wife has participated in making this book
will be appreciated only by those who know her.
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THE ISSUES

1 / How the Conflict Arose

IN

1858 King Frederick William IV of Prussia became
mentally deranged and had to relinquish the royal authority to his
brother, Prince William. The Regent quickly ousted most of the
Conservatives in the ministry and appointed right-wing liberals in
their stead. The people of Prussia interpreted the Regent's words and
actions as an indication of liberalism. In the elections to the Lower
House of the Landtag in the next year they threw out the Conservative
majority in favor of the liberals. During the course of the next three
years, popularly called the New Era because of the hope for the liberal
refornl of Prussia and the national unification of Germany, the ruler
and the liberal majority learned to their dismay that each wished something different from the other. The former harbored two aims, to reform and strengthen the army and to keep his absolute power, while
the latter was equally determined to reform Prussia in a liberal sense
and to unify Germany. Both William and the liberals confused reality
with desire. The Prince thought that he was governing a Prussia
like that of his beloved father, Frederick William III (d. 1840), but
actually he faced a state in which society had considerably altered.
The liberals believed that the Regent appreciated the needs of the
time and could be led or pushed into a movement of reform. Through
initial misunderstanding and subsequent refusal to compromise they
drifted by 1862 into a constitutional conflict. The ruler, who became
King on the death of his brother in January, 1861, dismissed the liberal
ministers in the next year, again turned to the Conservatives, and in
September, 1862, appointed Bismarck as Minister President. The
selection of this Junker statesman signified that the controversy over
the meaning of the constitution would be resolved by Machtpolitik.
J
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In spite of the fact that the elections to the Lower House in 1861 and
in 1862 had almost eliminated the Conservatives, the government,
through the exercise of all possible pressure upon the voters, tried i~
1863 to replace the overwhelming liberal majority by Conservatives.
The attempt failed; but the King and his Conservative ministers continued to rule, and as a result of their successful resistance to the
liberals they imparted to the constitution the absolutistic interpretation
that they wished. Apparently so promising at the beginning of the
New Era, liberalism went down to crushing defeat.
How did the conflict between the liberals on the one hand and the
King and the Conservatives on the other come about? An explanation
involves, first, a portrayal of the ruler's character, second, a comparison
between his aims and those of the liberals, and third, a summary of
the economic and social changes that had occurred in Prussia since the
formative years of the new ruler's youth.
The Prince Regent in 1858 was already sixty-one years old. He had
fought in the War of Liberation against Napoleon with the distinction
expected of a royal prince and had spent his life in the army. As a
second son he had never been intended for the kingship and had
received no preparatory training for that position. The family had
expected that Frederick William, the eldest son, would ascend the
throne, that in due time he would have a male heir, and that Prince
William would remain one of the many minor Hohenzollerns, a
younger son on the periphery of power, adept, if he had the energy
and ambition, in the military (other professions were scarcely of
comparable worth) and adjusted to a life of frustration. With the
position of supreme power in the state at stake, too thorough and allround an education might have made a second son dangerous to the
legitimate heir; it might have led to comparisons and aroused troublesome ambitions. A careful restriction of training and, after maturity,
of employment offered assurance of family and state harmony. No
more efficient school in subordination could have been found in the
uneventful years after 1815 than the Pruss ian army.
By the time he became ruler Prince William was too old to change
his fundamental views and ways of doing things. He belonged to the
ranks of those Hohenzollerns with modest talents and steadiness of
character, for he had the moderate and tenacious personality of his
father and he lacked entirely the brilliance of his older brother. He
had no relations with the artistic and intellectual life of the period.
He was first of all a Hohenzollern and then an officer, but an officer
of the ordinary, unimaginative, military type and not one like Boyen
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with a love of literature and philosophy. His model was not that of
Frederick the Great but of Frederick William III, his father, a dull,
commonsense, conservative person, who in the Napoleonic period had
had to be pushed into taking every decision that made him famous
and who had reverted to the commonplace as soon as the pressure of
international affairs had been removed. Prince William was content
to abide within the spiritual limitations of his character, concentrating
his emotions as well as his intellect upon the responsibilities of his
office. Possessed of a fine sense of moral uprightness and an aversion
to hypocrisy, he lived in accordance with the Pruss ian tradition of
frugality, asceticism and the categorical imperative. In keeping with
this tradition he appreciated and expected ability in his advisers and
loyally held to men of greater talent than himself. He had no understanding of popular politics and did not acquire any after he became
ruler. Indeed, he seems to have disliked politics from an instinctive
aversion to any source of competition with Hohenzollern power.
As soon as Prince William became Regent, he formulated a program
to which he clung tenaciously. The nature of the entire program, con·
sisting mainly of a set of moral standards, can be judged from the
initial sentences. After justifying his change of ministers on grounds
of harmony of views, he said that "there should not be at present and
there should never be any talk of a break with the past. The careful,
improving hand shall be laid upon that which shows itself to be
arbitrary or contrary to the needs of the time."
The program reflected the inconsistency of thought in William's
mind. During the Manteuffel period the Prince had shown a deep
antipathy to the hypocrisy, intrigue and brutality of the Conservatives
in power and had expressed himself freely against their activity. He
had thereby acquired their enmity, and he knew that they had tried
as long as possible to prevent his becoming Regent. His program was
aimed to rebuke the Conservatives and encourage the mildest form of
liberalism, under the one fundamental condition that the monarch reo
tain his power. Thus he spoke of kingship by divine right but also
of abiding loyally by the constitution, of advocating apparently liberal
reforms but of keeping within the historical tradition of absolutism.
The passages about preserving the ruler's authority were clear and
emphatic and were repeated throughout the entire document; the
statements about reforms never rose above the general, except on the
subjects of the military and of taxation to support it. It is clear that
the author of this program leaned far more toward the past than toward the future, that his interest in reform was limited by his determi-
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nation to preserve his own power by divine right, and that in his conception the process of reform consisted of the Landtag's approving his
proposals. His idea of kingship under the constitution of 1850 conformed to that held by Conservatives in about every sphere of life.
Just as under pressure from the liberals the Conservatives later proposed to have the survivals of the Old Regime-the patrimonial police
power, for example-confirmed to them by law, so William regarded
the constitution as a legal support to his absolute authority.
The King's lack of understanding of liberalism was evident in his
personnel policy. In revamping the ministry in 1858, he appointed
right·wing liberals like Count von Schwerin, a type he called conservative constitutionalist;! but at the same time he retained von der
Heydt as Minister of Commerce and soon added the reactionary
General von Roon as Minister of War. The conception of ministerial
unity was alien to him; while the ministry had a Minister President,
the latter acted as primus inter pares and exercised slight authority
over the others. The system assured the King greater power by enabling him to pick whom he wished as advisers without being dependent upon one prime minister or one party for the selection of the
other members. In the same way William refused to oust reactionary
officials from their positions even when their abuse of power had been
notorious. When the liberals urged him to dismiss police president
Zedlitz in Berlin, as infamous a reactionary as could be found serving
the Manteuffel ministry, the King refused, flatly and angrily. One
expected officials to be demigods, he scornfully said. 2 Officials existed,
he believed, to carry out his orders; they should take on the qualities
required of them. That they might sabotage or misinterpret the
King's instructions and continue quietly to play the tyrant without
the victim's being able to obtain justice was far beyond William's
comprehension. Such a thing smacked of politics. The machine of
officials, geared for decades to authoritarianism, remained unchanged
by the liberal ministers in organization and personnel and stood ready
for Bismarck to set again in motion.
Although the King preferred as advisers and ministers men of
authoritarian, aristocratic qualities like his own, he could not always
handle them. His honest revulsion against hypocrisy could not and
1 Aus dem Leben Theodor von Bernhardis, 1834·71 (Leipzig, 1893-1906), IV, 182,
187; Kaiser Wilhelms des Crossen Briefe, Reden und Schriften, edited by Ernst Berner
(Berlin, 1906), II, 22.
"Ibid., pp. 106-7, 126-27. Zedlitz later became involved in political scandal and
in 1861 had to be ousted.
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did not compensate for the effects of his intellectual limitations.
Persons like Bismarck could convince him, in case it was in his intetest
and he wished to be convinced, that black was white. Although usually
wrong in the fundamental decisions of his career, as a rule he had
the extraordinary capacity for being led back to the right track without loss of face or self-confidence. The constitutional conflict offered
rich examples of specious reasoning which he was persuaded to believe
as honest fact.
Early in his military career Prince William had concluded that the
army needed to be reformed-the size increased, the reserves brought
under the direct control of the regular officers, and the term of service
lengthened. As long as his father and brother reigned, he had been
unable to make headway with his ideas; but as soon as he himself
assumed power he set to work to achieve his life's purpose. Of one
thing he was sure-that he understood military affairs and knew what
reforms the army needed. He asserted flatly that anyone, whether
military or civilian, who disagreed with him on this question possessed
neither the necessary knowledge nor good judgment. To have the
Lower House of the Landtag, for which in any case he had little
respect, criticize his military program and refuse the funds for carrying it out angered and personally offended him.
Prince William did not comprehend what a flood of reform demands he caused by his modest proposals. His conception of the kind
of society in which he lived may be seen from a statement in his program of 1858 about education. The different classes of the population
should be given the "necessary education without raising these classes
[he meant social classes] above their proper sphere." All too obviously,
he still thought of society as it existed in the Old Regime. Although
he had bourgeois acquaintances, the society of industrialism and commerce, of freedom of activity and thought, was unknown to him.
The liberal masses were not aware of the ruler's autocratic beliefs
and during the New Era supposed that he was on their side. From
the little town of Angerburg in East Prussia came an address to that
unregenerate democratic deputy, Waldeck: "The people look with
trust to you as its courageous fighter for right and truth. Hail to our
Royal House! Twice hail to it when men like you are its advisers!
The Royal House stands firmly for eternity; its foundation is the
people." The non-Prus&ian Weser-Zeitung stated in January, 1861,
that there now "sits on the Pruss ian throne a man whom the German
liberals would confidently like to see march at their head." Early in
1861 the Kolnische Zeitung jubilantly remarked about the King's
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proclamation "To My People": "\lVe do not know what we would add
to this masterful address of our King William other than a thousandfold 'yes'! . . . Not only Prussia but all Germany will listen to the
glorious words of King William, whose name recalls the greatness of
princes, the constitution, legal freedom, for they know that a man
wears Prussia's Crown who is as good as his word."3
The liberal enthusiasm about the new ruler was hardly justified.
As early as 1859 Prince William was becoming alarmed over the effects
of his action. The reappearance in politics of persons like Jacoby and
Rodbertus, who had been active in the Revolution of 1848, greatly
disturbed him.4 The liberal ministers were pressing him for more
reforms, and specific ones, for they in turn were being urged to act by
the majority in the Lower House. One of the two reforms in which the
ruler was interested, namely, the military, was intensely disliked by all
liberals as a measure preserving those Prussian social and institutional
forces which the liberals wished to overcome-militarism, caste and
absolutism. The liberal ministers were caught between a ruler
increasingly concerned about losing his own power and a Lower House
of liberals determined to see Prussia reformed and the constitution
become a fact.
By the time of the opening of the Landtag in January, 1860, the
ministers had persuaded the Regent to state somewhat specifically the
reforms he supported. On the question of national unification he
remained vague, but he urged reform of the land tax, and he reported
that the conditions of provincial and local government were being
investigated and that a bill concerning county government would be
introduced into the Landtag. These statements marked an advance
over the vague phrases of 1858. He proposed to introduce a bill to
fix the election districts, a crying need to prevent the repetition of the
scandalous gerrymandering in the Manteuffel era. He promised a
bill to legalize civil marriage and one to improve education. He devoted most attention, however, to urging the approval of the military
reforms. Nor did he offer anything more at the opening of the Landtag
in 1861.5

• Tagesbericht, No. 75, March 30, 1861, quoting Volkszeitung (Berlin), No. 75;
Tagesbericht, No. 17, Jan. 21, 1861; ibid, No.7, Jan. 9, 1861. The Tagesbericht was
a summary of the daily press prepared for the King. A copy was to be found in the
Prussian State Archives in Berlin-Dahlem.
• Von Bernhardi, op. cit., III, 156·57.
• Horst Kohl, Dreissig Jahre preussisch-deutscher Geschichte 1858-1888 in amtlichen Kundgebungen (Giessen, 1888), pp. 12-15, 20-23.
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One may imagine that the liberals would scarcely be satisfied
with such a meager program of reform, especially in view of the
sacrifices they were expected to make for the sake of strengthening the
army. They noted the absence of any reference to reform of the
solidly Conservative Upper House or to the introduction of ministerial
responsibility; they noted the absence of action against reactionary
officials; they were disturbed by the apathy toward national unification
and by the general inability to accomplish anything. Their reaction
to the King's opening address to the Landtag in 1861 was, according to
one observer, glacia1. 6
The aggressive wing of the liberals began in 1860 to take steps
toward organizing a vigorous, active party. The next year the German
Progressive party emerged, and it soon became the most powerful of
all the liberal groups in the state. The election of 1861 reduced
radically the number of right-wing Old Liberals or Constitutionals,
who had been the government's main supporters, and returned in their
stead the Progressives and the like-minded Left-Center party, the one
especially powerful in the East, the other in the West, and both in the
Central provinces. Between a stubborn ruler and an aggressive Lower
House, the liberal ministers found themselves in a more embarrassing
position than ever. They urged the slogan "Do not Press!", which
the Lower House was decidedly disinclined to heed.
By 1862 the cleft between the King and the liberals could scarcely
have been wider. The more acute the conflict became, the more
irascible grew the monarch. Easily roused to anger, he was at times
inclined to weep. Accustomed to obedience as an officer, a Hohenzollern and a king, he was distressed by the outcome of the elections and
needed reassurance of the devotion of his people.
Angry at the Conservatives in the early part of the period, Prince
William had resisted their efforts to intrigue against the liberal ministers. When in 1858 Count Eberhard Stolberg, one of the Conservative
leaders, had tried to interest William in the plan to establish a Conservative newspaper, the Regent had opposed it and spoken in a
decidedly liberal vein. 7 In 1859 he said to the intriguing Stolberg,
"In short, this is my ministry and will remain so as long as I live and
reign."s The Regent disapproved thoroughly of the Conservatives'
resistance to reform of the land tax. Since he needed the extra
money to support his military, he forced the tax bill through the
• Von Bemhardi, op. cit., IV, 135-36.
• Ibid., III, 228.
I Ibid., III, 233-34.

10

/

Prussia 1858-1864

Upper House. Thereafter, no basic controversy divided him from
the Conservatives, and as he became increasingly involved in difficulty
with the liberals, he found the Conservatives, eager to serve him, more
and more to his liking.
Throughout the New Era the Conservatives had never lost influence at court. They practically monopolized the positions there
and were expert at exerting social pressure through personal channels
not subject to public control. By way especially of the royal military
attaches and Minister of War von Roon they aroused fear of revolution
and encouraged the ruler toward absolutism. In 1862 they utilized
the latter's anger at the liberals over the military reform~ to return to
power in the government. Their embarrassment during the New Era
at having to be more royal and more conservative than the King was
past; henceforth they crowded behind their lord and their lord's new
Minister President, Bismarck, in a fight to the finish against liberalism.
In order to understand the other major side in the constitutional
conflict, namely, the liberals, we must analyze the main lines of economic and social change that had occurred in Prussia during the preceding half century. The analysis will reveal why in the elections to
the Landtag the opposition proved to be so strong and the Conservatives so weak.
In May, 1862, a liberal newspaper wrote: "The Prussian people are
no longer that mass of peasants just freed from serfdom or of servile
and powerless town-dwellers that Frederick William III ruled. Just
as Berlin has risen in two decades from a wretched town of the royal
court with 200,000 population to the leading industrial city of Germany
and the second commercial city of North Germany, in the same way
Breslau, Cologne, Magdeburg and other provincial towns have also
grown to be large commercial centers. The anger of the government
can no longer strike the big industrialists and merchants of these cities
as long as they observe the law. Despotism is no longer possible; the
Prussian people have become too intelligent and wealthy for it. The
more the estate-owner has withdrawn from community affairs, the more
independent the peasant has become. We use the word 'peasant,'
which will soon be only a myth, to refer to persons whom it no longer
describes. In many areas the peasant already behaves like a townsman
and feels and thinks like one. He no longer stands in his village, isolated and dependent upon his own physical strength; through common
interests and contacts he has become a conscious part of the nation."9
• Quoted in Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, May 8, 1862.
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Although somewhat exaggerated, particularly in its description of the
peasant, the article correctly estimated the general situation.
Between 1816 and 1858, when Prince William became regent, the
population of Prussia had increased from 10,320,000 to 17,673,000. By
1864 it rose to 19,200,000. The increase had been a steady one, with
the largest gains registered since 1830. All parts of the country had
participated in the growth, the Administrative Districts of Liegnitz,
Erfurt, Munster, Minden and Aachen showing least, percentagewise,
and Koslin, Oppeln and Bromberg enjoying the largest. Some predominantly agricultural Districts had grown in population as much as
those with developing industries. A breakdown of the increase by
decades discloses that up to 1849 for the state as a whole the rural
population had grown faster than the urban; after that date the reverse was true. By the end of 1858 there were in the rural areas 1,672,
and in the towns 1,817 persons for every 1,000 in 1816; in 1840 the
comparable figures had been 1,461 and 1,411, and in 1849, they had
been 1,575 and 1,590. 10
While the towns and cities with a population of about a thousand
or more had scarcely increased in number (some 994 in 1860) since
the close of the Napoleonic wars, they had shared in the general growth.
The greatest gain had occurred in the large cities, which were well
scattered over the state. (See Appendix A.) The areas of coal mining
and iron and steel works attracted people in particularly large numbers, nearly doubling their population between 1819 and 1861.11
Since the increase cannot be accounted for by natural growth, the
towns and cities were manifestly drawing people from the rural districts and from the small towns that as yet lacked the opportunities
being made available by industry and transportation ..
Industrial production, especially since the 1830s, had begun to assume factory proportions and to show a growth in size of plant, capitalization and number of workers. The textile and clothing industry
remained the largest employer in 1861. The iron, steel and machinery
industry ranked a poor second but gave promise of speedily overtaking
textiles. Commerce and construction occupied the third and fourth
places respectively, with very little difference between them. Production had been changing to meet the needs of the increasing population.
Since master tailors could not turn out enough clothes at a low price
10 See the tables in Jahrbuch filr die amtliche Statistik des Preussischen Staates
(Berlin, 1863), pp. 109-10.
11 See Gustav Neumann, Das Deutsche Reich in geographischer, statistischer und
topographischer Beziehung (Berlin, 1874), I, 368.
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to satisfy the demand, the factory assumed the responsibility. The
building industry had to expand to house the people and the new
machines. The master builders were giving way to construction companies. Iron and steel production was adjusting to the opportunities
made available by the construction of railroads, gas works, factories,
and the numerous other creations of modern technology. Steam engines were becoming fairly common. The results of the changes in
production were evident in the statistics on employment. The number
engaged in industry was rising. In 1846 it had been 1,343,821; in 1861
it was 1,786,145. The number of handworkers, male and female, during the same time had declined from 1,470,091 to 1,087,924.12
The expansion of industry and the resulting increase in the turnover of goods afforded the opportunities for a rapid enlargement of
the middle class. Local persons and capital were being mobilized, and
new resources were moving from outside into promising centers. IS By
1860 Prussia had produced a crop of entrepreneurs in each town except
those remaining largely local in character; even in the latter, individuals were to be found who were eager to participate in the economic growth and were angry over the frustration of their ambitions.
The number of persons who, beginning with modest or almost no
means, succeeded in a few decades in accumulating a considerable
amount of wealth or even, for those times, a fortune was comparable
to that in other continental countries. These provided the leaders
in the development of industrial society. The process remained in an
early stage; but by 1860 the outlines of the future social organization
were fairly clear.
The changes in the countryside lacked the sharpness of cultural
outline of those in the towns, but they were nonetheless real and important. After the Battle of Jena the effort to aid in the revival of
Prussia by emancipating the peasants had aroused the ambitions of
the rural people and put land in the category of mobile property
along with factories and other urban objects. By 1860 peasant emancipation had produced marked economic results. An area of 56,683,005
Morgen of land with 1,478,022 owners had been freed of manorial
restrictions. By April I, 1859, mortgages to the amount of 78,568,380

u In 1846 Prussia possessed 1,139 steam engines with 21,715 horsepower; in 1861,
the figures were 6,669 engines with 137,377 horsepower. Jhb. fur die amtliche
Statistik des Preuss. Staates (1863), pp. 460-62.
,. See, for example, the situation in Stettin described in Bremer Handelsblatt,
March 19, 1859, pp. 121-23.
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Thalers had been issued.14 When one considers that in every case
property ownership and in most cases money transactions had been
involved, that in every case legal rights and claims had been at stake,
one must conclude that a large percentage of the peasantry was being
c6mpelled to cultivate the virtues of private ownership and initiative
to keep its property. The peasant was forced to assume some of the
characteristics of the urbanite; he had to deal in money, to calculate.
The responsibilities accruing from emancipation were pushing him
into modern society.
The effects upon the large landowners were more evident than
those upon the peasantry. Even in the preceding century large-scale
agrarians had begun to buy and sell land in order to take advantage
of rising prices. In this way some burghers had been able to purchase noble estates (Rittergiiter) and other extensive properties,
erasing the sharp social and economic separation between town and
country. After the period of the Stein-Hardenberg reforms the process
had continued at a speedy pace. Although the evidence about land
transactions in the Nineteenth Century is inadequate, some trends are
to be discerned. Many persons from the Western provinces, the Rhineland and Westphalia, where land was expensive, had been purchasing
estates in the Eastern provinces, where land was considerably cheaper.
The 1820s and '30s had been hard on owners in the Eastern provinces,
who having bought their land at high prices had suffered greatly from
the severe decline in the price of agricultural products. Except in
Silesia, where many estate-owners had come through the crisis years
primarily by raising sheep and seIling the wool in the world market,
the turnover in estates had been large. Wealthy burghers had bought
land not merely around the larger towns and cities but even in remote areas. Droysen, a contemporary expert, published the following
data on the ownership of noble estates in 1859.111
H As many as 82,855 peasant holdings had been established with 5,497,085 Morgen
of land; 1,180,133 other properties had been freed of servile duties, involving the
abolition of 6,319,352 days of service by animals and 23,444,396 days of personal
service. In compensation the peasants had paid or agreed to pay 34,210,962 Thalers
in capital, 5,347,323 Thalers in money rent, 287,972 Scheffels of rye, 10,633 Scheffels
of wheat, barley and oats, and 1,630,055 Morgen of land. Dr. Georg von Viebahn,
Statistik des zollverein ten und N6rdlichen Deutschlands (Berlin, 1858-68), II, 584-85.
A Scheffel was equal to about I y:! bushels, a Morgen nearly an acre, a Thaler about
3 marks, or 75 cents.
15 Eduard Pfeifer, "Ober die Grundsteuer," Vierteljahrschrift filr Volkswirtschaft
und Kulturgeschichte (1864), IV, 96 note. Johannes Ziekursch, Ein Hundert Jahre
Schlesischer Agrargeschichte (Breslau, 1927), pp. 328, 386. August Meitzen, Der
Boden und die landwirtschaftlichen Verhiiltnisse des Preussischen Staates (Berlin,
1868-71) , I, 502-3; III, 116, 411, 430-32, 596-98. Von Viebahn, op. cit., II, 984-93.
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Prussia
2,313 Noble estates, of which 788 were in burgher possession, or 34%
Posen
1,440
"
957
"
66
Pomerania 1,654
1,046
64
Branden1,116
burg
1,798
62
1,857
Silesia
3,132
59
563
54
Saxony
1,047
"
378
89
Westphalia 425
"
318
Rhineland 466
68
Total 12,275

7,023

Average 57%

A contemporary writer of an informative work on the province of
Prussia stated that in 1859 only fifty-nine estates in the entire province had remained in the possession of the same family for at least
a hundred years, whereas in Brandenburg there were 395 such estates.
He concluded that "a real landed aristocracy" practically no longer
existed in the province of Prussia. 16 All in all, with the exception of a
few areas, the writer's conclusion about the province of Prussia seems
to have applied to the entire state; land had become a commodity of
sale and had in the main lost its prestige as the basis for an aristocratic
caste. Too many of the estate-owners, whether of noble or of burgher
origin, were paying tribute to the ways of capitalism for them to pass
as traditional gentry.
The evidence is augmented by a consideration of the expansion of
industry into the rural areas. In the Eighteenth Century noblemen
had built on their estates distilleries, saw mills, and other kinds of
businesses closely associated with agriculture; but by 1860 both the
variety and the number of these industries had greatly increased. It
was estimated that 64,445 such enterprises were then in operation and
that they employed 229,500 technicians and workers. The list included lime burners, brick kilns, several kinds of mills, factories for
preparing foods, tobacco factories, sugar refineries, breweries, and so
on. By 1861 there were in use for agricultural purposes 242 steam engines with 4,172 horsepower (in 1846 the figures had been 48 and 504
respectively); the saw mills in 1861 used 230 steam engines of 2,913
horsepower (in 1846 the figures had been 25 and 268 respectively) ;
the flour mills in the same year employed 600 steam engines of 8,101
horsepower (in 1846 the figures had been 7I and 927 respectively).
Although flour milling was also being done in the towns, one can perceive that the gentry knew the value of modern machinery and methods. The evidence makes conditions sound dangerously like capitalism,
,. Die Provinz Preussen (Konigsberg, 1863), pp. 430, 434.
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with all the resulting implications of social mobility and the breakdown of the caste-state. When one adds the story of the establishment
in the villages and rural districts of many factories by bona fide businessmen of burgher origin,17 the impression is strengthened that the
ways of the middle class, the curse of vulgar materialism, the pursuit
of Mammon, had overcome the stronghold of Junker moral purity,
and that the difference in standards and objectives between town and
country was far less noticeable in 1860 than in 1815 or even 1840.
Some aristocrats, like the Prince of Pless, went into business on a large
scale at the same time that they tried to remain lords of the Old
Regime. This type eventually became the backbone of the Free
Conservative party and accepted national unification and the economic legislation put through by Bismarck.
Too little is known about the social history of the nobility in the
Nineteenth Century for us to be able to state how many aristocrats remained loyal to the Old Regime, how many took the line of the Prince
of Pless, and how many turned liberal. It is clear that in the half
century or more prior to the constitutional conflict the material and
the social structure of the large landownership had been in a process of
rapid transformation. Not merely the emancipation of the peasantry
and the legalization of the sale of landed estates had brought about
this change; the desire to take advantage of the developing opportunties
to make money had seized upon this class and was imparting to it some
of the characteristics of the bourgeoisie. Material interests were drawing the rural population, aristocratic and peasant, in the direction of
liberalism. Whether the attraction proved to be superior to that of
the Old Regime depended upon one's social ideals and one's knowledge
and understanding of the forces of the age.
The most striking example of the material facilities for change was
offered by the improvement in the means of transportation and communication. During the quarter of a century prior to 1860 Prussia
had built a railroad system of 737.9 Prussian miles, of which 231.3
miles were double-tracked. 18 In 1816 Prussia had had 419.8 Prussian
miles of all-season roads; by 1862 it had 3,756.2 miles. Likewise the
local roads were being improved with state aid. People and goods
were moving on a scale unprecedented in history. The rate of awakening to non·local interests can be seen from the four-fold increase in

.. Meitzen, op. cit., I, 336 If.; ]hb. filr die amtliche Statistik des Preuss. Staates
(1863), pp. 461·62.
'8 A Prussian mile was equal to 7,420.4 meters. Meitzen, op. cit., III, 232, 600.
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the number of letters sent through the mail between 1842 and 1860
and in the ten-fold increase in the number of telegrams sent in the
1850s.19 Speed was becoming valuable.
Higher education exhibited far less change than the economic and
social aspects of Prussian life. The universities, which should have
acted as intellectual leaders, preserved the standard curriculum of
half a century earlier. Except in theoretical and experimental science,
they had made few concessions to the needs of the developing industrial society. In the summer semester of 1820 there had been 2,368
students in the Prussian universities; in the summer semester of 1861
there were 4,466 students.2o In only one area, that of the Humanities
and the Social Sciences, had the percentage increase in enrollment exceeded that of the population. In consequence there were, for example,
fewer doctors per capita in the state than there had been in 1849
(one doctor to 3,076 people in 1861, one to 2,929 in 1849), and in four
Administrative Districts the number in absolute terms had declined.
As for technical schools, Prussia possessed only one which might be
called a school of engineering and it was of modest proportion (385
students in 1864). Most young men had to study that subject in other
states. The presence of a couple of small mining schools and an
agricultural institute could scarcely compensate for the absence of
other facilities. Official Prussia had not yet become aware of the fact
that industrialism was able to raise the general standard of living and
greatly enhance the per-capita need for professional services. 21
In 1860 Prussian society was on the move. The hope and promise
of a new culture were found over most of the state, in town and
country and among all classes. By the time of the constitutional conflict the psychological adjustments of the population varied from that
of the person who still tried to be a grand seigneur of the Old Regime
while participating on a large scale in modern industrial activity to
that of the individual who saw clearly the implications for the total
.9 Ibid., III, 221, 232, 286, 290.
these, 729 had studied Evangelical theology, 153 Catholic theology, 741
law, 398 medicine, 347 humanities and what passed as social science. In the summer
session of 1861 there were 4,466 students, among them 1,040 in Evangelical theology.
596 in Catholic theology, 655 in law. 753 in medicine. 1,422 in humanities and
social sciences. During that time the population had grown from ten million to
eighteen million. Tabellen und Amtliche Nachrichten uber den Preussischen Staat
fur das Jahr 1849, Hrsg. vom Statistischen Bureau zu Berlin (Berlin, 1851), II.
573-74; Preussische Statistik, Hrsg. vom Kgl. Statistischen Bureau in Berlin (1864),
p. 47; von Viebahn, op. cit., III, 1146-49 .
.. On the number of doctors and druggists see Zeitschrift des Kgl. Preussischen
Statistischen Bureaus (Berlin, 1863), pp. 236·39.
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culture of changing from a society of caste and local economy to one
of mobility. The economic and social turn toward liberalism did not
necessarily entail the introduction of political and governmental freedom, but a trend lay definitely in that direction. Could a state introduce freedom into its economy and social organization while preserving absolutism in its government? While the liberals thought not,
the King remained emotionally bound to the Old Regime, even when
he paid lip service to constitutionalism. The Conservatives were determined to preserve the past and hated the constitution and all those
ideals for which it stood. Out of this opposition of cultural values
developed the crisis of the early 1860s, when the institutional organization and distribution of political and social power in Prussia and
Germany were decided for the next two generations.

2 / Caste and Privilege

AmcLE FOUR of the Pru",ian comtitution of 1850
stated: "All Prussians are equal before the law. Caste privileges are invalid. Subject to conditions established by law, all public offices are
equally open to all who are competent." In 1856 the Conservative leader in the Lower House had introduced a resolution for the abolition of
the first two sentences of this article as "wrong" and "reprehensible."
The Conservative Minister of Interior had reassured him as follows:
The government has found and recognized in Article Four
the sense that for equal legal conditions, relations and actions
equality of the law with respect to the estate shall obtain. But
the government has always regarded it as compatible with this
position that . . . the special rights and dutIes of individual
estates, classes and corporations which exist according to special
and particular laws and are an essential part of the organism
of the state-that these special organizations which have the purpose of preserving an estate or a corporation belonging to the
State organism-, are not to be regarded as absolutely abolished
by Article Four but are far more to be considered as continuing
to exist. This interpretation is further to be recognized as correct because the constitution itself sanctions such special legal
rights for individual classes and estates-something which it
could not do if this recognition contradicted Article Four. Such
are the special rights and legal limitations of the military estate,
the speClal rights of judges, the privileges of deputies according
to Article Eighty-four.
The minister concluded that it was not necessary to annul Article
Four.l
1

Ludwig von Roenne, Das Staats·Recht der Preussischen Monarchie (Leipzig,

1864), Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 181-82.
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The contrast between the explicit words of the constitution and
the interpretation given it characterized the Pruss ian state as a whole.
Article Four contained an assertion of a fundamental principle of
social organization formulated in the Revolution of 1848. Upon recovering control of the country the Conservatives, not daring to
eliminate it, had chosen to annul it by interpretation. To infer that
the stipulations of special qualifications, rights and responsibilities of
professional groups like military personnel, judges and representatives
in the Lower House of the Landtag :qleant that privileges of the
nobility, guildsmen and other sharply separated social groups were
also legal transformed Article Four, said the liberals, into an expression of nonsense.
The interpretation of Article Four harmonized with the social
ideals to which the Conservatives adhered. They believed in inequality and wished to preserve the organization of society in estates,
with each person legally as well as socially restricted to the rights and
responsibilities of his caste. Their eyes were directed toward the past,
the estates-state; their objective was simply to preserve as much of that
social system as they could, above all to preserve the basic structure
even if a few concessions in details or in a formal sense, like Article
Four, had to be made. The concept of status predominated in their
thinking, a concept that opposed social movement and change. It
operated in accordance with the ideal of social relationship expressed
in the terms lordship and subjection. The three terms summarized
the bases of the Conservative social philosophy, the hard core of Conservative behavior around which was elaborated any further theoretical
justification.
To the liberals the basic ideal of social philosophy was clearly expressed in Article Four. They interpreted the article as referring to
individual persons, and rejected the Conservative interposition of
castes and estates, of feudal orders, between the individual person
and the state. They believed in freedom of the single person, not
freedom of the estate to which the individual members had to be
subordinated. They wished, as the liberal Karl Twesten wrote in 1861,
"equality before the law and legal security against aristocratic preference and arbitrary power"; they aimed at "the independence and
unobstructed development of all for the benefit of all." "Today the
world is liberal," Tweston declared with more optimism than truth. 2

• Karl Twesten, Was Uns Noch Retten Kann (1861), pp. 24-26.
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The liberals were starting with the New Era in 1858 the third largescale attempt in Nineteenth Century Prussian history to transform the
state of the Hohenzollerns and Junkers into a modern, free society.
During the first attempt, made in the urgent effort to revive the society
to fight against Napoleon, the principle of equality had been accepted
in law and to some extent in fact. The decree of October 9, 1807, had
created the legal possibility for a burgher or a peasant to purchase a
noble estate, for a noble or a peasant to take up a burgher occupation,
and for a burgher to turn to agriculture. The class restrictions upon
occupation were thereby abolished, and in subsequent decades the legal
right became an economic reality.3
With the elimination of the Napoleonic menace the Conservatives
reestablished themselves in authority and restored as much of the Old
Regime as they could. The caste restrictions upon the sale and purchase of property could not be re-introduced, for the noble landowners liked the economic advantages of this freedom. But, as we
shall see, the nobility succeeded in preserving most of their other privileges and were well established in power when the Revolution of
1848 endangered them once more. The threat to the aristocratic position which arose from a revolution from within proved to be even
more serious than that which a half century earlier had come from
without in the form of the French under Napoleon. Again the Conservatives were able to survive and to restore their authority, but only
by the official introduction of a potentially liberal constitution. When
the New Era began, they still controlled Prussia in all the key positions,
for even though the constitution used the language of liberalism it
remained in 1858 the fa~ade of a society dominated h.y caste and
privilege.
Liberals of all shades agreed that the crucial struggle in Prussia was
between Junkerism and the middle class. In April, 1862, the central
election committee of the Constitutional party declared in an election
broadsheet that "the Prussian people wish and can no longer forego
the conclusion of the conflict between burgher and Junkerism."4 The
National Zeitung of June 13, 1861, stated that
... According to the program of the German Progressive Party
and . . . according to our own conviction the main task for
Prussia in our age is the political elevation of the burgher
estate. 1£ the burgher estate is politically to carry any weight
and to exercise influence on the entire action of the government
• Von Roerme, op. cit., (1864), Vol. I, Part 2, p. 179.
• Volkszeitung, April 5, 1862.
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to the degree appropriate to it today, it must be represented in
a chamber filled with its spirit and independent of any other
power. In any case it has to show itself in the Chamber which
according to the constitution is called to represent it not as dependent upon the ministry but as a free and strong political
power.
Critics will say, the writer continued, that the realization of this claim
would give a preferred position to one class, whereas the constitution
belonged to the entire nation. The objection could be met by pointing to the fact that a constitutional state should be one of equality
before the law, a position supported only by the burghers since the
Prussian nobility was hopelessly feudal.
A correspondent from Pomerania to the W ochenschrift des N ationalvereins (November 7, 1862) elaborated upon the shortcomings of the
Junkers. These nobles, he asserted, lacked the wealth, the intelligence
and the record of public service to maintain their present position.
They lacked everything which would justify their retention of power
and significance. "It is doubtful," he continued, "whether this party
is at all capable of reorganization .... Pretentious and boastful it presses
forward as if to protect the throne, when in reality it is driven only
by the narrowest selfishness to find there a refuge for itself." The
writer lived in a Junker stronghold and spoke with the anger of one
who had learned from experience. Another author complained in the
same journal that the equal right of all citizens to occupy state offices
existed only on paper, that army officers, ministers and members of
the foreign service were almost always aristocrats, that they seem to
grow only on family trees. "The real aristocrat, that is, the upper,
independent nobility distinguished by rich land holdings, is," he said,
"least represented among those who reach for the high and influential
positions in the state." This poor court nobility, the Junkers, found
the means for its existence solely at court or in state service and therefore eagerly pressed forward into these positions. This nobility, he
declared, was "the cancer in our public life."5
Neither social origin nor social environment appears to have been
basic in conditioning the individual Prussian's attitude toward privilege. One would rightly expect representatives of the middle class,
especially from the larger towns and from the Western provinces, to
uphold liberalism against the Junkers; but numerous members of the
aristocracy condemned their Conservative colleagues as vehemently

• Wochenschrift des Nationalvereins, Sept. 12, 1862.
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as any urban democrat. Freiherr von Vincke, a member of an old
and distinguished Westphalian family, depicted them as follows:
How can a party claim the name 'Conservative' when in the
first instance it conserves only its private interests, I may even
say, its unconstitutional privileges, when it does not above all
conserve that which is the basis of all private right, the public
law of the land! How can a party call itself an aristocracy
when, unfaithful to the great precedent of the proudest aristocracy of the world, the English, it does n9t place on its shield the
principle of noblesse oblige and press to the front to protect at
all times the constitutional rights of the nation!6
On another occasion the same speaker remarked in the Lower House
that as for the claim of the Conservatives to superior patriotism he had
not heard that the noble lords had been especially active as subscribers to the recent government loan. "I believe much more," he
continued, "that the patriotism of the towns set an example for them
at that time."7
Von Vincke's colleagues, Professors von Sybel and Gneist, agreed
with him completely. "In internal affairs," stated von Sybel in a
speech in 1862, "the great conflict of our time is truly not one between
crown and parliament but one between the excessive privileges of the
nobility and the free right of merit." Gneist asserted that "the lesser
rural nobility, alternating as court official and as aide-de-camp, has remained the reason of state in Prussia as in Strelitz" (a small German
state).8
Religion exercised no more influence upon an individual's view
about the Junkers than social position. The right-wing Catholic political leader, Reichensperger-Geldern, criticized the Prussian nobility
in terms almost identical with those of the Protestant von Vincke.
Like von Vincke, he emphasized the difference between the ideals and
behavior of the English and of the German nobility. In England, he
said, sharp conflicts between the different classes in society had riot appeared as they had in Germany and France and indeed in all con-

• Stenographische Berichte fiber die Adres5·Debatte des Preussischen Abgeord.
netenhauses am 27., 28. und 29. Januar 1863 (Berlin, 1863), pp. 171·72. Henceforth
referred to as Adressdebatte 1863. The debates were published in book form and
within a week 100.000 copies were sold. See Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift (Stuttgart,
1863), No.3. p. 92.
• Preussen Stenographische Berichte des Hauses der Abgeordneten, March 8, 1861;
I, 426. Henceforth this source will be referred to as Abg. H., St. B.
8 Julius Heyderhoff (ed.) , Deutscher Liberalismus im Zeitalter Bismarcks (Bonn
and Leipzig, 1925). I, 88 note, 103.
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tinental states. England had been spared "the bloody traces" of these
conflicts. "Herein lies the punishment for the fact that the French
and the German nobility was not receptive to the same knowledge
and unselfishness which has made the English nobility and England
itself great and glorious and has founded English freedom."9
How well entrenched the ideals and practices of privilege and caste
were in Prussia in 1860 can be seen from an analysis of the extent to
which they dominated the personnel holding the positions of power.
At court, in the central government, in the provincial, county and local
governments, in the army, wherever political power wa$ exercised, the
old Prussia remained largely in control. It held swav over a society
which was rapidly increasing the degree of industrialism and commerce, was expanding the professions, and was developing the economic
and occupational interests expressed in liberalism. The contrast in
the number adhering to the two ways of life, that of caste and privilege
and that of liberalism, was extraordinarily sharp; but the former more
than compensated for its inferior numerical strength by its occupancy
of the strategic positions of authority.
At the top of the structure of power stood the King, William I, filled
with faith in his own divine right as ruler and automatically thinking
of all Prussians as his subjects. The King had no inclinations whatever
toward tyranny. He proposed to be an absolute monarch in the
Hohenzollern sense, that is, a ruler who decided personally all issues
after consulting the subjects chosen by him as his advisers. A subject
who opposed William's authority on a matter of importance to him
felt the impact of his anger, whether that subject was a Conservative
noble and official or a liberal. When the liberal von Saucken-Julienfelde, an old acquaintance, sought to explain the liberal position during the constitutional conflict, the King would not grant him an
audience. When the aristocratic member of the House of Lords, General
von der Groben, refused to vote for the land tax reform, the King
rebuked him personally and cut him off from court.1°
The Conservatives were entitled to claim the King-once the liberal
ministers could be eliminated. It is clear why the deputation sent
to the King in late 1862 aI1-d in 1863 to protest the loyalty of the folk
to the absolute sovereign and its repugnance to liberalism should have
proved to be so effective. The King was deeply moved by these deputations; they represented the Prussian folk as he knew it-peasants, a

• Abg. R., St. B., March 9, 1861; I, 440-41.
Von Bernhardi, op. cit~, IV, 123-24.
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pastor and a country school teacher or two, and a country nobleman to
lead them. The society of the Old Regime was perfectly reflected by
them; this reflection, moving the King to tears, hardened his heart
against the liberals. The Old Regime was the Prussia he could understand, the Prussia for which he had the sympathy of an absolute
monarch.
Among the members of the King's immediate family, his wife, a
member of one of the lesser German ruling houses, was a staunch
liberal. The King had married her after he had been forced to renounce the lady he loved (her noble rank had been too low for a
Hohenzollern), and it is doubtful whether Queen Augusta was able
in fundamental matters to exercise much influence on her husband.
When the Queen urged her views upon him with the zeal of a reformer,
the King referred to her in some admiration and awe as a "hot-head."
That he was able to resist even her temperament is clearly seen in his
relation to Bismarck. She had regarded Bismarck as a bitter enemy
since the days of 1848 when as a vehement Junker he had severely
criticized the ruling King to her for making any concessions to the revolution and had even proposed, she claimed, to dethrone him. The
enmity between the two persisted during the rest of their lives. How
much this hostility counted with William may be judged by the fact
that in 1862 he appointed Bismarck as Minister President and kept
him in power until the end of the reign.
The Crown Prince, William's son, had married a daughter of Queen
Victoria of England and was in many respects a liberal. At the height
of the constitutional conflict his wife made it known to liberal leaders
not only that she read the London Times and the National Zeitung, the
prominent Progressive Party organ in Berlin, but, further, that she
sympathized with them. The Crown Prince was treated kindly and
respectfully by his father and given some minor share in government;
but he lacked the conviction and the courage to defend liberalism
against the authority of the crown, and paternal rebuke drove him into
silent acquiescence.
While the King was acquainted with many prominent members of
the middle class and occasionally associated with them, his regular entourage was drawn from the nobility. Apart from the Queen's and
the Crown Prince's personal aides, the court was the incarnation of
feudalism. It remained about what it had been under Frederick William IV, a group of noble men and women to whom liberals were
repulsive persons unfit for the company of aristocrats. The noble
military adjutants, Count von Alvensleben and Edwin von Manteuffel,
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had more influence upon the King than most of his ministers of the
New Era. This feudal, military personnel was constantly spreading
rumors of revolution on the part of liberals, democrats and communists: they scarcely distinguished among these factions, labeling any
critic of the Old Regime a 'red' and encouraging in the King a mistrust
of liberal advisers. The Minister of War, General von Roon, along
with other officers, was to be found far more frequently in the King's
company than any liberal, whether aristocrat or burgher, and they
fed the royal mind with the same kind of reactionism. "Vulgar
Philistines," von Roon called the liberals. The liberals knew about
the monopoly held by aristocratic Conservatives at court, and the
liberal ministers of the New Era were urged to try to modify the
situation. The obstacles proved to be too great for them to overcome;
the King remained surrounded by persons of the Old Regime. l1
The extent to which the nobility ran the state may be seen from
statistics which a democrat collected and published at Hamburg in
1860. The higher bureaucratic positions were held predominantly
by nobles. In the period from April 1, 1858, to April 1, 1860, that
is, in the first years of the New Era, six presidents of the provincial administration were appointed, of whom four, or 66.7 per cent, were
nobles; ten divisional heads under the presidents were appointed, of
whom four, or 40 per cent, were nobles; of the next lower grade only
16.6 per cent were nobles. The position of Landrat was, as we shall
see, the most significant one in local goverment; 65.5 per cent of the
appointees were nobles. In general, the author estimated, 42.7 per
cent of all the newly appointed administrative officials in these years
came from the nobility. He showed that the percentages had remained
fairly uniform since 1853; that is, the replacement of the Conservative
regime of Manteuffel-Westphalen by the supposedly liberal New Era
had made almost no difference in the social origin of the powerful
administrative personnel.
The same author compiled similar figures for the judicial officials,
where, significantly, he found fewer nobles. The judiciary required
hard preparatory training and a strict adherence to law which were
usually foreign to noble temperaments. The nobility preferred the
influential administrative posts, in which aristocratic qualities of
leadership could dispense with rigorous intellectual preparation. In
1860, out of 4,964 justice officials, only 463, or 9.3 per cent, were nobles.

11 Martin Philippson, Max von Forckenbeck (Leipzig), p. 56; von Bernhardi, op.
cit., passim.
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The percentage of nobles serving as lawyers and notaries was but 5.7.
Of the 667 higher officials in the Ministry of Justice, on the Supreme
Court, the appellate courts, the courts of first instance, and the higher
state attorneys' office, only 114, or 17 per cent, were nobles, while the
lower official positions attracted not quite half of even that low figure.
The town and city courts were filled almost entirely by persons of
burgher origin, and the county judicial system drew no more nobles
than the towns, that is, less than 10 per cent. It is not difficult to
imagine what pattern took shape: the administrative official, the county
Landrat, was an aristocratic conservative who found himself opposed
by a burgher county judge devoted to the ideals of liberalism. 12
The King's ministers were selected almost entirely from the aristocracy. The Minister Presidents from the beginning of his rule to the
appointment of Bismarck mirror by their names alone the King's social
philosophy. The first was a relative, Prince Karl Anton von Hohenzollern, a figurehead who bore the title until early 1862. When the
Prince was able finally to escape the office on grounds of ill health, he
was succeeded by the President of the Upper House, Prince von
Hohenlohe-Ingolfingen. Neither Minister President took his duties
other than lightly; each avoided the work as thoroughly as possible.
Their presence, however, assured the King that a line of continuity
with the past was being kept. While the other ministers did not have
quite such imposing titles, they also came from the nobility. In the
ministry of March, 1862, not a single person of burgher origin was to
be found. The Berliners called the new crop the "little silent excellencies." One of Bismarck's first acts upon becoming Minister
President was to hunt for a burgher to fill at least one ministry, preferably, of course, that of commerce. On similar grounds, Bismarck
chose a Jew as his personal banker.
The fact that most of the ministers from 1858 to early 1862 professed to be liberal does not detract from the predominance of caste
standards in the selection of the chief officials. In 1848 burghers of the
highest ability had been found who were willing to assume the
ministerial positions. They could have been selected in the New Era,
and under a genuinely liberal king would no doubt have served; but
since the King was appalled even at the mild liberalism of some of his
appointments, von Patow and von Bonin, for example, it is clear that
in his view Prussia should continue to be governed by its aristocracy.

12 Freimund
Gutsmuth, Patriotische Untersuchungen bezuglich preussischer
Zustiinde (Hamburg, 1860), pp. 21-29.
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He had no feeling for the kind of life out of which could have come
a liberal burgher minister, able, aggressive and creative.
Although according to the constitution of 1850 both the House of
Lords and the Chamber of Deputies represented the people, the sense
in which they did so reflected two different conceptions of representation, one that of the Old Regime, the other that of modern liberal
society. Article 65 of the constitution fixed the membership of the
House of Lords as follows: (a) the adult royal princes; (b) the heads
of the former imperial families in Prussia and the heads of those
families which by royal order were given the hereditary right for the
first-born in direct line to have a seat and a vote in the Upper House;
(c) such members as the King appointed for life, but their number
might not be greater than one-tenth of those listed under (a) and (b);
(d) ninety members chosen by those who paid the highest direct state
taxes; (e) thirty members chosen by their colleagues from among the
councillors in the larger towns and cities of the state. 1S
With fifty per cent of the members holding hereditary seats or lifeappointments, and ninety others elected by a small group of the highest
taxpayers in the state, the House of Lords could hardly have been
other than what the liberals called it, the essence of Junkerdom, the
seat of reaction,14 In it were caste and privilege incarnate, with ideals
and standards utterly antithetic to those of liberalism. This body was
certain to block reforms in the direction of breaking down the old
Prussia and creating a modern free state. Even when the king had
been persuaded to accept some mild measure of social change, even
when he strongly supported a reform, as in the case of the marriage
law and the land tax, the House of Lords resisted. In only one case
did the king force it to retreat. He needed to reform the land tax in
order, he thought, to pay the increased cost of his beloved military
reorganization, but the landowners in the Upper House did not feel
sufficiently patriotic to make the necessary financial sacrifice. The
King finally had to appoint twenty-nine additional peers to force the
acceptance of this reform measure. He was not willing, however, to
use such coercion for the sake of any other. The liberals saw one reform bill after the other wrecked in the House of Lords. It soon become abundantly clear to the liberals that the preliminary to the
achievement of any program of change was the transformation of the

10 Von Roenne, op. cit. (1881), I. 203-16; Meitzen.
.. Berliner Borsen Zeitung, Dec. 12. 1861.

op. cit.,

I. 541-42 .
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Upper House. 15 They knew that this House did not represent the
country as they did, that it rested mainly upon the feudal principle
of representation without election, representation by the lord of his
subjects, representation by virtue of the lord's superior social position
and knowledge and responsibility for the welfare of his subordinates,
in short, representation of a kind antithetic to that of liberalism.
They learned from experience that such representation meant irresponsibility to anyone or anything other than one's own interests or one's
highly subjective conception of the general interest. When they
pressed the issue upon the King, he absolutely refused to sanction any
changes in the composition and power of the House of Lords. In fact,
he came to regard it as the bulwark of royal authority against the aggressive Chamber of Deputies. His devotion to the old Prussia and
his determination to preserve as much of it as possible were most
clearly evident in his unremitting defence of this stronghold of aristocratic conservatism.
Below the Landtag were to be found as representative bodies the
provincial assembly and the county assembly. Each of them the
nobility dominated completely. Privilege had in these assemblies a
means not merely to obstruct liberal proposals but to utilize the machinery of government for its own purposes. The reason becomes evident from an analysis of the constitution of these bodies.
The assemblies in the eight provinces had been restored in the
1850s to their pre-revolutionary form. Each consisted of three or four
estates, depending on the province, of which normally the first represented the nobility and the owners of aristocratic estates, the second
the towns, and the third the peasants and frequently the large landowners of the burgher class. In case the assembly was composed of
four estates, the nobility was organized into two units, the higher and
the lower.16 These provincial bodies were assemblies of the Old
Regime. The main difference lay in the facts that non-noble owners
of aristocratic estates could be elected to the first estate and that the
number of members of the first estate did not exceed that of the other
two combined. Since the assemblies had been created only in the

15 See as samples the expressions of the Danziger Zeitung, the Neue Stettiner
Zeitung, the Magdeburger Zeitung, the Elberfelder Zeitung in March, 1861, and the
speech by von Sybel in April, 1862. Tagesbericht, Nos. 58, 63, 65, 66, March 9-19,
1861; Heyderholf, op. cit., I, 88.
.. See von Roenne, op. cit. (1864), Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 366-72, 385 If.
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l820s, the Conservative government had thought it wise not to impose the usual numerical preponderance of the nobility.17
Since the introduction of the constitution and the creation of the
Landtag, the provincial assembly had lost much of its former importance. The same cannot be said of the county assembly, the Kreistag. It continued to be the most significant representative institution
of local government and was more expressive of the institutional structure of Prussia than the new Landtag.
Control of county government remained from the Old Regime in
the hands of the local landholding nobility. The Kreistag was dominated by this class, and the Landrat, the executive official in the
county, held the key powers over the rural community and over all the
towns in his county, unless the latter happened to be very large. The
county government brought peasants and townsmen under the authority of the nobility at a level of government close enough to the population to be in daily relations with it but sufficiently removed to be able
to exercise general control. This government established the nobility as
the channel of contact and the agency of authority between the central
government and the masses of the people.
The county government in 1860 expressed an adjustment of the
machinery prior to the Stein-Hardenberg reforms to the changed conditions since those times. To understand it one must first become
acquainted with its functioning in the Eighteenth Century. At that
time it had been composed of owners of noble estates and of representatives of spiritual foundations, universities and towns which owned
noble estates. Even though by royal consent an occasional burgher
had been permitted to purchase a noble or knight's estate, he had
been unable to sit in the Kreis tag. That privilege had been reserved
for noble owners alone. The main functions of the assembly had been
financial. Meeting twice a year, it had allocated the taxes and other
duties which the county had to bear; it had exercised control over the
county finances and participated in the administration of the dike,
mortgage, fire insurance, poor relief and agricultural credit associations.
It had expressed the local views and wishes about county affairs to the
central government. Only the noble knights' estate owners had had
the right to select the executive officer, the Landrat, from among their

17 See the decree establishing the provincial estates for Brandenburg in 1823 in
Dr. Wilhelm Altmann, Ausgewllhlte Urkunden %ur Brandenburgisch-Preussischen
l1er/assungs-u. l1erwaltungsgeschichte (Berlin, 1897); see figures on the membership
of these estates in Meitzen, op. cit., I, 534-36.
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midst; the representatives of the towns and other organizations owning
knights' estates had not been allowed to participate in this election.
The selection had had to be approved by the King, and the new Landrat had devoted most of his time to state administrative affairs, the
administration of taxes, the levying of recruits, control of a part of the
rural police, and other administrative matters pertaining to the central
governmen t. IS
After the Stein-Harden berg reforms the Kreistags were re-established, with a few concessions to the peasants and towns. These two
groups were also permitted now to send deputies to the assembly, but
in such small numbers in the Eastern provinces as to prevent them
from exercising any influence. Although burgher owners of noble
landed properties could sit in the first estate along with the Junkers,
the number of them remained small and they were subject to the
temptation of the parvenu of being more feudal in their behavior
than the genuine aristocrat. In all other respects the functions of the
Kreistag continued to be in 1860 about what they had been prior to
the Stein-Hardenberg reform period. If anything, the power of the
Landrat, who in the Eighteenth Century had been in the process of
being transformed from a county official, primus inter pares, into a
state official, diminished in the Nineteenth Century in favor of greater
responsibility and initiative on the part of the Kreistag. That the
nobility remained in control is evident from the continuing restriction
of the office of Landrat in most counties to the owners of noble landed
property and from the first estate's enormous numerical superiority in
all counties over the estates of the towns and the peasants. 19
The disparity between the size of the first estate and that of the
other two estates may be seen from a few figures. In 1859 some eighty
Schulzes, or village mayors, and other village officials from fifty-three
communities in Schlawe County stated in a petition to the Lower
House that their Kreistag was composed of seventy-six owners of noble
estates, six representatives of the peasants, and six of the towns. Another petition from ten owners of noble estates in County DeutschKrone, all members of the first estate in the Kreistag, brought to the
attention of the Lower House their situation. The county contained
thirty-nine square miles of territory, 50,000 population, five towns,
thirty-three noble estates, six demesne and larger estates held on a

'8 Dr. Paul Schoen, Das Recht der Kommunalverbaende in Preussen (Leipzig,
1897), pp. 363-64.
'9 Von Roenne, op. cit. (1864), Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 403·13.
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hereditary rental basis, ninety-one villages and rural market places,
some 1,355 peasant owners with a yoke of oxen, and 1,031 lesser peasant
owners. The noble estates contained 91,489 Magdeburger Morgen of
land, the peasant possessions, 246,000 Morgen. In the Kreistag the
owners of noble estates held thirty-five seats, the towns five, and the
rural communities only three or "at present perhaps six."20
In Westphalia and the Rhineland the effects of the French Revolution and the temporary incorporation of those areas within France
had prevented from occurring any such extreme disparity in the distribution of power. French law had been introduced and most of the
large estates broken up. The Pruss ian government after 1815 had been
unable to impose the full institutional organization of the Eastern
provinces, since it could not find enough noblemen with noble estates.
Instead of establishing the overwhelming predominance in the Kreistag of the big landowners, it had varied the distribution of power according to the county.21 In some, the first estate predominated, as in
Dusseldorf, where the first estate had thirty-one, the second six, and
the third eight; in others, one of the other two estates had most votes.
The difference marked one of the most significant lines of contrast between the social and economic conditions in the Eastern and Western
provinces: in the West, many towns, active commerce and industry,
few aristocratic estates, in general a burgher culture reinforced by a
vigorous peasantry; in the Eastern provinces, fewer towns, little industry except in special places like Berlin, large landed estates, diverse
conditions of the peasantry, in some regions free, in others dependent
-a predominantly rural culture.
The existing form of county government received severe criticism
from peasants, townsmen and numerous large landholders. From
every side except the Conservative came the complaint of unfair representation and unjust distribution of financial burdens. As the eighty
Schulzes and village elders from Schlawe County said, the enormous
disparity between the number of deputies in the first estate and in the
other two was not justified by the size of the landholding of the first
estate, by the amount of taxes paid, or by their percentage of the population. The peasants, they asserted, paid more county taxes and bore
more county burdens than the other two estates together. The
petitioners claimed that they were entitled to request an increase in
representation on the basis of population figures and amount of taxes

I.

Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1859, Vol. III, No. 108. pp. 5-9.
n Ibid., St. B., 1863; Vol. V. No. 129. p. 1069.
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paid. 22 As this petition showed, the peasants and townsmen objected
especially to the abuse by the first estate of the financial power of the
Kreistag. The members of that estate used their control of assessment
and collection to shift the burden of both state and local taxes upon
the others. Since 1841-45 the county assemblies had had the right to
levy taxes for county purposes such as road construction and reclamation; and while some county assemblies had behaved fairly, many had
approved local taxes for improvements of primary benefit to the large
landowners in the first estate. One of the main complaints in the
Revolution of 1848 had been directed against this abuse.23
Domination over the county assembly assured the large landowners
an additional economic advantage connected with the settlement of
the differences between former lord and serf over the allocation of
property. Growing out of peasant emancipation in the Stein-Hardenberg period, this problem continued to cause trouble in the 1850s. The
peasants were sure that the large landowners as members of the commissions set up in the localities to carry out the work were using their
position in their own interest. 24 The existence of over 5,600 contested
cases in 1860 attested to peasant discontent25
The question of reform resolved itself into one of just representation. The economic complaints would be taken care of, it was thought,
if a just distribution of power in the Kreistag could be attained. The
liberal Minister of Interior, Count von Schwerin, introduced in 1860
into the Lower House a reform bill for the six Eastern provinces, which
after lengthy consideration in commission was approved and sent to
the House of Lords for action. The representative of the Minister of
Interior declared that the nobility in the Eastern provinces had no
legal rights and privileges entitling them to a special position in the
Kreistag. Their position had been the natural expression of the conditions of the time when peasants were serfs and towns had stood outside the county organization. In the Old Regime the nobles' rights
had been balanced by duties. With the emancipation of the serfs and
the creation of a landholding peasantry the conditions had changed,
and the peasantry had come to demand its own adequate representation. As the towns had been incorporated in the county system of

"Ibid., Drucksachen, 1859; Vol. Ill, No. 108, pp. 8-9 .
•albid., 1860; Vol. VI, No. 265, p. 19.
.. See on this question von Roenne, op. cit. (1864), Vol. II. Part 2. pp. 216-19;
Jhb. fur die amtliche Statistik des Preuss. Staates (1863), p. 168 .
•• See statement by government official to the Commission of the Lower House in
1860. Abg. H .• Drucksachen, 1860; Vol. VI. No. 265. p. 40.
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government, the official spokesman declared, they had likewise claimed
their fair share of political authority. The government proposed to
make the number of deputies in the first estate equal to the sum of
those in the other two estates, to abolish the hereditary vote as contrary to Article Four of the constitution, and to enlarge the numerical
basis of the first estate by having it represent not merely the owners
of noble estates but those possessing land property producing an income of 2,000 Reichsthalers a year.
In advocating the retention of the existing system of three separate
estates, the government expressed the views of almost every liberal.
The liberal commission of the Lower House reported in 1860 that
with the expansion of education and with the introduction of the freedom of land-sale and occupation since 1807, the old law on county
government had lost its social and economic basis. The commission
condemned the law as an assertion of caste principle and declared that
with the elimination of this principle from the central representative
assembly the system of county government should also be freed from
this feudal vestige. 26 Nonetheless, scarcely anyone thought of merging
the three estates in the Kreistag into one. The disparity between town
and country and between large landholdings and small ones remained
so great, it was argued in the commission, that such a radical change
of the present organization would be contrary to fact and create confusion. Almost as unanimous was the view that the large landowners
should serve as the leaders of the peasantry and that the reform was
necessary to strengthen the political position of the large landlords to
enable them better to act as rural leaders.
The peasants, Minister Schwerin declared with the general assent of
the liberal deputies, had not yet reached the degree of independence
that would protect them against "the desire for unmotivated innovations on the one hand and from centralized, bureaucratic guardianship
on the other. The peasant needs the strong leadership of the large
landholders as the natural sources of strength of agricultural interests."
The minister proposed to make certain that the landlords retained the
role of leaders of the peasantry by giving them the additional right to
be chosen as deputies in the third estate and especially by making the
first estate as large as the other two combined. He thought that the
landlords had a well-founded right to such treatment by virtue of
their political, social and economic position. As for the small number
of representatives of the towns, the second estate, he declared that "the
a·Ibid., pp. 6-8.
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urban interests to be represented in the Kreistag are more uniform
than those of the rural areas and therefore permit a numerically
smaller representation."
According to Schwerin, almost 2,000 large landholdings of size and
value equal to a noble estate but lacking its legal status, should be
given the same right of belonging to the first estate. At the same time,
he continued, it would be unjust to the owners of noble estates which
did not produce an income of 2,000 Reichsthalers a year to deprive
them of that historic right. He rejected as too mechanical the standards
of size of landholding, amount of taxes paid, or the number of population as the basis of representation. The present inequality in taxation
made it impossible to use the amount of taxes paid as a basis; to use
the extent of land owned, the minister said, would be unfair to the
towns and cities where value depended on commerce and industry
rather than on the size of the area held; and to use population as the
basis would benefit the urban centers at the expense of the rural.
rural.
The only major objection from the liberal deputies to the government proposal on representation concerned the relative size of the first
estate. They thought that the government was merely retaining the
old feudal predominance under a new guise. The government denied
the charge, stressing the reduction in relative size of the representation
in most cases and the abolition of the hereditary vote attached to a
knight's estate. It stressed the necessity for the wisdom and independence of the large landowners to be present in the Kreistag and
pointed out that the peasants would come to accept this fact and because of their common interests would elect the large estate-owners as
deputies.
It is feared that in the first years after the promulgation of
the law the rural communities will be little inclined to seek their
representatives among the owners of large estates, for unfortunately the view is still widespread among the peasants that their
interests are specifically different from those of the landlords,
an opinion in which they have been strengthened by the experience with redemption and separation [he referred to the division of land after peasant emancipation] in the recent decades
and through the preservation of the strict division of estates in
the county government. It is therefore not to be expected that in
free election of county representatives the landlords in all counties will be assured of sufficient respect to assure their election
by the rural communities.
The government feared that if its proposal were weakened the ranks
of the large landowners would in many counties be extraordinarily

Caste and Privilege /

35

thinned in the Kreistag and that in some counties, for example Erfurt,
the landlords would not be represented at all. To allow the small
landowners to obtain a predominance in the Kreistag, declared the
liberal government spokesman, would endanger the interests of the
county.27
The liberal commission of the Lower House did not share the
opinion of the government that the peasantry in the Eastern provinces
needed the leadership of the large landowners. But, it continued in its
report, "it did not fail to recognize how important and desirable it
was that the peasantry, limited in education and judgment and often
thinking only of its nearest interests, should not be personally repre·
sented in the Kreistag in too large numbers." The commission wished
that the peasant's interests would be looked after together with those
of the entire county by "the intelligent, common-sensed landlords."
It hoped that the rural communities would elect such men as Kreistag
deputies and that thereby
... not only would the relations between the estate owners and
the rural communities improve, but the way would be opened to
create a county representation which would be really unified in
the effort to work for the welfare of the county and which would
ignore the petty interests of the different election associations,
render these associations superfluous and enable a better system,
a general election without differentiation between town and
country, between landed estates and rural communities, to be
introduced. 28
The Commission rejected the government's proposal to allow fifty
per cent of the votes in the Kreistag to the first estate. It recommended a somewhat complicated arrangement in the following terms:
The entire number of Kreistag deputies shall be divided into
three election associations according to the following principles:
(1) The number of urban deputies is to be determined according to the ratio of urban to rural population as established
at the last general census.
(2) The number of Kreistag deputies left after deducting the
number for the towns is to be divided between the association
of the large landed estates and the association of the rural communities according to the amount of land belonging to each of
these associations.
After the promulgation of the land-tax equalization law the
number of representatives of large and of small land holdings
will be determined by the amount of land tax each pays.
" Ibid., pp. 40. 52 .
•• Ibid., p. 52.

36 /

Prussia 1858-1864

The number of deputies of the towns will be allocated to the
various towns according to the size of the population.
This system would in most areas definitely have been to the advantage of the towns. Only in the rural counties, particularly in the
Eastern provinces, would the rural districts have benefited, especially
the large landholders who, though few in number, would have had
the same representation as the peasants. Even in this case the proposal
called for a sliding scale: the size of the representation in a county
would vary with the size of the large landholdings. It certainly would
have increased the political power of the towns and of the small landowners at the expense of the landed nobility far more than the government planned to do.
Count Schwerin was manifestly endeavoring to preserve as much
of the landowning nobility's power as he could and still introduce a
bill that would be considered liberal. His assertion that urban interests were much more uniform than rural ones and therefore did
not require such extensive representation had the genuine ring of the
pre-industrial regime, of a landed magnate to whom live things like
grain and livestock and peasants offered much more diversity of in-.
terest and required much more attention than inanimate objects like
iron and steel and machinery, factories and commerce. His bill was
intended for a rural and small-town society.in which the large landowners predominated. It called for the elimination of the aristocratic
monopoly by the inclusion of non-noble large owners in the first estate
and in control of the county; otherwise it proposed in the name of
realism to keep the distribution of political and social power nearly
as it was.
The liberals would have given much more authority to the townsmen than would the government; but by and large the two agreed in
fundamentals. Many liberals were large landowners, and in portraying the ideal type of local leader and the ideal relations between him
and the peasantry they were using themselves as models. They were
actually trying to realize that ideal-to transform the peasantry into
good citizens with more than local and personal interests. They aimed
at preparing the peasantry for political equality and political leadership by abolishing the vestiges of feudal privilege in the Kreistag.
They were consistent in their ideals, even though they remained cautiously within the existing institutional framework. To judge from
the political behavior of numerous peasants in 1848 and in the period
just beginning, the liberals were much too cautious in their estimate
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of the peasants' ability. Nonetheless, prepared to advance farther
than the ministry, they were pressing for additional concessions.29
Not merely in the distribution of representation in the Kreistag
but also in the selection of the Landrat did the liberals improve upon
the plans of the ministry. The latter advocated the preservation of
the existing method, whereby in most counties the Kreistag nominated
three candidates from the owners of noble landed properties, one of
whom the king usually, although not necessarily, chose to fill the office.
The liberals regarded this article in the government bill as a retention
of feudal privilege, and refused to accept it. Instead, they recommended that the stipulation about the candidate's being an owner of a noble
estate be eliminated. They were applying generally the practice existing in a number of counties, pointing to that precedent in support
of their proposal; otherwise, they were willing to retain the present
system. The amendment meant the elimination of another means of
control.
The Conservatives regarded the reform of county government as a
profound threat to the social order. Employing their usual argument
against it, they approved reform in general and in time but held this
particular reform unnecessary; the present system was working well;
there were no major complaints against it; individual complaints about
such matters as road construction did not justify a complete transformation of the system such as the government proposed. In the
Kreistag everyone was content, they maintained; there were no differences among the estates. The existing county estates had done much
for the land,
especially by virtue of the hereditary right of representation of
the knights' estates, whose bearers have particularly looked after
the poorer and more needy inhabitants of the county. The
abolition of this hereditary right is an attack on well-earned
rights, which could be justified only by most urgent reasons, and
these do not exist. The important and beneficial influence of
the large estate-owners, which must be preserved for the sake of
the welfare of the state, depends to a large extent upon the
fact that they are hereditary representatives of the county corporation. Through the introduction of elected representatives in
•• On the distribution of representation in the three estates in the Kreistag in
the Eastern provinces, see the figures according to the existing situation, the government proposal, and the proposal of the commission of the Lower House in 1860.
Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1860; Vol. VI, No. 265, App. A. See the figures for the two
Western provinces according to the existing situation and the proposal of the government in 1863. Abg. H., St. B., 1863, Vol. V, No. 129, pp. 1117 If. See also Meitzen,
01'. cit., IV, 477 If.
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place of the hereditary ones this influence would be substantially
endangered. Also it is to be feared that these innovations will
disturb the harmony in the Kreistag among the estates, and such
a disturbance will in difficult times be bitterly rued. There is
no definite principle in the new proposed county law, even
though the latter is better than expected. Also there should be
n?t one county law fo~ al.l six 'provinces, but one for each proVInce, so that the provInCIal dIfferences could be taken into account.30
These stock arguments, resting upon illusions supported by traditional power, bore some similarity to the views of the King. In his
program of 1858 the ruler had declared that he favored the reform of
local government; but "first," he had added in his wooden style, "we
must preserve what has just been re-established in order not to arouse
new uncertainty and unrest which would only be a grave matter."
When Minister von Schwerin insisted on introducing a bill for the
reform of county government, the King manifestly exerted his influence
in favor of retaining the power of the large landholders, especially the
nobles. How well the Conservatives gauged the King's attitude may
be seen in the fact that the House of Lords rejected the bill out of
hand. The King took no steps to push it through. A similar bill was
submitted to the Lower House in 1862, and again a commission
brought in a favorable report, with about the same modifications as
its predecessor of 1860. In only one respect did the liberals amend
the bill, and this change would no doubt have been acceptable to the
Lower House of 1860. The amount of direct state taxes paid by each
of the three estates should determine the number of deputies. The
proposal was at least an improvement over the existing system and that
offered in 1860; for it made financial support of the state the basis of
representation and had the advantage of relative simplicity. The bill
never received consideration in the Landtag, for the constitutional
conflict monopolized attention. When Bismarck was made Minister
President he buried the reform by referring it to the provincial Landtags for consideration. The possibility of renovating local government at some future time depended upon the outcome of the battle
against militarism and absolutism.
The government of the rural communities in the six Eastern
provinces remained in 1860 in the hands of the owners of large estates.
These owners might be towns, in which case the magistrate of the town
exercised the functions of lord; but in the overwhelming number of

•• Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1860; Vol. VI, No. 265, pp. 3-4.
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commumtIes the authority rested with the proprietor of the local
estate. After hearing recommendations from the village community,
the proprietor selected the village Schulze, or mayor, and his aides,
except in cases where the position of Schulze devolved upon the owner
of a certain piece of property; he supervised the village financial business; he had general authority over the important decisions of the
community; and he exercised the police power and in some respects
the judicial power. His authority referred both to communities
located on his own property and to those in the district of his estate.
The responsibility came to him not as an official specifically appointed
to this position but as owner of the estate: he had to assume it whether
he wished to or not.
Upon this system of government rested the domination over the
peasantry by the noble and other landlords in the Eastern provinces.
One may judge from its inclusiveness that is was effective. How far
the rights of the landlords had been extended in the two decades prior
to the Revolution of 1848 may be seen from the legislation about the
patrimonial judicial power. In 1827 the clause in the general legal
code for the state asserting that to exercise judicial authority a person
must meet the judicial qualifications was declared inapplicable to
landowners with patrimonial judicial responsibility. Bya law of 1838
the latter were allowed, again as an exception to the general legal
code, to judge certain cases in which they themselves were parties. By
virtue of regulations of that same year and of 1846 they were permitted
to appoint deputies to exercise their judicial and their police functions.st
Although the Revolution of 1848 abolished the rights of patrimonial police and judicial power and proposed to reform local government, the reforms either could not be carried out in the short period
of liberal and democratic control or were in the main abolished as
soon as the Conservative government was restored. A law of 1856
re-established the prerevolutionary situation with a new far;ade. It
stated that the patrimonial police power was "a right derived from
the sovereign power of the King but as a rule united with the possession
of a knight's or other landed estate." The government denied that
this measure violated the existing law according to which all such
rights belonged to the King. It asserted that the right still remained
with the King but that it had been delegated by him to the estateowners under the general supervision of the state. The Conservative

11

Von Roenne,

op. cit.

(1864), Vol. I, Part A, pp. 284·88.
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Commission of the Lower House appointed to consider the government
bill at the time approved this line of argument, but gave it a twist in
the feudal sense and toned down the emphasis on the authority of
the soverign. It asserted
that in the Eastern provinces the lord's power as a rule has been
tied to the possession of a knight's or other landed estate, that it
should remain so and that except in those cases foreseen in the
law. it could be acquired by inheritance or purchase. This patrimonial power of th~ estate-owner is not the result of an official
position in the narrower sense which is conferred by the king,
but rather the office of police administration as a rule is bound
to the possession of an estate and in the first line is derived from
the patrimonial position. On the other hand the right is not
purely private, but is a minor right transferred from the state.
The Conservative government had difficulty applying its own law.
It struggled to preserve the patrimonial power of the landed nobility
and the burgher large landowners; but what should it do in case the
estate to which the patrimonial power was attached was broken up and
sold, or acquired by peasants; or what if the lord did not wish the
responsibility or fulfilled it poorly? In such cases the government
stipulated in the law of 1856 that the patrimonial authority should
be transferred to another landed estate, or preferably, that a large
landowner should be selected to conduct the business as a state official;
or that if no one would accept this as an honorary unpaid position
the government might temporarily appoint an administrator with
remuneration. If the person with patrimonial power could not personally carry out his functions, he had to appoint a deputy; and the
law took care of cases in which an estate district or community district
(Gutsbezirk or Gemeindebezirk) was changed in scope and size or in
which a landed property should be given or deprived of the patrimonial power. The law made a valiant attempt to preserve the system in spite of changing conditions. 32
When the New Era began in 1858, the liberals in the ministry and
in the Lower House set to work to reform the local rural government.
They did not succeed in accomplishing their purpose, for the quarrel
over the military reorganization and then the constitutional conflict
destroyed any prospect of a change. The Minister of Interior, Count
von Schwerin, early in 1862 did, however, introduce in the Lower
House a bill which was considered in commission and afforded the
occasion for liberal criticism of the present system.
·'Ibid., pp. 298-307.
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Fundamental was the question of the responsibility for police power
in the rural communities. The law of 1856 had restored this power
to the local landlords as it had existed before 1848. The government
of the New Era criticized the law in the sharpest terms, asserting that
it was bad
... because it maintains an unfortunate crippling split in the
state between the local institutions and the constitution of the
central organization. The patrimonial police power is contrary
to the spirit of the constitution. Resting on no delegation of
authority, dependent upon no qualifications, bound by no oath,
resulting purely from the possession of certain estates acquired
in no matter what way, the patrimonial power over other property and persons is not in agreement with the recognition that
the executive power belongs to the King alone. It is not in
agreement with the abolition of all caste privileges, with the
equal right of all citizens to participate in the legislative authority, and so on. After the legislation of the past half century has
severed all other political and economic connections between
the former patrimonial estate and its subjects, after the estates
have been freed for sale and for division, and finally after the
new judicial constitution of 1849 has abolished the remains of
the patrimonial judicial power, the source of the patrimonial
police power, the retention of the latter has become an anomaly.
In general one must say that the overwhelming majority of
the landlords do not bother about their patrimonial position
and do not satisfy even the most modest requirements of a local
police administration. These requirements will increase with
the growth of the population and the spread of culture. Indeed,
the government has had to transfer a number of police responsibilities of a local character to the nearest state official, the
Landrat. Since the latter is already overburdened, the transfer
means the slowing down of work.
The government declared that if a reform was not put through legally
it would have to extend its authority into these areas by decree, even
at the risk of arousing bitter criticism about bureaucratic arbitrariness. It wished to abolish the patrimonial police power and expand
the area of responsibility of the rural communities. In this way alone
it believed that the present red tape, indolence and indifference in the
rural settlements could be overcome, a view which was fully shared
by the liberal commission of the Lower House reporting on this matter. S3

.. See Abg. H., St. B., 1862; Vol. II, No.3, pp. 8·11; No. 61, pp. 354-56; No. 62,
pp. 355-60. Also, No.4, pp. 10-18, for a discussion of the need to abolish the institution of hereditary Schulze_
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The government refused to introduce a bill creating a uniform
system of local rural government throughout the state. Count von
Schwerin explained that the actual conditions of local government
were at present too varied. 34 He was referring to the basic difference
between the situation in the six Eastern and the two Western provinces, a difference described in the Lower House in 1861 by the Westphalian liberal aristocrat, FreiheIT von Vincke. In the Rhineland
and Westphalia, the latter said, the land in noble estates amounted
to only five or six per cent; in some Eastern provinces to sixty per cent.
In the West a majority of the communities contained no noble estates
at all; in the East this was rarely the case.
We have never had a relation of the landlord to the corporation
as such from which comes, for example, the right of the landowner to name the Schulze, to supervise the finances of the community, to pass on certain measures. We know only a private
relation of the landlord to the individuals. Only in rare instances have we had patrimonial judicial power such as is here
almost universally the case. It seems almost impossible to introduce here what is entirely acceptable in Westphalia and the
Rhineland-to unite the landlord with the rural community
which . . . in many places, in Pomerania for example, is composed solely of persons, of day laborers, dependent upon the
landlord. These dependent persons would be in a position to
outvote the lord and to regulate all community affaIrs.
Freiherr von Vincke was entirely correct about the Western provinces. The administration of the rural communities in the West, including police and judicial power, lay in the hands of officials selected
by the local residents and confirmed, not by a local aristocrat or large
landowner, but by the state officials of higher instance. The Conservative government had tried to create a special position for the
nobles and estate-owners, but the number of cases in which it had
been possible was small. The government had been more successful in
the next larger district, the Samtgemeinde or the Amt of Westphalia or
Biirgermeisterei of the Rhineland, approximately the same institutions.
The difference between the organization in the East and in the
West requires some elaboration. The Samtgemeinde or Amt was
lacking in the Eastern provinces. There were two levels of rural
local government below the county, the community which was composed either of one village if sufficiently large or of several villages and

"'Ibid., No. 15, pp. 102-3.
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hamlets, and the estate district, Gutsbezirk, which included the large
estate and the communities. The owner of the estate exercised governance over the rural communities and in most matters was placed between it and the county government. In the two Western provinces
the organization of the Amt was more complicated and more efficient.
The Amt occupied a position comparable to that of the Gutsbezirk,
but its composition was entirely different. While a single large rural
community might constitute an Amt, it was normal for several communities of peasants and one or more noble estates to be members. In
case the estate-owners were entitled to personal membership in the
county assembly, they were also entitled to participate in person in the
Amt assembly; and the office of Amtmann, or head of the district, was
usually conferred upon a large landholder, if one were available and
willing to accept it. In many instances the office was held by a paid
official. Thus, whereas the lord ran the Gutsbezirk in the East and
occupied a superior, authoritarian positIOn above the peasants, in the
Western Amt or Biirgermeisterei the large landowners and the peasants
cooperated in a common assembly in which the peasant representatives
outnumbered the others. The Amt assembly elected its own chairman,
and by virtue of the institution of common participation it was able
to carry out tasks for the good of the district, like road building, the
improvement of schools and of facilities for the poor, which the
Gutsbezirk could not perform. It enabled a sense of politics and a
capacity for leadership to develop among the peasants; it stimulated
initiative; it reduced class hostility and encouraged the maintenance
of mutual respect among the social groups. It created a liberal atmosphere instead of the authoritarian one to be found in most of the
East. It gave to liberalism an institutional basis which made it no
longer dependent upon the political attitude of liberal large estateowners. It was one of the basic factors in the great difference between
the society in most of Eastern Prussia and that of Western Prussia.35
It was not a democratic body; its members did not think or act in
terms of social or political equality. But it was a free cooperative assembly of self-respecting and mutually respecting personalities. It
created a vastly different situation from that of a lord's calling together
at will an array of dependent peasants.
The Conservatives must have recognized that they were most vulnerable to criticism and aroused most hostility among the peasants
•• See von Vincke's speech in Abg. H., St. B., 1861; III, 1338-40. On the Landgemeindeordnung see von Roenne, op. cit. (1864), Vol. I, Part A, pp. 284-88; Vol. II,
Part I, pp. 236-37, 458-60; von Roenne, op. cit_ (I88l), I, 572 If.
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by retaining the patrimonial police power and control over the selection of the village Schulze and aids. To obviate this criticism their
representatives proposed a bill in the Landtag in 1862 which was a
model of Conservative thinking. The bill called for a transfer of the
existing power to the state which would in turn delegate the responsibility back to the large landowners as state agents. The details of
this proposal are worth studying as a revelation of the Conservative
conception of reform.
According to the bill the patrimonial power was to be abolished
and the exercise of these functions transferred to the government.
With respect to the police administration, each county excluding the
towns should be divided into police districts. "As a rule each community will constitute a police district; nonetheless, if the situation or
other conditions make it seem appropriate, several communities (villages, independent Gutsbezirke) might be united into a police district."
In each police district the police would be administered as an honorary
office. The police administrator would be chosen by the Kreistag from
among the owners, renters or administrators of large estates in the
district, and only in case these were lacking would other residents
be considered. The appointment would be for life. The Landrat
should supervise the entire police administration in the county and
decide complaints against the police administrators. The police administrator could punish offenders by a fine of not over five Thalers
or by imprisonment of three days. The Schulze should act as his
agent in the village.
In communities which include a peasant village and one or
several independent Gutsbezirke, the Schulze functions for the
entire community; nonetheless it remains permissible for the
owners of independent Gutsbezirke to assume the functions of
the Schulze for their Gutsbezirke.
In communities which consist only of an independent Gutsbezirk, the owner of the same is to appoint a Schulze who has
equal rights and duties with the other Schulzes.
If a community contains several independent Gutsbezirke,.
the right of appointing the Schulze rotates among the different
landlords.
So much for the patrimonial police and judicial power. In Article
25 was stated the proposed change in the relation of the lord to the
government of the rural community.
The authority over communal administration which formed
a part of the patrimonial power shall henceforth be exercised
by a county committee.
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The community heads (Schulze, judge, and so forth) , magistrates (court personnel, jurymen), and the representatives of
not-qualified hereditary Schulzes shall be elected by the community from the number of resident landowners and after a
previous expression of opinion by the police-administrator he
shall be confirmed and sworn in by the Landrat.
1£ the confirmation is refused and a second election is also
not approved, the Landrat shall appoint an administrator of the
position until the community selects a person who will be approved.
. . . Until a new law on county government is promulgated,
the functions imposed above on the county committee shall be
transferred to the Landrat.36
This piece of sleight-of-hand work would have preserved the status
quo. The Gutsbezirk would have been preserved, with the owner
now exercising his patrimonial police and judicial authority in the
name of the state. The police districts would have been fitted to the
existing administrative divisions so that each lord would have continued in his previous function. The selection of the officials for the
peasant communities would have been made by the Landrat, a large
landowner and usually a noble, after consultation with the police administrator, the owner of the large estate and former head of the
Gutsbezirk. In view of the number of peasant communities in which
peasants were to be selected as local officials, one can well imagine that
the advice of the administrative head of the Gutsbezirk would be followed.
The success of the whole plan from the standpoint of the Conservatives depended upon the preservation of the existing form of county
government. 1£ the nobles and big landowners had lost control of
the Kreistag and of the office of Landrat, their proposed reform of
community government and the patrimonial authority would have
been too risky for them. There is no reason to believe that the Conservatives would have accepted any major change in the structure of the
Kreistag. They knew too well how important that body was for the
preservation of their political and social power.
Did the liberals make a mistake in their strategy? Should they
have compromised on the military in return for concessions in the
matter of local government? The question is debatable. 1£ they
could have won an adequate reform of government in county, town
and rural community and achieved the abolition of the manorial
police and judicial authority in return for acceptance of the military
•• Abg. R., St. B., 1862; Vol. II, No. 33, pp. 192-95.
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reforms, they would have destroyed the institutional basis of Conservatism and Junkerdom in society.37 They might then in time have
been able to shape the army to the liberal ideal as well, in so far lUi
an army can be adapted to liberalism. The great question remains
whether they could have achieved this compromise, and the evidence
all points to a negative answer. The House of Lords flatly opposed
any such measures; the King, being at most lukewarm, would have
done nothing to break this opposition; and the liberals would have
been left with the burden of a huge military expansion and nothing
to show in the way of governmental reforms. 3s

87 On January 8, 1862, the Berliner Allgemeine Zeitung stated that the refonn of
the county government was an absolute necessity for the development of the consti·
tution, for the harmonizing of the social conflicts, for the reconciliation between nobility and burghers. When the county governmental refonn was really executed, the
present angry party battles would cease. Summarized in Tagesbericht, No.6, Jan. 8,
1862.
a. On county government reform see Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1859; Vol. III, No.
108. Ibid., 1860; Vol. III, No. 149; Vol. VI, No. 265. Abg. H. St. B., 1863; Vol. V,
No. 129.

3 / The Police State

A

PRU""N rorre'pondent wrow to the W;esbadenn
Zeitung at the close of the year 1861 as follows: "Whoever lives in
Prussia feels at every step that the military and police state encloses
him in its net, that he as a burgher has fewer rights than the haughty
nobility, that a powerful and truly officious bureaucracy may defy
unpunished every right of a burgher. In this state the constitution
has been planted like foreign rice."!
The term "police state" was used at the time to refer to the allinclusive authority of a centralized bureaucracy. The police were
responsible not merely for security against criminal acts but for the
operation of the vast network of controls over civilian life which
had survived from the period of mercantilism and absolutism. In
practice the two kinds of function coalesced. The spirit of the police
officials in charge of civilian affairs tended to be identical with that of
the security police, namely, to regard any violator as a wilful criminal.
Of the two, the officials responsible for the control of civilian activities
exercised far more influence upon Prussian life. Together with the
military they were the main instruments for the preservation of the
authoritarian state and the habits of mind among the civilian population of civic docility and a passionate regard for detail.
Writing in 1873, the liberal lawyer and politician Eduard Lasker
portrayed the process by which after the Reform Era the power of the
judiciary in Prussia had been ever more restricted and administrative

1

Togesbericht, No.3, Jan. 4, 1862.
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decisions increasingly favored. 2 The process, he said, culminated in
the law of May 11, 1842, the main point of which was that complaints
about police measures of any sort, even about whether they were legal,
necessary or appropriate, had to be made solely to the superior administrative officials. Only in case the plaintiff could show that a
police order had violated a privilege or a contractual right could the
case be brought before a judge. Reference to the general law, to personal rights, to property rights was not enough to carry the issue before a court. This, Lasker declared, supplied the legal basis of the
police state. The administrative official ruled supreme.
In a wider sense, Lasker stated, the police had under their authority
all public relations and the larger and more important aspects of
personal rights. If a person wished to move to another town he had
to obtain the approval of the police in the proposed seat of domicile.
Once he had moved, he required police permission for entering any
one of a large number of occupations. The police power determined
whether and how he might use his piece of land; it had to pass on
plans to improve his dwelling; it decided whether he might build a
factory and, if so, where and according to what plan; it passed on the
installation of machinery. It could lay paths and roads, dig ditches
and canals across his fields. It penetrated his home, checked on the
upbringing of his children, their school attendance, their religious
instruction. It watched over his activities in private associations.
It determined the amount of school and church tax he had to pay. It
entered his house as tax official or as security officer and searched the
premises.
All these powers of the local police and the Landrat could be exercised without any adequate means of protection for the citizen, whose
sole defence was to write a complaint, which could be sent, however,
even as far as a minister. The procedure was bureaucratic; the official
against whom the complaint was made would be ordered to report;
and, except in a few recent cases, Lasker said, the plaintiff would not
be again consulted. Everything had to be included in the original
statement, even though the plaintiff might not have known the grounds
for the objectionable action and the officials were not required to inform him. With few exceptions the hearing of witnesses and experts
was not required, no one was put under oath, and public hearings
were excluded. The deputies in the parliament could bring the mat-

• The discussion of this topic is based entirely upon Lasker's brilliant analysis
in his book, Zur Verfassungsgeschichte Preussens (Leipzig, 1874), Ch. IV, pp. 179·213.

The Police State

/

49

ter to the attention of a minister, but whether he took any action depended on him alone and on the aggressiveness of the deputies-certainly a cumbersome way of bringing complaint against a minor
official.
If a citizen had suffered property damage through the action of an
official, the plaintiff could bring the case before a judge only if the
official's superior called the action "contrary to law" or "improper."
Even after the case had gone to court, the central or the provincial
administrative agency could intervene and force the transfer of the
case to an agency known as the Court for Deciding Conflicts of Competence. In case the appropriate minister approved the transfer, this
court, dominated by administrative officials, could determine whether
the case should be brought before a judge. If it decided in the negative, the plaintiff had no other course of legal action.
This procedure, wrote Lasker, held for civil cases, but with slight
variation it was equally valid for criminal action. The judge could
immediately initiate a criminal investigation, but no action could be
brought against the official without the approval of the state's attorney,
another official. Once the state's attorney did initiate proceedings,
the Court for Deciding Conflicts of Competence could intervene as in
the case of civil actions. Thus an administrative body decided whether
an official could be tried in a regular court for some act which had
injured a citizen. The letter of the constitution may have been adhered to, concluded Lasker, but not the spirit. The officials were
allowed, as before 1848, to interpret the law as they and their administrative colleagues pleased.
Lasker showed that since the 1820s the important laws and even
the constitution revealed the effects of this arbitrary practice. The
laws guaranteeing the civil rights of the citizens, he wrote, lacked that
which would have made them inviolable. They were vague, incomplete, capable of contrary interpretations, full of reservations; they referred to subsequent supplements which would be contradictory to
the original terms. One could hardly tell what was the rule and what
were exceptions, for anything might be interpreted as an exception.
"In practice," Lasker concluded, "every opinion finds a basis, every
interpretation its proof, and irreconcilable opponents simultaneously
refer sometimes to the spirit, sometimes to the letter of the law to support contrary opinions. The system of incomplete laws has established
itself in Prussia."
With a view to changing this system Lasker called attention to two
paragraphs in the law which seemed to him invaluable. In these para'
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graphs it was asserted "that everyone is entitled to exercise his right
within the limits of the law and that the laws allow to everyone to
whom it gives a right the means to exercise that right."3 Lasker regarded this right as the foundation of the legal state, and deplored
the fact that it no longer prevailed in Prussia_ Whenever a law contradicted a police order, he said, the means to implement that law
ceased to exist. He gave numerous examples. The law of December
31, 1842, guaranteed freedom of movement to Prussians but allowed
the police to check whether the newcomer into a community possessed
the necessary property or the necessary physical strength to support
himself and his dependents. In actuality, Lasker said, the police did
not limit themselves to considering these conditions. Thousands of
strong and well-to-do Prussians were forbidden to move to certain
communities without having any means to defend themselves against
this prohibition. The industry law of 1845 seemed to establish freedom of occupation, but the police decided whether a person was permitted to carryon a particular occupation in a community. Freedom
of property was the foundation of all state order and was so recognized
in law. "But the police can prevent the owner's use of a piece of
land, the construction of factories of certain kinds, and can destroy
thereby the value of my property, even though I have evidence in hand
that no other interest, either official or private, would suffer from my
proposed activity." "Punishment shall be threatened or imposed only
in accordance with the law," stated Article Eight of the constitution.
Nonetheless, declared Lasker, a law of March 11, 1850, gave to the
police the authority to issue prohibitions and commands within the
limits of their official authority and in case of violations to threaten
to impose penalties up to the sum of ten Thalers or in case of penury
a term of imprisonment up to fourteen days. Only in case the order
concerned affairs of the agricultural police was the approval of the
community representatives required; otherwise the latter could merely
express an opinion. This form of "petty legislation," Lasker stated,
could be applied to any action falling in anyone of nine categories. The
inclusiveness of the list supplies the full flavor of the police state:
(1) Protection of persons and property;
(2) Order, security and ease of traffic on public roads, paths,
squares, bridges, banks and waters;
(3) Markets and the public sale of foodstuffs;
(4) Order and legality in the public assembly of a large number of persons;
• The quotation is from Lasker, not from the original text of the laws.
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(5) The public interest with respect to the reception and
housing of strangers; the wine, beer and coffee houses
and other establishments for the dispensing of food and
drink;
(6) Care for life and health;
(7) Precautions against the danger of fire in construction
work as well as against actions, undertakings and events
in general which are injurious to and dangerous for the
common welfare;
(8) Protection of fields, meadows, forests, orchards, vineyards, and so forth;
(9) Anything else which must be ordered in the special interest
of the community and its inhabitants by the police. 4
It would be difficult, declared Lasker, to think of any action which
could not be regarded as falling into at least one of these categories.
Nonetheless, he added, two sentences in the Prussian private law gave
the police even greater power. Of them Lasker wrote:

Whoever commits an illegal act is suspected of having caused by
his own fault any damage resulting from this act. Whoever ignores or neglects to abide by a police law is responsible for all
damages which could have been avoided by the observance of
the law, just as if the damage had arisen directly out of his action. The violation of a police order therefore often threatens
to entail in addition to the direct punishment a far greater
responsibility to compensate for damages. And a single police
official almost to the lowest level can be the source of such legal
effects.
Lasker drew the manifest conclusion from these conditions.
The most important laws, which should be the foundation of a
good economy and of freedom, are reduced to instructions for
administrative officials. The execution or neglect of these laws
has become an inner affair of the administrative agencies. How
the official handles the Jaw is in last analysis a matter to be
answered before his conscience and his superior, and in case he
has no superior, before his conscience alone.
This, Lasker stated, was the situation which during the Manteuffel
regime in the 1850s had made legality a matter of administrative
arbitrariness in the interest of the small but powerful Conservative
party. It was a situation which liberals wished to correct.
The exercise of authoritarianism required the existence of a system
of state and local government that could be controlled from the center.
Since the Pruss ian bureaucracy had developed in the regime of abso• The list is quoted by Lasker from the police law of March 11, 1850.
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lutism, an analysis of the hierarchy of control over the state will show
how thoroughly the Hohenzollerns had shaped the instruments of
administration in their own mold.
The question of the governmental structure, from the province
through the county to the town and the rural community, received
more attention from the ministry and Lower House of the New Era
than any other single item of reform, except, of course, the military.
The ministry submitted bills on each of these governmental units,
which the Lower House considered, especially in commission, at great
length. The King mistrusted the proposed reforms and the Upper
House hated them. In his program of 1858 William had recognized
the need for improving local government but had rejected any thought
of introducing self-government. He expressed the intention of preserving the existing system in order to prevent a repetition of the
troubles of 1848. He had not even mentioned those bulwarks of conservatism, county and provincial governments; apparently he considered them to be satisfactorily organized. In view of the King's
attitude, the Conservative Upper House felt entirely free adamantly to
oppose the liberal reforms. After the Lower House became engrossed
in the conflict with the government over the military reorganization,
the entire plan was neglected. Upon becoming Minister President
Bismarck likewise introduced bills on the questions; but again the
constitutional conflict prevented their being acted upon. The structure of government remained unchanged until several years after the
Reich was established. Even then the legislation actually preserved
the substance of Conservative power. A thorough reform had to wait
until the revolution of 1918.
The chain of command began with the Minister of Interior who
with the King's approval appointed the president of the government
in each province and the director of each regional office under him.
Below this director came (a) the county in which the Landrat, as we
have seen, was appointed by the King, that is by the Minister of Interior, in most cases after receiving the recommendation of three candidates from the county assembly, or (b) the cities and towns, in which
the election by the city council of the burgomaster and all other officials
had to be confirmed by the government. In the Eastern provinces,
with certain exceptions in Posen,5 the next lower official, in charge
• In the province of Posen with its large Polish population, which the Prussian
government did not trust, the rural community police power was administered by
district commissioners directly under the Landrat. Von Roenne, op. cit. (1864), Vol.
II, Part I, pp. 235·40.
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of the district (Gutsbezirk), obtained his office by virtue of his ownership of a piece of property to which this right or responsibility was
attached. In the Western provinces the Amtmann, or burgomaster, in
charge of the district was, after consultation with the regional and
provincial heads, appointed in the King's name by the Minister of
Interior. The head of the rural community, the Schulze, and the other
local officials were recommended by the community assembly and appointed, not necessarily from among those recommended, by the district head. In the Western provinces the appointment was subject
to confirmation by the Landrat. Exceptions occurred where the office
of Schulze was, like that of the head of the district, attached to a
particular piece of property. Apart from these two instances of
hereditary authority, the power of appointment or confirmation of the
administrative officials extended without a break from top to bottom
and provided the central government with full control. Officials were
appointed who were amenable to the government and who, as long as
the latter remained Conservative, would with rare exceptions be Conservative or, as the Conservatives loved to say, non-political.
The kind of personnel chosen for the administrative positions made
the control doubly firm. The lower positions were usually filled by
former noncommissioned officers or persons well drilled in the
bureaucracy, the higher positions by individuals with the same general
civil or military experience at an appropriate higher level. The appointments were not entirely of Conservatives, and many administrative officials believed in liberalism. Nonetheless, the relatively small
number who were publicly active in support of this way of life
shows that the system of control was on the whole effective. 6
The existence of assemblies at the provincial, county, and district
or local levels did not diminish the concentration of power. In each
instance the decisions of the assemblies on all important matters like
the budget, the criteria for the assessment of taxes and other financial
matters, and often on unimportant questions, had to be approved by
the administrative official at that level and by his superior. If the
administrative official regarded an act of the assembly as going beyond its authority, he had the power to suspend the act and appeal
to his superior for a decision. In some cases matters considered by
the rural community, the town council, or the district assemblies had
to be submitted even to the ministry itself for approval. For example,

• See statements by Waldeck, Kaiser and von Vincke in the Lower House, St. B.,
1861; III, 1333-40.
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if the assembly or council proposed to sell a piece of public property
or contract a debt, it had to secure authorization from a higher administrative official. It would be difficult to find any action of consequence which the assemblies at any level were allowed to decide on
their own responsibility. In case an assembly refused to pass a budget,
the administrative official could impose one to cover necessary expenditures. The assemblies were convened by the administrative
official at their level and were usually restricted to the agenda which
he proposed. The amount of paper work involved in this meticulous
control was enormous. In spite of the existence of the assemblies, anything like self-government was completely eliminated.7
With the New Era the reform of county government became an
acute issue. Under the existing system the first or noble estate in the
county assemblies in the Eastern provinces was entirely Conservative,
and the second and third estates were carefully preserved for trustworthy persons of the same inclination. The Conservative government
before 1848 had limited the eligibility for election in the second estate,
that for towns, to present town officials, members of the magistracy
and of the town representative council; and election in the third estate
was confined to present incumbents in the community government.
The liberal Minister of Interior von Schwerin proposed in 1860 to
enlarge eligibility to include past officials; but the liberal commission
of the Lower House disapproved such a slight extent and recommended that not merely the officials but anyone eligible to vote in the
community or town elections should be eligible. The commission
argued in favor of the greatest possible increase in voting power, asserting that thereby public interest in county government would be
stimulated. It saw no reason to restrict the eligibility for voting with
respect to the county assembly more sharply than that for balloting
for deputies to the Lower House of the Landtag, and it expressed confidence in the ability of the voters to select able representatives. It
regarded the government's proposal as excluding persons who might
make excellent deputies, and it accused the government of wishing to
preserve the present system of patriarchal ism. Since the magistrates in
the towns and the Schulze and other officials in the rural communities
had to be confirmed in their positions by the government, it said, the
latter would be able to exert pressure upon them to do its bidding in
the Kreistag. Count von Schwerin denied any such intention, but

• See von Roenne, op. cit. (1864), Vol. II. Part I, pp. 441-50, 458·66; Abg. R.,
Drucksachen, 1860; Vol. VI, No. 265.
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the liberals clung to their recommendation for expanding eligibility.
In the commission of the Lower House the question of whether
the Landrat should have the right to preside over the county assembly
was discussed at some length. A liberal deputy pointed out that in
the Western provinces it was not compulsory for the Landrat, or the
Amtmann, to preside over the district assembly and that the system
worked well. The case in the towns was .also brought up in support
of this view, as was that of representative bodies under constitutional
government. The government spokesman countered these arguments
by an analysis of the position of the Landrat which revealed the
ministry's concern to maintain the prestige of that official and to
change the distribution of power as little as possible. Aiming merely
at some minor reforms in the system of county government, the
ministry denied that the practices in the Western provinces could be
applied in the East. It rejected any parallel between the county administration an<;l the town administration, arguing that the town
magistracy and the town council were separate organizations, whereas
the Landrat could be a member of the county assembly.
Even if the Landrats are also state officials and organs of the
state administration experience shows that they are not prevented thereby from representing before the state government the interests of their counties with vigor and courage, and it can certainly not be asserted that the Landrats feel themselves to be too
dependent upon the central administration. The double position of the Landrat which gives him in his capacity as organ of
the county corporation an independent position toward the state
government offers an important basis and condition for the
successful activity of the Landrat.
The government feared that if the position of presiding officer over the
Kreistag were denied him, the Landrat would lose prestige in the
county and would be forced increasingly into the role merely of an
administrative official of the central authority. Even worse, it argued,
would be to subject him to competition by making the position of presiding officer elective; for in that case a failure to elect him would be
considered a vote of no confidence and a tense relation would develop
between him and the Kreistag which would hurt the entire county
governmental system. The minister urged that the present power of
the Landrat be preserved and that the parliament not try to introduce
parliamentary procedures into local government, where, he said, they
did not belong.s
• Abg. R., Drucksachen, 1860; Vol. II, No. 265, pp. 59-60.
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The question scarcely deserved the attention it received; more important was the government's plan to create an executive committee
composed of the Landrat and at least six members of the Kreistag to
work with him and in some respects to control him. Selected by the
county assembly these persons would not merely advise the Landrat
as before but would have actual responsibility in assisting him to
prepare recommendations for the assembly, in planning the execution
of decisions and in supporting him in his work. They would not
participate in actual administration but would constitute a check on
the Landrat's actions. In this way the government hoped to improve
the quality of the preparation of matters laid before the Kreistag.
It took its cue from the procedure in the province of Posen, where all
proposals were criticised by a committee before being submitted to
the full assembly. The Landrat needed the advice of men having
the confidence of the assembly, argued the government official, for his
duties had greatly expanded in kind and in number . .The government
would also find it useful at times to check the Landrat's recommendations by consulting the executive committee, and it hoped by this institution to reduce bureaucratic influence.
The liberal deputies in the Lower House showed as little confidence
in freedom in county government as the ministry. They proposed that
the central government keep its present authority. It was even suggested from the liberal side in the commission of the Lower House
that central control be strengthened by empowering the King to appoint all Landrats without prior recommendation from the county assembly. In this way, the argument ran, the government would without introducing a spoils system be able to eliminate Landrats who were
politically objectionable. The liberals had in mind the dismissal of
the overwhelming majority of Landrats, who were Conservative and
completely out of sympathy with the New Era. Others defended the
right of recommendation of candidates for the position as an act of
local self-government. The commission voted for the present system;
but in either case the result would have been to maintain the central
authority over the Landrat.
The limitations imposed upon Prussian liberalism by respect for
tradition were seen with equal clarity in the reaction to the question
of whether the county assembly and the town government should have
the power of petition to the King on matters other than those pertaining exclusively to the county. The government proposed to retain
the existing restriction. To the accusation in the commission that
this stipulation violated Article 32 of the constitution allowing all
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prussians the right of petition, it countered by asserting that the restriction was undoubtedly justified and not unconstitutional. The
argument in this instance pertained to the county assembly but expressed the views equally about the town governments. The government spokesman asserted that "the personality of a corporation is
based upon and also limited by the purpose for which it was established. The county corporation is thus only in so far a person as it
pursues the purposes of its constitution. If it goes beyond that point
it exceeds its competence, and this would be the case if the Kreistag
should petition about general political affairs not directly concerning
the county." The overwhelming majority of the liberal commission
of the Lower House agreed with the government's view. It added
"that the Kreistag deputies were elected because of their qualifications
to represent the interests of the county corporation, that one could not
conclude therefrom that they were all equally qualified to judge
general political affairs, that, moreover, the basis is lacking on which
the Kreistag deputies who were present could commit to their decisions
those who were absent and finally that the~right of petition in political
affairs would cause discord in the Kreistag and that to the disadvantage
of county affairs the political parties would become more sharply
prominent than ever."9
Most complaints about bureaucratic control came to the ministry
and the Lower House from the towns. The Rhinelanders were so
angry over regulation from above that Minister von Schwerin acknowledged the justice of their argument. 10 Conditions were actually no
worse in the Western provinces, however, than they were in the six
Eastern ones. In the latter the towns had a tradition of freedom
established by Stein's reform law of 1808. The restoration after 1815
had steadily whittled away these free rights, and after the Revolution
of 1848 the Conservative government had passed in 1853 a law which
imposed upon the towns in the Eastern provinces nearly the same
control as over those in the West. As soon as the New Era began, the
townsmen became loudly critical and demanded reform. They objected to the power of the government to confirm the selection of the
burgomaster and their other paid officials. They disliked having to
refer to the regional government for settlement of all disputes between
the magistracy and the town council. The towns of 10,000 population
or less protested the authority of the Landrat by virtue of his police

• Ibid., pp. 64·65.
10

See also Deputy Contzen's statement, Abg. H., St. B., May 2, 1861; II, 1027.
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power to interfere in purely town affairs like street lighting. Even the
larger towns, although not large enough for each to constitute a county
by itself, disliked the Landrat's exercising the same kind of authority
over them. It caused bad relations between the Landrat and the town
magistracy, they said, by leading to decisions based on ignorance, to an
unnecessary increase in bureaucratic work and to delay. It diminished
the prestige of the town and the burgomaster relative to the feudal,
landowning, usually aristocratic Landrat. The towns objected to the
government's exercising so much police power in their midst, asserting
that most of these matters were of a local nature, had nothing to
do with security, were mainly economic and social in content, and
should be left to the local population to handle.H In the Eastern
provinces the petitioners were practically unanimous in condemning
the introduction of the open ballot and the three-class system of voting
and requested the return to the method of voting under the town law
of 1808, the equal and secret ballot. The towns in the two Western
provinces were accustomed to the three-class system and, not having
known the other, were less critical; but they also wished the secret
ballot.
Although the Minister of Interior of the New Era and the liberal
Lower House differed somewhat in details about the reform of town
government, they agreed usually about fundamentals. They all accepted the basic principle "that in all cases where higher interests of
the state do not require interference from above, self-government of
the towns through their constitutional organs is to be permitted freedom of action."12 They agreed that town government should be uniform throughout the state. With respect to the government's power
to approve the selection by the town council of the local officials they
agreed that in spite of abuses under the Manteuffel government this
power should be kept. The minister wished it to cover all paid officials;

11 The Nurnberger Korrespondent published in January, 1861, the following
statement. "Whoever wishes to see how police tutelage makes a large city incapable
of self-government needs only to visit the capital and residence of the monarchy,
Berlin. Scarcely a large city in Europe is less well paved and lighted, scarcely a city
in Germany where in snowy weather passage is more endangered. The Berlin cab
and omnibus service, which is controlled by the entirely bureaucratic police administration, is distinguished by foolish regulations. Therefore the cabs are worse, the
horses lamer, the drivers lazier than in any other city. The people are arbitrarily
ruled and taxed by a pasha and have in their magistracy and town council a representative body which is only forced every two years to bother about the city. If
Prussia is to cease to be a police state, Berlin must first be given self-government."
Tagesbericht, No.4, Jan. 5, 1861.
12 Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1861; Vol. V, No. 160, p. 2.
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the commisson of the Lower House restricted it solely to the burgomaster and his assistants. They agreed that the burgomaster should retain a suspensory veto over the acts of the town council and of his colleagues in the magistracy which he considered illegal or contrary to the
welfare of the state, and that the issue should be appealed for settlement to the regional official of the bureaucracy. They preferred that
in certain cases of disagreement over matters of purely local interest
the action not be appealed and that it be postponed until the parties
could harmonize their views. They retained the existing practice of
requiring governmental approval of the local tax system, the contracting of town debts, the disposal of cultural articles of historical importance, and other predominantly economic matters. In case of
the sale of town property the town government was to have a free
hand, but it should notify the regional authority of its intention in
time for this bureaucratic agent to interfere and block the sale if he
saw fit.13
The proposed retention of the burgomaster's veto power in the
towns showed that the liberals were caught in a dilemma. Although
they believed firmly in living in a state of law, they knew that in the
smaller towns especially no one except the legally-trained burgomaster
would know what the laws were. For the sake of assuring that the
law would obtain, they placed the executive in a position to veto the
decisions of the popularly elected representative legislature. They retained in the town government the relation of the absolute monarch
to the Landtag, with the one exception that the burgomaster's veto
was limited by the right of appeal to a higher bureaucratic authority.
In the name of the legal state they proposed to preserve a large degree
of authoritarianism in town government.
An especially bad situation was to be found in the towns of Western
Pomerania and Riigen. In proposing reform in 1862 the Minister of
Interior described the conditions as follows: The magistracy co-opted
new members and served for life. It was a lordship in its own right,
able to dismiss burgher officials at will. The citizen body had either
no right to elect officials or the very limited one of selecting them from
among a number of candidates presented to it. A codified town law
did not exist; and where the commission was endeavoring to collect
the recent town ordinances, agreement had not been reached or the
work concluded. "As a consequence such uncertainty about the law
13 On the reform of town government see Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1859; Vol. III,
No. 108. Ibid., 1860; Vol. VI, No. 262. Ibid., 1861, Vol. V, No. 160. Also the lengthy
discussion in Abg. R., St. B., 1861; Vol. II. Ibid., 1862; Vol. II, No. 15.
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exists in these towns that now and then even today the town council
and burgher assembly must first be informed by the commission what
according to custom and according to sources accessible only to legal
scholars are to be considered norms and rules of town administration."14 The minister proposed to bring the government of these towns
into line with that in the rest of Prussia.
The commission disagreed with the Minister of Interior on one
major question, that of the system of voting. The minister strongly
recommended the retention of the three·class system of voting and the
open ballot. He argued that the three-class system worked well, that
it was not to blame for the decline in the number of actual voters, and
that a better one had not yet been found. He manifestly liked the
division of voters into three classes, with the political power allocated
~ccording to wealth, as a means of assuring the rule of the upper social
groups .. He defended open voting by the usual arguments: it stimulated and required civic courage and prevented corruption and hypocrisy. The liberals replied that the three-class system artificially
divided at election time the burghers who otherwise were not aware
of any such distinctions among themselves. It publically emphasized
differences in wealth, again to the detriment of civic cooperation. They
utterly condemned the open voting:
When it is a question in a town not of political elections but
of the representation of town interests, factors are emphasized
which in other cases are entirely without influence. It is much
easier in political elections, in which profound convictions can
be made to have great influence, to keep free from entanglements of kinship, friendship and neighborhood, than in cases
where in the main nothing but ability to achieve objectives
which are the same for all comes into question. It is much easier
to say that neighbor, relative, friend or customer has political
views which one does not share than to say: he is a man weak in
head and heart. Open voting also often disturbs the relation
between community government and the citizen body. Many
petitions point to the influence which under the present system
of voting the burgomaster and the commissioners of the magistracy are able to exert on the voters, an influence which is the
easier to exert because the commissioners face not a united body
of voters but each voter singly.15
In spite of these arguments, Count von Schwerin held to his view; but
by the beginning of the next year, 1862, he had come to agree to the
Abg. H., St. B., 1862; Vol. II, No. 15 .
.. Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1861; Vol. V, No. 160, pp. 16-17; St. B., 1861; especially
the debates on May 2 and 16.
H
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secret ballot. He accepted the commission's argument as valid, and
this time he buttressed his change of attitude by the historical fact
that the town laws of 1808, 1831 and 1845 had all required the secret
ballot and that the system of open voting owed its present force to the
legislation of the Manteuffel era. 16 Further experience with Conservative ability to exert political pressure in case of open voting had
won him over.
On one question the liberals found themselves in agreement even
with the Conservatives. They all advocated the abolition of the tax
on entry into the towns. Under the present law each town levied a
fee upon anyone seeking to settle there and carryon an occupation.
The restriction was opposed in the Eastern provinces but even more
so in the Western. With the rise of industrialism, freedom of movement throughout the state had become urgent.17 The industrial
population of the Rhineland was especially angry about the limitation, and since industry was spreading into the rural districts it wished
the entry fee to be completely abolished in these communities as well
as in the towns proper. "If the small communities close themselves
off from one another by this entry tax," declared Deputy Lette in the
Lower House in 1861, "then labor will be more expensive for the
factories, and the market for labor will be curtailed." The restriction
was so disliked that even the House of Lords favored its repeaJ.18
Although the liberal ideal called for local self-government, the
evidence supplied by the discussion of the reform of county, town and
rural community government shows that neither the liberal Minister
of Interior nor the liberal deputies had any intention of reducing
sharply the control exercised by the central government. They lacked
confidence in the ability of the peasants and townsmen, except in the
largest cities, to run their own affairs, and were so devoted to administrative efficiency that they limited the freedom of the townsmen
to learn by making mistakes. They denied to a representative body
of the leading persons in the county the right to discuss and pass resolutions on matters of state-wide interest. These should be dealt with
by another representative body, the Landtag, possibly composed of
many of the same persons and certainly representing the same people.
So well drilled had all Prussians been in bureaucratic specialization
that the most progressive of them were unable to perceive the inconsistency of this opinion with their belief in liberalism. They did not
.. Abg. H., St. B., 1862, Vol. II, No. 15, p. 104.
11 See Ibid., 1861; I, 479.
1. Ibid., March 12, 1861; I, 478.
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comprehend the nature and function of politics as a way of solving
public problems whether at the national, state or local level. They
thought of politics as reserved only to those high and noble affairs of
state interest, at a plane of action far above the local. They did not
see that politics should permeate an entire people, that otherwise the
political activity at the top had no support down the line. They
were inclined toward political snobbishness; they did not perceive how
enormously important it was for them in the Landtag to have the
organized aid of liberal elements in every popular assembly at every
level throughout the state. With such support publicly expressed and
aggressively supplied the liberal majority in the Lower House might
have forced the king to retreat and might have won the constitutional
conflict and established parliamentary government. Without this cooperation it allowed the government to retain ultimate power by
means of the army and the bureaucracy. It played into the Conservatives' hands, allowing them to divide and rule, to force major
groups to keep silent on public, state-wide issues. The liberals might
not have succeeded in any case in putting through the House of Lords
their reform plans for county and town government; by their attitude
toward the right of petition in the county and town assemblies they
betrayed the decided shortcomings of their own conception of selfgovernment and of politics and created the major source of weakness
in their combat with absolutism and Conservatism. Their thinking
in governmental affairs remained to a large extent patterned after the
existing institutions and practices of authoritarian bureaucracy.
Deputy Wagener spoke on behalf of the Conservative party against
the liberal proposals. The Conservatives, he said, believed in autonomy and self-government of the corporate bodies, but by corporations
they meant the castes of the Old Regime, plus such economic units as
guilds. They wished in the name of self-government to restore the
conditions prior to the Stein-Hardenberg reforms. They regarded it
as an illusion to try to decentralize a bureaucratic state. They disavowed what they called the practice of arbitrarily selecting some
member of the state organism, giving it a special constitution different
from that of the rest of the organs in the bureaucratic state, and calling it self-government. "What you will achieve thereby," stated Deputy
Wagener in the Lower House in 1861, "is not autonomy but disharmony, anarchy and disorder." He advocated the restoration of decentralized government as it had formerly existed, and he predicted
that "as long as you do not have this either the upper bureaucratic
agency will destroy the so-called autonomy or the so-called autonomy
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will destroy order and will force an increase in government from above,
in other words the application of imperialism." He was thinking of the
career of N apleon III.
The Conservatives opposed both the three-class system of voting
and equal suffrage. They disliked the arbitrary and materialistic
basis of the one, the equalitarianism of the other. In place of these,
they proposed that each person receive voting power according to his
social and political position. They meant thereby to allocate voting
power to the social groups of a fully restored Old Regime. Of course
they had no use for the secret ballot, dismissing it with the assertion
that "in all which one understands, one is conservative," and implying
that open voting was necessary so that the Conservatives could be sure
that one did understand, that is, understand to be and vote Conservative or suffer the consequences.
The extraordinary criss-crossing of views of Conservatives and
liberals on local self-government came out in the discussion of the
government's right of confirmation of town officials and control of
town affairs. The Conservatives were ready to support the liberals
in restricting this right to the burgomaster and the town councillors,
"because we are of the opinion," stated Wagener, "that the government
has much vexation and little benefit and even less gratitude from doing
so and because we do not wish to have it inferred that authority derives solely from the Crown." The Conservatives were willing to limit
the 'control of the government over town affairs even more than the
liberals proposed. "When one stretches the right of approval of the
government so far that it has the right not merely to suspend those
acts which are contrary to law but also those which are opposed to
the welfare of the state and the interests of the community," argued
Wagener, "then one takes away with one hand the autonomy that one
has given with the other."ll1 Although differing fundamentally from
the liberals in their conception of local self-government, the Conserva.
tives supported those liberal measures which were consistent with their
own ideal. That they had no use at all for most liberal policies on
local, county and provincial government may be seen from their intransigent opposition to the passage of the reform bills.
Examples of the kind of laws against which Lasker inveighed were
to be found in every field; but some of these had special significance
for politics, among them the press law, the law concerning the right

"'Ibid., 1861; II, 1024-25.
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of association and assembly, and the law defining the authority of the
state's attorney.
The constitution stipulated in Article 27 that "every Prussian has
the right to express his views freely in word, writing, print, and picture. Censorship may not be introduced." Then was added the catch
clause of a reactionary government: "Every other restriction upon freedom of the press shall be made only by way of legislation." Which part
of the clause should prevail, the part guaranteeing freedom of speech
and forbidding censorship, or that allowing the limitations of freedom
of press by law? It was a case of double meaning, a device which the
Conservatives took as the second best to what had existed prior to the
Revolution of 1848, a substitute for conditions which they had not
quite dared openly to restore.
The Conservative government had passed a press law, May 12,
1851, which suited their needs. This law remained in force through
the New Era and the constitutional conflict; and while the ministers
of the New Era either interpreted it in a liberal sense or ignored it,
Bismarck used it as the basis for ruthless action. The main terms
must be explained. Any person proposing to establish a printing
shop, a book or art shop, a lending library, a reading room, a shop
to sell newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and pictures had to receive
the permission of the regional administration. Booksellers and
printers had to pass an examination on their ability to handle those
trades. They and all those in the other businesses listed had to be
persons of "irreproachable character." What this term meant was
disputed. The liberals interpreted it as implying that the individual
must merely be in full possession of his rights as citizen. The Manteuffel government and subsequently Bismarck used it to annul the right
to carryon the occupation "if the person abused it to undermine the
principles of religion and morality as well as the foundations of the
state and of society."
The law required editors of newspapers and periodicals to place
a security sum with the police to assure good behavior. They had to
present a copy of each issue to the police and obtain a receipt. The
papers could not be sold or posted or even given away without the
vendor's or poster's or donor's having a police permit. Only technical
and similar periodical publications which did not discuss political and
social issues were excepted from the terms. Suits over the violation
of the press law were by a law of 1854 no longer to be tried before
a jury, and public solicitation of funds to pay the fine of a violator
was forbidden. By these measures the Conservatives in the 1850s
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had hoped to preserve the freedom of the press, and the government
of the New Era did not take the time to change the law before it was
forced out of office in favor of Bismarck.20
Even more circumstantial than the press law was that of 1850 concerning the right of association and of assembly. The constitution
contained two articles about this right. Article 29 stated that "all
Prussians have the right without previous governmental permission
peacefully and without weapons to assemble in closed buildings., This
provision does not apply to assemblies in the open air, which in respect
to the receipt of previous police permission are also subject to the disposition of the law." Article 30 declared that "all Prussians have the
right to organize societies for purposes which do not violate the law.
The law regulates, especially for the preservation of public safety, the
exercise of the right guaranteed in this and in the preceding article.
Political associations may be subjected by legislation to restrictions
and temporary prohibitions." Such were the articles of the constitution. They guaranteed freedom of association and assembly, subject
to the law; and the reactionary government after the Revolution of
1848 immediately set to work legally to destroy the rights which the
constitution supposedly guaranteed. The pertinent law of March 11,
1850, is so revealing of the domination over public life exercised by
the police that it must be analyzed in detail.
The terms of the law of 1850 were as follows: A police permit
had to be obtained at least twenty-four hours in advance for holding
any assembly in which public affairs would be discussed. If the assembly opened an hour late or if it was adjourned for longer than an
hour, the sponsors lost the right to hold it and had to seek a new
permit. The chairmen of an association which aimed to influence
public affairs had to supply to the police within three days after the
founding of the association a copy of the statutes and a list of members and to report within the same length of time any changes subsequently made in either. They had also to supply any other information about the association which the police requested. If an association met regularly at a particular time and place, it required a
police permit only for the first meeting. The police were empowered
to have one or two police officials present in uniform at each assembly.
These officials were to be given suitable places and upon demand were
to be supplied by the chairman with information about the speakers.
The police officials had the authority to close the meeting at any time

•• Von Roenne,

op.

cit. (1864), Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 89-112.
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if proposals were made which incited or encouraged illegal acts or if
armed persons appeared whom the chairman was unable to send away.
The meeting had to close upon orders of the police present, even if
the orders were without justification; the police could use arms to enforce their command.
Associations which held meetings for political discussion were subject to additional restrictions. Women, children of school age and
apprentices could not be members or attend the meetings. The associations could not enter into agreement with other associations for
common objectives; they could nQt form common committees or central
organizations or make any similar arrangements or carry on correspondence for that purpose. If the police closed a political association, they had to report the case to the state's attorney, who then
decided whether to prosecute it in court.
Outdoor public meetings of all kinds had to receive approval by the
police at least forty-eight hours beforehand. A permit could be refused
if the police regarded the meeting as dangerous to public safety and
order. The same conditions attached to staging a parade. 21
Each violation of the law was subject to a penalty of fine or imprisonment, and the accused was not entitled to trial by jury.
The law remained in effect during the New Era, when it was enforced in a liberal sense, and during the constitutional conflict. In the
latter years it performed valuable service for Bismarck's government
and, like the press law, was invoked to an extent that would have
aroused the admiration of its creators. 22 It placed all public meetings
under the arbitrary authority of the local police, and by its prohibition
of common organization among political associations it practically
prohibited the rise of well-organized state-wide political parties. Intended as an instrument for preserving the social and political status
quo by obstructing public discussion, it well suited the purpose.
As Lasker showed, the state's attorney held a key position in the
organization of state control over the Prussian people. According to
a law of 1849 this official had the power, with a few exceptions of no
consequence in this connection, to decide whether an investigation
and legal proceedings should be instituted against a person. The
courts could not take action before this official introduced the case.

21 After the Landtag electioJ;ls in 1862 four workers with large signs were placed
in front of the Elberfeld town hall. The signs read: "Hurrah for the Constitution!
Hurrah for the Law! Von der Heydt Gloriously Defeated! Long Live the King!" The
police immediately arrested the workers.J101ks%eitung, May 9, 1862.
•• Von Roenne, op. cit. (1864). Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 149·53.
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He had the right to decide whether or not a case should be tried; and
in an authoritarian regime one can imagine how this power would be
used. The political supporters of the government would not be tried
for violations of the press law, the assembly law, and so on; the opponents of the government would be tried. The office lent itself to
even greater abuse by virtue of the fact that the state's attorney did
not belong to the judiciary and enjoy the independence of that body,
but. was a member of the civil administration, subject to the pressure
and disciplinary action which could be applied to that branch of the
government. We shall see later how Bismarck exploited this instrument of domination. 23
The Breslau Chamber of Commerce wrote in its annual report for
the year 1863 that "our economy has reached that degree of self-dependence which makes police paternalism no longer necessary. In
view of the cultural condition of our people it is sufficient for the
state police to restrict its activity to supervision or control in so far
as these appear to be absolutely necessary for the general welfare."24
The liberals considered the question of freedom of economic
activity (Gewerbefreiheit) not necessarily of first importance, but
basic. In principle and practice economic freedom had been introduced into Prussia by the Stein-Hardenberg reforms, and in spite of
some recession it had since then retained its prestige. The industry
law of 1845 had reaffirmed Prussia's acceptance of the principle,26
which not even the reactionary government in the 1850s had dared to
repudiate. Nonetheless, the liberals of the New Era were thoroughly
dissatisfied with the law of 1845, as well as with the reactionary amendments introduced after the Revolution of 1848. They demanded reform. Too many exceptions had been made to the general application
of the principle; too much authority remained with the government
to control business. The liberals wanted freedom of enterprise, with
control exercised not by government but through competition. They
were doubtful about applying their favorite principle to professions
of law, medicine, pharmacy and other medical lines: some favored retaining state authorization, while others wished as complete freedom of
practice in these professions as in any other. For all other occupations they agreed with the resolutions expressed in September, 1860,
by the Congress of German Economists, in which they were heavily
represented:
··Ibid., Vol II, Part 1, pp. 264-65 •
•• Preussisches Handelsarchiv, 1864 (Berlin, 1865), ]ahresberichte, p. 423 .
•• Von Roenne, op. cit. (1884), IV, 418, 438 If.
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The right to carryon an occupation shall not depend upon
proof of personal ability.
The Congress is of the opinion that ... the existing system
of licensing has proved to be incompatible with the funda. 'mentals of a healthy economic life; that concern about endangering and burdening the public in particular businesses makes
necessary not the restriction of entry into the occupations but the
fulfillment of legal conditions in the exercise of them; that part
. from the stipulations of criminal law the transgression of mere
economic legal directives should merely be punished but should
not affect the right to carryon the occupation.26
One major source of liberal discontent was to be found in the existing system of government concessions so roundly condemned by the
Congress of Gennan. Economists. A commission of the Lower House
of the Landtag presented a report in 1861 in which the following
examples were given. 27 Each proprietor of a shop serving food or
drink, of a tobacco shop or of a billiard hall had to renew his license
every year. The liberal commission objected to the requirement of
annual renewal as a major source of trouble. Under the Manteuffel
system it had been used as a political weapon. 28 It was conducive to
corruption, to chicanery and to the demoralization of the proprietor
trying to earn an honest living. It created an enormous amount of
unnecessary bureaucratic business, particularly since in the overwhelming number of cases the licenses were renewed without any
question of the proprietor's good character. While not opposed to
licensing, the commission recommended that requirement of annual
renewal be dropped.
Similar difficulties confronted book publishers, book and art
dealers, antiquarians, proprietors of lending libraries and reading
rooms, and sellers of newspapers, pamphlets and pictures. In order
to open one of these businesses a person had to obtain permission from
the regional administration. He had to be of good character, and
especially in the case of book publishers and book dealers he had to
pass an examination before a commission showing his competence.
The liberal commission of the Lower House recommended that these
restrictions be abolished in favor of freedom of enterprise. As in the
case of the proprietors of restaurants and other public houses, the
•• Bremer Handelsblatt, No. 467, Sept. 22, 1860, p. 359 .
•• See also von Roenne, op. cit. (1884), IV, 463-65; Lasker, op. cit., pp. 179-213.
The chamber of commerce of the counties of Arnsberg, Meschede and Brilon included in their report for 1857 a long indictment of this system. Preuss. Handelsarchiv 1858; II, 527-29 .
• s As it was to be again by the Conservative governments of 1862.
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governmental control had in the name of morality been the means of
so much political and church abuse that the liberals wanted to abolish
the entire system. 29
In some localities where the handworkers remained economically
powerful and the influence of factories had not yet been strongly felt,
the liberals tended in the New Era to be wary of making the question
of freedom of occupation a political issue.3o The Conservatives had
since 1848 attempted to keep the handicraftsmen on their side, forming, as the liberals declared, a coalition of Junkerdom and guildism.
The government in 1849 had issued an ordinance restoring some of
the former authority of the guilds. In a campaign pamphlet in 1861
issued by the Progressive party, Schu1ze-Delitzsch described the results
of this ordinance as follows:
According to Paragraph 31 of the industrial law of 1849 any
factory owner can employ handicraft journeymen of all kinds
for factory purposes, while according to Paragraph 47 a master
handicraftsman is restricted to apprentices and journeymen of
his own craft. According to Paragraph 30 no industrialist has to
pass an examination, and according to Paragraph 32 such an
unexamined industrialist may carryon any industry similar in
purpose to that of a handicraft with the sole limitation that he
employ no journeymen outside his factory, something the owner
of a large factory will not do anyway. And other than size, no
indication of a factory-organized handicraft exists.31
Schulze-Delitzsch concluded that the law of 1849 had imposed restrictions solely upon the small handworkers and not upon the factories;
and he scoffed at the Conservatives' claim thereby to have prevented
economic anarchy.
Liberal ire had been aroused by the fact that the law of 1849 had
restored in part the conditions prevailing prior to the Stein-Hardenberg
reforms. The law had created the institute of economic councillors,
made it necessary in almost all handicrafts for a handworker to pass an
examination and belong to a guild, limited the right to carryon the
crafts, re-established the statutes of apprentice and journeyman and set
up special financial sources for the aid of guildsmen.32 It had imposed
restrictions even upon marketing the wares, all for the supposed pro-

2. Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1861; Vol. IV, No. 126 .
•• Bremer Handelsblatt, No. 534, Dec. 28, 1861.
., Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch, Schriften und Reden, Hrsg. von F. Thorwart (Berlin, 1910), II, 396-97.
·'Von Roenne, op. cit. (1884), IV, 419, 440.
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tection of the craftsmen, and had placed the latter under the special
protection of the state.
The conflict between autocratic mercantilism and the rising capitalistic industrialism was equally evident in other and economically more
important areas, those of insurance and mining. These two branches
of the economy already had a history, for each had contributed a considerable share to the economy of the Old Regime; but their role as
molding influences in the entire economy lay in the future. Curbed
and dominated by governmental regulations expressing the spirit of
mercantilism, they stood at the beginning of their greatness. Their
struggle for emancipation can only be understood in the light of the
restrictions against which they fought.
A law of 1853 had stated that the establishment of an insurance
business of any kind had to receive the approval of the administration
of the region in which it was to be domiciled, and that approval should
be granted only in case the government was convinced of the reliability
and integrity of the entrepreneurs.33 The way in which the system
worked was thoroughly condemned by chambers of commerce over
the state as expensive, cumbersome and obstructive of private intitiative. 34 The chambers of commerce of the counties of Arnsberg, Meschede and Brilon complained about the difficulties of starting and
conducting an insurance business. The state had extended its control
so far, the chamber said, that the establishment of even a small community insurance society for cattle had to receive prior approval. Every
agent of an insurance company had to convince the government that
he was reliable and honorable. One would think, said the chamber
of commerce, that the insurance company could be trusted to employ
persons of character. The law did not allow it such responsibility.
In consequence, the chamber calculated that even after the criterion
of political reliability used in the Manteuffel period was no longer
applied, it required at least two weeks' time to go through the formality
of clearing the person. If one multiplied two weeks by the 166 agents
to be found in Prussia, the chamber stated, one arrived at the sum of
seven years of time wasted. s5
The Berliner Borsen-Zeitung in 1861 stated that there were twentyseven different regulations for insurance companies in Prussia-four
for the province of Brandenburg, four for Pomerania, three for Silesia,
five for Saxony, eight for the province of Prussia and one each for
83 Ibid., 476 .
•• See Bremer Handelsblatt, Aug. 13. 1859, May 12. 1860.
3' Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1860; I, 744-45.
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Westphalia, the Rhineland, and Posen. It wished them unified for
the entire state.36 The same business journal complained about
government restrictions upon the activity of fire insurance companies
in provinces where local societies for that purpose had been established
under government auspices for the special benefit of the Junkers. 37
The story revealed the conflict between the two Prussias:
It undeniably belonged to the political program of the
Manteuffel-Westphalen system in Prussia, now a thing of the
past, to preserve the antiquated feudal Institute of Provincial
Fire Insurance Societies and to aid them against the competition of the rapidly expanding private insurance companies.
The latter were a thorn in the eye of all enemies of progress because they were independent of feudal paternalism. So it is
natural that the regulations of provincial societies issued during
the reaction period should bear the marks of the system and that
the communal Landtags endeavored to make the private companies dependent upon the control of the feudal societies and
by all kinds of handicaps to turn the public away from them.
Since these regulations still remain in force and since the
management of the provincial societies in view of the inevitable
decline of their irrationally conducted institute has recently
sought to increase the inequality of rights and to obtain from the
ministry further privileges, it appears advisable ... to analyze
one or another of these regulations ....
The writer chose as an example the revised regulation of the fire
insurance society for the Mark of Brandenburg, the Margravate NiederLausitz and the districts Jiiterbogk and Belzig of January 15, 1855.
Although according to Paragraph 2 of this regulation the society was
to insure only buildings, under the pressure of its officials it expanded
into the field of insuring movable property. The business of the
society was administered by county directors under the leadership of
a general director and the supervision and control of the communal
Landtag. Only Landrats and owners of knights' estates who were
members of the society were eligible as county directors; they were
elected by the Kreistag, with the Landrat usually being preferred.
The stipulations for insuring immovable property were as follows:
Through Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the law of May 8, 1837, and the
cabinet order of May 30, 1841, it was forbidden in Prussia for agents
and societies to give an insurance policy to a customer before local
police had inspected the request for insurance and an official declaration had been made that the police had no objections against the
•• Berliner Borsen Zeitung, May 17, 1861 •
•• Ibid., Jan. 11, Feb. 22, 1861.
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transaction. This police control, intended to prevent excessive insurance, was not regarded as sufficient in the case of the insurance of
buildings, for Paragraph 27 of the regulation of 1855 stated that the
county director of the Society had also to approve the transaction.
According to Paragraph 1 of their special instructions the county
directors might not grant this permission until they were convinced
of the accuracy of the proposed amount of the insurance (seven-eighths
of the tax value of the buildings). In case of need they had personally
to inspect the buildings or have a building commission do so. If the
necessary report on the proposed insurance with a private company
was not made to the county director, the insured person had to pay a
fine of fifty Reichsthalers to the Society. In case a building which
had been insured above seven-eights of its worth burned before the
policy had received the approval of the county director, according to
Paragraph 29 of the regulation the insured person lost all claim to
insurance from the private company and the latter had to pay the
insurance sum to the Society.
These stipulations offered convenient means for the officials to
curb and reduce the competition offered to the Society by the private
companies. The county director learned about any intention to insure with a private company. He had the power to use his official
influence as Landrat to persuade the applicant either to remain in
or to join the Society. Recent cases were known of attempts of this
sort, of one in Westphalia even to revive a defunct society. Without
a time limit the county director could at his leisure investigate the
policy with a private company. If a person proposed to withdraw
from the Society and purchase insurance from a private company, he
might find himself not covered by insurance while the county director
investigated the validity of the new policy, but in case the person proposed to insure with the Society, the county director had to pass on
the policy within eight days. The condition that a new building
could be insured up to seven-eights of its tax value held only for insurance taken with a private company. In the case of the provincial
Society the building could be insured to the extent of its full tax value.
The author of the article denounced as a scandal the provision
that the antiquated and decadent provincial Societies should have
such power over the private companies, such government support in
defending themselves against competition. He was particularly angry
over the stipulation that fines and even in some cases the entire insurance sum would have to be paid to the provincial society, and he believed that no judge in Prussia would allow such abuse of justice.
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That the writer expressed the opinions of the private insurance world
was evident from the numerous similar complaints of the time.
The government of the New Era with von der Heydt, a holdover
from the Manteuffel era, still in power as Minister of Commerce made
a few minor reforms between 1859 and 1861, such as that of abolishing
the necessity for an insurance company to prove the need for its entry
into business and for appointing agents in a district. 3s In the main
the old paternalistic controls were preserved, and in 1863 the Breslau
Chamber of Commerce was still complaining about the same government obstructions to the insurance business as before. The private
insurance business remained subject to police control of the sale of
each policy, an interference, declared the Breslau Chamber of Commerce, which contradicted the fundamental principles of government
and economic teachings. The private companies still objected to
government aid to their competitors, the public insurance companies.
Police officials in charge of fire prevention in the towns were still permitted to become members of the boards of directors of the public
insurance companies, and Schulzes and other officials in the villages
acted as agents of these companies. The private insurance business
considered this preferential treament to be utterly unfair. It wished
a free market in insurance and requested that police supervision be
kept at the minimum essential for the general welfare. It defended
insurance as a means of education in individual thinking and action
and as a basis of moral self-help. Its proponents were declared to be
fighting not merely for economic profit but for a moral cause.39
The business interests denounced Minister of Commerce von der
Heydt, himself a businessman, for clinging to autocratic power over
the economy and failing to recognize the need for a change in attitude
and policy. They asserted that industrialism, particularly in the field
of transportation, was creating problems which could not be handled
by a government devoted to a mercantilist policy of paternalism inherited from a purely agrarian Old Regime. Business demanded help
in both a negative and a positive sense. The government should cease
exercising such rigid control over business that it blocked enterprise;
but it should also perform for business those essential services of which
it alone was capable. It should reshape its entire policy with respect
to the economy and adjust to the conditions of a growing industrial
society.

I. Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1861, Jahresberichte, pp. 260-61.
s. Ibid., 1864, Jahresberichte, pp. 425-26, 581.
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At the meeting of the Congress of German Economists in 1863 the
following statement was made:
Railroads are transforming entire Europe and in entire
Europe the position and significance of individual towns and
cities. They organize an entire state in the way that formerly a
single town was organized. We still find in the old towns a
Tanner street where all the tanners live, a Dyers' street where
all the dyers live. In the same way we find today a Sheffield, a
Birmingham, a Leeds, a Wolverhampton where this or that
branch of industry is alone carried on in the entire state. 40
Every town and region of Prussia was ardently demanding that a
line connect it with the rest of the world. The Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung complained, August 4, 1861, that the Province of Prussia
was the most neglected of any in railroad construction and therefore
suffered from a severe economic handicap. Citizens of towns in other
provinces expressed themselves in even more vigorous terms. NiederLausitz had to have railroad connections, declared a correspondent to
the National Zeitung in Berlin in 1861, or its industry and trade
would be ruined. A railroad along the right bank of the Oder was a
matter of life or death for Silesia. Each town or region was fighting
to develop with the times. Each saw opportunities for expansion and
wealth if it could only obtain transportation facilities. Each realized
that without a railroad it was doomed to remain static. 41 These were
crucial years in which the fate of a town would be decided for decades
by whether or not it received a railroad connection.
The annual report of every chamber of commerce was full of
denunciations of the government's policy with respect to railroad construction. Criticism of Minister of Commerce von der Heydt was bitter.
The minister was accused of retarding construction. Capital had not
been willing to invest in railroads which would not pay for themselves,
and the minister was reluctant to provide government subsidies. The
Berliner Borsen Zeitung complained that whereas between 1844 and
1850 some 263 miles of railroads had been built in Prussia with the
participation of private capital, in the years 1850-57 only seventy-four
miles were built with the aid of private resources, the first at a cost
of 1I3,000,000 Thalers, the second of 56,000,000.42 In 1858 only
thirteen miles in toto were built.

4. Vierteljahrschrift filr Volkswirtschaft und Kulturgeschichte (1863), III, 267-68.
01 See for example National Zeitung, Jan. 24, 1861; Tagesbericht, No. 64, March 16,
1861, citing article in Schlesische Zeitung, No. 125.
"Berliner Borsen Zeituflg, Sept. 13, 11159.
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In 1862 Prussia had 745.5 miles of railroads. (See Appendix B.)
The critics argued that this amount was too small. The government
was accused of devoting money to military purposes which should have·
been put to economic ends. It was denounced for influencing the
capital market to deny private loans for railroad construction. ""While
it is no secret," wrote the Berliner Borsen Zeitung on February 18,
1859, "that the government is firmly determined, partly out of consideration of the bad state of the money market, to be most reserved
in the near future about concessioning railroads, the number of requests for concessions increases in the Lower House to a vast degree."
With the outbreak of the Italian War in 1859 the government was
accused of continuing this policy in order to have funds available for
state use in case of Prussia's becoming involved in international difficulty; and as the American Civil 'Var and other international complications followed immediately after, the accusations continued. The
liberals were angry over what they called the use of public funds for
unproductive purposes instead of for the development of an economy
which could support such burdens.
Liberal business interests denounced the government for following a
policy of mercantilism with respect to railroads. The Berliner Borsen
Zeitung for September 10, 1861, drew a significant parallel:
The efforts to bring the entire railroad system under the rule
of the state spring from the same spirit that formerly brought the
police administration of the towns in the hands of the state. Just
as in the latter case it was intended to destroy communal independence and make the police administration into a machine
controlled by one power, the Ministry of Interior, so it is now
intended to put lead strings on independent economic activity
and give it a nurse maid who will listen to the directions of one
power, the Ministry of Commerce.
From Beuthen in Silesia came a dispatch to the Berliner Borsen
Zeitung43 rebuking the Ministry of Commerce for being unwilling to
discuss and attend to the complaints of the citizens. Especially was
this the case with the monopolistic and exploitive policy of the railroads in the province of Silesia. Complaints had reached such a state,
the paper said, that in all localities "a feeling of bitterness and open
indignation predominates."
The coal and iron industries were especially angry. After the economic crisis of 1857 they had suffered from lack of markets and feared
English competition. When the Franco-Prussian commercial treaty
•• Tagesbcricht, No. 25, Jan. 30. 1862.
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of 1862 lowered the duty on these items, the producers intensified their
demand for lower costs of distribution and more efficient handling of
their products by railroads and waterways. They were thankful for
the grant made in 1860 of the one-penny freight rate for coal on the
railroads, but they wished the low rate to be applied also to iron.
They condemned the railroad companies for many acts of commission
and omission and sought aid from the government. Coal and iron,
asserted the industrialists, constituted the foundation for the economy
and should be given every assistance. When they prospered, the entire economy benefited. Instead of being assisted, said the Conference
of the Executive Committee of the Association of Mining Interests in
Dortmund, the railroads treated the industry as "a fat cow, which was
there to be milked by the railroads with the least possible understanding and the most bureaucratic, Pasha-like satisfaction." Service was
wretched, the industrialists said; cars were utterly inadequate in number; trains were too few; service was too irregular; stations were closed
at night with consequent lengthening of the time required for service;
the different railroad companies would not carry each other's cars;
mines had to be shut down for lack of cars to ship away the coal; the
number of lines was too small. According to the industrialists the
entire service suffered from the fact that the government would not
allow competing lines to be built and the canal service to be expanded,
and would not press the railroads to keep up with the industrial development. The entire business world was angry and vociferous about
the need for reform. 44
The discussion showed that the rising industrialism was creating
difficulties for its general line of economic laissez-faire. It was learning
that laissez-faire was beneficial to some interests but not to others.
The first big source of trouble came from the railroads. In addition
to charging too high freight rates, they were imposing differential
rates; that is, they charged less in proportion for carrying goods over
long distances than over short stretches. The inland towns which were
centers of wholesale trade, the old distribution points, and the smaller
towns with hopes of economic progress were especially angry. They
wished the government to interfere and either to permit competing
lines to be built or to force the railroads to change their methods. 45
Nor did the requests stop at railroads. All-weather roads were likewise wanted, though they were of secondary importance. The towns,
.. See as examples Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1861, Jahresberichte, p. 259; Berliner
Borsen Zeitung, Feb. 16, Nov. 20, Dec. 12-13, 1861.
•• See, for example, Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1861, Jahresberichte, pp. 376-77.
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particularly those of the Western provinces, asked for more canals and
the improvement of existing ones and of the other waterways. The
canal system, they stated, had not expanded since the days of Frederick
the Great. They wished above all that the Rhine, the Weser and the
Elbe should be connected. Thereby iron and steel, as well as other
bulk articles such as agricultural products, would greatly benefit from
freight rates lower than railroads could charge. The railroads would
be subject to competition from another kind of carrier and would
have to keep their rates at a minimum. In Silesia the economic interests, except the railroads, urged the government to make the Oder
River navigable at all times of the year so that their commerce would
have cheap means of reaching the outside world. The Cologne Chamber of Commerce envisaged a unified system of water transport joining
the Danube and its tributaries, the Rhine, the Weser, the Elbe, the
Oder and the Vistula, a water system covering the whole of Central
Europe. 46
All in all, the liberals had a large program of requests to put before
the government for economic assistance in developing the country. They
realized that each improvement in the means of transportation and
communication meant opening up an area to their liberal ideals and
methods.
The retention of the law against usury struck the liberals as a survival of medievalism. Its years if not its days were numbered, they
thought, even though as late as 1864 the law was still in force. 47 When
the government of the New Era endeavored to repeal the law, the
Lower House of the Landtag passed the necessary bill, but the Upper
House consistently refused to follow suit. The strength of the Upper
House's opposition may be seen from the vote in 1860 of 93 to 8 against
the governmental bilUs The Upper House was determined to maintain the legal limit upon the interest rate, five per cent for customary
loans and six per cent for commercial loans. The members made the
issue one of morality, of Christianity, as well as of economics. The
liberals considered it equally a moral issue, a touchstone as to whether
Prussia would accept the changes occurring in all enterprising coun-

•• Preuss. Handelarchiv, 1861; Jahresberichte, p. 377. The board of directors of
the Upper Silesian Railroad recognized the need of connecting the Oder with the
railroad, but refused to agree unconditionally to it for fear Of losing the trade in
transporting zinc, iron and grain and other ballast materials. Berliner Biirsen Zeitung,
March I, 1861.
•• Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1864; Jahresberichte, p. 118.
n Ibid., 1860; I, 453.
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tries or whether it would remain subject to the rigid standards of a
historic caste. The Conservatives believed that they were protecting
the ability of the landowners and handworkers to borrow money
cheaply, indeed to afford to borrow it at all. The liberals denounced
their opponents' stand as selfish and economically unsound. While
apparantly not greatly hindered in their economy by the presence of
the usury law, the liberals condemned it as an embarrassing symbol
of the dominant forces in Prussian society.
When the government of the New Era introduced a bill in 1860
to repeal the usury law, it explained in considerable detail its motives.
The usury law, it stated, did not accomplish its purpose. Instead of
inclining or forcing the capitalists to lend money at low rates, the law
actually drove funds out of the lending market into enterprises that
offered a larger return. Or, the government stated, the lenders well
understood how to circumvent the law and obtain the equivalent of
a high rate of interest without running any danger of prosecution.
Cases under the law almost never came before the courts; when they
did, they usually involved lenders who had not been acquainted with
the methods of gaining their ends without penalty.
Far from making loan capital more plentiful, the government
argued, the usury law reduced the amount available for personal loans
and hurt the small handworker or the landowner who already had a
large mortgage on his property and suddenly needed more money. A
reliable and honest lender would not take the risk for a return of five
or six per cent, whereas he might for a larger one. The borrower was
therefore driven into the hands of a real usurer. The law stimulated
the growth of those conditions which it was intended to prevent. The
situation became even worse in time of economic crisis, the government asserted, when, as conditions in 1857 had already shown, the usury
law might have to be suspended.
The government denied flatly that the repeal of the usury law
"Would "shock the sense of justice of the people," but argued that an
improvement of a law would hardly hurt the public sense of justice.
"The existence or non-existence of a legal prohibition offers no proper
measure for judging the morality of an action; rather, it is the duty
of the law-maker to adapt the laws to the real significance of the act."
The real usurer, the government said, would be subject to punishment
by law under any circumstances. Moreover, it was impossible to define
numerically what was usury, for under some circumstances charging
any interest at all might hurt the borrower much worse than charging
him ten per cent at other times. Even the state in case of need paid
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more than the legal limit for loans. The government concluded that
the usury law no longer stood in harmony with the sense of justice of
the people and ought to be eliminated.
The ministry countered the expression of fear of high rates on land
mortgages and a fall in value of the present mortgages by citing the
example of England, Oldenburg and other countries. In the case of
good securities, it stated, the interest rate even at the present time did
not reach the maximum. It was not the height of the legal interest
rate but the actual relation of demand to supply that regulated the
price of mortgages, and no usury law would in bad times assure to the
landowners cheap money. Nor did the government accept the view
that the usury law should remain in operation for non-commercial
and non-landowning classes even though it might be abolished for the
rest of the population. It denied that such a division was either enforceable or advantageous to the lower classes whom it was intended
to protect, and it adhered to the principle that a law should as far as
possible have general validity.49
In the area of mining law Prussia was entering the period of modern
industrialism with legal conditions mainly of the Old Regime. The
only region with even the semblance of a modern law was the left
bank of the Rhine, where the Napoleonic Code had done away with
the mercantile system. The confusion of mining codes in the rest
of the state expressed the diverse historic origin of the separate parts.
Except for the core of Frederick the Great's Prussia, where that ruler
had between 1766 and 1772 reduced the number of mining districts to
three, each with its code, the territorial accretions had been allowed to
retain their particular mining regulations, with new ordinances passed
from time to time with respect to them. After the Napoleonic era the
situation was so chaotic that the government in 1825 had begun to work
on a common code for the entire state. The leisurely attitude with
which the old Prussia approached such problems may be seen from the
fact that the new proposal was not worked out and submitted to the
interested parties until 1862 and did not become law until three years
later. 50
The response of the Chamber of Commerce of Essen, Werden and
Kettwig to the terms of the law proposed by the government in 1862
expressed the opinion of all the parties most interested. The chamber
thoroughly approved the government's action in basing the bill upon
the following principles: "abolition of the mining royalty, emancipa•• Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1860; I, 49-53.
See von Roenne, op. cit. (1884), IV, 399 ff.
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tion of mining from state paternalism, placing of mining on an equal
basis with all other branches of industry, permitting the free, independent exercise of acquired mining rights, abolition of cumbersome formalities which obstruct freedom of action, above all unification of mining law for the entire state." The chamber missed the
application of one major principle, "the granting of the character of
a juridical person to the mining companies and the free sale of the
mining shares." The reforms cleared away the procedural regulations
which had been imposed and enforced by the state mining administration and in general, to the extent that its particular nature would allow, placed mining under the rules of civil law like other business
enterprises. The bill, and subsequent law, did not permit the complete freedom which the mining operators wished, but it marked one
of the most liberal measures taken by the government. Both liberals
and many Conservatives, including the Bismarckian government, participated in putting through the reform.'51
The first part of the 1850s witnessed the founding of new private
banks to provide the financial facilities for the rapid expansion of
transportation and industry. The Disconto-Gesellschaft in Berlin was
the most famous of these, but in every fairly large town which had not
developed banks in the 1840s or earlier private interests now established new ones. The government was chary about this movement
and curbed the rights of these banks as much as possible. It caused
them great trouble by restricting sharply their right to issue bank notes.
The credit shortage during the economic crisis of 1857 was prolonged
by the international political complications evoked by the Italian War
in 1859-60; and often in desperate need of funds during these troubles
the business interests besieged the government with complaints. Early
in 1859 the Berliner Borsen Zeitung52 declared that the monopoly of
the Pruss ian State Bank to issue bank notes had to cease, that the private banks had to be given this right as well. These private banks, it
said, were leading only a sham existence and business was suffering for
lack of capital.
The protests of the private banks made no impression upon the
Prussian government. The cost of military reforms and the mobilization of the army in 1859, the impact of the international crisis upon

61 See Preuss. Handelsarchiv. 1862; Jahresberichte, pp. 457-58; "Die BergwerksHutten- und Salinen-VerwaItung in Preussen wlihrend 1849-1863," Vierteljahrschrift
fur Volkswirtschaft und Kulturgeschichte (1865), I, 90; von Roenne, op. cit. (1884),
IV, 404.
• 0 Berliner Borsen Zeitung, Feb. 15, 1859.

The Police State

/

81

the budget and a strong desire to keep state control over credit facilities
at all times made certain that the government would not relax its
restrictions upon the issuance of bank notes. In August, 1864, the
banks were still lamenting. At the meeting of the Congress of German
Economists at that time, the banker Sonnemann of Frankfurt am Main
reported that in Prussia the monopoly of the state bank continued,
that the private banks whose concessions would expire in a short time
were seriously debating whether in case of the persistance of the present restrictions they should not close down. The banks earned so
little profit on their capital as a result of these restrictions, said Sonnemann, that the returns were out of proportion to the risk. He advised
them to seek to obtain from the government the right to take unlimited,
interest-bearing deposits, and he thought that they might succeed. If
they failed to obtain this right, he recommended to them to close their
doors; "for a banking business that in ten years' time cannot pay higher
than four to five per cent interest is not worth the trouble."53 Bankers
were as dissatisfied as other business men with the vestiges of absolutistic mercantilism.
Passing from the particular to the general, the chambers of commerce expressed the wish for reform of the system of chartering
corporations. The existing procedure had been fixe<1 in a law of
April 22, 1845. A request was to be considered as appropriate only
when the proposed corporation satisfied three conditions: first, the
operations of the corporation had to extend beyond one locality;
second, the enterprise should be useful from a general point of view
and deserve special favor in the interest of the common welfare; third,
it had to be of such a nature that the corporate form was necessary
and that no other form of organization would suffice. In all cases,
stated the law, it was essential to make certain that in the process of
being created the corporation give adequate security against deceiving
and harming the public. Each request for the right to establish a
corporation had to be individually approved by the government.54
Under the terms of the law of 1845 an authoritarian bureaucracy
c;ould easily obstruct the economic development of the country. It
could grant or withhold permission as it saw fit; it might delay with
its answer until the entrepreneurs became disgusted and gave up, or

•• See Joseph Hansen, Gustav von Mevissen, Ein rheinisches Lebensbild, 18151899 (Berlin, 1906), II, 551-53; Vierteljahrschrift filr Volkswirtschaft und Kulturgeschichte (1864), IV, 198; also a criticism of the banks in Bremer Handelsblatt, Jan. 7,
1860, p. 7 .
.. Richard Passow, Die Aktiengesellschaft (jena, 1922), pp. 63-64.
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until a favorable economic situation had passed. A group of entrepreneurs might see an excellent opportunity, it might have the promise
of the necessary funds, it might have settled all details: if it could not
persuade the government of the value of the project, it would be unable to execute its plan. The government might react with some favor
to projects for the construction of railroads which were also of military
value; but other branches of the economy might not fare so well. One
example may suffice. In 1863 the National Zeitung reported that the
Prussian Mortgage Insurance Corporation had had to wait four years
before receiving approval. A main objection of the government against
the mortgage banks, the article stated, had been the fear that their
mortgages would offer powerful competition on the market to the
Pruss ian state bonds. This was a strange view, the article added, "for
the credit of the state rests on the labor of the people."o5
What the businessmen desired was the introduction of the English
system, the free right to incorporate a business in accordance with
certain legal forms,06 a right open to anyone and exercisable with a
minimum of bureaucratic circumstaIl£e in an objective, normal way.
They did not gain that right until 1870.
The existing, unreformed procedure indicated mistrust and even
disapproval of these growing corporations on the part of autocracy, a
jealous fear that the government might in time be unable to direct the
economy of the state and might have to concede increased power to
private organizations. A reactionary government run by Junkers and
mercantilists disliked the whole conception of a modern corporation,
for its implied the shift from the old forms of wealth which constituted
the basis of their power to new forms conducive to the capitalistic
bourgeoisie and to liberalism. The Conservatives thought that they
could control an economy of agriculture and handicrafts; they knew
that they would not be able to control one of industry. They claimed
that they represented the ideals of morality and justice, that their way
of life alone was advantageous to the state. They accused the liberals
of seeking to further selfish economic interests. One of their members,
Deputy Hahn, declared in 1861 to the Lower House: "The big industrialists wish nothing else than for their capital ... and their economic knowledge to prevail. They wish to expand the market for
capital and industry by elevating the handicrafts to factories or by
absorbing them." Another, the indispensable Deputy Wagener, asserted to the same body: "Weare entirely accustomed to being acos National Zeitung, Berlin, March 7, 1863 .
•• Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1860; I, 743·44.
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cused of pursuing special interests when something is advocated from
our side, but when something is originated by the representatives of
industrialism and capital these gentlemen naturally never have any
other objective in mind than the welfare of their fellow-men and
especially of the poorest class."51 The assertions of these Conservative
leaders showed a total lack of understanding of liberalism, a total
aversion to a society of freedom which could expand the economy and
create opportuntities for new achievements along all lines. The
Conservatives were struggling to use the full power of an authoritarian
government, a police state, to prevent a change from the society of the
Old Regime to that of modern industrialism. The conflict over the
form of government involved that over the nature of the society.
Unfortunately the government even of the New Era was not very
responsive to economic needs. The key Ministry of Commerce remained in the hands of von der Heydt, a businessman, but a holdover from the Manteuffel ministry, with a definitely mercantilist point
of view. Back of him stood the King, whose understanding of economics may be judged from the statement in his program of 1858.
"Trade, industry and the closely related means of communication have
expanded to an unimagined extent," he had written; "nonetheless we
must here also be moderate in the objective so that the spirit of fraud
does not wound us. Significant funds must continue to be placed at
the disposal of the means of communications; but they must be
measured in consideration of all state needs, and we must keep within
the budget." The King manifested little enthusiasm for the progress
of trade and commerce. The two points of emphasis in his remarks
had to do with preventing "the spirit of fraud" from "wounding us"
and with assuring that public funds were not devoted to the construction of roads and railroads to such an extent that, for example,
his army would suffer from lack of nourishment. He did not mention
the fact that commerce and industry were making his state more
powerful than ever before, and he failed to perceive that even though
the construction of modern means of communication required a large
initial outlay of money, the advantages to the state and society would
be immediate and out of all proportion to the cost. He sacrificed economic aid for business to the financial needs of his program of military
reforms; and both von der Heydt, although in the end under protest,
and Bismarck acquiesced in his policy. The economic expansion of
these years occurred in spite of the government's indifference .

•• Abg. H., St. B., May 6, 1861; II, 1096·97. Ibid., May 7, 1861; II, 1l07-08.
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N hi, ,c/onn p"'gum of Novembe>-, 1858, the Princ.
Regent included a paragraph about the conditions of the military
service which was so veiled in meaning as to be scarcely noticed.

The army created Prussia's greatness and battled success·
fully for its growth. The neglect of the army brought about
a catastrophe for it and the state, which was gloriously effaced by
the appropriate reorganization of the army, as the victories of
War of Liberation revealed. Forty years' experience and two
short wars have now made us note that much which has not
proved satisfactory needs to be changed. For that work we need
calm, peaceful conditions and money, and it would be a criminal
mistake if one should display a cheap army organization which
for this reason in a decisive moment did not live up to expectations. Prussia's army must be powerful and respected in order
when necessary to be a grave political weight in the scales. 1
The implementation of the idea in this paragraph led to the appointment of General von Roon as Minister of War and of Bismarck as
Minister President; it brought about the constitutional conflict, the
crushing defeat of liberalism and the victory of militarism and Con·
servatism in Prussia and Germany.
The plans for military reform were completed in the next year,
1859, and their execution was initiated with the mobilization for the
Italian war that year. In 1860 the government proposed a bill to the
Landtag to legalize the entire reform, justifying the action by the fact
that the army should be adapted to the changes in population and
society which had occurred since the passage of the basic military law
1

Horst Kohl, op. cit., p. 5.
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of 1814. The government called attention to the fact that the size of
the army remained the same as in 1814, in spite of the fact that the
population had increased from ten million to eighteen million and
that the stipulation for compulsory universal military service in the
law of 1814 was not being carried out. It proposed to increase the
number actually called for military service from twenty-six per cent
to forty per cent of those subject to military duty. The number of
annual recruits would be increased from 40,000 to 63,000 men. The
bill aimed to require military service of three years in the regular
army for the infantry and four years for the cavalry. The three-year
term had been stipulated in the law of 1814, but had actually not been
enforced from 1833 to 1853, when the two-year term had been substituted. Since 1853 the longer term had been restored and the bill
proposed to make it permanent. The Landwehr or reserve was to be
reorganized, with the three youngest year groups incorporated in the
regular army and the older ones used merely within the country for
garrison and similar duties. The term of service in the army would
last from the twentieth to the thirty-sixth year, that is, three years less
than at present. Of these sixteen years, seven were to be spent in the
regular army, three in active service and four in the reserve. The rest
of the term, from the twenty-eighth to the thirty-sixth year, would be
served in the Landwehr. The reform made it possible to leave the
older men, usually fathers of families, at home in case of mobilization
of the troops of the line; previously those who were in the first Landwehr (Erstes Angebot) had to be called at every mobilization for the
army to have enough men. An appropriate number of new regiments
was created to take care of the increased size of the standing army.
With the levying of more recruits and the alignment of the younger
years of the reserve with the standing army, the government expected
to keep the size of the army about the same as before but to have much
younger regular troops and to bring them under the efficient control
of regular army officers.
The Prince Regent regarded the military reform as his own special
task. He was from the start determined to stand or fall with it. He
declared many times that he would renounce the throne rather than
accept any modifications in fundamentals. He believed firmly that an
improvement in the military efficiency and strength of the state required increased conscription with intensive training of recruits for
a period of three years by regular army officers and the subordination
of the Landwehr for the first three years to the authority of the regular
officers. The integral combination in his thinking of military, social
and political arguments becomes clear from his numerous memoranda
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and speeches in the military commission. He constantly declared that
one could teach a peasant the necessary drills in a few months, but that
"to produce the soldierly character in its totality" three years' service
was too little. "For two years the recruit will be completely overpowered by drill and instruction; only in the third year will he learn
to feel himself a soldier and acquire respect for the uniform, for the
seriousness of his profession; and then he will be filled with the spirit
of the caste without which an army cannot exist." The Prince nursed
a deep distrust of the Landwehr, which von Roon and many regular
army officers shared. The Prince related how, when a Landwehr troop
had acted so badly in a review before the late Czar Nicholas I, he had
been sent ahead by the King to the next review place to prevent a
similar disgrace. In the streets one heard at that time the remark,
"There goes the dirty Landwehr man." The Prince had been particularly impressed by the fact that in the Baden campaign of 1849 the
Landwehr troops had had to be driven back into battle by a regiment
of the line. When the Landwehr troops hastened to the colors in the
mobilization of 1859, he remarked dryly that since then their over
estimation of themselves had given way to a healthy humility. Consequently, he regarded three years of training as indispensable, arguing in 1859 as follows:
Why did all Landwehr battalions of the Guard hold loyally
to their oath of service? [He was referring to the events of 184849.] Because the three-year period of service remained in force
in the Guard corps without interruption. Infantry regiments of
the line wavered .... But of all the cavalry regiments of the line
not a single one for even a moment became uncertain in its
loyalty I Why? Because they also had preserved the three-year
period of service.
With such quantitative explanations was his simple military mind
content. 2
Minister of War von Roon concurred in the Prince's low opinion
of the Landwehr. He regarded it as "a false and weak military institution," lacking the "genuine, correct, firm soldier's spirit and the
secure disciplinary control." He objected that the Landwehr man
felt not like a professional soldier but like a civilian, that all this thinking was directed toward civilian ends, that although he knew something about handling weapons "his soul clung to his farm, his chisel,

• See the Prince Regent's memorandum of December, 1859, in Briefe, Reden und
Schriften, I, 461-78; Egmont Zechlin, Bismarck und die Grundlegung der deutschen
Grossmacht (Stuttgart und Berlin, 1930), pp. 176-77.
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his work at his home, not to the flag." One had to appeal to his good
will and at times even to his "supposed patriotic sentiment." To
clinch his point, von Roon related the incident in 1849 of a despairing
commander who had had to buy beer for his Landwehr men to entice
them on. A preferable inducement, von Roon thought, was "the
restorative of the iron screws of military discipline." He believed that
times of general popular enthusiasm would come again, but he
thought it foolish to rely upon such means to accomplish indispensable
results. He preferred to depend upon "a good and sound organization" to use and augment the enthusiasm if present, or to achieve
objectives if absent. Corps spirit, love of honor, loyalty to the warlord were, he said, moral forces which were found in all great armies;
the basis of this spirit was to be had in the common deeds, dangers
and suffering of military discipline. This foundation, he declared,
was lacking in the Prussian Landwehr. He regarded the present Landwehr as a bad political institution, for with it the government could
lot be master in its own house and had constantly to think of the
:ffect of its action in both internal and foreign affairs upon the armed
part of its people, the Landwehr. This was especially the case, he
said, since the introduction of constitutional government, for now each
Landwehr man could use not only his arm but his tongue. To a certain extent he could check the government. This influence made the
government weak where in the interest of the country it should be
strong, indecisive and hesitant where it should be positive and swift.
Von Roon emphasized the value of the principle "The armed force
does not deliberate, it executes."3
This frank statement of Prussian militarism could scarcely have
been improved upon. The country existed to support the army; the
constitution had unfortunately weakened the morale of the army; that
weakness caused by the soldier's being also a voter could be overcome solely by exposing him to three years of intensive drill in the
military spirit by professional army officers; a civilian as soldier was
not to be trusted since he thought too much about those things which
he was defending; every eligible male in the state should be forced to
undergo this training so that he would be a loyal and obedient subject. One may judge from von Roon's remarks that the military reforms were the means by which the ruler and his Conservative army
officers of the nobility hoped to block the constitution's implications

• Zechlin. op. cit., pp. 177-79; Denkwilrdigkeiten aus dem Leben des GeneralFeldmarschalls Kriegsminister Grafen von Roan. (Breslau, 1892). I, 522-24.
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for freedom and a new society and to preserve the old order of caste
and absolutism under a constitutional cover.
The liberals understood the significance of the military reforms
from the start. They were appalled at the cost. The central committee of the German Progressive Party issued a broadsheet in which
it roundly denounced the reforms. 4 The peacetime army for 1862, it
said, called for a minimum of 205,000 men, a maximum of 215,000. If
one chose the median figure of 210,000, it would mean that Prussia
would have twelve soldiers to every 1,000 inhabitants. This figure
should be compared with that of ten per 1,000 in Austria, eight in
Russia and ten in France. Military expenses crippled Austrian and
Russian power to such an extent, the committee argued, that when war
finally came the two countries had plenty of soldiers but lacked the
means to use them successfully. Even France, which was much richer
than Prussia, had had to curtail its military expenditures.
In 1850, the broadsheet continued, Prussia had had an army of
131,000 men and now it was adding 80,000 more. In 1850 the army
had cost 26,000,000 Thalers; at present it cost 40,000,000, or 14,000,000
more. This meant that with 3,500,000 taxpayers in the state, the army
cost each taxpayer annually four Thalers more. In addition, the
country was deprived of the labor power of these 80,000 men, or if one
reckoned the value of the work of each at one hundred Thalers a
year, the country lost a sum of 8,000,000 Thalers' worth of productive
work every year. Thus the army cost the country 22,000,000 Thalers
more than in 1850. This was not all, declared the committee of
liberals. One must add 3,000,000 Thalers to cover cost of new construction and maintenance of fortifications, barracks and hospitals,
of construction of railroads for purely military purposes, of horses,
munitions and so on. Moreover, the soldier lived on the meagerest
possible terms. His pay of two and a half silver Groschen and one and
a half pounds of bread daily was not enough to maintain him. His
family, already deprived of his productive services, had to send him
food and money. The amount paid by the state for quartering troops
was utterly inadequate to cover costs and the burden was unfairly distributed. Nor was the reorganization of the army as yet completed.
One could expect fairly soon that the sum of 7,000,000 Thalers would
have to be added to the 22,000,000 or 23,000,000. And the navy had
not even been mentioned; it needed much more money than it had

• Spart im Frieden, dass lhr Stark im Kriege Seid. See also National Zeitung,
Jan. 26, 1861, and the debates in Abg. H., St. B., May 27-28, 1861; III, 1399 If.
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been recelvmg. The broadsheet estimated that sooner or later the
army reform would cost the country some 32.000,000 Thalers more
than in 1850, or nine Thalers for each h,ead of a family.
In calculating the size of the force available for immediate mobilization, the liberal broadsheet stated that the reorganization provided
only 353,000 men, whereas the army prior to 1860 could muster 344,000
men for immediate service. It concluded that the reform was not worth
the effort.
The liberals on the one side and the ruler and his military advisers
on the other had entirely different conceptions of defence. The former
believed that a country was strong in defence if it was economically
prosperous. They feared that the military reforms would wreck the
economy and expose the country in time of war to extreme danger.
They believed in the intelligent loyalty of each citizen to the country
and his willingness and ability to fight in a crisis. They disliked intensely the sense of social inequality which was preserved in the army.
The King and his military entourage emphasized the necessity of drill
and more drill for the inculcation of social and political obedience,
not to say docility. They stressed the organizational aspects of defence and tended to belittle the spiritual; and they had little or no
understanding for the economic factors. Two different views of life
were here opposed to each other, that of the growing industrial, liberal
society and that of the Old Regime.
Numerous complaints, especially in the Western provinces but also
in the Eastern, were levelled against the cost of quartering the troops.
Since the old system of requiring the locality to pay the cost still prevailed, those towns that had the misfortune to be selected for either
temporary or permanent quartering found themselves burdened with
excessive expenses, and they petitioned the Lower House to change
the system and relieve them of this load. Dusseldorf, for example, had
in former years paid 6,000 Reichsthalers, but in 1859 it had had to pay
out 50,000. The compensation provided by the government was regarded as much too low; the unfortunate towns had to make up the
difference to enable the soldiers to live. From Thorn came the
criticism that quartering cost one and a half to two Thalers, whereas
the government in summer paid for quarters only eight silver Groschen
and five Pfennig and in winter fourteen silver Groschen and one
Pfennig. (One Thaler = 30 Groschen; 1 Groschen = 8 Pfennig.) The
presence of the troops benefited only the tavern and the shopkeeper,
ran the criticism, and was a disadvantage to everyone else because of
the increased price of the usual necessities of life and increased wages.
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In the West a lively town did not want a garrison to be stationed in
its midst. In the Eastern provinces, however, the degree of economic
and cultural activity in many towns may be judged from the fact that
some of them actually petitioned for garrisons. The presence of
soldiers meant to them the stir of life. Nonetheless there was general
approval of the recommendation made in June, 1861, by the Commercial and Industrial Association of the Rhineland and Westphalia
that the cost of quartering troops be regarded as a state and not a
local expense and that it be absorbed by the state budget.1i
Strenuous objection was raised to increasing the size of the army.
The shortage of labor due to mobilization, it was said, would become
chronic. Manpower would be wasted; all those months of military
service would be devoted to non-productive purposes. Trades could
not be learned; idleness and ignorance would result. From Trier
came reports in 1862 that persons were emigrating to escape higher
taxes and the long military service. At Stettin Doctor Wolff, a leading
liberal, stated in August, 1864, that young men in the Baltic towns
were prevented by military duty from visiting foreign commercial centers and establishing connections, and that commerce was hurt more
by military conscription than any other branch of the economy.6
Representatives of the other branches raised similar objections. Except among the few Conservatives military service was universally disliked.
The government argued that even with the increase in the size of
the standing army the percentage of the population in service remained
less than that in any year between 1816 and 1822. In 1816 Prussia
had had a population of 10,349,031 and an army of 130,000 men, or
1.25 per cent. The percentage had steadily declined until in 1857 it
had reached 0.80 per cent of a population of 17,560,886. The new
organization of the army in 1861 put some 205,000 men in the army out
of a population of 18,246,760 (1.12 per cent). The government compared these figures, which included both land and sea power, with
those for Great Britain (0.75 per cent), France (1.13 per cent), Austt:ia
(1.25 per cent) , and Russia (1.33 per cent)-to the manifest advantage

• Berliner Borsen Zeitung, Dec. 28. 1859. June 12. 1861. Abg. B .• St. B., May 29.
1861; 111.1500. Ibid., Feb. II. 1861; I. 197-200. Ibid., May 28-29. 1861; III. 14~8. 150~.
Xolnuche Zeitung, March 9. 1862.
• See chamber of commerce reports of 1860-62; Xolnische Zeitung, April 27. 1862;
Vierterjahrschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Xulturgeschichte (1864). III. 2~.
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of the government's claim for more manpower to keep up with the
others. 7
The liberals replied with other figures, which included. the number
not merely of the standing army but of all the troops in service, and
came to the conclusion that Prussia had an army of 430,000 men, or
almost 2.5 per cent of its population, and that if garrison troops and
Landwehr were considered the percentage would reach about four. II
The views about the period of service necessary were equally opposed. Claiming that three years were essential to train a soldier, the
government contrasted the short term of service in Prussia with the
length of it elsewhere. In Russia, it stated, the soldier served from the
ages of twenty to thirty-two, in Austria from twenty to twenty-eight,
in France from twenty-one to twenty-seven, in Prussia from twenty to
twenty-three. If one added the service in the reserve the terms were:
in Russia from the age of twenty to that of thirty-five, in Austria from
twenty to thirty, in France from twenty-one to twenty-eight, in Prussia
from twenty to twenty-seven. The government pointed out that all
military obligation in Prussia ceased with the thirty-sixth year, whereas
it continued in Bavaria to the sixtieth year and in Russia to the fiftyfifth. It added that it would not be necessary to call to service even in
time of war the personnel above thirty-two years of age and concluded
that in Prussia the admitted burdens of compulsory military service
were held to a minimum.9
Severe protests were registered against the government for spending
so little for cultural or productive purposes. The Zeitung fur Norddeutschland remarked in January, 1861, that the present Prussian
government was "not all too human" in its support of literature and
art, that it was employing no artist of significance. It compared this
attitude with that in Bavaria, where recently the King had again given
large commissions to German artists. It reported that the artists in
Berlin feared the cessation of architectural and other artistic work
already in progress there_ 10 The Volkszeitung Gune 14, 1862) reported that newspapers were again expressing the need for a new parliament building. "They forget," this liberal paper commented, "that
we still need so and so many barracks for the new regiments_ First

• Die lnnere Politik der Preussischen Regierung von 1862 bis 1866. S4mmlung
der amtlichen Kundgebungen und halb4mtlichen A'usserungen (Berlin, 1866), pp.
lI5,55-56.
• Bremer Handelsblatt, July 6, 1861.
• Die Inn ere Politik, pp. 75-76.
1& T4gesbericht, No.4, Jan. 5, 1861.
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business and then pleasure. Barracks come first." The Kolnische
Zeitung (March 31, 1862) stated that "the world-famous University of
Berlin has no chemical laboratory!" and that apart from the Industrial
Institute in Berlin, Prussia had no polytechnic institute. Prussian
students had to go to Hanover, Karlsruhe or elsewhere to study engineering. Prussia had money only for the army. Most complaints, as
we have seen, were registered about the failure of the government to
devote larger sums to the construction of railroads and good roads
and to the improvement of canals. The papers and the reports of
chambers of commerce were full of such expressions. At the Berlin
meeting of the Prussian Commercial Association in March, 1860, the
chairman, David Hansemann, an ultra right-wing liberal, declared:
In one sense the convention has expressd itself with unanimity; in several votes it has given to understand with absolute
clarity that the state has great cause to devote more public funds
to productive purposes (navigable waterways, and so forth). It
has been stated that in this respect our fatherland has remained
behind other countries. If the same system of saving and devoting state money to other than productive purposes continues in
the present degree, as appears likely, Prussia will in the progress
of its welfare remain significantly behind other countries. I believe that these unanimous opinions should carry some weight,
for they are expressed by an assembly which is composed largely
of people who pay no small amount of taxes and who have a
great interest in the preservation of state credit and of a good
rate for state bonds. l l
The government tried to refute the charges of excessive burden. In
the Lower House Finance Minister von Patow admitted on May 28,
1861, that military costs had cut into expenditures for other purposes
but added that the budget for that year contained about the same
amount for productive expenditures that it had allotted for the past
decade. 12 The semi-official Stern-Zeitung in a series of articles in 1862
argued that Prussia had borne similar burdens before and could do so
again. It declared that the present high cost was necessary because
of failure to keep up the army in past years and that even with the reform Prussia had scarcely attained its former military strength with
respect to other countries. 13
The government claimed that the cost of the military after the reorganization constituted a lower percentage of the total public ex-

Bremer Handelsblatt, March 10, 1860, p. 93.
Abg. H., St. B., May 28. 1861; III. 1446-47.
13 Die lnnere Politik, p. 33.
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penditure than at any time between 1820 and 1849. It offered the
following figures as evidence: In 1820 the total public expenditure had
been 72,818,848 Thalers, of which the sum of 27,472,223 Thalers, or
37.73 per cent, had been devoted to the army. In 1847, the figures had
been 89,563,361 Thalers, 28,305,615 Thalers, and 31.6 per cent. In
1859 they had been 131,137,859 Thalers, 32,315,877 Thalers, and 24.64
per cent. And in 1861 they were 138,585,051 Thalers, 40,361,104
Thalers, and 29.12 per cent. The government further argued, with
statistics, that the cost of the army was less in proportion to size of
population and army than that in any of the large European states
except Russia.14
The government's defence did not convince the liberals, who objected to the military budget not so much on grounds of the money"s
being used wastefully but rather because so much was allocated to the
army at all. The justice of the liberals' criticism was acknowledged
even within the ministry. In March, 1862, Minister von der Heydt
wrote to his colleague von Roon a confidential letter which through
some slip appeared in the press. In it he urged a reduction in taxes
and in expenses.
That the larger part [of the reduction in revenue] can occur
only in case of a reduction in military expenditures ... hardly
needs to be shown further, for it is sufficiently known to you that
expenditures in all other administrative branches have been curtailed for years in order to reduce the deficit caused by the increased needs of the military administration while maintaining
the appearance of fulfilling repeated governmental promises.
The result has been that the needs postponed from year to year
because of lack of funds have become increasingly apparent. It
will no longer be possible without disadvantage to the country
further to ignore these and to decline those many requests for
increased expenditures made in the Landtag during consideration of the budget by pointing to the lack of funds. 10
In the Lower House Deputy von Ammon, who had served in the
War of Liberation against Napoleon, attacked the preferential financial
and social position of the military officers. He denounced the amount
of their salaries as proposed in the budget as "enormous" and "out of
all proportion to those of civil officials." The five hundred majors,
for example, he said, had far larger salaries than any civilian councillor

Ibid., pp. 39-40,48-74_
The letter is to be found in the Volkszeitung, April 6, 1862. It was reprinted
in other papers, but was given a modest summary in Bergengriin, Staatsminister
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of comparable rank could hope to obtain. In addition the officers
received extra assistance, service, and rations, which augmented their
income. While subaltern officers' salaries were not large, these young
men were rapidly promoted.
Compare the long and expensive theoretical and practical
preparation which every other state official has to go through.
When one considers that, for example, our assessors must wait
ten to twelve years for fees or a fixed salary and become gray,
while the subaltern officer who entered service at an earlier year
will have already in this period of time become a captain, you
will find in that situation no similarity.
When a position is to be filled in the civil bureaucracy there
is often no money available. The pension which a retiring
official is to receive can mostly be paid only out of the salary of
the position become vacant. In the case of the military, on the
other hand, everything is richly provided. Every position that
becomes vacant is immediately filled. Pensions are easily obtained, and in most cases are larger than those that can be
claimed by civil officials of comparable rank.
Von Ammon objected to the military as an "exclusive special caste, the
first estate in the country."
This prejudice is furthered ... by the undeniable preference
for nobles, by the autonomy of regiments [in selecting their own
officer personnel] which do not even accept what the highest war
lord gives them, ... by a policy, which, in spite of the view that
the soldier should not engage in politics, is characterized by opposition to all liberal progress,16
Von Ammon's criticism was approved by Freiherr von Hoverbeck,
who expressed the conviction that at the present scale of pay the common soldier was starving, unless he had the good fortune to receive
outside support or was able to work on the side,17 The Berlin correspondent of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung contrasted the scale of
financial support of the army with that of teachers, which was
notoriously low. IS
The main objection which the liberals had against the military
reform grew out of social conditions. Deputy Bramer did not criticize
"the corps spirit" as an evil but he denounced "the caste spirit which
is formed."19 Aristocratic caste and privilege dominated the army, he
.. Abg. H., St. B., May 27, 1861; III, 1398·99 .
• 7 Ibid., May 27, 1861; III, 1399·1400. Also Ludolf Parisius, Leopold Freiherr von
Haverbeclr. (Berlin, 1897·98), I, 196; II, 200 If .
•• Tagesberichte, No. 16, Jan. 20, 1862.
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said, and served as the basic support for the Old Regime throughout
the state. The nobility enjoyed almost a monopoly of the higher
officers' posts in the army and by far a majority of all the positions.
The only branch in which the nobles did not like to serve was the
artillery, where the necessarily strict training in mathematics did not
appeal to them. 20 A contemporary stated in 1860 that ninety per cent
of the officers in the cavalry were nobles, about seventy per cent in
the infantry, and around thirty per cent in the artillery. The higher
in rank one went, the larger became the percentage of nobles; over
ninety per cent of all generals in all branches of service were nobles.
A continuing supply of noble officers was assured by the fact that over
seventy per cent of the students in the cadet schools, the military training centers for officers, belonged to the aristocracy.21
The guard regiments and others of special social prestige were exclusively officered by nobles. The cadet schools served as training
centers of indigent young sons of the numerous military nobility,
whose only inheritance, said Minister von Roon, was their sword.
While a fourth or a third of the pupils were of bourgeois origin, the
schools succeeded in excluding bourgeois influence and in training the
authoritarian officer, acutely aware of his superiority over everyone
else in the state. General von Roon offered in his own person an
example of what the schools produced. He had found in one of them
about the only home he had ever known. 22 Their reputation was
shown in a secret police report in Breslau, June 25, 1860. An actor
in a local theater had asked on the stage: "What is a Cadet house?"
He had answered, "A school in which it is made certain that not even
by mistake a burgher will become a general." Shouts of laughter and
enthusiastic approval, continued the police report, greeted this statement. The police officer added that he had taken steps to investigate,
and he was later able to report that the actor had been punished. 23
The most startling evidence of the caste spirit among the military
was offered by the duel in 1861 between General von Manteuffel, the
King's military adjutant, and the liberal deputy, Karl Twesten. The

2. See also speeches of Deputies Hermann, Immermann and Bramer, in Abg. H.,
St. B., 1861; III, 1465·68. Also von Bernhardi, op. cit., III, 284 .
.. Gutsmuth. op. cit., I. 11·17. Minister von Roon in general gave similar figures
for the percentage of noble officers. See his speech in Abg. H., St. B., May 29. 1861;
III. 1459. 1462 .
•• On the cadet schools see the remarks by Deputies Fliegel and Bramer in Abg.
H .• St. B .• 1861; III. 1461·62. 1468. Also by von Roon, Ibid., III. 1459. 1462 .
•• Polizei-Bericht, Breslau. June 25. 1860. These police reports were used in the
Prussian State Archives in Berlin-Dahlem.
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latter had published a pamphlet entitled What Can Still Save Us, in
which he had discussed the condition of Prussia and Germany and had
proposed solutions to essential problems. In the course of the analysis
he had called General von Manteuffel "a harmful man in a harmful
position."24 The general took personal offence at the remark and
challenged the author to a duel. The latter replied that he had not
meant to question Manteuffel's personal honor, but as the general insisted on a duel Twesten accepted. The fight took place, ending with
Manteuffel unhurt and Twesten wounded in the arm. "Even after
Twesten shot, Manteuffel is said to have demanded that he take back
his words," wrote Deputy von Ammon to Heinrich Kruse of the
KOlnische Zeitung, "whereupon Twesten is said to have answered
that he could not understand how one could make such a demand of
him. Moreover, it is said that Manteuffel did not immediately fire but
calmlyaimed."25
The liberals unanimously condemned the duel. To Twesten it
meant that no one of any consequence could attack the military. The
National Zeitung added that the duel made perfectly clear the military
nobility's claim to be an unapproachable caste. The liberal journal
saw in this fact the existence of a "disastrous split" in the nation.
Deputy von Ammon expressed to his friend Kruse the expectation that
the Ko/nische Zeitung would do its share "for the eradication of this
barbaric vestige of a medieval ordeal."26
The King reacted in a personal way. "To have to do without
Manteuffel's service at this time," he wrote von Roon somewhat incoherently, "the triumph of democracy in having driven him out of
my presence, the scandal which this event must make in my closest
circle, these are matters which almost rob me of my senses because it
puts upon my government another unfortunate stigmal! What will
Heaven do with me?"27 Not a word about Twesten, not a word about
the illegality of the event, nothing except concern for his military,
his nobility, his government, his own prestige!
The official handling of the duel proved equally revealing. Twesten, the burgher, was suspended from office during the investigation.
He was hauled before the court; the three judges found him guilty of
having insulted Manteuffel but regarded his acceptance of the challenge as necessary in order not to lose the respect of his peers. Man2. The actual word used was "unheilvoll." Heyderhoff, op. cit., I, 63 .
•• Ibid., I, 65 .
•• Ibid., I, 64, 65.
27 Briefe, Reden und Schriften, II, 15.
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teuffel continued to confer daily with the King, who could not bear
to part with him. In commenting on: the disparity of treatment Deputy
von Ammon called it "injustice," an example of prejudice, and wished
the Kiilnische Zeitung to emphasize that "truth cannot be refuted by
a pistol." The National Zeitung remarked: "It is already a scandal
that a preferred caste can in violation of the law force its duelling
code upon the great majority of citizens which in our century is too
enlightened to defend itself with weapons against words; but what if
the state measures the illegal action of the parties by different standards
because they belong to different occupational classes?"
The reaction of the general public may be gauged from the response
to a speech which Twesten made in Berlin in April of the next year
as candidate for re-election to the Lower House. He closed his address by asserting: "As for me I hope that I am worthy of the belief
that I do not spare my person and that I shall risk more than office and
salary before I retreat from political activity so long as I may believe
myself able in any way to serve my country." The entire audience of
1,500 people rose and responded by "long-continuing stormy applause."28
The difference between the liberal and the Conservative mentality
may be seen in the subsequent behavior of the two participants in the
duel. Twesten continued to be a courageous and independent political
leader. Within a few months of the speech cited above he came to the
conclusion that the military reforms had been actually executed to
such an extent that the Lower House could not block or fundamentally
change them. He held no grudge against the military because of the
duel; he served not his hatred but his country. Upon defending his
changed opinion, he was thrown out of the Progressive party and in
the next year he failed to be re-elected from Berlin; but he clung to
his beliefs. Manteuffel remained an egotist, a reactionary, an intriguer.
Both von Roon and Bismarck had trouble with him. His were personal characteristics, not necessarily those of Conservatism; but the
rigidity of Manteuffel's thinking and acting exemplified the traits of
the society in which he moved, and that society included the King.
Within the course of the next two years von Roon and Bismarck were
both to challenge liberal critics in the Lower House to duels. The
affairs were never carried out; but they indicated that the Conservative
technique of employing physical force to subdue an opponent was to
invade even the legislative chamber of a culturally advanced society .

•• Heyderhoff, op. cit., 1,66, 87.
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The liberals were divided in their conception of what the military
force should be. A few favored a militia like that in Switzerland; some,
especially in the Western provinces, advocated the right of persons
called to service to supply substitutes; some varied this proposal with
one in favor of having mercenaries; some wished a nucleus of a professional army, supplemented by a youth trained in sports, gymnastics
and shooting. The vast majority of liberals, however, favored the
military system erected by General von Boyen in 1814, the system which
the King was determined to change. They favored at most a two-year
term of active military service for all, and the retention of the Landwehr in its old form.21I
General von Boyen had organized the Landwehr in two reserves:
the second was composed of older men on call in emergency; the first
consisted of the personnel which had served its term in the army of the
line. The Landwehr was sharply separated from the latter and had
its own officers, usually persons who had volunteered for one year,
received the necessary training and passed the necessary examinations.
The Landwehr battalions of the first reserve formed part of the army
of the line; on mobilization they were called to duty, but they preserved their own identity from the regular troops. In this way von
Boyen had hoped to associate the people with the regular army, to
make the army a people's army, and to prevent a caste feeling from developing among the regular officers, which would once more. as in the
Eighteenth Century, weaken the military strength of the state by
dividing the civilian and the military population. Von Boyen had
drawn these lessons from the experience of the Prussian army since its
collapse in 1806 at Jena. Above all, the army should remain a
popular force, and the Landwehr was contituted with this intention.
Even though by the 1850s the nobility had acquired major control of
the higher positions in the Landwehr. the officers of the reserve continued to come in the main from the middle class. so
The retention of the Landwehr in the form created by von Boyen
meant to the liberals the preservation of the military system that had
defeated Napoleon. It signified the system in which militarism had
been checked by associating the army with the popular forces of the
•• For the report of the discussion at the Seventh Congress of German Economists,
see Kolnische Zeitung, May 6. 1862; Tagesbericht, No. 18. Jan. 22, 1862. citing the
Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 20. Jan. 20; Vierteljahrschrift filr Volkswirtschaft und
Kulturgeschichte (1864), III. 220-224.
a. Gutsmuth. op. cit., I. 18. In 1853 some 64 per cent of the staff officers of the
Landwehr were nobles. but only 37 per cent of the first lieutenants and 23 per cent
of the second lieutenants.
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people. It institutionalized the ideals of the great period of social
and political reform and of military devotion to the fatherland. The
liberals accused the regular army officers of having deliberately
weakened the Landwehr since 1814 by neglecting to train the officers
and by failing to assist it in maintaining efficiency.31 They believed
that the regular army sought to create an excuse to destroy the Landwehr as a separate organization and to bring the reserve troops directly
under its control. The King's reform program meant to the liberals
the culmination of this strategy; and they opposed it as an expression
of Junker militarism certain to cause once again a split between the
army and the people and to weaken the defences of the state. Only if
the Landwehr were rejuvenated and treated as an equal, they thought,
would defence be strengthened. The liberals were not opposd to expanding the numbers called to military service. In fact, they favored it,
but they did object on military, social and political grounds to the
destruction of the Boyen type of army. They felt that the King intended thereby to preserve his absolutism, that the conflict over the
military summed up the conflict along the entire front between liberalism and absolutism. "We have only one conflict and only one question
of life or death," wrote Deputy von Hoverbeck in January 1862, "upon
which everything is concentrated, the military question." Deputy
Fischel had already stated in private in April, 1860, that if the Lower
House should approve the military bill proposed by the government,
"the liberal party would be ruined in the country."32
In the course of the conflict over the military reorganization the
difference of views about the position of the Landwehr became less important than that concerning the length of the term of service. Should
it be three years, or should it be restricted to two? The liberals concentrated on this issue as their major means of blocking the drive for
control by Junker militarism. They did not even make an issue of the
fact that the army took an oath of allegiance not to the constitution
but to the King. Although this question would undoubtedly haye
come up in time, the liberals had for the present enough difficulty in
trying to win on the simplest and clearest of issues, two years' service
or three.
In January, 1862, the semi-official Stern-Zeitung issued the following
warning: "The alternative that confronts us is absolutely clear: if the

.. See, among others, Parisius, von Hover beck, I, 173 .
•• See Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 5. Abg. H., St. B., 1861; III, 1405-06. Von
Bernhardi, op. cit., III, lIIS.
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Landtag passes the military budget, our constitutional system triumphs;
if the opposite occurs it is lost:'33 The liberals paid little heed to this
warning. They maintained that the King should follow the will of
the nation as expressed in the reaction of the representatives in the
Lower House of the Landtag. The state of mind of the vast majority
of the liberals was reflected in an article in the W ochenschrift des
National Vereins published soon after Bismarck took office.a!
The three-year term of service is apparently a dogma to the
King and in consequence the orthodox and sanctimonious
, spiritual fathers call any opposition to the reorganization and
the three-year service "a rebellion against the order of God,"
preach the immaculate sanctity of the new battalions and the
new officers' positions and proclaim amidst hosannas the satisfaction of the heavenly armies with the constant increase of the
earthly ones. Out of the dogma about the three-year service and
out of the horrible picture of revolution this party [the Conservative] has woven the threads with which it knows cleverly
and brazenly how to guide the King.
, In another address originating among pastors it even says:
"the Pruss ian people will ever more clearly respect and feel
under Your Royal scepter that God sits in the regiment and
guides all to the best." Thus instead of the usual view of absolutism about divine inspiration God now sits in person in the
government, and the rule of the King by means of the Bismarck
ministry is frankly identified with God and rule of the universe!
Servility was assuredly not pushed farther even under Domitian,
and such blasphemy is reported as "heartwarming exaggeration"
and causes no offense at all.
The question of military reorganization led to complete antagonism
in the relations between the King and his government on the one hand
and the Lower House of the Landtag on the other. Faulty handling
of, the problem on both sides accentuated a fundamental difference
and brought the issue to a head. After the King had used the mobilization of 1859 caused by the Austro-Italian war as the occasion for beginning the military reform, his ministry submitted a budget the next
year for continuing the work and promised that a bill on the military organi;z:ation would be placed before the Lower House. In 1860
a bill to that effect was introduced, but consideration of it required
so much time that the Lower House did not complete its investigation
and once more passed a provisional military budget while making
clear that it had not yet decided pro or con about the military re-

.3 Tagesbericht, No. 13, Jan. 16, .1862 .
.. Nov. 28, 1862, pp. 1132-33.

Militarism

/

101

forms as such. The King and his Minister of War continued the reorganization as if it were to be permanent. Having seen the hostility
of the Lower House to the military proposal, the government in 1861
changed its tactics and stated that a new law on military reorganization
was unnecessary, claiming authority under the law of 1814.35 Nonetheless, the disinclination to oppose the liberals in the ministry caused
the Lower House to approve the funds in the extraordinary budget
by a very small majority obtained by the votes of all the ministers.
Once more the House made clear that the approval of funds was provisional and should not be interpreted as final acceptance of the reorganization. Early in 1862 the ministry was again ready to submit
a military bill, but as soon as the liberal ministers were ousted von
Roon declared that a change in the law of 1814 was not necessary.
The ministry was certainly not straightforward in its dealings with
the Lower House. It knew that the King was determined to reorganize the army and to maintain the reform once it had been accomplished; but instead of saying so and taking at the beginning a
legal stand one way or the other and adhering consistently to it, the
Minister of War tried first one way of assuring the permanence of the
reforms and then another_ He proposed a new law; but when he saw
that he could not put it through, he declared the reforms enacted on
the basis of a law of 1814 to be legal anyway. The Lower House reacted with equal lack of courage and consistency. Twice to grant
funds on a provisional basis for a reform which was becoming permanent under its own eyes and about which it knew the King's intentions, and then suddenly to deny those funds and demand reform on
its own terms, was hardly good politics or even, for that matter, quite
fair to the King. The two sides muddled into the conflict.
Early in 1862 the government once more asked for funds in the
regular budget but without a bill on the military reorganization. By
this time the House was suspicious and angry, and as the government
again declared that the law of 1814 gave the King the power to reorganize and expand the army and that a new law was unnecessary, the
liberals accused the ministry of violating its promise to submit legislaS'The law of 1814 stated in Paragraph Fifteen that "in war time troops may
be attached to or severed from the parts of the army according to need and all
units called to service may he enlarged from the ones that remained at home or
from those growing up:' Die Inn ere' Politik, p. 91. The government also referred
to the third paragraph of that law which stated that "the size of the standing army
and of the Landwehr will be determined by the situation of the state at the time."
Rudolf von Gneist, Die Militiirvorlage von 1892 und der preussische Verfassungskonftikt von 1862 bis 1866 (Berlin, 1893), p. 34.
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tion on the question and of trying to deprive the Landtag of its share
of control of military affairs. They planned to refuse to grant the
extra funds for the military reform and by breaking the budget down
into smaller units than at present to ~ighten the legislative control
over military expenditures. They thereby sought to prevent the
government from being able to retain the reforms by covering the
cost from concealed items in the budget or from funds transferred from
one category to another. They aimed to use their constitutional right
to pass the budget each year as a means of controlling the size of the
army. This action led the King to dissolve the Lower House and call
for new elections, the results of which were even more liberal than
before.
The liberals were aware of the fact that they were opposing the
King on the military question, for the latter had made widely known
his determination to stand or fall by the military reorganization. They
knew that he regarded the reorganization as entirely within his competence. For a time during the regency the liberal deputy Gneist had
been a member of a small group which the Regent had invited each
week to the palace. Later he wrote:
I gained the impression that the Regent recognized without
any doubt that personal military duty could be introduced only
by a formal law, that namely a three-year term of service could
be changed into a four-year term (as was proposed for a time for
the cavalry) by a law. But he understood the word organization
in the sense that had become firmly established among the administrative officials, as compassing any change within the
framework of an administrative branch, thus for example the
increase in the number of army cadres. In view of Paragraph
Three of the law of September 3, 1814, he had no doubt about
his authority to determine annually the peace-time strength of
the army.a6
To many people, including liberals, the ruler had asserted that he
would abdicate rather than recede on this question. He openly expressed his anger at the Lower House for holding up the final approval
of the reforms. As early as 1860 he was accusing the deputies in the
Lower House of lack of patriotism because they would not accept his
military program. On learning in March of that year that the Lower
House was still debating over the length of the term of military service, William "raised his hands in unwilling amazement" and exclaimed, " ... if only the people would not talk about matters which

•• Von Gneist, op. cit., pp. 83-84.
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they do not understand." A month later he said to some officers that
"as long as I live I will never agree to the two-year service," and he was
already threatening to abdicate. By June, 1860, he regarded all who
opposed the military reforms as "enemies or revolutionaries, . . .
because they were seeking to limit the highest attribute of royalty, the
war command."37 And in June, 1861, Deputy von Ammon wrote his
friend Kruse of the Kolnische Zeitung, "The King thinks and dreams
of nothing but soldiers and the day before yesterday said to some
deputies that the approval of funds for the military in the extraordinary budget is entirely unacceptable. 'What is, remains; the army
organization should become definitive; that is what I wish and it must
be done, otherwise I go!' "38
The liberals knew that personages at court, especially the King's
reactionary brother, Prince Friedrich Karl, and the military adjutants,
were stirring the royal anger by conjuring the threat of revolution.
In March, 1862, detailed reports were published in liberal newspapers
about the military precautions taken during the winter against the
possibility of revolution. The liberals had also read the King's statement to the generals of the army at the coronation in the autumn of
1861.
The crown has descended upon me from God's hands, and
when I take it from His holy altar and place it upon my head, I
receive His blessing that it be preserved for me! The army has
the duty to defend it, and Prussia's kings have never seen the
army waver in its loyalty. It has been that which has recently
saved the King and the Fatherland in most calamitous storms
and has made him secure. I also count on this loyalty and devotion if I have to call upon it against enemies from whatever side
they may come.
The implication for the liberals was clear: "from whatever side they
may come" included internal as well as external enemies of both the
crown and the fatherland. 39
The conflict over the military reorganization reached a crisis in
September, 1862. A commission of the Lower House had for several
months been deliberating upon the budget for the military and in
September brought in its report. It recommended striking all funds
for the reorganization and restoring the budget for the pre-reformed
army. The House debated the report extensively. A handful of
.. Von Bernhardi, op. cit., III, 272-317 passim; IV,5.
8. Heyderholf, op. cit., I, 66.
I. Horst Kohl, 01'. cit., p. 29. On the liberals' knowledge of the K.ing'. attitude,
see Parisius, von Hoverbeck, I, 176, II, 8, 65 If; Philippson, 01'. cit., pp. 52,57.59,87.
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liberals, among them Twesten, von Sybel and von Stavenhagen, expressed concern over the fact that the conflict about the military
reorganization was involving the person of the King. These liberals
argued that the military had actually been reorganized, the new regiments had been created, new officers appointed, the Landwehr broken
up. They concluded that the work could not be undone. They
stated further that the King had personally committed himself completely to these reforms and that the Landtag could not afford to affront
him by forcing the government to restore the status quo ante. They
wished to reach a compromise with the government by which in return for approval of the reorganization the two-year term of service
would be restored. Von Roon intimated that the compromise might
be accepted; but the King remained adamant and once more threatened to abdicate. Since the ministers were always susceptible to pressure
by this kind of emotional outburst, von Roon rejected the proposed
compromise. In consequence, the House passed by an overwhelming
vote the recommendation of the commission, refusing funds for the
reorganization. If abided by, that resolution would have forced the
King to restore the army to its earlier form.40
The Lower House would undoubtedly have accepted a compromise
on the terms proposed by Twesten and his few colleagues. The actual
fact was that the funds for 1862 about which the House was voting
at this late date had in the main already been spent. To have been
forced to undo the military reform would have weakened Prussia and
been an affront to the King. The liberals knew that the King had
blocked the acceptance of the compromise, just as they knew that he
had been mainly responsible all along for the military program. They
were determined to defend the rights of the Lower House even at the
risk, or the certainty, of a break with the crown. 41
The liberals could not comprehend why anyone should be so
adamant on the question of the three-year term of service when the
evidence was so largely in favor of the two-year period. They cited the
fact that from 1833 to 1853 the shorter period had obtained, that two
kings plus their generals had regarded it as satisfactory. Even if that
had not been the case, they argued,
We know very well that of the brave soldiers with whom our
generals so thoroughly defeated in 1813, 1814 and 1815 a general
O. On this crisis see Zechlin, pp. 277 If, and the literature which he cites.
"It is said that not merely von der Heydt but also von Roon is willing to give
in, I;mt. that yesterday the King rejected evrything." Twesten to Lipke, Sept. 18,
1862. Hc::yderhoff •. op. cit., l, 116; see also Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 8,47, 78.
U
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like Napoleon and an army like the French scarcely a single one
had served in peace time longer than a year. The Landwehr
men had at most been drilled a couple of months and many
only a couple of weeks_ Now we have no more generals who
have actually served in war; nonetheless they think themselves
much wiser than Scharnhorst and BlUcher ever were. So wise
are these gentlemen that they do not doubt for a moment that a
seventeen-year-old cadet can enter the line as officer and that the
former junior in high school can easily be trained to be a reserve and Landwehr officer in one year's time. All other young
people are so awkward and stupid that they must be drilled and
maneuvered and must stand watch at least three years before
they can be used as soldiers in the field. Let anyone understand that who can!42
Neither von Roon nor Bismarck had any particular conviction
about the term of service. As early as 1859 von Roon had been willing
to accept the shorter perio?, and in the September crisis of 1862 he
proposed to accede on this point in return for liberal concessions on
others. As for Bismarck, as soon as he became Minister President he
frankly told liberal leaders that in time he would win the King to
accept the two-year term of service, that with a corresponding number
of re-enlisted soldiers he thought it militarily preferable. The attitude of both, however, can be summed up in Bismarck's assertion that
he would support the King even if the latter wished a ten-year term of
service. 43 They were frankly carrying out the King's orders, no matter
what, until they were able to win him to their way of thinking.
As for the Conservatives, they were jubilant over the proposals for
military reform. Early in 1860 their leaders handed the ruler a
memorandum expressing their loyalty, approving the military reforms
and offering to put them through for him, and saying that one could
not govern with liberals. They saw an opportunity to regain power,
and they were undoubtedly growing in influence. By January, 1861,
a Berlin correspondent to the Zeitung fur N orddeutschland noted that
"the military party has won such overwhelming influence at court that
retreat is out of the question."44
Under the circumstances, prospects of cooling off the King and
persuading him to accept anything short of a fight to the finish seemed
remote. The height of his temperature may be gauged by a letter
which he wrote in August, 1862, to an old liberal acquaintance, von
•• spart im Frieden. See also Gneist, op. cit., pp. 40-41; Parisius, von Hoverbeck,
II, 61.
.
•• Zechlin, pp. 278-80, 291, 325, 334, 354 .
•• VOQ. Bernhardi, op. cit., III, 281-82, 310; Tagesbericht, No. 25, Jan. 30, 1861.
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Saucken-J ulienfelde, who tried to bring him to comprehend the position of the Lower House on the military question. The King refused to
listen to him and replied with the following letter, in which one can
still hear the pen stab the paper and the ink explode.
Who started the conflict? Have I not laid the reorganization of the army before the Landtag with the completest possible
frankness, a reorganization which has occurred in an entirely
legal and constitutional way? Does the constitution prescribe
the number of battalions and the number of annual recruits and
horses? Does it prescribe the number of officers and underofficers? No! What does it prescribe? The term of service and
the division of the recruits into the line and the reserve. For this
division the legal change has already been laid before the Landtag in the session of 1859-60, and in addition the constitutional
approval of the money for the reorganization was requested.
What has the Second Chamber done? It has attacked and
changed the reorganization through persons who understood
nothing of the matter; and when the House ran into a cul de sac
it only granted the funds for the reorganization provisionally.
In the following year the House took a similar course and again
finally approved the funds in an extraordinary budget. During
two years the revolutionary and democratic press has not ceased
to scatter lie after lie about the reorganization and· the financial
situation until the people at last believed that we were on the
point of bankruptcy and had an unbearable budget. This had
to precede the new plan of operations of the democrats, namely
to deny the funds. In order to meet a justified complaint I cancelled almost four millions [Thalers], the excess tax, a concession which very harmfully affected the army even if it was only
to be temporary and only on this account acceptable. But even
though this concession threw the opposition forces off the track
for a moment, it only spurred them on to be ever more shameless
and unreasonable in their action against me and my creation,
so that we have now reached a turning point.
Then, continued the King, since the ministry was in full agreement
with him, since the reorganization was approved "by all thinking
military, by all unprejudiced thinking men," and since the funds were
available without any undue burden on the land, why did the opposition continue? Why did it demand concessions?
For absolutely no other reasons than that the desired concessions had to extend to objects which are intended to destroy
the striking power, the military spirit and the training of the
army. War to the death against the monarch and his standing
army has been vowed, and in order to reach that goal the Progressivists and democrats and ultra liberals scorn no means, and
indeed with rare consequence and deep conviction. . . . The
shortening of the term of service is demanded so that firm, well
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disciplined military training, the effects of which will hold during the long period of leave, shall not be given the soldier. The
under-officers shall become officers, not as everyone could in
Prussia since 1808 by passing one and the same examination, but
without proving this equality of cultural level, so that a schism
will develop in the officers' corps and dissatisfaction will slowly
creep into them and the democrats will be able to develop an
officers' caste of their own which because they are neither trained nor steeled in their views to stand loyally by the throne are
to be won for the revolution. Since loyalty and self-sacrifice for
King and throne are to be expected from the present officers and
through them to be transferred to the troops, therefore the
officers' class is slandered in every possible way, and then one
wonders that the officers are angry? And even censures them
for this II
"A peoples' army back of Parliament." That is the solution
revealed since Frankfurt am Main [he referred to a speech by
Schulze-Delitzsch] to which I counter with the watchword:
"A disciplined army that is also the people in arms, back of
the King and war lord."
Between these two watchwords no agreement is possible.
The Lower House opposition had burned its bridges in refusing
the military funds, the King said, and he had done likewise; he
would make no more concessions. They would be beneath the dignity
of the crown. He warned von Saucken-J ulienfelde and his friends to
keep watch or they would be drawn in tow by the revolution.45
The King was convinced that in fighting for his military reforms
he was defending his position as monarch. He identified the maintenance of his military authority with the welfare of his country. He
put the struggle on a moral and a patriotic plane: he and persons
who agreed with him were right, all others were revolutionaries. He
misinterpreted a speech by Schulze-Delitzsch out of all reason, finding
in it convincing evidence that the Lower House planned to take the
army away from him, ruin it, and transform it into an instrument of
parliament. He had such strange conceptions of how the conflict over
the military arose and of who had made concessions that one cannot imagine the possibility of straightening him out on facts. He
claimed the dropping of the extra tax as a concession from him;
actually, the tax expired and the Landtag did not renew it. The
military budget was somewhat reduced in 1862, but the fact was that
the Lower House had not passed any budget at all. The King assumed that the military reorganization was legal; the Lower House
to Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 65-68; see a letter of similar content to VinckeOlbendorf in January, 1863, in Briefe, Reden und Schriften, II, 43-45.
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disputed the point. The King assumed that the military reform was
permanent; the Lower House denied the statement. The King regarded the existing organization of society as a model and the army
as the expression of that society; the liberals denounced the feudal
caste structure and wished to transform it into a free society. The
King thought of a people's army as one commanded by an absolute
monarch, with officers chosen from the upper classes, especially the
nobility, and trained to be a military caste. The liberals wanted a
people's army devoid of caste and representative of a free society. The
King had a feeling, not unwarranted, that this liberalism was endangering his authority, and he clung to the old-style army as his main support. Behind the conflict over the military reforms was a social conflict between two different sets of cultural values. The liberals tried,
as we shall see in a subsequent chapter, to gloss over this fact, and
the King undoubtedly misinterpreted events and exaggerated the
danger; but, in last analysis, being sensitive to the threat to his position, he correctly recognized the ultimate danger to absolutism from
parliamentary control over military affairs. The issues were all to
come to a head in the course of the constitutional conflict.
Agreement about the military reforms could well have been
reached even on the King's terms if the government had offered an
adequate quid pro quo. The liberals were particularly angry because the military sacrifices demanded by the government were not
counter-balanced by liberal reforms. "Not even the communal and
the county governments have been reformed," declared Deputy Waldeck, "and as long as we have the feudal vestiges in these regions I
shall never be able to reconcile it with my conscience to help strengthen
these feudal remains by strengthening the caste of officers in the
standing army without Landwehr and Landwehr officers." The
Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung and the National Zeitung reacted
in the same way. If the government wanted military reform, let it
assure the public that it was not aiming thereby merely to strengthen
the Old Regime; let it prove by deeds that it was interested also in developing the economic and social resources of the land and in developing the constitution in a liberal sense. Let it reform the House of
Lords so that liberal legislation could be passed. "If a thorough reform of the House of Lords is not allowed, or if some prospect for a
quick forward action in the German question is not initiated, the
Lower House will not impose this burden [the military reform] upon
th~ country," wrote a Berlin correspondent to the Grenzboten; and
Deputy von Carlowitz in May, 1861, openly stated in the Lower House
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that if the Prussian government would take the initiative expected of
it in unifying Germany, he would vote in favor of the item in the
military budget which he was the opposing. Indeed he would vote
for other items; indeed "I would approve still more." For the present
policy, he declared, our present army is sufficient.46 The liberals
could have been won to support the military reforms if the King had
been willing to initiate action and achieve results. With the King's
slow and cautious approach to things, postponing action to some time
in the future, and with liberal ministers urging upon their supporters,
"Do not press," the liberal representatives of a people eager for state
and national reforms could hardly be expected to add the huge burden
of what seemed to them useless military expense. Bismarck was to
try the other method in the question of national unification, that of
action; and he was ultimately to succeed.
To the Prince Regent the problem of financing the military reorganization seemed simple. "In a monarchy like ours," he wrote to
Minister von Bonin on November 24, 1859, "the military point of
view should never be curtailed by financial or political-economic ones;
for the European position of the state upon which so much else depends is based upon it."47 An increase of nearly 8,000,000 Thalers in
the military budget seemed to him a matter about which there should
be no controversy. The phrase "the European position of the state"
justified any sacrifice. William's ideal of civic virtue remained that
of the War of Liberation, when every person and every interest in
Prussia was subordinated to the purpose of military defence.
The government took the position that the increase in military
funds could be supplied without undue sacrifice and pointed to the
excellent condition of Prussian state finances as evidence. It claimed
that the state had a smaller tax burden than Austria and Spain and a
decidedly smaller one than Great Britain, France, Netherlands, and
Belgium. It showed that the total state expenditures per head were
lower than in any of the other countries except Russia and Portugal
and that Prussia covered these expenditures by its income, whereas the
majority of the other states did so in part by loans. It claimed that the
cost of raising the state funds was lower, that the percentage of funds
for other genuine state administration was higher than in the other
states, and that even after the reorganization the military cost absorbed
•• Abg. R., St. B., May 27, 1861; III, 1405-06. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung,
Dec. 4, 1861, Sept. II, 1862. National Zeitung, Feb. I, 1861. Berliner Biirsen Zeitung,
Jan. 28, 1861. Tagesbericht, No.5, Jan. 7, 1862. Abg., R., St. B., 1861, III, 1476.
•• Erich Marcks, Kaiser Wilhelm 1. (Munich and Leipzig, 1918), p. 179.
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a smaller part of the net funds than in any of the other great powers. iS
Therefore, the government concluded, Prussia could well afford the
reform of the army.
The ministry recognized that some tax reform would be necessary
to cover the additional military costs, and it concentrated attention
upon the land tax.49 It justified the reform of the tax with arguments
which showed a better historic than prophetic sense.
The land tax has been proposed especially as a source of income for war needs, for in case of war the burden must be overwhelmingly laid on the landowner. The indirect taxes, out of
which the state at present derives a large share of its income, dry
up in war, the industrial activity declines, capital is cautious,
and there remains finally the return from the land which can be
tapped. This was, alas, clearly revealed in the unfortunate year
1807, when the losses which had to be made up by deliveries in
transport livestock, grain and other war needs solely in the province of Prussia amounted to 150,000,000 Thalers. In order to
avoid such calamities and to establish a military organization
which can prevent similar unfortunate events it is desirable to
do what is necessary in time and for that purpose to draw
especially upon the land in order to prevent the landowners
from being exposed in the future to similar spoliation.
To regard a land tax as the main financial reliance for military
purposes in a country which was rapidly becoming industrialized may
seem out of focus; but the King wholeheartedly supported the tax
reform, and solely through his pressure it became law. He needed for
his military reforms the 10,000,000 Thalers a year which it was to bring
in. While the bill passed the Lower House, with opposition from some
liberals as well as from the Conservatives, it was overwhelmingly rejected by the Conservative Upper House. In order to put it through that
body in 1861, the King had to use his personal pressure. Because of
the necessity for new assessments the tax could not be levied before
1865.
In 1860, that is, before the reform, the land tax preserved the characteristics of its historic past. It was unevenly assessed among the
provinces as well as within a single province. Many large estates and
peasant holdings were exempt from it or paid only a small sum, whereas others were taxed in varying amounts. The difference in treatment
depended upon whether the piece of land preserved a historic legal

•• Die lnnere Politik, p. 71. See also statements in the Lower House by Finance
Minister von Patow. Abg. H., St. B., Jan. 21, May 27, 1861; I, 26, III, 1409 .
•• Die lnnere Politik, pp. 81-82.
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right to exemption from this tax, often also upon whether the owner
had succeeded in having his property dropped from the tax records.
The state administered some twenty main systems of land taxation,
more than one hundred forms of land tax, and so many kinds of buildings tax that one could scarcely count them. The provincial differences were evident from the fact that of the net tax return the land
tax produced the following percentages: province of Prussia, 6.14;
Posen, 4.93; Pomerania, 6.21; Silesia, 10.53; Brandenburg, 7.75; Saxony,
8.97; Westphalia, 10.0; and the Rhineland, 8.69. The provinces of
Silesia, Saxony, Westphalia and the Rhineland had to make up for
the low returns from the others. If one added the taxation of the
towns, the disparity would have been even more pronounced. Differences among counties were extreme, for many of them had been
exempt from the land tax. Thus the county of Lauenburg paid in
land and buildings taxes after the reform 403.2 per cent more, the
county of Landeshut 41.2 per cent less, than before. Fifty-five counties
had to pay 100 per cent more after the reform, whereas ninety had to
return less. 50
The principle of equalization of the land tax throughout the state
had been included in the financial edict of October 27, 1810, under
pressure of the military defeat by Napoleon. As soon as Prussia had
recovered after 1815, the land-owning nobility had made certain that
the principle was ignored. It was reasserted in the revolutionary
period of 1849-49 but again succumbed to Conservative domination
in the 1850s. Military need, this time during peace, once more brought
up the question in 1859; and a half century after the principle had
first been legally established, it became a reality. The difference in
outcome lay solely in the fact that the King needed the money for
military reforms. The Conservatives could not enjoy both the expansion of the military and low, privileged taxation. Universal military
service entailed the elimination of tax privilege in favor of equalization of financial responsibility to support the state. Those with a
historic legal claim to tax privilege should be compensated, according
to the bill of 1859, for the abolition of this right; but they should
henceforth pay their due shares of taxes like everyone else.
The Conservatives condemned the land tax from the standpoint
of national economy as the worst tax one could have. It measured
movable and immovable capital and land property, they said, by the
same standard; it taxed a single object of property; it imposed a
~

Meitzen,

op. cit.,

I, 20.
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special burden upon a single class for the support of a general need;
it used in the present the resources of land property which should be
regarded as the real state treasury, the reserve for cases of state calamity;
it amounted to a tax on capital, and could be called a form of confiscation. The tax would cripple many peasants, always an object of
special concern for the Conservatives, and ruin many landowners.
The Conservatives feared that administrative difficulties would be insurmountable. The difficulties of assessment particularly alarmed
them, for they apprehended that this work might become subject to
politics and might arouse much bad feeling among the natives in
the Eastern provinces, above all between peasants and large estate
owners. The old and favored argument of "Let well enough alone"
was once more advanced. 51
The government bill contained a proposal to indemnify the large
landowners, but not the peasants, who would bear a major loss from
the new tax. The Conservative leader Wagener opposed this clause
as unfair to the peasants and likely or even sure to cause hostility between peasants and large estate-owners. Nonetheless, as the commission reporter in the Lower House correctly stated, the House of Lords
would not accept the bill without the clause. The gentlemen preferred cash to preserving the appearance of equality of treatment.
They did not believe in equality anyway, certainly not at the expense
of their pocket books. The liberal deputy Schulze-Delitzsch used the
opportunity to state that the approval of compensation by the Conservatives was no way to preserve the moral position in society of the
nobility. "A political party" (like the Conservative), he said, "which
has always participated in the development of our institutions solely
in order to defend its caste privileges and prejudices at the expense
of the common welfare is naturally inclined to attribute similar motives to other parties because it itself is not aware of any others."52
That the criticism made by Schulze-Delitzsch was felt by others to
be justified was evident from the argument given by the very right-wing
member of the Constitutional party, Bethmann-Hollweg. "Higher
political considerations cause me," he said in the Lower House in
March, 1861, "to overlook in this matter special doubts which I have
raised against the land tax bill. The higher political consideration is
that I regard the land tax legislation as the first prerequisite for restoring to the large landowners their position in the country, particularly
.. Tagesbericht, No. 70, March 23, 1861. Abg. H., St. B., March 5, 6, 9, 1861; I,
335-37, 357, 443.
"Ibid., March 5, 9, 1861; I, 335-37, 439, 443. Ibid., May 28, 1861; III, 1425.
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with respect to the small landowners [the peasantry]. I regard this
restoration as necessary so that the large landowners will in the future
be equal to the political responsibility without which I regard a satisfactory development of our municipal and county constitutions, and
with these the entire political life of our nation, as impossible."53 The
remarks had the stately dignity of a true aristocrat. They continued
the finest ideal of true nonpartisan conservatism, the desire to be a
leader not for the defence of egoistic interests but for the general good.
While the Conservatives were totally against the land tax reform,
the liberals were somewhat divided between those in the heavily taxed
provinces favoring reform and those in the lightly taxed ones disliking
or even openly opposing the government proposal. Deputy Behrend
wished the matter settled once and for all so that the liberals could
join forces wholeheartedly and one of the provincial differences between East and West could be overcome. 54 Actually the question did
not cause as much trouble between the two main branches of the
liberal movement as Behrend implied. The land tax differential was
merely symptomatic of the wider range of cultural distinctions between
Eastern and Western Prussia, and some of the areas of strongest support of the reform lay in the East. The argument put forth by Deputy
Gneist in favor of the measure had more weight with the liberals.
It is a question of giving our state, which still shows traces
of being a conglomerate of former pieces, the character of a
definitely unified state. This will be achieved first by means of
the unified land tax. In a time in which an incompletely implemented constitution has loosened so much in the state, it is a
question of establishing our unity on a firm material foundation,
in order now to give Prussia a consistent position in Germany
around which new forces can crystallize without danger. 55
The issue of tax reform showed the interdependence of the parts
of the liberal program. The government bill stipulated that the
assessment commissions for the new land and buildings tax should be
chosen by the provincial and county assemblies. Since these assemblies
were at present overwhelmingly dominated by owners of large landed
estates, espcially of noble estates, the liberals had to be assured beforehand that the government intended to introduce a bill to reform these
assemblies. 56

·'Ibid., March 9, 1861; I, 439 .
• 4 Abg. R., St. B., March 6, 1861; I, 355·56.
··Ibid., March 8, 1861; I, 423-24.
O. See Ibid., March 6, 1861; I, 355. Ibid., March 9, 1861; I, 435·36.
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The fact that the Conservatives were enthusiastic about military
reforms, more military discipline, more officers' positions for the
nobility, but decidedly averse to paying taxes for the support of these
services aroused deep resentment among the liberals. The latter
realized that in this attitude the Conservatives were manifesting scorn
for the so-called vulgarity of commercial life. The liberals knew that
they were paying largely for the maintenance of a social and political
regime which blocked freedom and progress. In the last half century
taxes had increased heavily on townsmen but not on the land. As
Deputy Riedel asserted in the Lower House in 1861,
Since the introduction of the land tax over the course of cen·
turies the entire weight of the public burden has gradually been
shifted more and more from landowners to the other classes of
the people. In recent times not a decade has passed in which
new taxes and increases of the old taxes have not been imposed
on the non.landowning elements of the people. Most of these
taxes are so well laid out that they have enjoyed a natural
increase in returns with the increase in population, economic
activity, income and property, and have become even more productive for the government. The land tax alone has not been
changed in fifty years, in other regions in one hundred, in still
others in one hundred and fifty and in many regions in two
hundred years and longer, and it has been left so untouched that
the gentlemen have the illusion that it is not even a tax but
merely a rent.
Deputy Riedel regarded tax reform not as primarily an economic but
as a moral issue.57 He and other liberals showed anger especially over
the existing discrimination. A writer in the Frankfurter Journal in
1861 asserted that in Hagen a poor laborer who formerly paid one
Thaler in tax now had to pay three. The refusal of the nobility in
the old provinces to pay taxes, the writer said, sounded to him like
scorn and offered no proof of patriotism and no sense of justice.1I8
The heavy tax burden weighed particularly on the supporters of
liberalism. Angry protests came to the Landtag from all parts of Prussia and from all groups of the population, except those still enjoying
the privileged position of the Old Regime. Chamber of commerce
reports loudly denounced the tax burden and prophesied ruin.
Salaried employees and the lower middle·class blamed the tax pressure
for depriving them of the opportunity to save for their old age or for
investment which might improve their economic situation. Industry

.. Ibid., March 5, 1861; I, 34l1 .
•• Tagesbericht, No. 64, March 16, 1861.
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wanted tax reduction to lower costs of production and to improve its
competitIve positIOn. These were all well-known arguments against
taxation at any time. The significant fact was the unanimity and the
intensity of feeling. IID
What added insult to injury for the liberals was the way in which
the Conservative Junkers were able to avoid paying the share of the
taxes for which they were already responsible. In the first place the
Prussians paid nearly twice as much in indirect as in direct taxes, a fact
that imposed a major burden upon the poor. 60 In the second place,
the class and income taxes were so allocated as to strike the lower income groups, and the government kept raising the percentage paid.
In the third place, and above all, the method of assessment enabled
the Conservatives to transfer much of the tax burden to others. The
system showed again the advantage to the Junkers of controlling the
Kreistag and the office of Landrat.
A tax commission was created annually in each county and in each
town not belonging to a county for the purpose of assessing the class
and income taxes. The commission was presided over by the Landrat
or by a commissioner specially appointed by the regional administration. In the counties the commission was composed of representatives
of the Kreistag. In the towns not belonging to a county it was made
up of representatives of the citizens; but, since most of the towns were
incorporated within the county government, the system of assessment
in the counties was by far the more important. The Junkers used their
power in the Kreistag to select a tax-assessment commission which
shifted the burden to peasants and townsmen. One can understand
why the issue of reform of county government was regarded as crucia1. 61
The results of the assessment were evident from a circular issued in
1860 by the Minister of Finance. The rural areas paid relatively less
tax than the townspeople. For the current year, of an income tax of
3,645,000 Thalers the rural districts paid one-third, although they had
more than two-thirds of the population. One person in 157 in the rural
areas paid income tax, whereas one in thirty-one did so in the towns.
(Income tax began on incomes of 1,000 Thalers). The circular stated
that the greater number of wealthy persons in the towns was in part
•• References are so numerous in contemporary newspapers, chamber of commerce reports, Landtag speeches, etc., that it is superfluous to document them here.
e. See Berliner Borsen Zeitung, July 27, 1861. It was estimated in that paper
that the Prussians paid 9 florins, 25 kronen per capita. of which 3 florins. 2 kronen
came from direct taxes and 5 florins. 12 kronen from indirect.
01 See the petition from Cologne as reported in the Ko/nische Zeitung, April 4.
1861.
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responsible for this difference; but it added that many peasants were
put under the class tax who should be placed in the lower brackets of
the income tax, and that the big landowners "by and large are assessed
relatively and in part considerably lower . . . than the peasant
proprietors in the higher brackets of the class tax." The circular
further asserted
... that in the estimation of the taxable income of the large
landowners that which the owners use from their own economy
for their families, as well as the value of free dwelling, and that
which is applied from the estate to permanent improvements and
therefore to increasing its capital value have not been considered
at all or at only their partial value. How unjust such a procedure is becomes clearest by a comparison with town dwellers
who pay income tax. They have to cover all expenses of living,
including house rent, out of their income; but although they
cannot use a part of their income for these purposes and have to
save capital, they are not allowed to deduct these sums in estimating their income tax. In some assessment districts for the
current year the assessment for income tax has declined in comparison with that of last year, and the reason is to be found not
in the removal or death of payers of large taxes, but in a
thorough going tax reduction especially for the landowners for
which the highly unfavorable crop is given as justification. 62
The criticism was equally applicable to any country in which agriculture paid an income, or,at the lower level, a class tax; but in Prussia
the inequality was particularly felt. When in 1868 Hamburg came to
consider joining the North German Confederation, a commission was
appointed by the Senate and the Citizens Assembly to consider economic and financial questions in connection therewith. It reported
that iQ comparison with Hamburg in Prussia the higher income
classes were by virtue of the assessment procedure less burdened, that
the middle and lower income classes were much more burdened and
that far wider circles were made to pay taxes. Prussia retained the
class system of taxation of an autocratic government just emerging
from the Old Regime. 63
The government proposed in 1861 to increase the business tax in
certain instances and to change it in others. The details do not need
to be described; the effect, as stated by government officials in defending the proposal, was to increase the tax burden on commercial under8. See c. J. Bergius, "Die Personal -, Vermogens-, und Einkommensteuer in
Preussen," Vierteljahrschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Kulturgeschichte (1870), pp.
62-73; Meitzen, op. cit., III, 39 .
• s Bergius, op. cit., pp. 72-73.
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takings. The plan caused an outburst of lamentation. The proper
title for this law, declared Deputy Scholler, should have been "Authority for the Finance Minister to Raise Several Millions more than Previously according to Need or according to Arbitrary Wish." The
bill passed by a vote of 153 to 104, with many prominent liberals voting
against it. The Conservatives enjoyed the show. Deputy Wagener
remarked: "I believe that we must help you obtain this law; because
you so kindly helped us gain the land tax my friends and I will vote
for this law."64
Objections were raised, although not to the same extent, against
the twenty-five per cent increase imposed in 1859 on the milling and
slaughter tax. This tax was levied in those towns which were not
subject to the income tax, and while the number of towns falling in
that category had declined from 132 in 1820 when the tax was imposed to seventy-seven in 1862, the list of those still paying it included
almost all the large cities. The tax was unpopular under any circumstances and was retained solely because of the difficulty of finding
an alternative. It obstructed commerce, placed an especially heavy
burden upon the poorer classes, and was conducive to smuggling and
other forms of illegality.65 That unpopular military reforms should
require a twenty-five per cent increase in an unpopular tax just as the
depression of 1857 was ebbing did not make either of them attractive
to the liberal public.
The government made a few concessions with respect to taxes.
After three years, in 1862, it agreed to abolish as no longer needed
the twenty-five per cent increase in the milling and slaughter tax. In
1861, 1862 and 1863 it put through legislation, readily accepted by the
liberals, reducing and rendering uniform throughout the state the
taxes on mining, removing iron mining from a special tax and placing
it under the terms of the general business tax. These changes brought
financial relief to the mine owners and equalized the competitive tax
position of mining in the various parts of the state. While the mining
interests expressed great pleasure over each law, the relief came so
slowly that they continued to be hostile to the government. 66 None•• See the discussion in Abg. H., St. B., April 9, 10, 11, 1861, Vol. III. For a sum·
mary of the business tax system see von Roenne, op. cit. (1884), IV, 812 If., and
Meitzen, op. cit., III, 30-33 .
•• Meitzen, op. cit., III, 34-35 .
•• Von Roenne, op. cit. (1884), IV, 818 If.; see the discussion, especially by von
Beughem, in the Lower House on March 18, 1861, St. B., Vol. I; on the tax situation
see also articles in Berliner Borsen Zeitung, Feb. 12, Feb. 20, March 5, 1861, and in
Bremer Handelsblatt, March 9, 1861.
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theless, the trend in taxation was definitely upward. The reductions
were of minor significance, except in the case of mining. With land
taxes increased. even though more equitably levied, with business taxes
higher for many lines, with class and income taxes increased, the
liberals were angry at the cost of government and blamed it on the
military.
How much weight should be given the complaints is difficult to say.
The liberal Minister of Finance von Patow denied that the tax burden
was excessive.67 Certainly the extraordinary economic development
of the years after the crisis of 1857 cast doubt on the validity of the
complaints. The economy was so flourishing that in the constitutional
conflict the liberals defeated themselves. By making so much money
and turning in so much revenue to the state, they enabled the government to carryon in spite of the resistance of the Lower House and to
cover even the excessive expenditures entailed by two highly unpopular wars.
The irony of the situation arose from the fact that the liberal
deputies were being asked for increased taxes while being unable to
put through any reforms to counter balance the effect. Certainly it
was an anomalous position for deputies enthusiastically elected for the
purpose of liberalizing the entire state to have to face the public again
without having accomplished a single popular constructive reform,
with having to their credit the dubious achievement of approving,
even though provisionally, an unpopular military reform directed by
its sponsors against liberalism, and with having sanctioned increased
taxes to pay for his military reform. One can understand the mood
with which the deputies returned to their constituencies. One can
perceive why the voters in the elections of 1861 and 1862 eliminated
the right-wing conciliatory liberals in favor of more aggresliive and
determined leaders .

•• Abg. H., St. B., May 27, 1861; III, 1409.
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1860 the pwblem of national unification
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modern phase, over a half-century old. In 1848 it had been subjected
to a serious attempt at solution. The beginning of the New Era
aroused the Prussian liberals to renewed hope for the achievement of
the goal, and the Italian unification in 1859-60 revived their belief
that within the foreseeable future a similar success should be possible
for their own nation. The liberals took the initiative in pressing this
issue upon their own state and joined forces with colleagues in the
other German states for the struggle. They made the issue an integral
part of their program of remaking Prussian and German culture in
the pattern of freedom and compelled the indifferent, lukewarm,
theoretically interested and hostile elements to respond in one way or
another. Four separate social forces interested in the question need
to be considered: the King, the liberals, the Conservatives and Bismarck. The reaction of each will be considered in this chapter.
The Political Interest
In theory the King approved of German unity at some time in the
future, but he never expected to live long enough to see it. In his
program of November, 1858, he had written:
Prussia must stand in friendly relations with all great powers
without giving itself over to foreign influences and without binding its hands too early by treaties. Friendly relations with all
other powers are equally offered. In Germany Prussia must
make moral conquests by wise legislation of its own, by elevating
all moral elements and by adopting elements of unification like
the Zollverein, which nevertheless must be subjected to reform.
The world must know that Prussia is ready everywhere to protect right. A firm, consequent, and, when it must be, energetic
119
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demeanor in politics combined with wisdom and circumspection
must create for Prussia the political prestige and the position of
power which it is unable to attain by its material power alone.
In the formulation of that statement the King seemed to approve
the general idea of moral conquest in Germany. That he comprehended the import of his assertion appears in the light of subsequent
events extremely doubtful. His promise that "Prussia is ready to defend right everywhere" is rather inclusive; but since he also called for
coupling "energetic demeanor," when it was necessary, with "wisdom
and circumspection" and since he refused to bind his hands by treaty
too early, one could anticipate that in the German question very little
if anything would be accomplished on his initiative.
During the entire New Era vague statements and timid action continued to characterize the King's policy toward German unity. At
the opening of the Landtag in 1860 the ruler declared that "the wish for
reform of the Constitution of the German Confederation has recently
been expressed again. Prussia will always regard itself as the natural
exponent of the objective to raise and bind together the glories of the
nation by appropriate institutions and in general effectively to further
the totality of German interests by measures of truly practicalsignificance." Such self-satisfied assertions committed him to nothing more
than "measures of truly practical significance"; and since each of the
three words, "truly," "practical," and "significance" is capable of
diverse interpretation, an ardent advocate of national unification could
derive from this speech the assurance of nothing.
At the beginning of the Landtag session in January, 1861, the King
announced that he had been endeavoring to bring about a revision of
the military organization of the German confederation and expressed
confidence in the outcome, "since all German governments and all
German tribes recognize unanimous cooperation as the most urgent
need of our entire fatherland." -When the Landtag opened in January,
1862, the King was still talking in generalities, of greater vagueness
even than those of his predecessors. He reported "to my regret" that
his proposals for reform of the military organization of the Confederation had not reached "a satisfactory conclusion." He was therefore
trying to improve conditions by agreements among the separate states
for "a greater similarity in military matters" and announced that an
agreement had been made with the little state of Saxony-Coburg-Gotha.
The King added,
The need of a general reform of the German constitution
has recently been expressly recognized in circles of the German
governments. True to the national traditions of Prussia my
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government will endeavor constantly to work in favor of such
reforms which by corresponding to the real power relations will
unite more energetically the forces of the German people and
place Prussia in the position to further with increased pressure
the interests of the entire fatherland. 1
The King did not compose these addresses himself, but they had
It can be assumed that the assertions expressed his own
thinking, especially on the vital question of national unity. From
the statement of 1862, again one must have inferred, and correctly so,
that the King would do nothing. His reference to Prussia as a nation
must have implied indifference to the hopes of the German nation.
Derived from the Eighteenth Century or earlier, it showed complete
ignorance of the ideals and aspirations of German nationalism. To
speak of his country's traditional policy of working for reform of the
German confederation promised even less, when one recalled the
names of the ancestors to whom he was most devoted, Frederick the
Great and that arch-particularist and conservative, Frederick William
III. When he posed "the real power relations" as the standard for
reorganization among the German states, he opened the way either to
endless negotiations or to the exercise of superior authority by Prussia;
and since the second policy could be ruled out, one could assume that
the first would be followed. The King's wish to set Prussia in a position to "further the interests of the entire fatherland with increased
emphasis" can scarcely have evoked an enthusistic response from those
states that had refused to make any agreement even for improving the
Confederation's military defence.
The statement by Foreign Minister von Bernstorff in the Lower
House in February, 1862, may be taken as confirmation of the inactive attitude. The Foreign Minister spoke of the desirability of
forming a smaller union of German states (by "smaller" he meant
the exclusion of Austria), with an executive which would exercise the
supreme military command, would conduct foreign affairs, and would
have a parliament composed of representatives from the individual
states. These reforms were considered desirable. The minister ignored the need for economic unity and for a central authority to further
national economic interests. Nor did he offer any assurance of a
popular national parliament representing not merely the German
states but the German people. The lack of precision about the way
in which the representatives were to be selected left doubt as to
whether they should be diplomatic representatives, as was the case
to suit him.

1

For the ruler's statements see Horst Kohl, op. cit., pp. 5-6, 12, 22, 33·34.
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already with the despised Bundestag of the Confederation, or should
be selected from the state parliaments by the deputies themselves in cooperation with the governments, or should be specially elected by the
people of the separate states. The minister's remarks left matter once
more in the air, a condition for which the King had a special affinity.
In one respect William was prepared to act. He was willing at any
favorable opportunity to continue one of the traditions of his house,
that of absorbing small German states. In speaking to the liberal von
Bernhardi in 1860, the ruler was decidedly of the view that "the small
German states must be absorbed in Prussia; he scorned the petty rulers,"
so von Bernhardi reported, "and thought that they would gain in their
personal position by becoming subordinate to a big state."2 He
would have treated them in the same manner that his father and
brother had treated those who had been fortunate enough to be absorbed into Prussia in 1815. The princes would have been given a
privileged place in the governmental assemblies and allowed to serve
in the Hohenzollern army and bureaucracy.
The King particularly despised one of his princely colleagues, the
ruler of Kurhesse. This ruler had violated the constitution of 1831
and restored absolute rule. His mistreatment of his subjects was
notorious; Kurhesse compared favorably in that respect with the Manteuffel regime in Prussia which in 1858 the King had ousted. William
fumed at this colleague, negotiated with and about him, tried to stir the
Diet of the Confederation to action against him, and accomplished
nothing. The indignity of having to back down before the adamant
ruler of Kurhesse was augmented by the fact that the little state
separated the Eastern and the Western parts of Prussia at the narrowest
place. A Hohenzollern was eager to absorbe this petty principality.
When the King become involved in conflict over military reform
with the liberals in his own Lower House, he turned against not merely
their domestic program for Prussia but their hope and plan of national
unification. The debates in the first informal and unofficial meeting
of deputies from the parliaments of the various German states in
September, 1862, aroused his ire. The assembly of deputies did not
mention Prussia's mission to unify Germany, though liberals were accustomed to stress this point. Instead it demanded the creation of a
national parliament composed of deputies elected by the people without interference by the states. The King, who was visiting the Grand
Duke of Baden at the time of this assembly, broke into such a storm
• Von Bemhardi, op. cit., III, 300; also Parisius, von HOVf'Tbeck, II, 8.
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of anger "that one could even hear his immoderate words in the
street," wrote the Grand Duke to an acquaintance. He became so
hostile to the movement for unification that he subsequently caused
Bismarck great difficulty.3 In January, 1871, he was still averse to accepting the title of emperor, and declared, "My son is with his entire
soul in the new state of affairs, while it means nothing at all to me.
I hold only to Prussia."4 He tolerated national unification, but he
would never have personally pushed it through to completion. That
honor belonged to the liberals and especially to Bismarck.
When the liberals spoke of the need for German unification, their
justification was based upon the belief that the German people required a larger area of activity than was theirs at present in the separate
states. The question of size bore significance in respect both to the
German people's role among the nations and to the character of life
within the German nation. These formed two facets of an identical
problem, the international and the internal; each conditioned the other
and could not be understood in isolation.
The German Diet was composed of diplomats representing the
practically independent German states, which treated each other as
foreign powers. With the possible exception of Prussia and Austria
no one of these thirty-three states possessed the necessary resources in
land mass, population and wealth to protect itself against foreign aggressors. The medium-sized and small states maintained armies and
other services which they could not well afford and which absorbed
funds needed for other purposes. They preserved their independence
solely under the protection of the principle of the balance of power:
the large states of Europe would object to any foreign state seizing one
or more of them.
The Prussian liberals recognized that even their own state suffered
from the same handicap. In addition to being much smaller in size,
population and resources than the other great powers, Prussia was
separated into two geographic areas by several German states. It had
tried to overcome this fundamental weakness by devoting a larger
amount of its energy to the military than did other great powers and
by maintaining in absolutism the form of leadership regarded as most
efficient and economical for quick action. As the liberal deputy von
Forckenbeck said, Prussia could not be liberalized without German

Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 338-39.
• Quoted in Parisius, von Hoverbeck, I, 218.
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unity.5 The greater resources of a unified Germany would relieve
Prussia of the excessive burden of her military power and render
absolutism no longer justifiable on military grounds. Bigness would
enable the new German state to be an authentic great power, selfconfident because of its reserve force without the necessity of constant
military tension.
The size of a unified Germany, ran the nationalist argument, would
assure the German people independence and security. No great power
would then dare attack the country with intentions of conquest. Germans could feel self-respect among the peoples of the world and command respect from them. Like other nations long since politically
unified, they would achieve the form enabling them to fulfill their historic destiny. German honor required that the people win the national unity, independence and security which other nations had
gained.
Honor, self-respect and the respect of others, the liberal nationalists
believed, had to be acquired at home, within Germany. This cardinal
point among the advocates of national unification involved the relationship of liberalism and nationalism. By honor and self-respect the
liberals referred not merely to relations with other countries; they
were speaking not merely of the German nation; they were speaking
of the relations of German individuals and social groups with other
Germans. They were concerned with the attitude of the nobility toward the middle class and the peasantry, of the military Junkers toward everyone else. They were upholding the liberal principles of
social freedom and the dignity of man against caste and privilege.
They wanted their own governments to honor and respect not merely
those of the upper class but all citizens, and for that purpose they
wished a life freed from the tyranny of German rulers, petty or otherwise. They maintained that a nation had the right to develop the
forms of public life which it needed and wished, that irrespective of
existing legality it had the right to replace the legal and institutional
structure of particularism by that of national unity. The ideals of
liberalism were employed to justify a people in asserting the right of
self-determination within the limits of its own nation.
The major enemy of both liberalism and national unity was particularism, the independent existence of each German state ruled by
its own sovereign, usually still in fact an absolute monarch. These

• Parisius, von Hoverbeck, I. 164-65; Philippson, op. cit., p. 43; von Saucken in
the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Aug. 2. 1862.
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rulers were, like King William I of Prussia, intent upon maintaining
their position as autocratic sovereigns of independent states. They
had no more inclination to become mediatized than to become figureheads over parliamentary governments. The liberals were actually
aware of the fact that the princes would never give up enough of
their power to unify Germany unless they were compelled to do so.
The liberals firmly believed that the cabinets, as they called the
governments of these rulers, would not unify Germany, that if the
German people did not perform that work it would never be executed.
To the liberals particularism meant moral, intellectual and material stagnation. It deprived the people of the opportunities to realize
their potentialities. It prevented "German character in its universality"
from realizing itself. Especially in the small states the people found
themselves dependent upon the will of the petty ruler. Restricted
within the narrow boundary of one of these states, they had too few
opportunities to try to accomplish what they wished to do. The ruler
was able to keep them under control; the current of life in the large
states and in the outside world passed these people by, leaving them
frustrated, listless, devoid of the sense of honor and self-respect that
comes from personal initiative and achievement. In a small particularistic state, the liberals maintained, man tended to vegetate; the
horizon was so close that he was scarcely aware of opportunities beyond his reach. Occupations were few in number because of the
small size of the population and tended to serve almost entirely the
local court or the local people. Society was in-bred. Cultural facilities
depended in the main upon the will of the ruler as the only person with wealth. Political activity and understanding were confined
to the small items of local significance and were too concerned with the
interests of the ruler to be other than trivial. International affairs
and problems of constitutional governance scarcely aroused interest;
they lacked reality.
Although the criticism of the effects of particularism was directed
mainly at the small or medium-sized states rather than at the large
ones, the Prussian liberals recognized that in some respects it applied
to their own country as well. Their ruler still thought about his subjects in much the same way as his fellow-sovereigns in the lesser states;
the people were subjects, therefore with limited comprehension of
affairs; the constitution should be interpreted according to the theory
of the divine right of kings; military affairs and foreign relations
should be the exclusive province of the ruler; the social structure
should remain essentially that of the Old Regime, with the nobility
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at the top helping the King rule the state; the particular state, not the
nation, should be the first object of the subject's devotion. Economically, the state also continued to restrict private activities too much for
the liberals. Mercantilist control was comparable to that in the other
states. It prevented Prussian economic organizations, insurance companies, banks, industries, tradesmen, craftsmen, from freely carrying
on business in the other states, and vice versa. Because of particularism
modern means of transportation and communication were not being
developed quickly or widely enough. The market, even in Prussia,
was too small to satisfy the needs of the big corporations and industrial facilities being created. Prussians suffered not to the same
extent but in the same way as businessmen in the lesser states. They
wanted freedom of movement and domicile and occupation on a national scale. No German state was sufficiently large to provide the
necessary area for the exercise of these rights. The German working
man, the German industrialist, any German should have the right to
earn a living in his nation wherever he chose. Questions of personal
honor and self-respect were involved, questions of the dignity of a
member of the German nation. Each German was or should be concerned, for the issues affected the life of each individual. Over against
his status as a subject of a small state were set his rights as a member
of the German nation.
The klein-deutsch liberals of north and central Germany, among
them the Prussians, worked out a plan for the unification of the country.6 The essence of it was incorporated in the program of the German
Progressive party, a wholly Pruss ian party whose title indicated its objective. The plan, published in 1861, read as follows:
The existence and greatness of Prussia depend upon a firm
unification of Germany, which cannot be conceived without a
strong central power in the hands of Prussia and without a representation of its people....
Thus we believe that Prussia has the right and the duty to
support with pressure the endeavor of the German people to
achieve unity within and power without and wherever the rights
of the people are violated as in Kurhesse and in Schleswig-Holstein to restore them again by active aid.
Prussia should never lose from sight its task of winning the
approval of the other German tribes for its domestic organization and work. Strict and consistent achievement of the constitutional, legal state, stimulation of all the forces of the peo-

• By klein-deutsch is meant the plan for unifying Germany with the exclusion
of Austria. The gross-deutsch proponents wished to include Austria.
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pIe to useful activity, careful treatment and preservation of these
forces by wise economy in state expenditures are therefore the
indispensable bases of our political objective. 7
The program was accepted by all klein·deutsch liberals, irrespective
of party affiliation. They all believed in Prussia's taking the lead, in
the moral conquest of the rest of Germany by liberal reforms within
Prussia, in having a national government composed of an executive
and a popularly elected representative assembly of the nation with
authority over military and commercial affairs and foreign relations. s
The left-wing and the right-wing liberals differed only over questions of strategy in timing and over distribution of emphasis on the
various points of the national program. The Progressive party wished
to advance quickly to action. The other liberal groups advised a
slower pace; the farther to the right they were the more slowly they
were inclined to proceed. The groups differed somewhat in the proposed treatment of the rulers. The Progressive party held most of
these rulers in such contempt that it wished to force reforms upon
them. The liberals of the right wing advocated respecting the authority
of the princes. They stood close to William's own vague idea of unification at some distant time, unification with and by the rulers in such
a way as to satisfy everyone. They wished to preserve "the inner independence of the individual states, with Prussian leadership in national, military, diplomatic and commercial affairs."9 It would have
been possible to preserve this inner independence and at the same time
unify Germany, depending on one's understanding of these phrases;
but the mental reservation behind the statement becomes clear when
it is contrasted with ones by the Progessivist Schulze-Delitzsch or his
colleague Freiherr von Hoverbeck. At the conference of riflemen in
Frankfurt am Main in July, 1862, von Hoverbeck made a speech in
which he extended greetings from the majority in the Prussian Lower
House and declared "that this majority recognizes no other than the
German interests, and that if in some way the so-called Prussian
interests should conflict with the German interests, we prefer the
German interests!" Schulze-Delitzsch was even blunter. "We work
for no one dynasty in Germany, neither for the Hohenzollern nor for

7 Quoted from
Ludolph Parisius, Deutschlands politische Parteien und das
Ministerium Bismarck (Berlin, 1878), pp. 33 If.
8 See the joint resolution of the liberals in the Lower House early in 1862.
Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 13-14.
• Parisius, Politische Parteien, p. 55.
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the Hapsburg, when we wish to establish German unity. We work
for ourselves, for the German peoplel"lo
The difference between the right-wing or Old Liberals (Constitutionals, as they were called) and the Progressives was one of degree
rather than of kind. Each recognized the need for instruments making national unity a reality; but the former preferred federalism with
the central government having just sufficient authority to function as
the head of the national state. Since the Old Liberals were few in
number in Prussia and lost out almost completely as a political force
in favor of the Progressive party and the almost equally aggressive
Left-Center liberal party, one may assume that on questions of national
unity all Prussian liberals, apart from a small handful of GrossDeutsche, shared common objectives.
The plan of the liberals for unifying the nation conformed with
their own social and political ideals. Since they had no confidence in
the ability or the willingness of the princes to unify the country, they
had to devise means for achieving the objective in spite of these persons. The plan called for the progressive transfer of authority from
the rulers to the representatives of the people in each state-not all
authority, not parliamentary control of government, but enough to
push the rulers into national unity. Liberal reforms were essential
in each state so that the people would perceive the value of unification
for them. The more economic and social progress, the more freedom
and cultural reform, the more awake and active the population would
be in furthering its own interests. The stronghold of particularism
lay in the King and his bureaucracy: liberalism aimed to reduce the
authority of both these powers. The freedom for action achieved
thereby would benefit economic and other kinds of activity, which
would expand the area of life and the range of problems requiring
political and economic attention and administrative machinery on a
national scale. The liberals saw that there must be real interests of a
national scope or there would be no institutional force behind the
movement of unification. Each factory builder, each large-scale merchant, each free organization of the professions or other occupational
and social groups, each victory for freedom of movement, domicile and
occupation, each victory for freedom of speech, press, and assembly,
each gain of political power by the representatives of the people meant
an increased concern with public affairs and aggressiveness in pushing these interests. Each one meant a greater sense of all Germans

10

Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 56; Schulze-Delitzsch, op. cit., III, 191·92.
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belonging in one country and a greater confidence in one's ability to
work for this goal. When, if he wished, the Prussian could freely live
and work in Bavaria, when he could run his own government, when
he could manage his own business of German-wide range, when he
could read in the papers about conditions in every German state and
plans for improving them, then he would be serving and expressing
both liberalism and the desire for national unification.
Some machinery was necessary for organizing the liberal-sponsored
activity on a national scale, some legal method for focusing the disparate action within each state upon the national objective. The
liberals worked out a plan for solving this most complicated problem.
In 1859 they organized the National Verein, a kind of holding company
for liberal and national activity in each state. It was directed by
leading liberals from all over Germany and published a weekly journal.
In each state a German progressive party was to be organized to represent and further the interests of liberal and national reform. The
choice of name did not matter, although that of German Progessive
party was recommended. More important was the unity of purpose
among the patries. In each state the liberal party would press its
program and at the same time keep in close touch with its colleagues
in other states. As these parties grew in influence, they would bring
their state governments actively to strive for national unity. The
liberal deputies from the various states would work out common
policies not merely in the National Verein but in national conferences
of parliamentary deputies. The necessary coordination and cooperation would be assured for the pursuit of a common goal. Simultaneous
pressure would be applied on all German governments to realize a
common plan for national unity.
Prussia was to assume the lead because it was the largest state and
could withstand Austria. If it set an example, the lesser states would
fall into line, for Prussia had so many political and economic means
of pressure upon the lesser states that they would have to follow suit.
The closing of the Prussian market, the refusal of a loan, the breaking
of diplomatic relations, the release of a press campaign of criticism,
these and many other instruments of influence were at Prussia's disposal, not to speak of the sheer power of its army. Prussia held the
key to the entire plan. If it became liberal, so would Germany; if it
did not, the liberal plan for national unification would fail.
The liberals expected their method of unification to succeed without international intervention and a foreign war. Not even France,
the enemy, would dare interfere in a country where the people were
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wholeheartedly supporting the national movement. Unification would
be carried on so calmly, so peacefully, with such devotion and harmony, apart from the objections of a few rulers and aristocrats, that
France would have no occasion to interfere. Unity would be achieved
so gradually that France would scarcely realize what was occurring before it was too late to act. Enormous expenditures for a Pruss ian army
and vast military reforms would not be necessary. In fact they were a
detriment, said the liberals, for they made the non-Prussians think that
Pruss ian militarism was on the aggressive and that the Junkers might
be able to destroy liberalism. The King's reform program for the army
had to be opposed as a danger to the liberal plan of unification. The
funds resulting from the economy of the liberal method, the saving on
militaTY expenditure, would be devoted to constructive activity,
schools, railroads, and the like, which would further Prussia's moral
conquest of the rest of Germany. If an army were needed, SchulzeDelitzsch said in July, 1862, it should be a people's army supporting a
people's parliament, not, he inferred, a standing army of an absolute
sovereign led by Junkers. The liberals encouraged the activity of the
riflemen's clubs, gymnastic societies and other associations building up
the defensive power, they said, of the German people; but they placed
most emphasis on maintaining the popular character of the Prussian
army as established in 1814. To keep the army popular, to hold down
expenses, to abolish Junker militarism, all were parts of the plan to
unify Germany by peaceful means.
The liberals realized that the execution of their program would
take time. They believed that the course of history law with them and
that they were sure to win. Even though they knew that they had to
be active and to labor for their cause, they derived great assurance
from their belief that time worked, not for absolutism, Junkers, and
particularism, but for liberalism and national unity.
The liberals could not readily be extreme nationalists, like the
National Socialists of a later date, when the main obstacle to the
popular conception of national unification lay in the rivalry of two
German powers, one, Prussia, which was almost entirely German in
population and certainly German in leadership, the other, Austria,
which was dominated by the German elements of the population. The
situation did not lend itself to extreme nationalist agitation. Grossdeutsch and klein-deutsch advocates were equally in favor of German
unity, even though they differed over their conception of unity_ The
klein-deutsch advocates aimed to exclude Austria from the German
state, mainly on two counts: it contained too many non-German peo-
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pIes, and it was too big either to be absorbed as it was into a unified
Germany or to be broken up and the German population incorporated
in the new national state. The liberals wished to tie Austria to the
new state by an alliance of an especially close character, different from
the ordinary foreign alliance in that it rested upon not merely political interest but common nationality. They emphasized the practical
and feasible aspects of the klein-deutsch solution and did not overemphasize German nationality. They were actually not concerned with
the entire German nation, but with only a part of it. A few were
gross-deutsch, but certainly in Prussia the liberals adhered overwhelmingly to the klein-deutsch solution. The reasonable and practical character of it appealed to these liberals in the same way that constitutional
government, freedom of occupation, freedom of press and assembly,
and other liberal ideals appealed to them.
Extreme nationalism did not seize hold of the Prussians, for Germany was not endangered from abroad and was prospering within.
The only possible danger would come from France, which in 1859 became involved in the Italian affair. While many Germans, especially
liberals, feared a French attack at the time, their fears soon proved to
be unjustified. The movement for national unity owed its drive not
to outside threats but to the process of internal transformation under
way in Germany society with the development of industrialism and the
middle class. It was not merely economic in character; it was cultural;
it involved the change from the Old Regime to the free society of
modern industrialism. Under these conditions nationalism had little
in common with the emotionalism of Fichte and Arndt suffering from
the humiliation of the Pruss ian collapse and the Napoleonic control of
Germany. It had nothing in common with Hitlerism. It intended to
provide a solid basis of adequate size for the new industrial culture,
which should operate in a world still employing power politics but
which was essentially peaceful in its international relations. The fact
that the liberal movement for national unity coincided with the liberal
movement for free trade made this attitude doubly evident. The
Fichtean closed commercial state had no significance for these liberals.
They rejected economic autarchy and urged expansion of international
trade, just as they pressed for trade among the German people within
a unified Germany. They sought to consolidate Germany without war
either among the Germans or against foreign powers. They chose the
nation as the object of their desires because it provided the next largest
body for which they could find a justification for political unity.
The liberals hated no one abroad. Their special enemies were German particularists and conservatives who opposed freedom and na-
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tional unification. They mistrusted France, but not to any excessive
degree. Their criteria of behavior were not the amount of physical
power but the degree of moral and rational justification one had, the
number of persons supporting one's views and the efficiency and character of those persons as shown, not in the accident of their social
position obtained by birth, but in their intellectual and material accomplishment and in their moral standards. On these grounds they
disliked the exclusiveness of castes, the sense of superiority of the aristocracy, and monopolistic absolutism more than they did the French or
any other foreign people. Their feeling of middle-class solidarity
made them akin to the French, English and any other middle class.
They were very much aware of the greatness of the German people,
who they thought were striding toward the achievement of a free culture; but they also recognized that the English in particular were ahead
of them, not merely in the fact of national unity but in the fact of the
achievement of a progressive economy and a free society and government. They did not envy or hate the French, English or anyone else
on that account, for they were too busy and optimistic to succumb to
that attitude. The Germans were doing well; they had hopes; they
were progressing; they saw the possibility of achieving all their objectives by themselves. Why should they envy or hate anyone else and
compensate for their own backwardness by exalting the German nation
into a messianic role? They did not believe that they were especially
backward any more than that they were in the vanguard. They knew
that their nation contained backward forces; but they thought that
they could overcome these and accomplish their objectives by themselves. l l
As on all other questions, with respect to national unification the
Conservatives were forced to action by the initiative of the liberals.
When they organized for fighting the election campaign in 1861, they
called their instrument the Prussian Volksverein, in deliberate opposition to the liberals' National Verein, and stated that it should be
the center of Conservative action in Prussia and "offer its hand to colleagues of like mind in the rest of the German fatherland." The first
point of the program of this Prussian Union laid down the position on
national unity. "Unity of our German fatherland, not in the manner
of the Italian kingdom by blood and fire but in the unity of its princes
and peoples and in the firm preservation of authority and law. No
11 The position of the liberals on national unification is to be found in so many
well·known publications that bibliographical data are superfluous. The Landtag
debates and the contemporary newspapers and magazines are particularly valuable.

National Unification

/

133

repudiation of our Prussian fatherland and its glorious history; no
perishing in the filth of a German republic; no robbery of the crown
and nationality swindle."12
Although the Conservatives were still reacting to the Revolution of
1848, not to the existing situation, they showed complete hostility to
the liberal conception of national unity. They did so because it was
liberal and because it was national. To Wagener, the nationality
theory of the liberals was not merely "false" but of such weak character
that "you [the liberals] appear to recognize a German as a fellow
countryman only in his party uniform." Deputy von Blanckenburg
expressed the same thought in blunter form, "Gentlemen, for us
national union is ridiculous."13
The degree of clarity in the proposal of the Conservatives for
achieving national unity may be gathered from an election appeal of
October, 1863. The statement revealed that they were much more concerned about preserving the King's power and through it the present
structure of social and political power than they were about unifying
the Germans. The latter objective was used as a sort of extra argument
in favor of the former. The government, the Conservatives declared
in this call for popular support, had given two reasons for dissolving
the Lower House and asking for new elections: the question of the role
of the monarchy in Prussia and the question of the role of Prussia in
Germany. The Conservatives accepted these as the main issues in the
election:
The monarchy alone is able to bring our domestic confusion
to a healthy conclusion; a strong monarchy alone is able also to
preserve and to strengthen Prussia's position in Germany. Let
us hold firmly to all which His Majesty the King has guarded
and held to firmly as his hereditary and constitutional prerogatives, especially his position as supreme war lord of his people.
Let us hold firmly to Prussia's position of power in Germany ....
Let us hold firmly to the strength and prestige of our army,
which is Germany's sword and Prussia's iron wall. Let us hold
firmly to right within and without, and let us enter the election
campaign with the slogan to prove to friends and to foes that we
have recently celebrated the memory of the great deeds of our
ancestors not merely in appearance alone. Since the days of
Frederick the Great Prussia can never more be the second but
always one of the two first powers in Germany.14
U Parisius, Politische Parteien, p. 42; see also the statement by the Conservative
Committee in Konigsberg in Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 3, 18(H.
13 Abg. H., St. B., March 2, 1861; 1,308. Ibid., March 28, 1861; III, 1432.
u Hugo 1\Hiller, Der Pretlssische Volks-Verein (Berlin, 1914), pp. 130-31; also in
Kreuzzeitung. Oct. 18, 1863.
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Wagener worked out a plan for national unification for the Volksverein which, in so far as the Conservatives had any idea of how to accomplish that objective, may be considered as the party's proposal. Its
import may be quickly judged from the details. "The Volksverein
demands not plans of fantastic alliance and conquest but the energetic
and conscious initiative of the Pruss ian government in all critical questions of our time, an independent political action on the bas¥; of
which one can claim to be recognized and respected as the protection
and shield of right and of the legitimacy of the princes and the peoples." The plan recommended not the abolition but the development
of the Confederation constitution "by clear and energetic initiative
on the part of Prussia" in order finally to bring about "the necessary
and desirable reform" of the Confederation by means of "serious negotiations with the German princes and in cooperation with the conservative elements of the individual states." Wagener spoke of the general
mistrust of Prussia as a main obstacle to its position in Germany and
to its action in the Confederation and deplored the absence of a German prince who would be regarded with confidence from all sides as
the true shield of right and legitimacy. It would not be long, he
declared, before all peoples would readily place in such a prince the
faith which he needed in order to be their shield and defence. If a
state would simply fulfill its duty and administer justice, influence
would come to it automatically. As for the Diet of the Confederation,
Wagener declared that when, instead of ministers, princes placed themselves personally at the head of the German nation, that body would
lose its unpopularity. "If the princes wish to remain what they are,"
Wagener declared, "or if they wish to remain at all, it is high time
they came to the front in person."15
The election appeal showed that the Conservatives really had no
policy for unifying Germany. They wished to maintain the status quo,
with power left in the hands of the ruling princes and with the Prussian and Austrian monarchs cooperating as equals to keep out foreign
enemies and to keep down internal liberalism. In so far as any changes
were to be made in the existing constitution for Germany, they had to
be achieved by common agreement among all the rulers; otherwise
legal rights and therefore morality would be violated, the door opened
to further inroads upon the status quo, to liberalism and nationalism.
Conservatism revived its policy of the Metternich era of using international relations as a justification for not reforming at home and as a
'. Miiller, op. cit., pp. 93·94.
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means of preventing any reform. Just how the German nation would
come out of its existing impasse did not bother the Conservatives.
Many of them preferred to concentrate merely upon Prussia, as one
election propoganda sheet put out by the Konigsberg election committee said, "With God for King and Fatherland,"16 and by Fatherland
they meant Prussia.
The Conservatives were necessarily opposed to change. Their
emotional response toward opponents varied from indifference to hate,
depending upon the degree of danger to them from these forces. They
hated the liberals within Germany and they hated Louis Napoleon and
the French. They regarded these two forces alike as their greatest
enemies. They condemned Louis Napoleon for having established
the kind of absolutistic, bureaucratic, centralized government which,
they thought, was as contrary to their views and interests as liberalism.
For the latter they felt scorn; for Louis Napoleon and his accomplishments they felt fear-fear of imitation in Prussia, fear of Louis Napoleon's using the military power gained by his absolutism to attack
Prussia. They maintained the standards of power politics of the Old
Regime in international as well as internal relations, and attributing
the same standards to Louis Napoleon, they mistrusted him deeply
and freely vented their antagonism in words of intense aversion. They
were far from being nationalists; but believing in the game of international politics as played by Frederick the Great, they were constantly
on the lookout for foreign enemies. Rather ignorant of conditions in
other countries, they were not aware of any community of interest
with the nobility and other conservatives in other European countries.
They were not conservative internationalists; they were conservative
Prussians. The extent of their interest in conservatism abroad was
limited to Germany and German-speaking Austria. While they were
theoretically willing to cooperate with these German and AustrianGerman conservatives against the liberal advocates of national unity,
they did not bestir themselves to do more than put the idea into words,
and they left the initiative and responsibility for action to the conservative governments. They concentrated on preserving their position in Prussia, and for that purpose they supported the King's power.
The institutional structure of their society was restricted to Prussia;
they had no interest in or occasion for exploiting German nationalism
for their own gain as they had after Germany became unified. The
new Reich created new institutions of control which they could use
.. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 16, 1861.
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for the preservation of conservatism and gave a new set of institutions
to conserve. After the radical act of national unification the Conservatives could and did accustom themselves to maintaining the conservative character of these institutions; and since the institutions were
on a national basis, the Conservatives became nationalists for the sake
of their way of life. In the period under consideration, however, the
area of their interest remained Prussia, their major enemy not France
or any foreign power so much as the liberals and democrats who wished
to reform Prussia and to unify Germany. They associated nationalism
with liberalism and both with revolutionary destruction of the Old
Regime.
When Bismarck became Minister President in September, 1862,
he had already cast aside his stock Prussianism of 1849 and recognized
the necessity for German unity. He had clarified in his own mind
the outlines of the desired organization of a unified Germany and a
plan for accomplishing the objective. He had weighed the forces
which would oppose unification and those which would support it,
and he arrived at a policy which incorporated elements from the liberal
program and from the Hohenzollern tradition of power politics. He
was to be unable to execute in toto the plan which he had worked out;
nonetheless, he returned to it after the war of 1866 and built the
essentials into the structure of a unified Germany.
Bismarck approached the problem of national unification from the
standpoint of Pruss ian state interests. Whatever accrued to Prussia·s
advantage should be furthered. He learned from experience as representative at the Diet in Frankfurt am Main in the 1850s that Prussia
lacked the resources of the other great powers and needed German support. He recognized that Prussia's position in the geographic center
of Europe would force it to become involved in every European affair,
that it could not remain passive and in peace, that it must be either
hammer or anvil. "We shall appear relatively weak in every connection with other great powers," he wrote in 1857, "as long as we are not
stronger than we now are." In the next year he added, "There is nothing more German than the development of properly understood Prussian particularist interests."17 Bismarck discovered the German nation
in his search for means of strengthening Prussia as an international
power.

.. Hans Rothfels (ed.), Otto von Bismarck. Deutscher Staat. Ausgewiihlte Dokumente (Munich, 1925), pp. 129, 127, 192.
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Under the existing constitution of the German confederation Prussia would be unable to improve upon its position. Bismarck's criticism
of that organization, based on his own experience, had much in common with the condemnatory views of the liberals, but it was put in
terms of power rather than in expressions of cultural ideals for the
German people. He had concluded that the exercise of the veto
by each of the thirty-three or so members of the Diet prevented anything from being accomplished. He expressed to Prince William in
March, 1858, his belief that the particularism of the majority of the
smaller German governments and the tendencies of the Austrian polides were both un-German, that the Confederation was being exploited
to preserve the domestic and foreign security of its members and that it
would in time break apart. He condemned Prussian policy for being
enthusiastic about "the small state sovereignty created by Napoleon
and sanctioned by Metternich," and called this policy one of "blindness toward all dangers with which Prussia and Germany's independence are threatened in the future as long as the nonsense of the present
Confederation constitution exists, which is nothing more than a hothouse and conservatory of dangerous and revolutionary particularist
activities."18
From his experience at the German Diet Bismarck had acquired a
profound mistrust of Austria. Again his comments resembled those
of the liberals, but again with the difference that they were based on
standards of power politics. Austria would act as an independent great
power, he said, and exploit its German connections for selfish purposes.
The twenty per cent German population in Austria, Bismarck declared,
offered no assurance whatever that Austria would follow a policy of
advantage to Germany or cooperate with Prussia to that effect. On
the contrary, he wrote Prince William, in its relations with Prussia
Austria would pursue its own interests, "to combat and reduce Prussia's prestige and influence in Germany as much as possible, but in
case of war and against the manifold dangers surrounding Austria to
seek to be able to count on the support of Prussia's complete power."19
Like most of his liberal opponents Bismarck was klein-deutsch; in his
thinking, the presence of two great powers, Austria and Prussia,
created a situation of dualism and rivalry which would have to be
eliminated.
The disadvantage and danger of the dualism to Prussia became clear
to Bismarck from the behavior of the so-called middle states, the larger
18
10

Ibid., pp. 192, 204-05.
Ibid., pp. 131, 193-94.
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of the German states, especially Saxony, Bavaria and Wiirttemberg.
These, he said, were too small to act like international powers and too
large to be conscious of their own intrinsic weakness. Bismarck
diagnosed their policy as one of maintaining themselves by playing between Prussia and Austria.
The belief in the possibility of a unanimous action of both
powers has nowhere sunk lower than in Germany itself. The
middle states know the situation best, for they are the ones which
fan the rivalry of the great powers. Their simple means for doing so is to support every unjust claim of Austria against Prussia.
The office of arbitrator between the two powers in peacetime
and a plausible excuse in wartime to be able to leave the Confederation in the lurch because of the disunity of Prussia and
Austria are the fruits of their policy.
The middle and small states were normally pro-Austrian out of fear of
Prussia, Bismarck asserted in 1859; but if Austria became aggressive
and Prussia quiescent, they would flock to Prussia's standard. Their
policy was "the natural and necessary result of their situation in the
Confederation and was not to be expected to change." "We have no
means," he concluded, "to come to an enduring and satisfactory arrangement with this policy within the existing constitution of the
Confederation."20
Bismarck rarely restricted his thinking to negative criticism. Along
with the analysis of the defects in the German constitution he developed ideas about reorganization. Nor did he stop merely with a
description of what should be introduced in place of the existing structure. As a person concerned with action he considered how the plans
would be implemented.
The key to Bismarck's national policy was contained in a letter of
criticism of the political program put forth by the Conservative party
in 1861. "Our government is liberal in Prussia; but legitimist in
foreign policy," he wrote. He proposed that the policy be made not
liberal but consistent. Liberal ideas should be used in handling the
question of German unity. "In the national sphere," he said, "very
modest concessions have been greeted as valuable. One could create
quite a conservative national representation and still gain the gratitude
of the liberals for it." He thought it possible to achieve a liberal objective with liberal support, to do so under Conservative control and
with the preservation of the Conservative political and social structure,

•• Ibid., pp. 194·95, 198.
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making possible the assumption and retention of political power by
a Bismarck.21
In setting the ultimate objective of German unity, Bismarck did not
at this time (1861) go as far along the road toward centralization as the
liberals. He had written in 1857 that military, political and commercial authority would be most useful for the Confederation, that "under
unified direction the Confederation would accomplish entirely other
things in war and peace than at present and in case of war would be
really tenable."22 He was then thinking about the ideal, and he had
no intention of subordinating Prussia to such political control. His
usual statement omitted the political factor and called for the transfer
to a central government solely of military, customs and commercial
authority. "We need a tighter consolidation of German military power
as much as bread itself," he wrote in September, 1861. "We need a new
organization in customs affairs and a number of common institutions
in ~rder to protect the material interests against the disadvantages
which grow out of the unnatural configuration of the inner German
state boundaries."23 He did not expand his conception of what powers
the German government would need until in 1866 and 1867 he actually
had to face the issue. One must conclude that his Prussian Conservative standards prevented him from working out an adequate answer
to this problem until the crisis, and that the liberals had both a much
earlier and a much clearer understanding of it than he had. When
the North German Confederation was created in 1867 the character
of the central authority bore much more the stamp of the liberals than
of Bismarck; but he had the statemanship to accept the additions as
useful in achieving the common objective of national unity.
From practical experience Bismarck came to incorporate in his plans
the creation of a national parliament to represent the people. The
ideal was related in his mind with that of moral conquest in Germany
by Prussia and showed extraordinary similarity to the liberals' thinking. Early in 1858 he wrote Prince William in eloquent terms.
The leading position which Prussia had before 1848 in the
Confederation rested not upon the favor of the middle states and
the Confederation assembly but upon the fact that Prussia was
in the vanguard in all lines of state development, that all that
was specifically Prussian was recognized in the other states of the
Confederation as model and according to ability was imitated.
The precipitancy of this line of development in the revolutionary period and the resulting mistrust aroused in the German
Ibid., pp. 204.05.
42.
23 Ibid., pp. 204-05.
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governments have necessarily caused a decided setback to the
advance of Prussian influence. The weakening of the powerful
influence of public opinon since 1848 resulting from the reaction
to that movement and the novelty of Austria's coming forth as
competitor make it difficult at present to regain the grou~d
which Prussia has lost. Nonetheless, this is the only way to WIn
the position which Prussia needs for the fulfillment of its state
tasks, and its superior means in this area are in comparison with
Austria and the other German states still significant. The assurance that His Majesty the King of Prussia would still remain
king in his country if the entire standing army were drawn out
of it is shared with Prussia by no other continental state and no
German one. On this fact rests the possibility for developing
public life to satisfy the demands of the present time more nearly than any other states are able to do. The degree of free movement which is permissible without hurting the authority of the
government is much greater in Prussia than in the rest of Germany. Prussia is able to allow its representative body and its
press even with respect to political questions more freedom of
action than before. It knew how to gain and preserve the position of the intellectual leader of Germany before 1848 under an
almost absolute government, and would irrespective of its present constitution be able to do the same at present. For that
end it is only necessary that its domestic conditions be such that
they do not disturb the impression abroad of unified cooperation of all organs and forces of the country and that they actually
further this cooperation. If the present Prussian constitution is
a definitive institution, then the firm unity of the governmental
organs and their harmony with the representative assembly
should reach such a degree that the force of Prussia is not in
part broken by controversies within between mutually hostile
currents. Otherwise Prussia cannot exercise abroad, at least during peace, the predominant moral influence on Germany which
is assured it if its power is not weakened. The royal authority
rests in Prussia upon such a secure basis that the government can
create for itself without danger very effective means of action
toward German conditions by more vigorous activity of the
representative assembly. It is worth noting what an impression
upon entire Germany was recently made by the discussion in the
Saxon parliament of the Confederation policy and the position
of Saxony toward the Confederation. How much more powerful
would the impression have been if a similar discussion had occurred in the Prussian parliament. If Prussia should openly discuss the German policy, its position toward the Confederation,
the difficulties which it has to overcome, the endeavors of its
opponents, perhaps a few sessions of the Prussian Landtag would
suffice to put an end to the presumption of the majority in the
Confederation.24
"Ibid., pp. 196·98.
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Although the picture of Prussian conditions was too idyllic and that
of other states, German and non-German, much too black, the urgent
advocacy of harmony between the government and the Landtag in
Prussia and of full discussion of the German question in the latter as
powerful means of winning support among the other Germans reads
like a plea by the liberals.
The idea was in keeping with Bismarck's proposal to establish a
German national parliament. In each case, in Prussia and in Germany, the people should cooperate in affairs of government, and Bismarck severely condemned the Conservative party's election program
of 1861 for its negative attitude toward parliaments. "I do not understand," he wrote in September of that year to a leading Conservative,
"why we recoil so prudishly before the idea of popular representation,
either in the Confederation or in a customs union parliament. We
cannot combat an institution as revolutionary which is legitimately
accepted in every German state, which we Conservatives would not
like to do without even in Prussia!. .. One could create a conservative
national assembly and nonetheless gain thanks from the liberals for it."
Bismarck supported the idea of a national parliament as an integral
part of the central government in order to establish a unifying force
as a counterbalance against "the diverging tendencies of dynastic
special policies." He wished the parliament to exercise wide powers
so that it could adequately perform its function, and he wished it to
represent, not the governments of the separate states, but the German
people. In 1863 he explained his reasons:
Only such a representation will assure Prussia that it makes
no sacrifice which does not accrue to the good of entire Germany.
No organization of Confederation agencies, however artistically
thought out, can eliminate the play and counter-play of dynastic
and particularist interests. These must find a counterweight and
corrective in the national representation. In an assembly which
is chosen for all Germany according to the principle of numbers
by direct elections the center of gravity will never be found outside Germany or in anyone state which is trying to separate itself from the rest. Therefore Prussia can enter the assembly
with assurance. The interests and needs of the Prussian people
are basically and inseparably identical with those of the German
people. Where this force achieves its real significance Prussia
need never have any fear of being drawn into a policy contrary
to its own interests-a fear which would be doubly justified if,
in addition to having an organization in which the center of
gravity would lie outside Prussia, the mutually hostile particular-
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istic elements would be on principle the basis for the formation
of the popular representative body.25
History was to show that Prussian interests did not always coincide
with German interests, except by Pruss ian definition; but that Bismarck was so clearly aware of the need for the people to participate
directly in the governance of the future Germany revealed how far he
had travelled from his stock Prussianism of a decade earlier.
Bismarck saw in the creation of a German national assembly the
advantage for the political training of the people. He had as sharp
an eye as the liberals for the depressing effect of particularism upon
political understanding, and like them he wished to change it. "Such
a representative assembly for entire Germany," he stated, "should with
some certainty also bring it about that the deplorable tendency of most
German Landtags to devote themselves predominantly to petty controversies with their own government may be beneficially diverted to
broader and more generally useful paths, and the insignificant conflicts of the estates give way to a more statesmanlike handling of interests of German scope."26 Bigness appeared as essential for the
development of political talent as for economic expansion. Bismarck
and the liberals alike hoped and expected that it would lift politics
out of local pettiness to the plane of major issues. They were to find
that the handling of problems on a national scale did at times elevate
the character of German politics. It gave political life a seriousness
and scope which had been present, if at all, only in the larger states.
But if one may judge from this remark alone, Bismarck, like the
liberals, was much too optimistic. Other statements show that he was
aware of that fact and that he was here mainly expressing a hope in the
days of the liberal New Era (July, 1861). He was answering one of
the constant Conservative arguments against parliamentary life.
The question of how national representation could be created
under present circumstances with adequate powers to be effective in
achieving unification concerned Bismarck just as it did the liberals.
Like them, he thought of developing that kind of assembly in connection with the Zollverein. In writing to the King in 1861 about the
forthcoming renewal of the Zollverein he expressed the wish to discontinue that organization in its present form because the veto power of
each member prevented any development of commercial legislation.
He proposed that a two-thirds majority be given the power to legislate,
and he recommended further
·'Ibid., pp. 201, 205, 207-09.
··Ibid., p. 202.
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... that committees of larger or smaller numbers of members
from the parliaments of the individual states come together and
seek to harmonize through their discussion and conclusions the
differences in opinions of the governments. Such a customs
parliament can under circumstances and with clever guidance
become the organ for initiating agreements in other spheres, in
which German states would be inclined all the more readily to
participate if they were always to remain able to withdraw. The
first beginnings of customs unification with Darmstadt were
scarcely more important than in its way the military convention
with Coburg-Gotha and other similarly disposed small states
would be. The influence of existing parliamentary bodies offers
prospects at the present time of faster progress in national endeavors than thirty years ago, and foreign events can exert a
favorable influence. Common military organization should be
kept in mind as an ultimate, realizable goal, for which the common income from customs and related taxes would serve as a
budget and supplement a common legislation for trade and
transportation, all on a terminable treaty basis with the cooperation of a popular representative body chosen out of the Landtags. 27
Bismarck recognized the need of having the German people participate in the political unification of their nation. He even spoke of
using revolution if it would help to achieve the objective of national
unity.28 The irony of this remark lies in the fact that he actually unified the country in the face of public hostility. To him popular participation was only one of three major instruments for unifying Germany; the other two, diplomacy and war, carried much more weight
in his estimation than the nationalist public.
As soon as Bismarck became Minister President in September, 1862,
he openly announced to the Budget Commission of the Lower House
his standards of action. "Germany does not look to Prussia's liberalism
but to its power. Bavaria, Wiirttemberg and Baden may indulge in
liberalism; therefore no one would atrribute to them Prussia's role.
Prussia must concentrate its power for the favorable moment which
already has several times been missed. Prussia's frontiers as set by the
Vienna treaties are not favorable to a sound statehood. The great
questions of our time will be decided not by speeches and majority
decisions-that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849-but by iron
and blood."29 Bismarck praised the National Verein as having achieved

.7 Ibid., pp. 202-03.
·"Ibid., p. 132.
'9 Ibid., p. 206. This is a summary of his extemporaneous remarks. He had expressed the same belief in August, 1849. Ibid., p. 183.
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recogmtlOn "because of the justice of its demands"; but he utterly
condemned "the chase after the phantom 'popularity' " in Germany,
and he poured scorn upon the idea of relying upon the support of the
democratic associations in the lesser states.30 At the time of the
Schleswig-Holstein crisis in December, 1863, he wrote the Prussian
diplomat Count von der Goltz as follows:
1£ we turn our back now on the great powers and throw ourselves in the arms of the policy of the small states, a policy
caught in the net of the democracy of private societies, the
monarchy would be in the worst situation within the state and
toward the outside world of which it is possible to conceive.
Instead of pushing we should be pushed. We should depend
upon elements which we do not control and which are necessarily hostile to us, but to which we should have to surrender
unconditionally. You believe that in "German public opinion,"
parliaments, newspapers, and so forth, there is something which
could help and support us in a policy of union or hegemony.
I hold that to be a grave mistake, a figment of the imagination.
Our strength cannot arise out of parliaments and press politics
but solely out of militarily strong, great power politics, and we
do not have enough reserve to waste it on a false front and in
words ....

In this letter Bismarck was exaggerating somewhat in order to stress
his major point, just as he had overemphasized in his letter to the King
the importance of moral conquest. He wished to use all these forces
according to need and possibility; but there can be no doubt that
diplomacy and war conducted by Prussia as a great power represented
to him the main means for accomplishing his objectives. Germany
could be unified solely within the framework provided by international
power politics, and he referred to the liberals' proposed solution as
that of "professors, county judges and small-town chatter-boxes."31
Bismarck was willing to use whatever means were at his disposalthe Zollverein, other princes, military might, diplomacy. While holding to his objective, he was a thorough opportunist in selecting his
means and in timing his action. He worked out the main lines of that
objective, and he was gifted with the ability to learn from the clarifying experience of action what those main lines should be. In adhering
firmly to his basic policies, he was quite willing to compromise on
details, in fact, not merely to compromise but frankly to accept changes
that seemed to be sensible.
O. Ibid., p. 206.
• 1 Ibid., pp. 130-31.
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The liberals, on the other hand, never had the chance to learn the
ways of statesmanship by practical experience in the responsibility of
government. Necessarily, they seem dogmatic. Some of them were,
but many of them possessed the potential qualities of statesmen. While
Bismarck damned the constitution of the Co~federation as useless, he
played with the idea that the Zollverein might be developed into the
organization for a unified Germany. The liberals never had any
illusions about either. They recognized that the fundamental issue
was political and would ultimately have to be faced on the political
plane. They may have overestimated the power of public opinion;
but we know today from experience with the attempts to unify Europe
that the liberal proposal was far from being foolish. When the liberals
lost faith in the willingness of the Pnissian ruler to lead in the creation of the new Germany, they advocated the reintroduction of the
German constitution of 1849. They had a reasonable, concrete objective and a feasible method of attaining it.
The fundamental divergence between the liberals and Bismarck
may be seen most clearly in their respective estimate of the relative
importance of internal and foreign affairs. To the liberals with their
belief in rationality and peaceful discussion as means for solving problems, internal matters took priority. Germany could be unified by action within the country. In a statement to the Lower House in
February, 1866, Bismarck expressed the contrary belief. Deputy
Twesten, he said, had surmised that he, Bismarck, used foreign policy
only as a means for furthering the domestic struggle against parliamentary claims. He denied the accusation absolutely. "For me
foreign affairs are ends in themselves and are superior to the others
[that is, internal affairs]. And you," he said to the liberals, "should
also think so, for under some future liberal ministry you could very
quickly regain in foreign affairs the ground which you may have lost in
domestic affairs."32
It may be doubted whether Bismarck, pressed to do so in an extensive debate, could have defended the position which he took, in fact
whether he even fully believed his own words. Once again he was
exaggerating to support his main idea. It is even more doubtful
whether he could have maintained the proposition as one of general
application. Questions of internal and of foreign affairs are so interconnected that one can hardly gauge exactly the significance of one as
over against the other. Certainly in the case of German unification
"Ibid" pp. 137-3ft
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the problem was created not by foreign affairs but by internal developments. Diplomacy responded to this change in German society and
fulfilled the popular desire for national unity. While Prussian advantage as a power-state coincided with this popular movement, the
latter force initiated the situation in which the former could act.
The validity of Bismarck's estimate arises from the fact that a least
temporarily and on the surface he made it valid. He did unify Germany by way of foreign affairs, diplomacy and war, and in spite of the
hostility of the public. He did correctly recognize that at the time
Austria's aversion to German unity could be overcome solely by war.
He accurately estimated the weakness of the other German states and
predicted correctly that once Prussia showed determination, the governments of those states would adjust themselves to the inevitability of
German unity under Prussian leadership.ss He misjudged the value
and strength of the internal forces in this work, just as the liberals
may have underrated the significance of the international aspect of
national unification. The liberals had no concrete and dearly
enunciated method to offer for the ultimate ousting of Austria as a
German power. They had no force to oppose to it, and unless broken
up by nationalism, Austria would not have acquiesced without compulsion in the klein-deutsch solution. If they erred in the case of
Austria, they were more likely correct with respect to France. By
their method of unification war with France could probably have
been avoided. It is quite thinkable that in time the liberals might
have unified the non-Austrian states by peaceful means, and that
neither Austria nor France would have dared to interfere. By flouting
liberal popular support for so long and so flagrantly, Bismarck had to
recover the support of the German people by some dramatic events like
the wars against Austria and France and thereby arouse the public to
press their particularistic rulers and governments into accepting national unification. Even apart from that fact he had chosen the method
of power politics and involved himself in a system which practically
assured a war with both countries. In the case of Bismarck and the
liberals, internal and international affairs were inextricably interconnected, and neglect of one needed to be counterbalanced by an accentuation of the other. The liberals' weakness-too great a concentration on the internal factors-was never proved because of lack
of opportunity for action; but Bismarck's exaggeration of the role of

"Ibid., pp. 192-93.
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international diplomacy and war had results which were permanently
harmful to German life.
It was unfortunate that Bismarck inherited the constitutional conflict and felt compell~d to fight the liberals. He himself regretted the
fact,34 for actually he and the liberals agreed in their fundamental conception of German unity, and each needed the abilities of the other.
The King's stubborness had created a situation which prevented Bismarck from utilizing one of the three means of unification which he
had recognized. He had to forego popular support and to rely upon
diplomacy and war to a much greater extent than he had anticipated.
The effects were bad upon him as well, in that he henceforth tended
to belittle internal affairs and to look for solutions- of these problems
in the play of international power politics. Nonetheless, he kept in
mind his plan of 1858, and as soon as the Austro-Prussian war was won,
he again, and this time successfully, endeavored to associate the people
with his work of unification. The German constitution bears the
evidence of the cooperation. A figure of less stature might have endeavored to impose a constitution upon Germany which would have
excluded popular participation in a representative assembly. Bismarck recognized that national unity made no sense and would have
no permanence without the cooperation of the nation.
What did each of the four forces, the King, the liberals, the Conservatives, and Bismarck, know about the plans of the others for
~national unification? The ideas of the liberals and the Conservatives
were well known. These parties depended upon public discussion for
the effectiveness of their programs. The King's attitude was also public. Stories of such incidents as the following went the rounds of the
liberals and, together with their knowledge of the tame and ineffective course of the current Foreign Minister's German policy, made
the liberal public pessimistic about the King's willingness to take any
significant measures toward unity. Von Hoverbeck related the incident in a private letter of January, 1862:
Today at twelve o'clock there took place in the Opera House
[in Berlin] a concert for the navy. The Berlin choral society
had brought together 1,500 singers for it. The remaining seats
in the Opera House with the exception of the first row of boxes
were fairly well filled; this row, however, was intentionally empty, for practically not a single army officer was present. The
King and Queen were present. Next to the last song was one
about Old Bliicher, "The Armies Remain on the Rhine," and
could be regarded as- a threat to France. The King listened to i,t
.. Zechlin, op. cit., p. 324; Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 102.
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with great satisfaction, and then left quickly, immediately before
the first notes of "The German's Fatherland." But the public
here has good sense and knows in its turn how to demonstrate.
As soon as the King left the box and the first four notes of "The
German's Fatherland" were sung, the audience interrupted the
song by energetic applause in the middle of the first line, an
unprecedented event. The song was rendered by the 1,500
voices with much love and joy and received stormy applause.
About the fact itself there is nothing further to say than "Our
poor country."35
With respect to Bismarck, the liberals knew about his ideas, that
he favored Prussia's taking the intitiative for klein-deutsch unification,
that he wished the German central authority to have power over military and commercial affairs, and that he advocated the creation of a
national assembly as part of that government. They were appalled
at Bismark's assertions about "blood and iron," and about legality'S
being that which force makes valid.36 Such assertions ran utterly
counter to their moral sense. They were even more repelled by his
behavior in the constitutional conflict and refused to believe that a
person could follow a liberal policy in German unification while seeking to destroy, as they thought, the constitution in his own state. As
Deputy von Sybel said in the Lower House, January 29,1863: "How one
can expect that one can question the entire legal power of the Prussian
parliament and at the same time interest the German people in a German parliament under the same auspices? This is something that goes
beyond the limits of my limited understanding as a subject (beschriinkter Untertanenverstanll)."37 The liberals felt such mistrust of Bismarck
that they refused to support him in his program of national unification, a program of the same general content as their own.3S

The Economic 1nterest
The Bremer Handelsblatt served as a leading organ of expression
for liberalism and for national unification. Its editor had close contacts with others of like mind all over Germany. As much as any
other, this journal can be considered a spokesman for ,the Prussian
liberals. The personnel worked together in the National Verein, the
Congress of German Economists, and the other important associations.
• 6 Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 8.
a. Rothfels, op. cit., p .. 133.
3. A dress-De batte, p. 228 .
• 8 On liberals' knowledge of Bismarck's plans, see Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 324-25;
Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 87-88, 102; Heinrich von Poschinger (ed.), Erinnerungen
aus dem Leben von Hans Viktor von Unruh (Stuttgart, 1895), pp. 207-09, 216·17.

National Unification

/

149

The Handelsblatt reported all the economic activities of the time and
supported all those making for national unity along liberal principles.
The following article, published on July 11, 1857, may be read as the
expression of its views as well those of its Pruss ian colleagues.
Whoever in Germany could write about the economy and the
commercial policy without touching politics would make himself
extremely beloved in the highest circles and would not be unwelcome even among burghers [the article here used the word to
refer to citizens]. The governments would easily give a patent
to anyone who knew how to isolate the entire economic area as
a contented idyll in which land and people would quietly and
obediently carryon their material progress and would bear in
their hearts exclusively the political feeling of gratitude toward
the high officials, the furtherers of their fortune. ,Many a good
burgher agrees with the boldest national economic liberalism
but lets his voice noticeably drop at every approach to the really
political aspect. Such views, high and low, prove most clearly
that we in Germany are in both respects still in the beginning of
our development. Whoever looks at the situation without prejudice and fear will recognize immediately the intimate connection especially in Germany of the national economic with the national political problem, this Alpha and Omega of German politics. The commerce and transportation of a country have in spite
of the egoism among individuals a common aspect. They demand
one law, one legislation, one defence abroad. This need has
been satisfied in all other countries which we may mention, but
not in Germany. A common code of commercial law is now slowly struggling to life; a common legislation is a pious wish, and
abroad we all enjoy the same right, defencelessness. Now there
are people who like, for example, the Geestemiinde trade in its
Geestemiinde particularity as something specifically Hanoverian,
and are able to close their eyes to the fact of its undeniable Weser
nature. There are others who judge the transit tolls solely by
whether their preservation is more advantageous to Stettin or
their abolition more favorable to Hamburg. With people of
such exceptional gifts and views we have nothing to do. The
Bremer Handelsblatt has sought to represent the interests of
German commerce and still seeks to do so. But we have something to say to and about such people.
The great evil of German disunity is denied by no one, but
we have grown accustomed to bear it. To throw it off seems
to us too bold a hope. Petty sufferings, on the other hand, anger,
excite, make wild. Since they do not burden us continuously,
sensitive trade has not yet blunted itself against them. We have
recently discussed these daily vexations. We have called attention to a supreme railroad committee, have shaken the transit.
tolls, have sought with the idea of an econoinic congress to
arouse continuing, all-sided agitation. We may twist and turn as
we will: a solution of this and all other related questions is
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possible only within the realm of national politics. To avoid
this area in the discussion of these questions is inconceivable.
For where do these needs and demands lead to? To the one demand of impartial justice, unified representation of common
interests prior to and above particular ones. That is nothing
else than another expression for the demands of national politics.
Four years later, on May 31, 1861, another organ for advancing the
views of Prussian liberals and nationalists, the W ochenschrift des
NationaFVereins, was assertive and specific about the relation between
economics and politics.
We suffer everywhere in the most important nerve for the entire
economy, namely, in confidence iI?- our o~ state po~er, which
is so necessary for all trade and 10dustrIal undertak1Ogs. We
lack the protection and support for enterprise and speculation
which develop with an international poliucal position of states
which command respect. Instead, we enjoy the doubtful benefit
of paternalism, of a system of much governance, which hinders
.
us 10 the development of our tr.ade and in?l!stry.
Capital has no confidence 10 the stabIlity and durauon of a
confederation which rests solely upon common dynastic interests and has never done or even wished to do anything beneficial
for the material interests of the people. The capitalists therefore seek opportunity for advantageous outlay of money on the
stock exchange rather than in national production. Therefore,
one has on the average to use much less money in industrial
enterprises in Germany than in other industrial states. The
German industrialist is also seldom in a position to exploit a
favorable situation on the world market, but is always exposed
disadvantageously to such situations. The larger capital sum invested in industry is assured of its interest and can more easily
save funds because it has the advantages of large-scale operations.
The smaller industrial capital must save on wages, on the
quality of the raw materials or of the products themselves. The
results have become very perceptible in many branches of German industry. The low wages in Germany have driven the good
workers abroad, and the poor-quality wares have ruined the
market.
The complaints of the W ochenschrift represented a refinement
upon the more basic ones expressed by the other journal. Both criticisms were justified; those of the Handelsblatt were much more frequent. If they were taken care of, the others would be met automatically. Public opinion concentrated upon overcoming institutional deficiencies. The acceptance of a common German economic
legal code, the reorganization of the Zollverein to give it body and
authority to act, the establishment of common citizenship and of the
right of freedom of movement and domicile and occupation, the crea-
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tion of a unified transportation and communication system, the formation of a German consular service abroad and of organs of power at
home able to protect and further German economic interests abroad,
the introduction of a uniform system of weights, measures and coinage
-these constituted the main economic desires, and all implied the
organization of national political unity. As the Bremer Handelsblatt
had declared, politics and economics were inseparable; the furtherance
of economic interests in Germany required political unification.
The intimate relation between liberalism and nationalism was evident in every line of desired reform. The life of the German states,
declared the Bremer Handelsblatt, was becoming increasingly interdependent.
It is not possible that Oldenburg and Bremen should for long experience the advantages of free interest rates while Hanover
continues to believe the church fathers rather than science. It
is not possible for Bavaria and Hanover to preserve guilds, to
which Saxony and Wiirttemberg have given the deathblow. For
good or evil, Prussia must soon introduce the economic reforms
in which Austria and the middle states have taken the lead.
And as soon as Prussia raises its foot for this forward march, its
freedom of movement, its ... freedom of occupation will be irresistibly contagious. . . . The economic reform movement in
the end conquers reaction, for it attracts the more teachable
members of this party and victoriously drives the others off the
field. 39
This line of thinking led the liberals and nationalists to believe that
in the economic sphere of life as well as the political, they had the
forces of history on their side. It offeI:ed a source of great confidence
in the outcome.
Of basic importance among the demands for economic reform was
the question of freedom of movement throughout Germany. The
resolution passed by the Congress of German Economists in 1863 will
indicate the nature of the problem. The resolution read in major part
as follows:
1. Everyone, irrespective of the community, state or nation to
which he may belong, shall be permitted to live in any place
where he wishes, to carryon any occupation which is permitted,
to marry and establish a family, to acquire property in land.
2. This right shall not be limited to natives or be dependent
upon reciprocity or the payment of immigration tax or upon
other burdensome and restricting conditions .

•• Feb. 23. 1861.
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3. The right to domicile does not include automatically the
right of citizenship and community membership. Nonetheless,
the latter right should be attainable if one has maintain~d his
domicile continuously in a community for three years wIthout
becoming a public charge ....
5. The right to carryon an occupation is included in that of
domicile and may not be made dependent upon the previous
acquisition of state or community citizenship.
6. The permission to marry shall depend solely upon the
terms of the general civil law, and shall not depend upon the
permission of the community of residence or citizenship, or upon
a preliminary examination and approval by a state or other
police bureau, or upon evidence of a livelihood or upon other
burdensome and restricting conditions.
7. The acquisition of state and community citizenship is to be
made as easy as possible; if membership in the community also
includes legal property requirements, an admission fee corresponding to the latter may be raised. 40
Nothing is as revealing of the practical import of the resolution as
contemporary descriptions of actual conditions. The press constantly
supplied evidence of the most condemnatory sort. An article in the
National Zeitung of October 10, 1863, reproduced the feeling of
exasperation as well as any.
When in a great land inhabited by one people the thousands
of communities which it contains shut themselves off one against
the other, not in respect to material goods and capital but in
respect to the most important good and the most valuable capital
there is, namely, the movement of human beings; when in this
people that has one language, more or less extensive groups of
communities are united in states and these states in relation to
the movement of persons close their frontiers against one another
through new restrictions and seek as far as possible to keep out
any immigrant from another group as a "foreigner" or as the
ancients called him, a "barbarian": can one wonder that this
land and people are disunited and lack the common feeling
which is indispensable for national cooperation? If we look at
the lands where national feeling and national cooperation have
developed, freedom of movement obtains everywhere not merely
within the nation but also for entry from other nations; for the
foreigners which a people attracts and absorbs serve, so one believes there with justice, to augment economic strength and
political significance. In Germany alone there survive from outworn times obsolete conditions where each state and each town
encloses itself by a police wall and a swampy communal moat
so that no one will think of moving there and increasing the

.0
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capital, the division of labor and the tax resources. And i~ these
abiding conditions of inner defence from which d~mestIc hostility is bound to follow, we wonder why national umty does not
progress! One longs for conventions of delegates, reform of the
confederation, Kaiser and Reich; but if we acquired Kaiser and
Reich and continued to shut ourselves off one from another,
Kaiser and Reich would be just. as powerless as before. 'For
without the moral and economic basis of a unified consciousness
unified constitutions remain dead forms. We see liberal town
councils today jubilantly unfold the black, red and gold flag:
and tomorrow they stick their heads together in secret session
and discuss long and carefully whether they should allow a Hessian or a Saxon to regard his district as part of the fatherland.
Is that a fatherland which turns away from the door its son who
does not want to steal or to be given his bread, who wishes to
earn his bread by ability and hard work? Is that a fatherland
which shuts him up in the village where he was born? Can a
people become conscious of its unity when unity is not allowed
for the utilization of its forces and the winning of its material
existence? Unified government by one army can bring together
or break up the nations according to the interests of the ruler.
What holds them securely together is one fatherland. So long as
we in Germany do not have that one fatherland, unified rule will
rest on a weak foundation. If we have one fatherland, political
unity will come of itself; for a people which has become interdependent in its material conditions of life cannot be politically
divided.
Man has the need of a fatherland. No guild, no magistrate or
senate can disprove that fact. And the more railroads and
telegraphs we build, the more industry and commerce we carry
on, just so much more grows the need for a fatherland. For
with the cheapness and ease of transportation, the human being
develops. He develops in himself the need for movement; the
area which he needs for his activity expands. Man is not a plant,
which is rooted to the soil; he is more than an animal, which is
distinguished from the plant by its movement. If you degrade
him in his own land below the animal to the condition of a
plant, which cannot move from the spot where chance sowed it,
then he will seek a fatherland abroad which you deny him at
home. He will go beyond the Rhine or the Channel or the
ocean. These are the best persons, those who have the irresistible urge for a fatherland of free participation. They are the
best forces, the most courageous, which move to uncertain lands
and most easily separate themselves from the home community.
Is that a useful institution which invests valuable capital in the
workers only to have it exported without compensation at home,
which makes the workers skilled and then drives them out because their skill might lay hands on the old pigtails [the survivals of the Old Regime]?
And as for those who stay at home ... how much devotion to
the old fatherland do you expect from them when in it only a
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poor local district is open for their endeavors and every other
door is closed and barricaded, when from youth they are accustomed to long for the foreign land where uncle and godfather
made their fortune, because there a big fatherland in all communities gladly opened up even to the adopted sons, while for
those at home every fatherland was taken away by the chaos of
irrational legislation ... ?
We will first of all create for the Germans by freedom of
movement the conditions which are most desired, a fatherland.
Thereby we shall retain the strength and ability which grow so
richly in our soil and shall attract strength and ability from
other nations which are willing to work with us for our welfare, honor and power. By freedom of movement we create a
common spirit and national feeling, welfare and contentment.
And to create this high, national benefit, we need no complicated
negotiation between large and small sovereignties; no position of
power, great or small, will be endangered; no freedom, no right
restricted. We need nothing at all other than that people be
reasonable. And whatever government, whatever popular representative assembly first opens its land to full freedom of movement will immediately enjoy the advantage of a rising standard
of living. And in the competition among the states that exists
in Germany the example of advantage will stimulate imitation.
It is a relatively easy task and in relation to the effort the results
are infinitely rewarding. Therefore, let everyone work in his
circle, in his tribe and in his land, everyone who is honorably
concerned over the German problem, whether he be grossdeutsch or klein-deutsch, that economically speaking, a fatherland be given the Germansl
The editor of the Bremer Handelsblatt correctly asserted in 1863
that "the German actually enjoys in England, France, America and
other states more rights than in his own fatherland, for as soon as he
puts foot upon those countries he can freely settle, freely work, freely
acquire land, and without any official difficulty marry as he pleases.
Millions of Germans have much more interest in these material rights
than in the more ideal political rights."41
Equally fundamental appeared to these liberals the issue of freedom of occupation. It was so closely related to that of freedom of
movement that the two were usually treated together. "No economic
question in Germany is at present so burning and so urgently in need
of a speedy solution," stated the Bremer Handelsblatt, "as that of freedom of occupation." Bremen, for example, had in 1858 guild restrictions upon shoemaking, but freedom in clothing production; the
making of bread was restricted to guilds, but that of cakes was free;
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beer-brewing was restricted, but the preparation of other spiritous
drinks, for example champagne, was free. Offenbach had enjoyed full
freedom of occupation since 1819 and had flourished. It had increased two-and-a-half fold in population since then, from 6,000 to
15,000, and had 5,000 factory workers. Many states forbade or restFicted the import of furniture in order to protect the local guilds. Among
these were Saxony, Altenburg, Dessau, Oldenburg, Bremen and Hanover, but not Prussia. Many of them placed obstacles in the way of
the sale of men's clothes for the same reason. The Berlin Merchants'
Association objected to these prohibitions, but under the conditions of
particularism it could do nothing except protest and agitate for national unity.42
The question of freedom of occupation affected far more lines of
activity than those of the handworkers. In terms of economics alone
the handicrafts could hardly be placed in the same class of importance
with, for instance, another line of activity which was equally curbed,
the insurance business. Because of the character of this enterprise it
suffered greatly from the lack of national economic unity. The
strength of an insurance company usually varied with its size. Once
it established headquarters in one state, it wished to send agents into
other states. Since its business depended upon the number and
efficiency of these agents, it needed to open the entire national market
for its activity and might suffer irreparable hardship if restricted to
one or a few states, no one of which with the possible exception of
Prussia was large enough to support it. The meetings of the Congress
of German Economists and of the German Chamber of Commerce
resounded with the lamentations of insurance ~xecutives, whose descriptions of the legal conditions under which their business operated in
the various states offered revealing insight into the economic effects of
particularism upon a developing capitalistic business.
The report to the Congress of German Economists by a Prussian
insurance executive may be used as an example. 43 The insurance
business, the author stated, was subject to both public and private
law. Since thirty-four sovereign states would as yet allow no such
thing as a common code of public law to be introduced, he restricted
his remarks to private law aspects. He emphasized that the inmrance

.. Bremer Handelsblatt, April 3, 1858; Der Arbeitgeber (ed. Max Wirth). Oct. 13.
1858. No. 107. Supplement; Bremer Handelsblatt, Sept. 25. 1858. Aug. 20. 1859.
• 8 The following details are taken from the report made by Richter of Magdeburg to the Congress of German Economists in September. 1865. The histories of
insurance companies are also worth reading.

156

/

Prussia 1858-1864

business depended upon magnitude to fulfill its purpose. The larger
.the coverage, the greater was the risk spread; and he scoffed at the
official insurance companies of some of the small states which had an
insurance sum of, for example, from 4.7 million Thalers (LippeSchaumburg) to 16 million (Lippe-Detmold). He contrasted these
amounts with the lowest, namely, 70 or 80 million, for each of the
private insurance corporations, and concluded that in the case of fire
iI;lsurance the loss on a single major policy for one of the small public
companies would use up its premium payments for months. Worse
than this petty playing at economic sovereignty, he said, were the
obstacles to business. Laws, regulations, administrative whim, all
scourged the insurance companies. Prussia had cleared out much of
this array of controls but in. the other st;lles it remained triumphant.
The reporter cited the case of Saxony. After the passage of an insurance law in 1863 the administration had issued a regulation for fire
insurance 'of eighty-three paragraphs, some of them a foot long. Then
it ordered the companies to submit their insurance terms to be checked
against the regulation. After a year's time even the bureaucrats gave
up, said that they could not judge whether the terms were in agreement
with the regulation or not, and ordered the companies to include in
their contracts a statement to the effect that "in so far as the following
general insurance terms do not correspond to the laws and regulations
in the Kingdom of Saxony, the legal conditions are to replace them in
any insurance contract in Saxony." The companies refused to accept
this proposed solution, and in 1865 the dispute was still being negotiated with no prospect of settlement.
In the case of fire insurance, the reporter continued, every state in
the Confederation except Schleswig-Holstein and the four free cities,
that is, twenty-nine states in all, required official concession for doing
business. In many cases other insurance lines were subject to similar
restrIctIOn. Insurance agents, for example, in many states were not
allowed to solicit business. Yet how could an insurance company be
expected to have an agent in each village or to rely upon a local peasant
to make out policies? In Bavaria, in consequence, the peasants remained unprotected in case of fire, and numerous begging letters were
circulated on behalf of peasants who had been burned out. The number became so large that the government, responsible for the ban on
soliciting fire insurance business, had instructed its officials to inform
the peasants about fire insurance and to advise the latter to take out
policies. The reporter remarked that a simpler and more economical
method would have been to remove the restrictions on the activity of
insurance agents.
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Twenty-two states had public monopolies in fire insurance, no one
of which was large enough to provide adequate security. Private companies could compete with these, but were subject to numerous administrative restrictions. The reporter was irate over the fact that, depending upon the scope of its activity, a fire insurance company might
have to know all the terms of regulations pertaining to its business in
each of twenty-nine states, all of them different. First, the company
had to obtain the concession to do business in the state; for that purpose it had to pay. Then its concession could be cancelled arbitrarily
at any moment for any cause which the government might find. In
order to prevent itself from falling into the bad graces of the local
government, the bureaucrats as well as the ruler, the company had to
be very careful in the selection of its agents. It dared not appoint a
person who was politically objectionable to the local authorities. The
company and each agent in some states had to give to each government
a surety for good behavior, in Schwarzburg-Sondershausen a sum
amounting to 1,000 Thaler for each agent. Then came the taxes.
Some states demanded half the profits. Some imposed a host of petty
taxes, which they would commute for an annual percentage or lump
sum. One little state demanded a percentage of the insurance sum so
that in case of need it could help those who had not insured their
property, a stipulation which particularly angered the reporter. Another petty state wrote the companies that they would have to commute the small state fees for a definite sum or, the threat was implied,
their concession would be cancelled. "One could hardly say more
elegantly in German bureaucratic style," remarked the reporter, " 'your
purse or your life!' "
The state governments claimed that they used the funds obtained
from the taxes and other financial imposts upon the insurance companies "for purposes of general welfare." The reporter had investigated the nature of these "purposes" in the state of Hesse-Darmstadt
and had found that most of the money went to support the military.
Then it became clear to him why the ministers of war usually protested against changing the present system of concessions. The funds
squeezed from out-of-state insurance companies run by liberals and
nationalists were being devoted to the preservation of absolutism,
militarism, and particularism in the middle-sized and small German
states. Since most of the big insurance companies had their headquarters in Prussia, the ardent devotion of this branch of business to
national unification and to economic freedom is understandable.

158

/

Prussia 1858-1864

The Congress of German Economists summed up the demands for
freedom of economic opportunity for the insurance business as follows:

1. The formation of insurance companies is to be dependent
upon the approval of t~e state only to the extent that ~t is
necessary in order to obtam the character of a legal personalIty.
2. The insurance companies do not need a police permit or a
concession to do business in any German state.
3. The requirement of insurance purchase~s .to use exclusivel'y
a state (provincial or communal) or other pnvIleged company IS
abolished.
4. It is not permissible to grant the state and other privileged companies release from the payment of general fees and
burdens levied by law.
5. It is not permissible to impose upon private companies
special taxes and burdens; they should be subject only to the
general ones.
6. State action with respect to the conduct of the insurance
business should be restricted to supervision in the wider sense of
the word.
To carry out that program meant a revolution in social structure and
in the purpose and character of government, and that was precisely
what these liberals and nationalists sought.
The banks had to contend with a situation equally chaotic. During
the 1850s many new banks had been establlshed in Prussia and in the
other states. Those in the smaller states had almost no clientele for
their services within their home territories and were founded for the
specific purpose of exploiting the urgent demand for capital in the
large states, especially Prussia. These banks put out large amounts of
paper money and expected to profit from the business. Understanding
their intention, the Prussian government in 1858 prohibited the circulation of non-Prussian bank notes within its territory, to the dismay
of the outside banks and to the bitter disappointment of Prussian business men, liberals and nationalists. The Prussian economic leaders,
eager for funds to invest in the expanding industrial and transportation
systems, accused the government of retarding this development in the
name of an antiquated autocratic mercantilism. The prohibition,
they declared, made Prussia extremely unpopular in the rest of Germany; it was a source of "genuine pain to every patriot. . . . No
measure of recent times has antagonized opinion in Germany against
the Prussian government to the same great extent as this one has ....
It has called forth and will continue to call forth reprisals from other
states against Prussia. It is likewise preventing Prussian industry from
obtaining money which it urgently needs in the present crisis [1859];
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probably 30 millions [Thalers] have been kept from it by this act."44
To the liberals the act resembled closely the policy of the reactionary
Manteuffel government, which a few years earlier had requested the
Berlin banks not to participate in the founding of foreign, that is nonPruss ian, economic institutions. 45
Even as careful and thorough a business man as Gustav Mevissen,
the leader in the economic development of the Rhineland, roundly
condemned the Prussian and other governments for such prohibitions
and asked for reform. In a memorandum of 1859 he wrote that this
and similar prohibitions in other states violated the purpose of the
Zollverein to create a nationwide market and the aim of Prussia to
make moral conquests in the rest of German. He urged that the banks
be free to issue paper money and that this money be free to circulate
in all German states. A clearing house could be established in Berlin,
he said, in which the money could be exchanged, and no state would
suffer from a flood of extra-state paper. He paid a strong tribute to the
good judgment of the bankers, citing the fact that under their guidance
the present banks had survived two crises and concluding that they
were worthy of trust in the future. 46 The numerous remarks of other
private bankers made clear that Mevissen spoke for practically all; with
very minor exceptions they recognized the relation between banking
prosperity on the one hand and freedom and national unity on the
other.
The cry among liberals and nationalists for a common system of
weights, measures and coinage could be heard all over Germany. Irrespective of differences over the proposals for unifying the nation
politically, those millions of individuals who had dealings with persons
in other German states sought the abolition of the current chaos and
the introduction of common standards of measurement.
The extent of the confusion may be seen from a contemporary
example. On May II, 1861, the Bremer Handelsblatt published a list
showing that, exclusive of Holstein and Luxemburg-Limburg, eight
different monetary systems were used in Germany. Some states used
the Thaler unit, some the Gulden, some the Mark. Stories were told
of the difficulties with the coinage systems which a housemaid encountered in purchasing food supplies in the market: she had to be a
mathematical expert to make correct change. Problems of bookkeeping for firms were even more forbidding .
.. Berliner B6rsen Zeitung, Jan. 7, Feb. 12, 1859 .
•• F. Hardegen and K. Smidt, H. H. Meier (1920), p. 130 .
•• Hansen, op. cit., II, 553-54.
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The situation was improved by the declaration in 1857 that the oneThaler coin should be regarded as standard in the Zollverein alongside
the double-Thaler coin already used since 1838_ Particularly after
1857 the amount minted in this Zollverein currency greatly increased
in proportion to that coined in the state currencies. It has been estimated that between 1838 and 1857 a little more than 50 million Thalers
were minted in the form of Zollverein coins (the double-Thaler), while
80 million Thalers were struck in the form of South German currency.
Between 1857 and 1871, some 229 million Thalers were put out in the
Zollverein currency (one- and two-Thaler pieces) and coins struck in
the form of territorial currencies amounted to only 6.33 million
Thalers. 47 Nonetheless, as late as May, 1870, Ludwig Bamberger described the situation to the Customs Parliament as follows:
I have here a so-called "bordereau," namely, a table setting
forth specifically the types of money which a trader enclosed
with a draft to his bankers. The "bordereau" is dated the 19th
December 1869. It relates to a sum of 15,834 gulden. I have
extracted it from the correspondence of a bank. It contains the
coins of which these 15,834 gulden were composed, and in order
that you might understand its true meaning, I must add that the
draft came from a small town in the province of Rhenish Hessen. The town is small, 3,000 to 4,000 inhabitants, and has but
a single inn-not sufficiently attractive to be frequented by
strangers. It is a payment composed of receipts from rents, purchase agreements, and from sales of wheat, barley, fruit, and
similar products, brought from the various surrounding villages
into this small town to be sold through the agency of a merchant.
What was thus collected from the pockets of the peasants is as
follows: The sum of 15,834 gulden consisted of double talers,
crown talers, pieces of 2Y2 gulden, of 2 gulden, 1 gulden, Y2
gulden, 'lj, Y6 and 1I12 Imperial talers, 5-franc pieces, 2-franc
pieces, I-franc pieces, then we have gold coins such as pis toles,
double and single Friedrichsdor, half-sovereigns, Russian Imperials, dollars, Napoleons, Dutch Wilhelmsdor, Austrian and
Wiirttemberg ducats, Hessian 10-gulden pieces, and last of all a
piece of Danish gold.48
To supply comparable examples in weights and measures seems
superfluous. Since the situation was as chaotic in this field as in currency, the Congress of German Economists and the German Commercial Association zealously passed resolutions in favor of unity.
Nationalism had become a practical problem of persuading the states
to accept as the basic units meter, liter, and thaler, and these two
.. Karl Helfferich, Money (New York, 1927). I, 150-51.
··Ibid., I, 147-48.
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prominent associations took the lead for the liberals and nationalists
in pressing the reform.49
Particularism manifested itself in one of its most irritating and
embarrassing forms in the levying of river and transit tolls. These tolls
were historical vestiges, bearable in a predominantly agricultural and
localistic society, anathema to an economy of expanding commerce
and developing industry. Questions of cost of distribution and
ability to compete were intimately involved with those of national
pride.
The tolls collected on goods in transit across German territory to
other countries were in the main abolished in 1860 by general agreement among the Zollverein members. The states decided that it was
more profitable to keep the trade to Russia and Austria, for example,
using the Zollverein ports and railways and waterways than it was to
see this trade shifted respectively to Russian Baltic and to Adriatic
ports. One international transit toll continued to be raised and to
evoke severe criticism on the part of those suffering from it. That was
the toll imposed by Baden upon goods shipped from German ports
to Switzerland. Since the negotiations about it were involved with the
other question of the tolls on the Rhine river, the two problems may
be treated together.
Attempts had previously been made to lower the tolls on the Rhine
and to persuade the riparian states to improve the stream bed. Two
states in particular, Hesse and Nassau, had refused to make any concessions. They derived large revenues from the tolls, which they needed in maintaining their armies and paying other government expenses.
Since the sums came in regularly, the governments were, to the extent
of these funds, independent of financial control by the local legislatures, a fact which enhanced the liberal's wrath.
Baden made its abolition of the transit tolls dependent upon the
abolition of the Rhine tolls. The Bremer Handelsblatt published
Oanuary 28, 1860) the following figures on the amount of revenue
which each Rhenish state would lose by the elimination of the river
tolls:
Pn 1,000 inhabitants

Prussia
Nassau
Hesse
Bavaria
Baden

398,200 Francs (approx.)
176,969
157,600
6,585
5,957

21.99 Francs
406.10
182.62
1.42
4.46

•• See the resolutions in 1861 and 1865 of the German Commercial Association
in Bremer Handelsblatt, May 25, 1861, Sept. 30, 1865.
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In view of these figures, the journal commented, one can appreciate
why Nassau and Hesse should oppose the complete abolition of the
Rhine tolls and Baden should favor it. At the time of this article,
Prussia, Nassau and Hesse were willing to lower the tolls by one-sixth
if Baden would abolish the transit tolls, but Baden refused.
The Bremer Handelsblatt was vigorously hostile to Baden's position,
calling it an "un-German particularist policy." "According to the recently published agreement between Baden and the French Eastern
Railway," it said, "Baden obligates itself to turn international trade
to the French railways. The constantly declining returns from transit
tolls show that the low sea-freight rates of the German North Sea ports
are unable to provide the German railways with a large amount of
work in the transport of raw materials to Switzerland and Austria as
long as that unfortunate toll remains."50 "For the paltry toll income
of 400,000 Thalers a year," it stated, "Germany is losing out to France
in the transit trade," trade which for Switzerland alone in 1858 amounted to 272 million francs. The paper damned the transit toll as "a
betrayal of the most sacred interests of our nation when one thinks
that that sum of which Germany each year is made poorer accrues to
the same country [France] which threatens the greatest danger to our
independence and safety."51
Baden's determined stand and especially the development of railroads as competitive means of transportation created conditions which
inclined even Hesse and Nassau to consider a substantial reduction
of Rhine tolls. The toll income of these states was declining; traffic
on the Rhine threatened to cease; the representative assemblies in the
two states disliked having their states bla~ed for this misfortune; the
governments showed some willingness to negotiate. Baden invited the
riparian states to a conference, where in December, 1860, agreement
was reached. The river tolls were substantially reduced and in return
Baden agreed to abolish its transit tolL52 Nonetheless, the agreement
did not solve the problem. Four years later the Cologne Chamber of
Commerce reported that tolls were still too high and that in consequence the river traffic was decidedly declining. Competition from
railroads, it prophesied, would ruin the river traffic unless these tolls
were eliminated. "It is one of the blackest spots in the public conditions of Germany," stated the chamber in its annual report for 1864,

50 Ibid., Jan. 7, 1860.
"Ibid., March 10, 17, 1860.
•• See Rudolf von Delbriick, Lebenserinnemngen (Leipzig, 1905). II, 191.
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"that our most important stream, which if we did not have it as a gift
of nature could not be built for hundreds of millions of Thalers, is
headed for disuse and desertion because of these excessive and unjust
tolls."li3
The freeing of the Elbe river from tolls proved to be equally difficult. According to Article III of the Treaty of Vienna, both rivers,
the Elbe and the Rhine, were to have such tolls as would "encourage
commerce and facilitate navigation," and the agreement of the same
time with respect to navigation on the Elbe had contained in Article
30 a stipulation that the Elbe Commission should "consider arrangements and measures which according to recent experience could facilitate commerce and shipping."54 Nonetheless, the riparian states had
been unable to agree on any improvement. Austria, Saxony and the
other states on the upper Elbe, Hamburg, and especially Prussia had
endeavored to persuade the Elbe Commission to reduce tolls, but the
three states near the mouth of the river, Hanover, Lauenburg, and
Mecklenburg, depended upon the tolls to provide them with a considerable part of their public revenue and up to 1860 had refused to
budge. The illegality of their action was disputed or ignored by these
three sovereign states, and unlike Hesse and Nassau they also owned
the potentially competing railroads to the North Sea ports. Mecklenburg charged a high transit toll on the railroad, and both it and Hanover profited from the freight charges on commodities going to Prussia,
Austria, Saxony and elsewhere south and southeast.
The first breach in the tight system of Elbe tolls occurred in 1860
when Great Britain forced Hanover to abolish the Stade toll in return
for a single lump payment. The Hanoverian foreign minister, Count
Platen, was "deeply aroused" over this act and lamented that "from
all sides one is storming Hanover and claiming financial sacrifices."55
The Chamber of Commerce in Magdeburg, in its annual report for
1861, reacted in a different manner.
It is depressing and embarrassing for national feeling when
one hears of plans to turn to foreign governments with complaints about the Elbe tolls. To be sure, the history of the Stade
toll teaches that this way is more practical than that of sending
tedious and futile complaints to the native governments. The

.3 Preuss. Handeisarchiv, 1864, Jahresberichte, pp. 524-26 .
•• Ibid., 1859; I, 241.
•• The formulation is Delbriick's. Delbriick conducted the negotiations for Prussia
at the Elbe Conference in 1861. See Delbriick, op. cit., II, 190-95, for the story of
the negotiations and the agreement of 1863.
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intervention of America gave the impetus to abolishing the
Sound tolls; the intervention of England moved Hanover to retreat from its excessive demands in return for regulating the
Stade toll and to be satisfied with an indemnity which offered
only half of its previous income. If such results are attainable by
the intervention of a foreign government with respect to the
Stade toll, which is based on an entirely different legal right, why
should it not be effective in the case of the Elbe tolls, which contrary to all agreements serve as a financial aid and as a specific
means for the Hanover state railways systematically to suppress
certain branches of Elbe traffic? If Prussia would decide to proceed energetically in this affair and finally break with the
method of fruitless conferences, it would assuredly gain the
moral support of all civilized nations and would on at least one
occasion show by action its supremacy in Germany and especially
toward states which continually place petty obstacles in the way
of the free, national and economic development of Prussia and
Germany.56
The goods transported on the Elbe were divided into seven categories, each of which paid a different toll. The Mecklenburg government had arbitrarily introduced another classification, goods that were
qualified for transportation by water and those that were not. The
former included bulky commodities like coal on which the toll was
not very high. The latter included coffee, tobacco, wine and spiritous
drinks, yarns, spices, sugar, rags, zinc and so on, goods which were put
in the highest class for tolls and could not have afforded water transportation at all if Austria, Saxony and Prussia had not renounced their
share of the toll. These latter three states had to do so, a semi-official
writer in the Preussisches Handelsarchiv said bitterly (March 11, 1859),
in order to keep any traffic on the Elbe. He showed by statistics how
great the decline in freight on the river had been between 1845 and
1858 in the two highest toll classes and how large the increase in goods
carried by rail.
Goods in the highest toll category 1845
1857
Loss of
Goods in the second toll category

1852
1857

Loss of

•• Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1861, Jahresberichte, p. 257.

2,489,032 Centners
131,357
2,357,675
436,504
162,936
273,568
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Goods carried on railroad

1851
1857

Increase of
Amount of these subject to highest two
categories of tolls
1853
1857
Increase of
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2,613,000
7,007,000
4,394,000
1,991,000
2,702,000
711,000

Mecklenburg was forcing the higher-priced goods to use the BerlinHamburg railroad. The state manifestly derived more from transit
tolls and freight charges than it did from river tolls; and in Hanover
the state railway administration was even more opposed to reducing
the Elbe tolls than the state toll administration. 57 Both states were
squeezing all the money possible out of the traffic. Since Mecklenburg
was an almost feudal agrarian state it could scarcely be affected by
reprisals; and Hanover, although more advanced economically and
in every other way, enjoyed about equal immunity. Statistical proof
of how one could derive more revenue from an increase in volume
through lower toll rates did not seem to interest these states. 58
In 1861 the pressure upon the three obstructive states, Mecklenburg, Hanover and Lauenburg, became too strong to resist. The German Commercial Association at its meeting in that year passed a strong
resolution condemning the Mecklenburg transit toll on the railway
and the Elbe tolls, and the agreement on the reduction of the Rhine
tolls proved to be the turning point. Since the Elbe remained the
only river in Germany heavily burdened by tolls, the offending states
had to give in to the pressure of public opinion. At a conference of
the Elbe states called in November, 1861, agreement was reached which
decidedly lightened the burden. The agreement concentrated the payment of tolls at one place, Wittenberge; it cut the number of the classes
of goods from seven to three and greatly reduced the amount of toll
to be paid. It reallocated the proceeds from the tolls so that Hanover,
Mecklenburg, Lauenburg and Anhalt received half and the other states
received half; the others agreed to contribute 132,000 Thalers annually to the four states making the greater sacrifice. 59 Although Hanover and the other obstructionists lamented, they signed.

G'Delbriick, op. cit., II, 193.
O. See Preuss. Handelsarchiv, 1859; I, 22, 241-44.
O. Delbriick. op. cit., II, 194-95.

166

/

Prussia 1858-1864

The Elbe agreement was generally approved by the business public,60 just as the comparable one on the Rhine had been. It did not,
however, solve the problem of the transit toll collected by Mecklenburg
on the Berlin-Hamburg railway line. This was not eliminated until
the latter joined the Zollverein in 1868; and the last of the river tolls
succumbed only to the unification of the country in 1870-71.61
Problems relating to the German railways were so complicated that
the economic interests were divided and often confused in dealing
with them. The one which stirred up most wrath was that of the
differential freight rates. The seaport towns and developing big industry, especially coal, iron and steel, supported the existing practice
of the railways of giving lower rates to traffic between major terminals
wide distances apart. They did so on grounds of lower cost achieved
by less handling of the goods en route and of the necessity to meet
foreign competition. The large inland towns, Breslau, Magdeburg,
Cologne and others which had for centuries served as distributing
centers, thought that their traditional function was being menaced. 62
The matter was brought before the German Commercial Association at its first meeting in 1861 and remained on the agenda for the
rest of the decade. The conference of 1865 was largely devoted to discussion of it, during which the two sides came to understand each
other's position and a third group appeared which tried to mediate.
The Commercial Association resolution of that year and again of 1868
actually straddled the issue.
A second question that troubled the business world had to do with
the multiplicity of freight rates, "the height and the frequent and
sudden changes in freight rates." At the end of 1860 the German
railways showed 5,223.5 kilometers of state-owned lines, 1,344.8 kilometers of privately owned lines under state administration and 5,064.4
kilometers of privately owned and administered lines. The criticism
applied particularly to the railroads in Prussia, where by the law of
1838 the government had allowed freedom to the roads to set their own
charges. Besides seven state companies some sixteen private ones
had almost unlimited authority to do so. In recent years the government had recognized its blunder, and had written into the contract
for each new railroad company a stipulation for close government
control over rates. The fact remained that rates on not merely the
Prussian but also the non-Prussian lines were a source of constant
.0 Der Deutsche Handelstag 1861-1911 (Berlin, 1913), II, 345 .
.. Ibid., II, 345 .
•• See, for example, Bremer Handelsblatt, April 13, 1861.
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CrItlciSm by those who had to pay them. Goods were divided into
seven classes for purposes of imposing freight charges; nonetheless,
the differences in charges for the same commodity were large, and the
major companies had developed agreements on rates among themselves
which increased the financial troubles of the sender.63
Complaints about inadequate service and lack of locomotives and
of freight cars in sufficient numbers and at the proper time were
numerous and led to further criticism about the absence of cooperation among the railway companies. The latter, so ran the argument,
were extremely reluctant to use cars belonging to other companies and
to send cars over other lines even when it was cheaper and faster to do
so. The delay and extra cost were at the expense of the customer, not
of the railroad. Connections between lines of different companies continued to be poorly developed, with additional cost frequently involved in the transfer of goods from one line to another; and the railroads
were haphazard in protecting the freight from loss or damage. New
railway lines which were badly needed could not be constructed for
years because some small state refused to cooperate. The most notorious case was that of Hanover's holding up the building of the railway
from Hamburg to Paris. A private company wished to build the line;
but since the Hanoverian government insisted on state ownership of the
section within its territory, the German part of the project was blocked,
to the utter disgust of the liberals.64
Businessmen were divided in their opinion about remedial measures. The liberals opposed government interference in business; but
they disliked freight rates which were high and arbitrarily subject to
change. The temptation to appeal to the government for help against
the railroads was strong. The liberals debated the issues back and
forth, some favoring government ownership or control and others opposing it. In its meeting in 1865 the German Commercial Association passed a resolution on the subject which tried to compromise
among the conflicting interests and opinions by including all points.
It laid down for the railroads the ideal not of making the largest possible profit but of serving the entire economy. It sought to furt4er
the standard of competition in an economic field in which monopoly
was almost inevitable. It straddled the issue of public ownership or
control versus private ownership and the question of differential rates.
8. Der Deutsche Handelstag 1861·1911, II, 106 .
•• See report of the negotiations of the 7th Congress of German Economists in
1864 in Vierteljahrschrift filr Volkswirtschaftund Kulturgeschichte (1864), III,
207·10.
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The last part of the resolution was most characteristic, the indication
of intention carefully to watch the railway matters on an ad hoc basis. fl5
All liberals agreed that, although their principles might have to be
compromised in favor of some state control or even of state ownership
of railways, national political unification would greatly simplify the
problems of transportation. With unification, single states could no
longer block essential needs, a common railway system and a common
railroad law could be developed. A merchant or industrialist in any
state in Germany would then know that he could ship goods anywhere
in the nation without having to worry about the policy and practice
of this little state or that. While much was being accomplished in
this direction even under existing conditions many basic problems
remained which could be solved easily and speedily by national unification. If the political question could be settled, the railways constituted the essential means of unification of the economy and society.
In the meantime, they pushed the political issue to the fore.
The question of unifying the economic organization of Germany
came to be vigorously discussed as a practical possibility in connection
with Prussia's negotiation of a commercial treaty with France. The
treaty itself was signed in 1862, but negotiations had been under way
for several years beforehand and everyone in Germany and Austria
knew that they were taking place. The treaty precipitated a crisis in
the Zollverein and in the relations between it and Austria, a crisis involving both economics and politics in major proportions. It proved
to be the most important event in the efforts for national unity during
the years immediately prior to Bismarck's wars; and an analysis of the
factors involved throws light upon the question whether the German
nation could have been unified without war.
When the Zollverein had last been renewed in 1853, Austria had
had sufficient strength to force Prussia to include a clause looking toward Austria's joining that organization. Prussia had subsequently
succeeded in preventing the clause from being carried out; but the
issue came up again when in the late 1850s discussions for a renewal
of the Zollverein began. Although in varying degrees of intensity
criticism of the existing organization of the Zollverein arose from all
quarters and reached a climax in connection with the publication of
the Franco-Prussian commercial treaty. The most thorough and intelligent public analysis occurred at the meeting of the German Com-

•• The best summary of this discussion is found in Der Deutsche Handelstag
1861-1911, II, 106-26.
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mercial Association in Munich in 1862, where all sides were fully
represented and prepared to defend their position. 66
Businessmen and statesmen in all the Zollverein states, in Austria
and even in some of the other states not belonging to the Zollverein
agreed that the customs union was valuable and should be continued.
They agreed that commercial relations between the Zollverein states
and Austria should be close and should be expanded. They all recognized that the Zollverein needed to be reformed and most of them
thought that its tariff rates should be reduced. They differed sharply,
however, in their views about the constitution.
The Zollverein was composed of sovereign states, each one able to
block by its veto power any proposal for reform. Since the discussions by the delegates to the Zollverein conferences, all of them officials,
were held in secret, the public was not informed about the negotiations
and was unable to exert pressure upon the governments with respect
to specific issues. The customs schedule badly needed to be revised;
yet nothing could be done from one date of renewal of the Zollverein
to the next, twelve years hence. As critics said, the Zollverein had become an obstacle to reform; an international, certainly an inter-state,
diplomatic crisis was required every twelve years to try to bring about
urgently needed changes.
The Pruss ian government had decided to force the issue by negotiating the commercial treaty with France. That treaty called for a
sharp reduction in Prussian tariff rates, and in Article 31 it accepted
the most-favored-nations clause with respect to all other states. It was
understood between Prussia and France that the treaty was expected
to be approved by the other Zollverein states. Prussia's strategy in
the negotiations had definitely aimed at excluding Austria from future
membership in the Zollverein. Prussia wanted no major competitor
in that organization.
The reactions of the business world represented at the conference
of the German Commercial Association in Munich may be roughly
divided into three major groups, the pro-Austrians, the pro-Prussians,
and the middle party. Politics and economics could hardly be
separated. The pro-Austrians denounced the Franco-Prussian treaty
as a violation of the Zollverein agreement of 1853. The new treaty,
they said, abolished Austria's favored position with respect to Zollverein trade and relegated that German country to the status of every
non-German country. The tariff schedule of the new commercial

00

See Der Deutsche Handelstag 1861-1911, II, 357.
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treaty had been set so low, they bitterly complained, that Austrian industry could not possibly accept it without risking bankruptcy. A
large trade between Austria and South Germany in particular had
developed under the differential system of 1853, which in case the
Franco-Prussian treaty were accepted would have to be modified or
reduced. The question of preserving special relations with Austria,
declared Hanle of Munich, was for the South Germans one of "life or
death."67
Spitzer of Neuhaus and others stated that the Austrian market
had far more value for Germany than the French. Germany would be
unable to compete in the French market with industrial products and
would have to export to it raw materials. In Austria, on the other
hand, German industry would enjoy a vast market for its manufactured products. South German, Saxon, and even some Silesian
industry in Prussia itself was eager to retain the Austrian market.
The advocates of this position pleaded for a treaty to be made with
Austria first; then one could be negotiated with France.
The opponents of the treaty correctly attributed political motives
to Prussia, and showed the anger of the small states at such cavalier
treatment. Spitzer asserted that by making the agreement with France
Prussia aimed to strengthen its power over the other members of the
Zollverein. The delegate Karmarsch from Hanover agreed with him
and asked, "Who will guarantee that Prussia will not wish other
changes and will sooner or later say, 'Agree to them or we shall push
you out the door.''' The issue of sovereignty became involved in the
issue of tariff rates and the method of negotiating a tariff agreement.
Prussia had anticipated this well known reaction and had discounted
it in advance.
The novel aspect at this time was furnished by the attitude of the
most powerful industrial association in Austria, that of Vienna, which
in October, 1862, after a two-days' session approved in theory the idea
of union with the Zollverein but wished the fulfillment postponed to
some future time. Vienna industry had no inclination to subject itself
to the competition of German industry even to gain political advantage
for the country. It was willing to make sacrifices, it said, for the sake
of union; but it could not afford to sacrifice so much without undergoing the threat of economic ruin. The advocates of Austria's joining
.7 For data on the discussion of the Zollverein see Verhandlungen des II. deutschen
Handelstages zu Munchen, 14-18 Okt. 1862; Der Deutsche Handebtag 18611911, II; also Eugen Franz, Der Entscheidungskarnp! urn die wirtschaftspolitische
Fuhrung Deutschlands (1856-1867), (Munich, 19!1!1), pp. 246 If.
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the Zollverein had lost economic support even in Austria itself. The
question had in that state become one merely of politics. 68
A middle group, including such influential figures as David Hansemann, certainly one of the most prominent economic statesmen in
Germany, and H. H. Meier, the head of the Nordeutscher Lloyd in
Bremen and one of the ablest economic leaders in North Germany,
wished to retain both the Franco-Prussian treaty and the close commercial relations with Austria. 60 This group would have liked to exclude Austria from the application of the most-favored-nations clause.
It wished preferential relations with that country, although not at
the sacrifice of the Franco-Prussian treaty. While this group recognized the interdependence of the political and economic factors in the
conflict, it sought to reduce political hostility by stressing the economic
advantages of close cooperation.70
The pro-Prussian group took the aggressive. It fully supported
the changes that the Pruss ian government had introduced into the
Zollverein. First of all, it asserted that the Austrian market could not
compare in value with that of Western Europe which the treaty would
open. In Austria, declared one speaker, only about nine million people came into consideration as a market; the others, the non-Germans,
were culturally too backward to be able to afford Western goods. In
the region of Aachen, declared von Beckerath, one would smile at an
assertion of the superior value of the Austrian over the West European
market. For Silesia, said Weigel of Breslau, the Franco-Belgian market
was far more important than the Austrian.
The entire European transportation system, indeed that of the
world, declared Braun, was being changed by the development of railroads. Western Europe was beginning to unite into a free commercial
system. Germany had to join this great system, he said, or it would
be forced back upon the East European market, which was not so capable of consuming goods, or upon the uncertainty of the overseas
market. His views were supported by Michaelis of the National
Zeitung in Berlin, who stressed the importance of a diversified market
as protection against economic crises. The National Zeitung, like
numerous other North German papers, strongly supported the reduction in tariffs which the Franco-Prussian treaty specified. It advocated free trade not merely for economic but for political reasons.
Protective tariffs were regarded as a basic support of autocracy and
•• See Der Deutsche Handelstag 1861-1911, II, 361·62 .
•• See Meier's report on the meeting, Bremer Handelsblatt, Nov. I, 1862.
TO Bremer Handelsblatt, Sept. 12, Oct. 14·18, 1862.
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particularism; free trade seemed to hold out the assurance of liberalism
and nationalism. 71
Weigel of Breslau staunchly defended the method which Prussia
had used to reform the tariff schedule. He admitted that it "tasted
like compulsion"; but he argued that the reform could not have been
achieved by a general tariff conference. "The times have rendered our
institutions, out of date . . . . We lack an organization to decide this
great and weighty question." Action had to be taken by the leading
state, namely Prussia, and the other members would have to accept
the results en bloc. There was no other way.
The Austrians rejoined that trade had nothing to do with the
nationality question. They sought to justify thereby the inclusion of
the non-German as well as the German peoples of the Hapsburg empire in the Zollverein. Weigel of Breslau agreed with them, and added
that political sympathy did not incline him to approve the FrancoPruss ian treaty but that economic interest did. Political antipathy
toward Austria, he continued, did not determine his position: "We
have first of all to choose between two customers," and he preferred
France. 72 His colleague Braun of Wins en disagreed with him completely on the question of Austrian nationalities. He considered a
trade agreement acceptable, but he objected to having as a member of
the Zollverein an Austria of "Magyars, Croats, Slovenes, Rumanians,
Ruthenians, and so forth" who as a potential majority in the Austrian
parliament might gain the right of passing on Zollverein affairs.
The pro-Prussians were even more critical of the political and
economic conditions within Austria and said that these rendered any
customs union impossible. The instability of the Austrian monetary
system, the constitutional troubles, the differences in taxation as seen
in the Austrian tobacco monopoly, the differences in organization of
customs collection and the slowness and unreliability of the Austrian
system-these and other factors turned the klein-deutsch group away
from any notion of a customs union with that country. Von Beckerath
of Crefeld, another of the most distinguished older liberals of Prussia,
denied that he and his friends were opponents of Austria; they merely
disliked the idea of having that country as a member of the Zollverein.
"We recognize," he said, "that the power and greatness of Austria is
not alone a European but in an eminent sense a German need, that
German Austria must draw strength out of Germany in order to be

71

72

National Zeitung, Sept. 26, 1863.
T'erilalldlllngen, p. 77.
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the leading race in Austria. "But," he asked the delegates from
Austria, "do you believe that you can derive this strength from a
Germany which is restricted in its development, which does not progress in the economic field? Well, the entrance of Austria into the
Zollverein would have just these results," for Austria could enter only
if the present constitution of the Zollverein with the liberum veto
should be retained. He objected to Austria's entry for two major
reasons: first, that its entry under present circumstances would transfer
to the Zollverein the conditions that made the Diet of the Confederation an unworkable body, namely, the presence of two great powers,
each with the liberum veto; second, that by bringing the non-German
peoples of Austria into the Zollverein the right of each nationality to
its own free self-determination would be violated. "German customs
union and only German customs union is what we all wish," said
Michaelis.
The German Commercial Association passed by a vote of 138 to 55
a resolution in favor of preserving the independence of the two customs areas, that of the Zollverein and that of Austria, but equally in
favor of eliminating customs duties and facilitating commerce between the two areas. The latter half of the resolution may be termed
an expression of good intentions and of kind feelings toward Austria.
More important was a further resolution urging the reform of the
constitution of the Zollverein in accordance with the following principles:
In the renewal of the Zollverein it should be taken into consideration that the legislative functions of the Zollverein should
be transferred jointly to representatives of the governments on
the one hand and to those of the people of the union states on
the other. Common agreements by majority vote of these two
bodies are to be introduced as final law in the entire customs
area.
In the composition of these two representative bodies due
consideration will be given the size of population of the member
states. 7S
7. The resolution had originally been passed at the meeting in 1861. It was
reaffirmed in 1862. See a similar resolution passed by the Congress of German Econ·
omists in 1862. Bremer Handelsblatt, Sept. 13, 1862. The resolution did not satisfy
David Hansemann and his friends, who condemned it as too vague to be of any
value. Hansemann and a colleague, Hurtzig, offered to the Handelstag an extensive
and detailed memorandum on the future constitution of the Zollverein. Hansemann's
proposal never carried much weight. The German Commercial Association merely
called the attention of the public to it, but did not subject it to any discussion.
The Bremer Handelsblatt in the issues of Sept. 13 and Nov. I, 1862, criticized it
sharply.
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While the liberals and nationalists discussed the reorganization of
the Zollverein as a means of furthering German unity, they understood the limitations of this approach. The fact was, as von Beckerath,
Michaelis and all the Pruss ian klein-deutsch liberals agreed, that economic unity could be gained only by way of political unity. In their
opinion the major weaknesses of the Zollverein were the terminability
of the agreement, the liberum veto and the one-sided power of state
ministries, each of which was not an economic but a political question. 74 While they pressed for strengthening the organization of the
Zollverein, they had no illusions about the necessity of an inclusive
institutional framework for a unified German nation. "We shall
not have this customs union for our advantage and for our prosperous
development," said Michaelis, "until we also have a German Reich
authority and a German parliament."
That the liberal nationalists were interested most of all in political
unification is seen in the fact that after the outburst of conflicting views
in 1862 about the constitution of the Zollverein, the subject seems to
have lost popular interest. The stir of political life caused by the
war of Italian unification, the constitutional controversy in Prussia,
and the outbreak of the Danish war turned attention away from economic to political action. Bismarck and the Prussian government
were so hated by liberals that the Bremer Handelsblatt wrote on
December 19, 1863, as follows:
. . . As long as the Pruss ian people do not succeed in transferring the administration of the Pruss ian state into other hands,
one does not know whether one should even wish a renewal of
the Zollverein treaty at all. For at the price of strengthening
the political influence of a Bismarck ministry in the Zollverein
the material advantages of a continuing free internal trade are
bought too dearly, and not much good is to be expected from the
leadership in commercial policy of a ministry which allies itself
with the Petersburg and Vienna governments in order to obtain
a basis for a foreign policy hostile to the Confederation and to
support absolutism in Germany.

When the German Commercial Association met in 1865 it could
look back on a number of accomplishments toward which it had aimed
three years ago at the crucial meeting in Munich, as well as some major
setbacks. The Franco-Prussian commercial treaty had been ratified
and come into force; Austria and the Zollverein had reached a new
agreement which in no way infringed upon the independence of the
.. Bremer Handelsblatt, Nov. 1. 1862.
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latter; the Zollverein was assured of renewal. The German commercial
law code, prepared in the late 1850s, had been approved by most of
the German states. Nonetheless, the constitution of the Zollverein
had not been reformed; the liberum veto in that body had not been
abolished or a national economic legislative body created. At its
meeting in 1865 the German Commercial Association without discussion unanimously approved a declaration which summed up once
more the existing grievances. It criticized the slowness in making commercial treaties, regretted the failure to create a unified consular system,
condemned the persistence of governmental abuses in dealing with
insurance business and transportation facilities, denounced the failure
to achieve freedom of occupation, and urged once more the reform
of the Zollverein constitution as a prerequisite for achieving the other
reforms.
After this outcry the German private economic interests took no
further steps toward economic unification of the nation before Bismarck imposed political unity and simultaneously solved the economic
problems. The success of Bismarck's policy of blood and iron seemed
to discourage them from further efforts comparable in vigor and incisiveness to those of the years 1861 to 1863. Politics won over economics as the decisive factor in gaining the objectives of national unity
and the concomitant economic reforms for which the economic leaders
had striven.

6 / The Constitution

T

HE ,"mtitution. introduced in 1849-50 into a Pro"ia
which had been governed for several centuries by absolute rulers, was
found to be the object of much dispute. It had to be interpreted and
adjusted to a society in which major elements looked toward the past
for their models, while others judged conditions by a liberal ideal
yet to be realized. Differing objectives were set for the development
of the constitution according to differing social ideals. On the one
side were lined the King and the Conservatives, including Bismarck.
They all sought, although in varying degree, to preserve under the
regime of constitutional government the royal rights of the past.
Since the sovereign had sworn allegiance to the constitution, he tolerated it unwillingly but, according to his view, loyally. He interpreted
it in the light of absolutism and the divine right of kings. The Conservatives, including the key Minister of War General von Roon, disliked the constitution intensely and wished to abolish it; but they
stood by the King, who they hoped might continue to rule by divine
right. To Bismarck the constitution provided a useful means of
government under a monarch whose power was not greatly restricted
by that document. It should not be allowed to develop into a system
where parliament exercised final authority over the other organs of
government. Opposed to the royal group were the liberals, who
interpreted the constitution as promising free government, responsive
to the will of the people and assuring the public a powerful role in the
conduct of state affairs. In the absence of a willingness to compromise,
these differences of views about the constitution led to a constitutional
conflict.
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King William believed as much as any of his ancestors in kingship
by divine right. He accepted the constitution as a historic fact, and he
intended loyally to uphold it; but his mental limitations made it possible for him to reconcile the divine-right theory and constitutional
government. The confusion in his thinking is evident from two of
his addresses, one entitled "To My People," issued on his becoming
King, the second at the ceremony of his coronation in January, 1861.
With free royal hand he [Frederick William IV] gave the
country institutions in the development of which its hopes
should be fulfilled. When an unfortunate movement of spirits
had shaken all foundations of law [he referred to the Revolution
of 1848], my brother knew how to bring the confusion to an
end, by a new political creation to renew our unbroken development and to direct its advance into fixed channels [he meant the
introduction of the constitution].
I will loyally preserve the high heritage of my ancestors,
which with constant care they founded and augmented by their
best efforts at the risk of their lives. Proudly I see myself surrounded by such a loyal and brave people, by such a glorious
army.
My hand shall watch over the welfare and the right of all in
all classes of the population; it shall rule over this rich life,
protecting and furthering it. It is not Prussia's mission to live
in the enjoyment of its earnings. In the exercise of its spiritual
and moral forces, in the seriousness and uprightness of its religious thinking, in the union of obedience and freedom, in the
strengthening of its military force lie the conditions of its power.
Only in this way is it able to maintain its position among the
states of Europe.
I hold firmly to the traditions of my house when I set myself
the task of elevating and strengthening the patriotic spirit of my
people. I will make firm and develop the right of the state according to its historical significance, and will uphold the institutions which King Frederick William IV called into being.
Faithful to the oath with which I assumed the regency, I will
protect the constitution and the laws of the kingdom.
At his coronation the King declared: "By the ceremony of coronation in the presence of the members of both Houses of the Landtag
and of other witnesses summoned to us from all provinces of our
kingdom, we wish to give witness to the hallowed and eternal rights
of the throne to which by the grace of God we have been called and
to affirm anew the bond strengthened by glorious history between
Our House and the people of Prussia."!

1

Horst Kohl,

op. cit., pp.

18-19, 2R.

178

/

Prussia 1858-1864

William promised to hold firmly to the traditions of his house and
loyally to abide by the constitution. An intimation of how he might
resolve this contradiction lay in the assertion that his brother had
granted the constitution "with free royal hand." One might infer
that as a free royal gift the constitution might have to agree with the
will of the giver, or the latter might change his mind and freely give
the country something else. The necessity of concentrating power in
the King was strongly emphasized along with that of the continued
cultivation of Spartan virtues associated with Prussianism, so that the
state could continue to play a major role in international affairs.
Power meant to William the political and military power of a monarch
by divine right. Prussia dared not run the international risk of
weakening itself by introducing parliamentry government, that is,
ministerial responsibility to a parliament. The King soon blamed
the Lower House for his troubles with his fellow sovereigns in the
other German states. "When one sees," he asked, "that I can exercise
no command at all in my own house, who will trust me?"2
The King regarded the constitution as a means of associating the
public in the affairs of government, but he expected it to assure public
approval of all measures which he particularly advocated. In case of
conflict parliament should acquiesce in the King's will. Liberals
noted that in his coronation address he did not mention the constitution or the rights of the people and of their representatives. s How
little the King esteemed the parliament, especially the Lower House,
was evident in many ways. When the Lower House in February, 1861,
sent him an address stating its wishes as to legislation, he replied: "I
am relying firmly upon the representative assembly's standing by my
side in the execution of my aims in the sense of the undiminished
preservation of the power of my Crown; this is necessary for the true
welfare of the Fatherland. With respect to the questions of domestic
and foreign policy which are touched upon in your address, my government has clearly emphasized the points of view which accord with my
intentions for it and to which it will adhere. I expect the Lower
House to support these by its approval. ... I know that my people
stand at my side in unswerving loyalty in good and bad times."4 The
Lower House should pass the legislation which he approved.
The royal conception of the legislative process was equally simple
and clear. When the liberal ministers pressed him in 1861 to initiate
• Von Bemhardi, op. cit., IV, 127.
• Parisius, von Hoverbeck, I, 215.
• Horst Kohl, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
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legislation against his will, he reacted as follows: "His Majesty remarked that he also wished this development of our domestic legislation
[which Minister Count Schwerin had declared once more to be as much
'desired as expected'], but that it is not necessary for certain re-submitted bills to be accepted without change. The highest officials of
the Crown were called to submit to the soverign their proposed laws;
the Crown has to consider them and in case of disagreement to seek a
compromise and a rapprochement of views. One will and one view
must in the end be decisive and this is the King's. Whoever among
the ministers is unable for reasons of conscience to accept His decision
must resign."6 The ministers should propose legislation, the King
should decide what should be done; the parliament should perform its
part in making the decisions effective. "A wise reciprocal action of
relaxing and tightening the reins of power," expressed the King's
formula of rule, and he compared the art of ruling with the regulation of the flow of a stream. 6
When the liberals in the Lower House criticized and opposed the
military reforms, the King began to lose confidence in that body. By
March, 1861, he had come to consider the liberal ministers a failure
and condemned the entire constitutional system. He regarded every
new desire of the liberal ministry, trying to appease the Lower House,
as a new "concession" from him, and he opposed it on the suspicion
that this process would continue forever. "The ambition of these
persons is," he declared in April, "for themselves to rule! . . . The
King shall not rule; they want to rule! ... But that cannot and dare
not be the case in Prussia." As early as March, he was alarmed at the
rise of the "democrats," a word connoting the worst excesses of 1848;
and he thought that a revolt in Berlin was not impossible. His mistrust and anger were so great that one of the liberal von Sauckens,
who knew William well, described the relations with the King as
"rotten, super-rotten!"7
In 1861 the elections took place which shifted the strength in the
Lower House from the Old Liberals to the Progressive party and returned several persons like Waldeck and Schulze-Delitzsch, whose
names were associated in the minds of Conservatives with 1848. They
were "democrats." "Our enemies are very active," said the King in
January, 1862, referring not merely to these few so-called democrats

• Von Roon, op. cit., II, 50-51.
• Briefe, Reden und Schriften, I, 496-97; II, 16, 22.
• Von Bernhardi. op. cit., IV, 100-01, 107, 118, 137.
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but to liberal opponents in general. s He spoke in public of even
criminals being elected, 9 and when von Saucken advised him to open
the Landtag in person, William became excited, placed his hand over
his heart and declared that he could not personally face people like
Waldeck (a former high judicial official and a staunch democrat who
had been very active in 1848-49). Von Saucken reminded the King
that a ruler stood above parties, and William finally agreed to the
request. When Deputy Behrend, a member of the Progressive party,
was invited to a concert at court because of his position as vice-president of the newly convened Lower House and was introduced to the
King, the latter asked, "The Vice-president?" Behrend: "At your
service, your Majesty." The King: "Aha!" Thereafter, his liberal
colleagues threatened to rename Behrend "Aha!"lO
In the statement of his program of rule made in 1858 the King
had spoken about the question of whether and in how far the constitution should be developed. His remarks could have been considered
promising only by the most willful optimist. There could be no talk
of breaking with the past, he declared. "Only the careful and improving hand shall be applied where something arbitrary or contrary
to the needs of the time appears. You all recognize that the welfare
of the Crown and of the country is inseparable, that the welfare of
both rests on a sound, powerful, conservative basis. To recognize these
needs correctly, to weigh them and call them into life, that is the
secret of state wisdom, wherein all extremes are to be avoided. Our
task will in this respect not be light, for recently a movement has
appeared in public life which if partly understandable already shows
on the other hand traces of intentionally exaggerated ideas which we
must oppose by our calm and legal and energetic action. One must
hold true to promises without refusing to improve on them wherever
necessary; but one must courageously obstruct that which has not been
promised. Above all, I warn against stereotyped statements, such as
that the government will let itself be continuously pushed into developing liberal ideas which would in any case advance by themselves."ll

• Ibid., 182.
• He was referring to Becker, a leader in the Revolution of 1848 who had been
unjustly sentenced to several years in prison for his activity then and had served
his term. He was a good democratic subject, whose radicalism may be judged by
the fact that he subsequently served for many years as Oberbiirgermeister of Cologne.
Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 1.
1OVon Bernhardi, op. cit., IV, 198-99; Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 6.
11 Horst Kohl, op_ cit., p. 3.
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With this condemnation of liberalism and the warning that he
would not change fundamentals in the state, the King, at that time
Prince Regent, inaugurated his reign. During the next years, he clung
resolutely to this statement of principles in spite of pressure from his
liberal ministers. Not until early in 1862 were his New Era ministers
able to persuade him to agree in general to a few very mild structural
reforms, especially ones on ministerial responsibility and local government. Within a few months, however, he was able to dismiss these
ministers, whom months ago he had ceased to trust, and to drop the
reform proposals. After he became involved in the constitutional COIlflict with the Lower House, he remained steadfast, a favorite word with
him, in the defence of his policies. In October, 1863, he wrote to
one of his officials: "I feel the heavy burden of the battle, which God
has laid upon us, but I also know that lowe it to my people and to
the Crown inherited by me to fight it out with determination. Whatever may come, I shall persist in that which I know to be necessary for
the welfare and the independence of the Fatherland. I shall not deviate from the path that I have taken .... "12
Two ministers were mainly responsible for enabling the King to
continue his adamant attitude in the conflict with the liberal Lower
House. The one, von Roon, headed the powerful military group
which knew no other way of life than that of ultra conservatism; the
other, the civilian Bismarck, employed every force-King, Conservatives, military, bureaucracy, even the liberals-to fulfill a selection of
ideals of his own choosing which proved acceptable in varying degrees
to all of them and preserved the authority of Conservatism in Germany
far beyond its useful life.
The Junker von Roon was made Minister of War in 1859, replacing
the liberal General von Bonin who was lukewarm toward the Regent's
military reform proposals and popular with the liberal public. Von
Roon was brought in to put through these reforms; he was accepted
by his liberal colleagues as a non-political specialist in office for a
specific task. The new minister was gleeful over the fact that his
colleagues made no attempt to commit him to their liberal program.
He openly stated his ideas of government, writing to his friend Perthes
at the time of his appointment as follows:
I have curtsied after I had frankly declared that I never had
any use for the whole constitutional business, but that as a true
conservative subject I would bow to the completed deed, that I
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shall remain "a fool on my own responsibility" but think that I
can nonetheless be a minister-expert if one can use me as I am
for that purpose. My assertion seemed to surprise no one; they
had apparently expected worse from me.
After expressing his aversion to the kind of life he would have to lead
as minister, he continued:
A human being of my kind cannot do other than with God's
help tackle the most difficult and dangerous assignments when
it is a question, as it is here, of the most important and the highest affairs in a man's life work, namely, the political health of
his fatherland. Should a soldier, in cowardly fashion, turn his
back on his war lord when the latter calls, "Come and support
me" -merely because his lord's other helpers do not please him?
Never! That which is called political honor I conceive otherwise, for I am a soldier.... According to my conception of political honor, it is my honorable duty to say: "Yes, Lord, I will;
but do not wish something which you may at some time perhaps
regret. See, I am otherwise than you may think and, in view of
your other supporters, you may wish. Think over whether you
cannot find a more suitable pillar which would less disturb the
harmony of your building." When one has said this and similar
things with feeling and frankness and the desire remains unchanged, then in my opinion an honest man has done his duty,
and it is extraordinary that one replied to him, "If I had and
knew a better man, I should not have chosen yoU."13
In spite of this show of modesty von Roon had eagerly sought to
obtain the appointment. He took a keen interest in politics, and
from the beginning of his service as minister he actively pursued the
political side of his task.14 It would have been impossible for him to
keep out of politics, for the military reform became almost immediately the dominant political issue with the ministry, the Landtag
and the public. That von Roon would be on the Conservative side
was evident from the first. His close relative, Moritz von Blanckenburg, was a Conservative party leader and his circle of friends belonged
to the same tradition. Like the Prince Regent, he had been brought
up exclusively in the army. While this training did not necessarily
make a person a Conservative, it tended to throw the full weight of
the military institutions and traditions on that side, and liberal
officers continued to be exceptions.
The Regent immediately trusted von Roon more than anyone else
in the ministry, and the latter encouraged him in every way to do so.
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As soon as the new Minister of War took over his position he began

to plot how he could oust the liberals in the ministry. With Bismarck
and Moritz von Blanckenburg he had long discussions of this problem;15 for von Roon was determined to bring in Bismarck as minister
and to do so required breaking the bond between the King and his
liberal advisers. In a letter of June 18, 1861, to his friend Perthes,
Roon described his strategy:
The members of the ministry, except the Kultusminister
[Bethmann-Hollweg] and, under certain conditions, myself, wish
decidedly not to resign and regard their resignation as ruinous
for the state and their loss as irreparable. With the best intentions, that is, in blind devotion to constitutional doctrines, they
wish to make the King and the state un-Prussian, and with full
sails they continue to steer toward a parliamentary regime.
Since they should and must be eliminated, because their continuation would according to Prussian-conservative views be
ruinous for the state, they must be eliminated as soon as possible.
"Whoever plays with the devil is accursed," says Wallenstein,
and in reference to the present case I should appear to myself
to be a fool, a stupid fool, if I did not use today the opportunity
to seize the rudder of state from the hands of these men caught
in dangerous errors and intentions merely because this could be
done more advantageously at a later moment .... In my opinion
nothing would be worse for Prussia than to succumb to a doctrinaire swindle. It can arise with new strength out of the mud
bath of a revolution; in the filth of doctrinaire liberalism it will
irretrievably rot.
In the next paragraph of the letter to Perthes, von Roon showed
his insight into the personality of the sovereign.
Do not consider me fanatical. I know my terrain and the
persons acting on it; I know with what difficulty decisions are to
be reached, particularly when they involve acknowledgement of
a previous mistake. [That is, the King would have to admit his
blunder in appointing liberals as ministers and in making any
concessions to their doctrines.] You will admit that on concrete
questions (like the swearing of allegiance at the coronation)
decisions are easier than in the discussion of abstract theories.
Von Roon knew that the King's intellectual limitations made any
ideological discussion useless as a means of overthrowing the liberals
and that one had to concentrate on specific acts, like that of the swearing of allegiance, in which ideas were actually in conflict, even though
the King explicitly did not recognize the fact. Von Roon planned to
"Ibid., II, 19, 22.
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work from one concrete act to another, without ever bringing up
questions of principle. Thereby he expected to save the King's fare
about having to dismiss liberal ministers whom he had appointed and
to bring the ruler back to Pruss ian conservatism without his being
aware of his own inconsistency. The letter to Perthes continued:
Do not regard me as a deceiver. I made my challenge openly
but no one dared openly to accept it. [For good reason, since tI;te
King supported him wholeheartedly]. But for reasons of WISdom, I have not yet come forth with the declaration, that is, with
the formal, clearly and sharply emphasized declaration, "They or
I," although it lies implicit in the situati0l!-. The gen~lemen
certainly know that, but they say the OpposIte as ostenSIbly as
possible.
You see I aim at no so-called "change of system" but only
at the repudiation of the liberal interpretation of the November
program [of 1858]. I entered office with a conservative interpretation of it; I can, will and must hold firmly to it, but I also wish
and endeavor to achieve that this interpretation, which is actually
that of the King, becomes recognized as official. If this public
profession should not protect us against red elections, a result
of which I do not yet despair, then let the battle for existence
be fought. I am confident that it will end victoriously and will
lead to health and recovery, and indeed not by a reactionary
recipe but by an honorable, open and courageous use of constitutional means. God will not forsake us if we do not forsake Him. The reorganization [of the army] has shown that
our supreme person is capable of courageous, decisive and determined rule. Unity of views between the ruler and his
ministers strengthens and gives wings to all governmental
activity; the prevailing disunity has weakened and crippled it.
That was unavoidable. Everything depends therefore on the
choice of persons! The world belongs to the courageousP6
Von Roon regarded all liberals, democrats, and communists as
belonging in the same category of "reds." He preferred a civil war
to a liberal regime. He claimed to have God on his side. He had a
plan for changing completely the policies of government without the
King's being aware of his royal inconsistency. Von Roon expected a
Conservative government to apply in all cases the methods being used
in the execution of the military reorganization: Once the King decided on a matter the ministers should carry out his orders with
parliamentary approval of just enough of the program for them to
go ahead with the whole plan. Then parliament would have to give
in or the conflict would be brought to a crisis, and the sooner the
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better. If parliament would not approve the proposals, the ministers
should follow the King's orders anyway. A group of courageous
ministers was needed, and of the possible candidates Von Roon considered Bismarck the ablest and bravest. With Bismarck in the
ministry, so he thought, liberals would not be tolerated, the King
would once more be strong and firm, and Prussia would be governed
in accordance with its tradition.
Von Roon followed his plan in full. On many questions he sided
with the King against all the other ministers, and he made certain that
the King knew about his stand. He wished to strengthen his sovereign,
to give the latter confidence in pressing his policies. When in February,
1861, the liberal ministers wrung from a very unwilling King consent
to introduce bills for the development of the constitution in a liberal
sense, for example a bill on ministerial responsibility, von Roon immediately wrote the King a long letter which was a masterpiece in the
way it undermined his colleagues and their whole program. Cut to
the personality of the ruler, the letter proved as effective as its author
could have wished,l7
Still deeply shaken by the outcome of yesterday's meeting of
the ministry, I have been struggling to regain the composure
which I recognize as necessary in order to speak to Your Majesty
about the present situation with some prospects of success. I
dare to do this, I must do this, for Your Majesty chose me as an
adviser. But I must also do this because after Your statement
of yesterday, I belong to a ministry which has forced Your
Majesty to approve a measure which is most decidedly contrary
to Your conviction, to Your conscience.
I was deeply hurt thereby, for my Prussian soldier's heart cannot bear the thought that my King and Lord should place another will above His own. But I hope confidently that Your
Majesty will clear me of the suspcion of solidarity with those
who put pressure upon You.
At the present time it is a question on the one hand of the
approval of certain things which the Crown expects from the
Landtag [the military organization] and on the other hand of
certain concessions which the Lower House expects from the
Crown [liberal reforms].
The first-named approvals relate to indispensable needs, the
satisfaction of which is urgently demanded by the first of all
natural duties, that of self-preservation. The concessions desired
in exchange are supposed to complete our constitution, after we
have already lived and prospered for a number of years in constitutional conditions without this completion. These concessions
are far from having been won by other and great countries.
17
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The approvals are absolutely necessary; the concessions are
from a certain standpoint merely desirable. The values which
are here to be exchanged are therefore unequal.
.
Nonetheless, it would be conceivable that performance and
counter-performance considered from the standpoint of legality
might be balanced, that the government is legally committed to
make the concessions in question because thereby certain promises in the constitutional document should be fulfilled.
But our constitution was given by the King alone. It is not
a contract the immediate fulfillment of which can be unconditionally claimed by the contracting party without further ado.
Our Prussian Monarchy is not newly created by constitutional
agreement, as for example the former bourgeois kingship [of
Louis Philippe in France] or as the Belgian; it is far more one
created by our great rulers, one which was not abolished but
only modified by the constitution granted by free Royal decision.
As a product of the free will of a King of Prussia our constitution
... will be honestly interpreted and faithfully followed. In accordance therewith, the promises of the constitution are also to
be fulfilled, not as contractual obligations which cannot be deferred but much more as a freely assumed obligation for the
future, the actual fulfillment of which is dependent upon future
free Royal decisions .... Mere external considerations of the convictions of others, if they should serve as motives for Royal decisions, would create the worst conditions. In other constitutional states the assertion of the will of a ministry against the
King is conceivable, but not in Prussia! For, as its entire history shows, Prussia needs for its salvation an absolutely undivided Royal will which is limited only by itself and by the inborn respect for the law of the family of Hohenzollern.
Von Roon's conservative, military constitutional theory may be
translated as advising the King as follows: The monarchy gave the
state the constitution out of its own free will; it has to abide by its
own freely-given constitution, but it can expand that instrument or
otherwise change it freely, and it is subject to no legal or institutional
restraints in doing so; there exists and may exist in Prussia no power
above or conditioning that of the King, for Prussia's history proves
that this state cannot afford to weaken itself by any such limitation.
In substance, von Roon told the King that this was his constitution,
that he should of course abide by it, but that he could do with it· as
he pleased. Von Roon's letter continued:
This conception, the only one which preserves the interest of
the Crown, offers the greatest security for the continuation of its
rthe Crown's] undiminished brilliance. It does not exclude
further delegation of authority; still less does it designate such as
absolutely harmful; but it unconditionally demands that all further delegation of power must in truth be made freely with the
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deepest convICtIon. [Von Roon thought correctly that under
these conditions no sovereign would ever give up any more
power. He also know that the kind of minister serving the King
under such a conception of the constitution would not advise
him to transfer any of his power to others.] Such a conception is
therefore to be held to and represented in all matters by the
King's first servants, the ministers. If they are unable to do so,
either because they have doctrinaire views about the binding nature of the constitutional promises or because they lack courage
to face with assurance the consequences of that conception, then
acting like honorable men they will request the King to seek
other advisers and representatives of his prerogatives. [In these
statements von Roon by implication took care of his liberal colleagues in the ministry; they were doctrinaires and cowards and
were clinging to their jobs; they were not men of honor, for
otherwise they would have resigned].
If on the other hand, in conflict with his interests and his
innermost convictions about that which benefits the country they
attempt to move the King to act against his own views, then they
act in the interest of expanding the parliamentary power, and
Prussia demands a strong individual authority!
And I hope that Your Majesty shares all my conceptions.
But if Your Majesty should ever again have the experience
that Your own conscientious convictions are found in opposition
to the views of Your first servants, whether about the so-called
completion of the constitution or about any other measure of
utility, then I beseech Your Majesty with all the respect and
feeling of a servant's loyalty of over forty years to remember
that Your advisers with all their zeal for their views could not
wish, and dare not wish, to bend the will of their Lord and to
cause division in His sovereign conscience, a state which would
deeply embarrass and burden the advisers themselves.
Von Roon was appearing to be most concerned about the royal
conscience, not to let it be torn by inner dissention. He knew that in
fundamentals the ruler sided with the Conservatives and wished to
retain his absolute power. The general was appealing indirectly to
the King's sense of honor to keep his conscience free from doubt and
trouble by getting rid of the liberals. At the same time, he blamed
not the King but the liberals for the split in the royal conscience and
said that they should feel shame for causing it.
Von Roon continued in his letter to the King:
Moreover, pressure is not demanded by the situation. In
order to attain the great objectives of the government, over-hasty
concessions to parliamentarism would in my modest opinion be
the most questionable means of all. The King of Prussia is at
this moment still in full possession of his sovereignty and for the
well-understood interests of the country must remain so. He
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does not lack constitutional means in order to execute his justified will in a legal way. If this is so, why should one seize
means which against the will of Your Majesty limit and stunt
the power of the Crown?
The answer to this question could only be found in the as~
sumption that Your Majesty's advisers regarded the immediate
completion of the constitution according to their own political
convictions as an unavoidable necessity, or without such completion they held their authority in the chamber to be endangered
by their own friends in that body, or without initiative aiming
at that objective they would come into contradiction with their
own parliamentary antecedents. Then it would surely be less a
question of a constitutional than of a ministerial need.
Von Roon accused his liberal colleagues of pressing for reforms, not
because the King wanted these reforms or the country needed them,
but because the ministers needed them in order to hold their positions.
He attributed selfish, petty motives to the liberal ministers and did not
even consider worth mentioning the fact that the Lower House existed
as the representative of the people, that the liberals held an overwhelming majority in that house, and that the country manifestly demanded constitutional reforms. He kept the controversy within the
limited, personal group of the King and a few liberal ministers. The
country needed Hohenzollern absolutism; the desires of the people
as expressed in elections and in the wishes of their representatives in
the Lower House did not even deserve to be mentioned, especially
in a letter to a sovereign eager to be shown a way of saving face while
actually repudiating liberalism and restoring the absolutism of the
Hohenzollern tradition.
Since, moreover, under the assumption that only the introduction of the laws but not their passage, that is, not the completion of the constitution but only the beginnings of that process would be intended or at least only needed to be intended,
one could perhaps regard their [the liberal ministers'] measures
as mere sham battles and devoid of danger, if a large part of the
nation did not become angry over such onsets and regard them
as an injury to the Crown. Your Majesty's Minister of War may
not conceal the fact that such views find repercussions in
that part of the nation which bears Your Majesty's arms and in
which Your Majesty has always found the firmest pillar of Your
throne. Whoever is faithful to Your Majesty can only with
reluctance think of the possibility of this "rocher de bronce"
being undermined.
The King's comment on this last sentence was, "I should not survive
that!"
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Von Roon was saying that the army, "a large part of the nation,"
took affront at these liberal reforms; they should not be accepted, for
they would lead to undermining the army, the firmest support of the
throne. The army represented the nation, and nothing should occur
which would offend it. The Lower House was not even mentioned;
it did not represent the nation; it was of no importance in the nation.
The army expressed the national interest; that is, the top officers,
almost all Conservatives, expressed the national interest. Rarely, if
ever, has an argument based on self-interest been advanced more
blandly. For the sake of its national defence the nation should subordinate itself to the will of the officer-king and his officer advisers.
This ideal was the essence of militarism. Von Roon assured the King
that the army would defend him in case of any difficulty with the
liberals. Far from opposing the King for not accepting liberal reforms,
the general was saying that the army would be seriously alienated if
the King did accept these reforms.
Finally, I have to repeat once more the thought that in contradiction to Your own conscientious convictions, Your Majesty
may feel that You must make concessions in order thereby to
further the great objectives of Your government. But what if
the quid pro quo were not forthcoming? Parliamentary majorities have always been unreliable. In view of this fact, would it
not be much more advisable to expect beforehand the evidence
of love and trust ... ? If this proof is given, and if Your Majesty's power is thereby strengthened to the necessary degree in
internal and in foreign affairs, then Your Majesty can be less
hesitating in Your concessions. The strong and rich can be
obliging and generous; but as long as power and property are
found in a doubtful situation wisdom advises caution and
economy.
Let the Landtag first approve the military reforms, von Roon advised his lord; after that act the King could think about granting a
quid pro quo. Two statements in von Roon's advice could be used
time and time again to block any reforms: first, since "parliamentary
majorities have always been unreliable," how could an absolute
monarch ever trust them by granting reforms at any time; second,
what is the "necessary degree" of power "in internal and in foreign
affairs" which a state must possess before the absolute ruler dare allow
any constitutional concessions to a parliament?
The heart of von Roon as Prussian soldier was instructing the
monarch how to be at the same time an absolute sovereign and a constitutional sovereign. He was teaching constitutional law as interpreted
by the military, a subject in which he was undoubtedly proficient.
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With the most self-righteous thoughts about serving the state, he was
showing the King ways of defying the Prussian people. The content
of this document fitted the period over fifty years before, when other
Pruss ian army officers had fought to prevent the Steins and the Hardenbergs from putting through constitutional reforms. The document
reveals no understanding of the new society in the making, its problems and desires. It does not consider the fact that industrialists and
bankers, merchants and railroad magnates, newspaper editors, professors and other professional personnel were becoming numerous, aware
of their social and economic significance in the state, and eager to share
the power by which their own fate and that of their state was determined. Von Roon's ideal world consisted of an absolute monarch
surrounded by conservative nobility and army officers who were in a
position to guide the will of the absolute monarch. Everyone else in
the state belonged in the general category of "people," second and third
class subjects who did not know enough to run the state or even their
own affairs.
The King wrote in his own hand on von Roon's letter, "You deserve
for your candour my sincerest thanks for all time!" And at numerous
places on the margin, he commented, "Agreed" and "Entirely agreed."18
He withdrew his approval of the reforms for which his liberal ministers,
especially Count von Schwerin, had been pressing; but his troubles
were not over. A few months later in the same year, 1861, he turned
to von Roon again for reassurance against the renewed pressure from
the ministers. Von Roon replied in a long letter manifesting the increased strength of his position. He turned from the defensive to the
offensive. One of the liberal ministers had
... demanded of Your Majesty to give way to his urging or to
dismiss him. Can there be ... a choice? Your Majesty believes
that You cannot dismiss him because the survival of the ministry
would thereby be endangered. The disadvantage from it should
not be underestimated. But on mature reflection it appears in
fact to be tolerable. [It certainly did to him since he had been
working for months for this objective.] Your Majesty will by
virtue of Your authority appoint other ministers, and if You
do not select them from among the leaders of the loudest and
most extreme parties, the outcry of the parties will not be worse
than it is at present. Your Majesty's pure intentions are known.
You wished and wish to govern according to the constitution,
but You wished and wish also to rule as a true King of Prussia.
In this lies the insufficiency of several of Your present advisers.
'·Ibid., II, 38-43.
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Because You wished to rule constitutionally, You chose men who
helped develop the constitutional doctrine in Prussia, whose
names therefore had a good repute among their party comrades.
But Your Majesty overlooked the fact that they had only the
loudest but not at all the most competent voices in the country
in their favor, that the consequences ?f the const~tutional doctrine of these men could be harmolllzed only wIth the shammonarchy of Belgium, England, or of Louis Philippe, but not
with a genuine Pruss ian monarchy by the grace of God, with a
monarchy in accordance with Your intentions which was rooted
in the legal consciousness of Your people. Your Majesty did not
wish to break with the past; the legal continuity should be preserved; also an improving hand should be laid upon the traditional. It would not be surprising if these Royal intentions,
capable of various meanings, were to be interpreted by everyone
according to his own wishes and outlook. In how far an identity
of understanding was found between Your Majesty and Your
newly chosen advisers remained uncertain from the beginning.
When I entered the ministry, I found this lack of clarity; yes,
the opposition of opinions and basic views was already plainly
marked. Your Majesty had overlooked the fact that the parliamentary antecedents of several of Your advisers imposed party
obligations upon them which stood and stand in the most decided opposition to their obligations toward Your Majesty. I
often thought that I recognized that Your Majesty's policy would
indeed have found the approval of these prejudiced persons if
former assertions and party commitments had not made it impossible for them. It was absolutely impossible for them! At
the moment in which they had the bona fide wish to follow Your
Majesty's political directions, they would have ruined themselves
in the eyes of their party; their influence would have been lost;
they would have been overwhelmed with insults. They could
not-and also would not do it.
This was von Roon's understanding of political parties. The
leaders became such not because the best qualified people chose them
but because the loudest shouters favored them; often these leaders
would have liked to support the King, but previous public commitments and fear of the party would not allow them. What was the
inference? That one could not have absolute monarchy and at the
same time a ministry composed of party heads, a view about which von
Roon was certainly correct. The further inference to be drawn was
that party leaders obtained their position through the aid of the worst
elements in the state and were responsible to them, that no respectable
and powerful state could possibly be governed by means of a popular
representative ministry. The liberals would have had no difficulty in
refuting these assertions by citing the example of England; but as long
as von Roon was writing for the eyes of the King alone his inferences
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could not be challenged. One can see why Conservatives preferred the
dark of absolutism to the light of representative government: they knew
how to intrigue and wield personal influence on a few select individuals; they knew almost nothing about political parties and popular
government. These devices were alien to them. Von Roan had a
clear eye for the inconsistency of absolutism and party rule, just as
Bismarck and subsequent Conservatives had. Von Roon went on:
That is the situation. It is horrible; it brings the Fatherland
to the edge of the abyss. But it should not cause despair.
Your Majesty has two ways out of the confusion of the moment. One is called "giving in," full and complete, unconditional giving in, sacrifice of one's own conscientious conviction,
binding the Royal will to the will of the ministers. It leads irrevocably along the path of monarchy by the grace of the people; the special lustre of the Prussian Royal Crown will be
extinguished, but in the background will beckon a citizens'
crown and Prussia will in the future perhaps compete with Belgium in the material blessings of an unhistorical existence. This
would mean a breach with the historical past; the step in this
direction would be a big one, but it would lead out of the embarrassment of the present on to the smoothest path. All unseasonable friction would cease, the state machine would gain
new movement and jubilant approval would not be lacking.
Von Roon failed to mention the fact that the overwhelming numbers of the Pruss ian people wished, not the extreme form of government here portrayed, but a constitutional monarchy in which they
would also have a share in the government. They wished a government responsive to their wishes, one which would keep abreast of the
times; they certainly did not desire the alternative which von Roan
advocated:
The other way calls for the assertion of the legally justified
Royal will! It loosens the chains of the eagle; the King by the
grace of God remains at the head of His people, the center of
gravity in the state, ruler in the country, not subjected to ministerial guardianship and parliamentary majorities. There would
be no breach with the past, and an improving hand can with
wise moderation be applied to the completion of our public
life. This way leads at the beginning over a rough path but
with all the splendor and all the armed majesty of a glorious battle to the dominating heights of life. It is the only way worthy
of a Prussian king.
Von Roon was urging his ruler to take steps which would lead to
civil war. But it would be a glorious civil war. Just how it would
lead "to the dominating heights of life" was not any clearer than why
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"the only way worthy of a Prussian king" was to force his people into
a civil war.
One has attempted to intimidate Your Majesty by the loud
cries of the day. The same has occurred in the case of all unfortunate kings of history. Only because they believed in ghosts
were they frightened and ruined. I beseech our Majesty, do
not believe in this cry. Speak one word and the phantom will
disappear. This word is "change of ministers," not "change of
system." You have erred not in your goals but in the tools with
which You strive toward that goal. .. _ Your Majesty said today
that if you dismissed that minister who desired to retire others
would follow. I grant this, but I do not recoil from the act.
On the contrary, I should thank God on my knees for it if Your
Majesty could thereby be free from the chains which now hold
captive Your noblest self.
Von Roon assured the King that he did not wish the liberal
ministers to be supplanted by leaders of the Conservative party. He
wanted no parties represented in the ministry, for "ministers with a
parliamentary background are Your Majesty's ruin. Among Your
Majesty's officials there are to be found many able persons who are not
yet bound to parties. Choose some of these no matter whether they are
numbered as members of the Constitutional or of the Conservative
party."
This has been the time-honored solution of all absolutists, a government of officials supposedly above parties to execute the king's will
and serve the best interests of the land. The system transfers the
struggle for power to the entourage of the king, turns it into secret
channels, and prevents the public from exercising any control, short
of revolution, over their own affairs and from learning about national
welfare and about how to achieve it through the only effective means,
namely, the participation of all in public life- Von Roon was consistent to the end. The kind of ministry he proposed was the only
one suited to the retention of absolutism under a constitution.
The long letter closed with a display of emotion which the writer
no doubt felt but which was cleverly calculated to make the deepest
impression upon the King.
How can I justify the boldness of this letter? I answer:
With the zeal of a brave soldier who sees his Prince in bonds, of
the faithful servant who sees his beloved master on the edge of
the abyss. Should one hesitate to break the chains, to spring to
the rescue? Certainly not! Even if one were certain to fall.
And another thing: today I saw tears in the eyes of my beloved
King which filled me with pain and wrath_ I had to write
Your Majesty what I could not say today because my heart was
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in my throat. Believe me, Your Majesty, millions of ~ou.r loyal
subjects would feel the same fury and the same pam If they
should be so unfortunate as to know that their faithful King
was in such deep sorrow, in such profound anxiety of conscience.
No one of them would hesitate to offer Your Majesty his life
and blood to free You from the distress which threatens the
country with the heaviest of all losses, with the loss of its King. 19
The Minister of War was creating imaginary emotional "millions"
of loyal subjects to counterbalance the results of the liberal elections.
This self-styled "brave soldier" and "faithful servant" was springing to
rescue his King from a situation which he was doing his best to make
worse. He had his way, in that the King again refused to sanction the
proposal of bills for developing the constitution, and against the urgent
advice of his liberal ministers he insisted on carrying through his own
autocratic plans for the ceremony of coronation. To his friend Perthes
von Roon wrote in November, 1861:
The cardinal point of Prussian internal politics is and remains the military question. Therefore, I cannot, dare not, and
will not resign now. Nor dare I show myself to be yielding on
that question. The army, up to this time the sole reliable
anchor and pillar of our future, should not become confused
in its self-confidence and in its convictions; otherwise chaos will
overtake us. To prevent this by preserving the army in its actual
physical strength and with its inner values is the political part
of my task. Herein alone I am able to do something with assurance; therefore I must restrict myself to this. All other damage which I cannot prevent is not irreparable; but the decay of
the army would be the ruin of all ordered social relations. God
give me sound vision, mental alertness, and the will to act.20
From the Conservative point of view von Roon was entirely correct
in his estimate. Since the bureaucracy contained many liberals, in an
emergency it could not be trusted. In last analysis the conflict would
have to be decided by force. The attitude of the army would determine
the outcome. If the army were loyal to the King, the latter could act
as he pleased. The army had sworn allegiance, not to the constitution,
but to the King; and von Roon intended it to abide by that oath. Concessions to the Lower House liberals would disgust the army officers,
overwhelmingly Conservative in their politics, and might cause them
to be indifferent toward the outcome of the constitutional conflict.
In their rigid loyalty to the King the officers might be confused about
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the import of the conflict. Von Roon had to watch the effect of any
legislative proposal upon the spirit of the military. He kn~w that he
controlled the decisive force in the controversy, if he could only persuade the King to be adamant and to allow the issues to come to a
crisis. He knew that the outcome of this crisis would determine the
future character of Prussian society. He was fighting for the preservation of the Old Regime, for rule by the absolute monarch and the
nobility. He did not have to be particularly astute to grasp the
social significance of the conflict; all the Conservatives and most of
the liberals understood it quite early, and all the liberals did so before
the conflict ended. Von Roon's historical significance in the crisis
arose out of the fact that he spearheaded the Conservative forces in
winning back the King to their side and in keeping in safe control the
instrument of their power. To von Roon, as to the other Conservatives, and to the liberals, the army problem was not primarily one to
determine the power of the state in international affairs, but one to
decide the character of Prussian institutions and society.
By the autumn of 1861 von Roon was defending the Conservative
party to the King, saying that apart from a few hot-heads it had come
to accept the constitution and was ready to preserve and defend it.
"Since a reliable and adequate ministerial party does not exist," he
wrote the King, "since alliances with the radicals or democrats are out
of the question, there remains only the possibility of looking about the
Conservative camp for auxiliary troops in order to oppose the expected
assault of the revolutionary party." He formulated once more his
solution of the situation: "The King cannot resign, the ministry
can'''21 He was preparing the way for the change of ministry and the
appointment of Conservatives. Since no liberals of any shade were
acceptable, Conservatives alone remained.
The results of the elections in April and May, 1862, turned out
worse for the King than before. The liberals were chosen in even
larger numbers and the more determined representatives won over
the right-wing candidates. Von Roon felt deep scorn for public
opinion in any circumstances, and, although he had hoped for at least
the election of moderates who might let themselves be pushed and
shoved in the Conservative direction, he was not at all disheartened by
the results. He had laid plans for a showdown and, writing to Perthes
in April, did not believe that the liberals would dare revolt .
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Do you believe that the liberal mass, the vulgar Philistines,
love high stakes? I do not believe it. To wish to force the
government either to give in or to drown the darling child of the
blind monkey-mother "Constitutionalism," perhaps in blood, is
a high stake which not even Vincke [an outspoken liberal aristocrat] would risk. 22
His strategy for handling the new Lower House remained the same
as the one he had used on its predecessors.
A vote of no-confidence in the address debate accomplishes
nothing; the address will either be accepted or coolly rejected on
the basis of the constitutional rights of the King. Or the proposed laws will be rejected. Good. Things remain as they were.
Always cold-blooded, urbane manners, rude despatch only in
case of pronounced shamelessness, economical in words, no attempt at engaging manners to curry favor; all corrections factual;
no quarrels over theories. 23
In the following month he wrote Perthes, "The stakes are indeed
high, very high. It is better to bleed to death than to rot away....
Prussia must act, make history and finally exchange the role of anvil
for that of hammer!" He was reading the history of Strafford and
Charles I; but he thought that he had a much better cause than the
English ruler. When the Lower House in the autumn rejected by
an overwhelming majority the proposal to provide funds for the military reforms and demanded the two-year term of service and the
restoration of the former organization of the army, von Roon saw
that the crisis had arrived. He had deliberately baited the liberals
so as to bring it on;24 and he was happy. "Nonsense, you win!" he
wrote his friend Perthes on September 20, "and if I do no add 'and I
must perish,' this is not because I still feel absolutely no desire and no
occasion to perish."2l5
What made von Roon so cheerful was the prospect of obtaining for
the first time since 1858 a unified ministry supporting the King with
initiative, courage, and determination. He had striven since at least
186.0 .to bring his friend Bismarck into the ministry and had ·always
met with disinclination on the part of his sovereign. He believed that
at last the King could find no one else capable of resolving the conflict
in .an acceptable way. The ruler had tried a mixed ministry of Con.. Von Roon, op. cit., II, 70, 77-78.
··Ibid., II, 84.
so See von Bemhardi, op. cit., IV, 190-91, 196-97: Tagesbericht, Feb. 4, 1862,
citing the Danziger Zeitung, No. 1150.
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servatives and liberals and had failed; in 1862 he had tried a cabinet
of Conservative ministers not especially active in party affairs and
therefore supposedly not committed to a party program and had failed
again. He now had reached the point at which he had either to
find some person of extraordinary ability to overcome the difficulties
or to carry out his frequent threat of abdicating.
The story of the King's conference with Bismarck at Babelsberg
in September, 1862, need not be retold. The King undoubtedly mistrusted this Junker and feared that he could not control him. The
ruler hated to repudiate his past relations with the right-wing liberals
by appointing a person whose name alone indicated the most profound
hostility to liberalism and the willingness to use extreme means. The
appointment revealed the King's desperate plight. It required the
extreme act of the Lower House in rejecting his military reforms to
make him willing to entrust his future to this high-handed, brilliantly
versatile and determined aristocrat. The King was thinking of the
fate of Charles I, as Bismarck was of that of Strafford. Neither was
deterred by his thought for both were determined to win.
When Bismarck became Minister President, he had to maintain
himself against or between two centers of power, the King and the
Lower House of the Landtag. He knew that the King had appointed
him to the present position only as an act of despair. He understood
also that the Queen had opposed the appointment with all her influence and that she would continue to be hostile. As for the Lower
House, he had entered the ministry at the peak, so far, of the conflict
between the King and that body, and he had no illusions about the
attitude which it would take toward him.
The King proved to be fairly easy to handle. He was so angry
at the liberals and so determined to preserve his military reorganization
and his royal power that the more ruthlessly Bismarck fought the
Lower House while preserving the appearance of constitutionality, the
better the King felt. Once Bismarck took up the warfare in earnest
against the liberals, the King for the first time since 1860 became cheerful and confident. As we shall see, the gap theory of the constitution
pleased him through and through as an interpretation exactly to his
liking.
Within a span of five years the King made the transition from
aversion to Manteuffel Conservatism to support of mild liberalism to
enthusiastic advocacy of a regime much more ruthlessly Conservative
than that associated with Manteuffel. His mentality was so limited
and his personal belief in his own divine right so strong that he shifted
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his opinions easily and with a free conscience. When under proper
verbal coverage Bismarck flouted the constitution, the King felt him
to be entirely justified. When Bismarck used far more coercion in the
elections than Manteuffel had done, the King vigorously approved.
When Bismarck punished liberal officials, the King found all in order.
The shoe was now on the other foot, the King's foot; he did not like
the pinching. As a King by grace of God he reacted favorably to any
means which flexible minds could make him think constitutional.
The liberals accused Bismarck of exacerbating the conflict with the
Lower House in order to hold his ministerial position. The allegation
lacked foundation, even though at the time it seemed plausible. Bismarck was so self-confident and so aware of the possibilities of both
the internal and the external situation that he actually would have
preferred peace with the Lower House, at his price. His offer of cooperation to liberal leaders immediately upon entering the ministry
was not bluff. One may doubt his political acumen in conceiving that
the liberals would accept; but from another angle it was good politics.
If they accepted, they would lose their popular following and would
be dependent upon Bismarck. If they refused Bismarck could always
assert that he had come into the governmnet as a dove of peace. 26 He
had no fear of a solution of the conflict on terms acceptable to both
liberals and the King. Under such conditions the latter would have
been highly pleased, and Bismarck would have won his favor by a success which no other ministers had been able to achieve.
Bismarck's conceptions of government possessed a quality of realism
that was lacking in the views of his Conservative colleagues. He
understood something of the complexity of purpose and conditions
which government had to serve, and realized that simple, old-fashioned
rule by divine right would not satisfy modern needs. He had positive
ideas about the structure and functions of government which resembled
in part those of liberals and in part those of Conservatives; but he
blended them in an original way appropriate to the furtherance of his
own power.
Provided the authority of parliament was restricted in favor of the
executive, Bismarck regarded the assembly as useful and essential. As
early as 1853 he had written to the Prince of Prussia, the future King
William I, as follows:
It is true that the good reputation and the undoubted
achievements of the Prussian bureaucracy have led this body to
•• See Zechlin,
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overestimate itself, to lean to one side, and to endeavor to rule
more than is necessary. This disease points to a gap, the filling
of which is the task of the representative assembly. The latter
provides a counterweight to the presumptuousness of the officials, a correction of their one-sided and impractical theories and
a protection against the dangers which arise out of our scholarly
educational institutions. In these institutions our officials receive a higher type of education than perhaps in any other state,
but this education easily leaves an attitude of skeptical criticism
of life which brings disbelief in the field of religion and classical
republicanism in the field of politics. If there is added dissatisfaction with the subsequent position, slow advancement and the
entire practical results of such a long, tiresome and costly preparation, then one understands how easily our officials can change
from servants of the Crown to opponents; for they anticipate an
improvement in their own position from changes in the conditions in the country. Against these dangers the Crown and the
country find support in the control and counter-activity which
are exercised by the representative assembly with respect to the
bureaucracy. But to prevent the representative assembly from
becoming itself a danger, it should have not a dominant and aggressive character but basically a defensive one.
In 1861 and 1862 Bismarck still believed in the need for a parliamentary assembly, even on the eve of his assuming power as minister; and
the fact that he advocated the creation of a popular representative
body for Germany and introduced one in the newly unified country in
1867 and 1871 showed that he did not intend to abolish the Prussian
Landtag. He meant to use it in realizing his personal, state, and national objectives.27
Bismarck's approval of the Landtag as an institution was conditioned by his views on the political ability of the Prussian people and
their liberal leaders. He dismissed any notion of a parliamentary
government like that in England by citing the absence of a two-party
system in Prussia and the lack of an equivalent of the English gentry.
The Pruss ian nobility, he had stated in 1849, had not acquired the
qualities of political leadership possessed by the gentry. As for the
party system in Prussia, he declared that the liberals were too divided
among themselves to be able to govern even if they had the chance.
"We are too educated," he asserted in the Budget Commission of the
Lower House in September, 1862, "to be able to maintain a constitution, we are too critical; the ability to judge governmental measures,
acts of the representative assembly, is too widespread."28
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In keeping with this conception of parliament Bismarck scorned the
liberal deputies. "Even though we are an educated country, doubtless
too much so, I am amazed at the political incapacity of our Chambers,"
he wrote von Roon in July, 1862. "The other parliamentary bodies
are certainly no wiser than the flowers of our class system of elections,
but they do not have this childish self-confidence with which ours in
full nakedness publicly expose their incapacity as a model. How
have we Germans acquired the reputation of timid modesty? There
is not one of us who does not believe that he understands everything
better than all trained specialists from the conduct of war to picking
fleas off a dog, whereas in other countries there are many who admit
that they understand less than others about many things and remain
modest and silent." In a private letter he referred to liberal deputies
as "petty,"29 and during a session of the Lower House he wrote his
American friend, John Lothrop Motley:
I sit again in the House of Phrases and listen to the people
talk nonsense .... The chatterers can really not govern Prussia;
I must oppose them; they have too little wit and too much selfsatisfaction, are stupid and audacious. Stupid in a general
sense is not the proper expression; the people are individually in
part fairly sensible, mostly informed, with standard German university education; but about politics beyond local interests they
know as little as we knew as students, yes, even less. In foreign
affairs they are, taken individually, mere children; but in all
other questions they become childish as soon as they meet in a
body-stupid as a mass, understanding as individuals.30
Bismarck was addicted to the use of extreme words about opponents,
often to statements which went beyond his actual opinion. There
can be little doubt, however, that in this instance he expressed his
real views.
Evidence was supplied by the strategy which Bismarck evolved for
attacking the Lower House. At least as early as 1861 he believed that
ultimately "only by a change in our foreign policy can ... the position
of the Crown within the country be freed from the present pressure.":!1
In July, 1862, he proposed to von Roon a plan:
The longer the affair continues, the more the Lower House
will sink in public prestige, because it has committed the mistake and will continue to do so of locking its jaws upon trivia,
•• Ibid., pp. 46, 49.
I. Quoted in Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 163, from Politische Briefe Bismarcks
(Berlin, 1889), p. 124 .
.. Rothfels, op. cit., p. 46.
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and because it has no speaker who does not augment the boredom of the public. If one can induce them to bite tenaciously
into such petty matters as the continuation of the Upper House
and begin a conflict about that and delay the settlement of important business, it will be a great good fortune. They will become tired and hope that the government will give out of breath,
and the county judges must be alarmed about the cost of substitutes. When they become soft and feel that the country is bored
and urgently hope for concessions from the government in order
to be freed from their false position, then the time will have
come to show them by my appointment that we are far from
ready to give up the battle, and that on the contrary we are renewing it with fresh forces. The display of a new battalion in
the ministerial order of battle will perhaps make an impression
which at present cannot be achieved. Especially if beforehand
they are threatened somewhat with phrases about dictation and
coup d'etat, myoid reputation of lighthearted violence will help
me, and they will think, "now it begins." Then all those in the
center and all half-hearted ones will be inclined to negotiate. 32
As soon as the country understood the issue, rule by king or rule by
parliament, Bismarck believed, it would support the king. Several
elections might be necessary before the government obtained a cooperative Lower House, but he did not doubt that ultimately one
would be elected. No concessions should be made and no long debates
should be held with the liberals, as they would only encourage opposition. "Patient and persistent efforts at understanding," Bismarck
wrote, "will alone lead us through the straits between the Scylla of
Kurhessian conditions in the country and the Charybdis of parliamentary rule."33
The plan of action is most revealing of Bismarck's mental limitations. The imputation to the liberal deputies of low motives, such as
fear of material loss, reflected his usual slight esteem for human beings.
In his failure to realize that questioning a parliament's budgetary
authority would arouse the deputies to action as no other issue would,
he showed such lack of understanding of parliamentary government
that one can appreciate the liberal deputy Virchow's remark that Bismarck was acquainted with Russia but not England. His plan manifested the jaunty nonchalance of a Junker concocting a scheme to
suit his own measure.
Needless to say, the plan did not work. Bismarck's appointment
did not discourage the Lower House or make it ripe for compromise.

·'Ibid., pp. 48-49.
.. See Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 257-59.
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His procedure did not cause the conflict to degenerate into quarrels
over details with the result of alienating the public. In fact, the more
Bismarck tried his strategy on internal affairs, the more he consolidated
the public against him. He was manifestly not equal to many liberal
leaders in debate on constitutional issues. The fact was virtually admitted when he replied to Virchow with personal insults, his usual
recourse when cornered. He maintained himself in office simply because he had the backing of the King and the military and because
the bureaucracy continued to function for him as it had for the liberal
ministers, for Manteuffel, and before 1848 for Hohenzollern absolutism.
He won out ultimately because he carried through the unification of
Germany, an objective so ardently desired by the liberals that in order
to attain it they were willing in internal affairs to swallow defeat.
After having served as Minister President for a few weeks Bismarck
perceived that the constitution offered many possibilities of employing
terror and enticements, and he was already playing with the idea of
a coup d'etat in case of necessity.34 In the following July he urged
his Minister of Interior to revive the notorious Hinkeldey regime of
the Manteuffel period by banning particular individuals from Berlin,
especially writers. The further the conflict progressed, the more ruthless Bismarck became. In accordance with his plan of the summer of
1862 he tried to stir the liberals to fight on a series of continually new
issues, some of major, some of minor significance, but all useful, he
thought, to wear down the endurance of the Lower House and its
supporters in the country. The first opportunity presented itself in
the action of the House of Lords. When the Lower House rejected
the government budget in September, 1862, the House of Lords refused
to follow suit and passed instead the government's original budget.
Then each side accused the other of unconstitutional action. In
November the government tried to mobilize the provincial Landtags
against the Lower House, only to find that even they refused to be
exploited for that purpose. In September of the next year after many
threats the government required officials who served as deputies to
pay the cost of their substitutes and withheld the amount from their
salaries; since 1848 the costs had been covered out of public funds. 35
Each side advanced legal arguments in its favor. When the Lower
House in January, 1863, voted an address to the King accusing the
ministers of unconstitutional acts, Bismarck declared that he would

.. Zechlin, op. cit., p. 342 .
•• Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 107, 128, 178.
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not advise the King to accept the document. The Lower House replied
that this attitude violated the constitutional right of Pruss ian subjects
to petition their sovereign. Bismarck countered that "there is a limit
to what a Prussian monarch can listen to."36 The liberal majority
severely criticized the government for signing a convention with Russia agreeing to assist the latter in suppressing the Polish rebellion. The
government accused the majority of infringing upon the King's constitutional right to declare war and make peace and to conduct foreign
relations. The liberals were equally furious at the ministry's attempt
to prevent the Lower House from expressing its views about an issue
so important for the entire state. In May, Minister von Roon lost his
temper in the Lower House, whether deliberately or not would be
hard to say. He began to make personal remarks about certain deputies and was called to order by the president of the chamber. The
minister refused to be called to order. He swore that the authority of
the president did not extend to the ministers, that the constitution entitled a minister to speak at any time he wished. He accused the
House of endeavoring to impose censorship upon the ministers and of
forcing them under parliamentary control. The president of the chamber, with the full support of the liberal majority, asserted that he did
have authority as presiding officer to enforce parliamentary rules and
that the minister must abide by them. He denied that the constitutional
rights of the ministers were involved and countered with the assertion
that the constitution gave to the Lower House the right to organize itself and to establish its own rules of conduct. The liberals denounced
the ministry for trying to force the Lower House to obey its orders and
feared that if the ministers should maintain their claim to be free from
any control by the president of the chamber they would wreck the
order of business of that body. Each accused the other of violating the
constitution, of trying to extend authority over the other.
The ministry regarded the incident as an excellent opportunity to
stir up a maximum amount of trouble over a minor affair. It declared
that its members would not appear again in the Lower House until
the latter had receded from its position. The liberals refused and
appealed to the King, who completely vindicated the ministry's most
extreme position in a document that possessed all the characteristics of
Bismarck's style. When the Lower House in turn declared to the
King that it could not work with this ministry, the King utilized the
occasion to close the session and send the deputies home. The affair

•• Adress-Debatte, pp. 5-7; Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 124-25.
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suited Bismarck's prescription exactly, a fight over a matter of no
great intrinsic consequence which the public would not understand,
thus causing general irritation and disgust. This kind of incident
would lead, according to Bismarck's strategy, to an alienation of the
public from the liberal Lower House and would help prepare conditions for a new election.37
The Landtag was closed on May 27, 1863. On the first of June the
ministry began a campaign by which it expected to restore order. The
statement of program which it published in the official papers offered
such a striking example of ministerial hypocrisy that it deserves to be
quoted. First came the justification:
In Prussia it is something unheard of and entirely unnatural
for such a division to occur. Among us there exists no opposition between monarchy and popular freedom, between army
and citizens, between the authority of the King and genuine
progress. Prussia's Kings have always cultivated and furthered
progress in all areas of civic right and welfare.
After having denied by fiat the existence of any conflict between
Lower House and government, after having denied by implication
the occurrence of the Revolution of 1848, after having established harmony among all Prussians, the ministry explained in kindly terms
what it proposed to do in order to restore order to a country already
in perfect order.
Therefore it will certainly need only a time of calm, only a
soothing of that unnatural excitement in order to revive once
more the traditional spirit of loyalty, the old unity between
prince and people, in order to return to complete understanding
between the government and the people's representation and
thereby to a blessed new development of our constitutional life.
Only a slight controversy existed, the ministry soothingly explained,
between the ministry and a Lower House which had little or no support in the country and which would once more return to the happy
state of constitutional development as soon as the unnatural excitement was overcome.
This is the meaning and the purpose of the most recent
measures. The government will thereby exercise a policy of
pacification and reconciliation, not a policy of anger or of despotic passion. It will use the severity, which it has momentarily
adopted, only in the spirit of healing, and in legal discipline, not
in the spirit of revenge or of reprisal.
.7 See the pertinent documents in Die lnnel"e Politik, pp" 184-95; see also Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 137, 155-59.
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When the government succeeds in restoring peace to the
spirits and in finally quieting again the conflict of party passions,
it hopes that the results will soon show that with the restoration
of order, legality, and moderation it has made possible and again
assured the further development of our constitutionalliberties.88
The few liberal deputies were assumed to be trouble makers, rather
than the King, who demanded a huge increase in the army budget, or
the ministry, which proposed to rule by interpreting the constitution
out of existence. The few liberals were to be handled by the King,
a wise father who punished his dear children for their own good. The
limited intelligence of the subject was to be enabled by a few stern
measures to recover its natural equanimity. Then constitutional freedom would be restored, that is, freedom to reorganize the army in a
way which the people did not want, freedom to collect taxes and expend money without the consent of the people's representatives, freedom for the King to rule by divine right under a constitution.
How should peace be restored? The government plan of action
had already been initiated as soon as Bismarck became Minister President. At that time the Minister of Interior had sent a secret order to
Police President von Bernuth:
The present situation makes necessary the duty of the Royal
officials to devote special attention to the expressions of public
life and to act with decision against punishable deeds which concern public order. Under the guise of constitutional loyalty and
in apparent defence of existing fundamental laws, the manifestations contrary to the laws are increasing. There repeatedly
occurs in direct or concealed fashion a violation of the respect
for His Majesty the King and in the same way the loosening of
discipline in the army is being aimed at. Moreover, there exist
numerous provocations to hate and despise the institutions of
the state with respect to the sovereign power....
The police were ordered especially to watch the political newspapers
and to take all legal steps against them. They should keep under
close observation all societies, check on all public meetings, and prevent political associations from entering into contact with each other.39
On May 27, 1863, the Landtag was closed. On June I the government issued a decree curbing freedom of the press. The government
recognized that the press law of 1851 did not permit such an act; it
also recognized that since 1860 it did not have the power to apply to
a. Die Innere Politik, pp. 206-07.
a. Preussisches Geheirn Staatsarchiv. Pr. Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94,
Lit. P. 377, Vol. II.
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the press the concessionary authority that it exercised with respect to
other business. Nonetheless, it sought and found means to curb the
press during the election campaign, and it now exercised its power
ruthlessly. In July, 1863, it declared it to be "the urgent and unavoidable duty of the government" to take all steps to calm "the
passionate and unnatural excitement which in recent years as a result of party activity has seized hold of all spirits." To that end it
proposed to restrict "the exciting and confusing effects of the daily
press." It accused the press of having a large share in "undermining
all bases of orderly state life, of religion, and morality." It admitted
that the Conservative press was unable to stem these attacks, for it
lacked the physical resources and did not have the attention of the
public. The press law of 1851 gave insufficient justifi<;ation for curbing the excesses, it said, since the newspapers were expert at including
articles the meaning of which was sufficiently clear to their readers
without violating the letter of the law. The government changed the
basis for legal action against the press by asserting that not individual
articles or statements but "the entire attitude of a paper over a longer
period of time" should be used in deciding whether a paper should be
banned. Press cases should be decided not by the judiciary but by
administrative officials. Knowing that journals from other German
states also brought the contamination of liberalism into Prussia, the
government assumed the power, in spite of the clause in the press law
of 1851 prohibiting such an act, to forbid the entry of foreign newspapers which it considered dangerous.
In justification of its action the government referred to Articles
27 and 63 of the constitution. Article 27 guaranteed the freedom of the
press and prohibited the introduction of a censorship. It stated that
every other restriction of freedom of the press should be imposed only
by law. These constitutional clauses did not cause any concern to a
government bent on violating them. The ministry maintained that by
its decree "the free exchange of opinions which the constitution guarantees will in reality not be restricted .... Since the reprehensible excesses of an unrestrained press will be curbed," it declared, "the freedom of the press will be restored to the foundation of morality and selfrespect on which alone it can prosper and permanently strengthen
itself."40
Just how the prohibition of freedom of the press achieved freedom
of the press was a riddle which may have been crystal clear to the Con•• Die Innere Politik, pp. 195-98.
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servatives, but to no one else. Article 63 regulated the conditions
under which a decree could be promulgated. It read:
In so far as the chambers are not in session and under the
responsibility of the entire ministry, decrees which do not violate
the constitution can be promulgated with the power of law only
in case the preservation of public safety or the settlement of an
unusual emergency makes them urgently necessary. These are
to be laid immediately before the chambers for approval at their
next session.
The government had dissolved the Lower House before it had
issued the decree, for it knew that the House would never approve
the measure. Then it called the time "an unusual emergency," although no rebellion or civil war threatened. Nothing was occurring
except peaceful electioneering with the liberals severely condemning
the government. It was assumed that the government would lay a bill
before the new Landtag in the autumn for approval of its action; but
in the meantime the government would have used this arbitrary
measure, a clear violation of the constitution, to cripple the liberals
in the election campaign. The execution of the act was entirely partisan; only liberal and democratic papers suffered, while the Conservative ones indulged in the most vulgar vituperation against the opponents of the government without being molested.
The liberals immediately declared the decree to be unconstitutional. The law faculties of the universities of G6ttingen, Heidelberg,
and Kiel issued a public statement condemning it as a violation of the
law of the land. The Crown Prince publicly dissociated himself from
the act. 41 When the Landtag reconvened in November after the new
elections, the Lower House immediately condemned the government
action and refused to approve a bill to make the press decree legal and
permanent. In analyzing the ministry's justification of the decree,
Deputy Gneist declared that the ministry regarded as a state of emergency that which in the rest of Europe passed as constitutional government. The embarrassment of the government was never an emergency
for the country, he continued, and he condemned the decree as the
"most extreme dictatorial measure since the introduction of the constitution." He accused the government of curbing only the liberal
press.
You speak of the falsification of the truth, of the demoralization which the press spreads. Yes, there is such and it continues .
.. See, among others, Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 165-66; R. Haym, Das Leben
Max Dunckers (Berlin, 1891), pp. 298-99_
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The hateful falsification of the truth, the malignings, the summons to revolution, to a violation of the constitution, these continue; but they continue in the press which is found in the camp
of the Royal government, in the press which dares to call itself
the governmental press, in the press which has not been warned
a single time by the presidents of the twenty-six regional adinistrations. There lies the root of the evil in which we find
ourselves.
That the government had succeeded in curbing sharply the oppositional press not even the liberals denied. That it had gained its
purpose of calming the "unnatural" excitement in the country could
not have been maintained even by the government. As the liberal
deputy von Carlowitz asserted, "Figures show that even though the
press is not entirely silent, it is nonetheless half silent. Still, the people have understood what is to their interest and have re-elected those
deputies in whom they have confidence."42
Although the Lower House in the autumn made short work of the
ministry's bill to legalize the press decree, the government continued
to harass and curb the opposition press by administrative measures.
Bismarck had no conception of a free press; he regarded the press as
an instrument of political power to be used along with the bureaucracy,
the army, and all other available means. The conflict for freedom
continued. 43
The decree of June I abolishing for the time being the freedom of
the press led to another restrictive measure. One of the main forces
of the liberals' political support lay in the personnel of the town and
city councils. These councils in urban centers in all parts of Prussia
frequently discussed the conflict occurring between the government
and the Lower House and passed resolutions or sent petitions and
deputations to the House or to the King condemning the government's
actions and supporting the liberal majority of the House. They were
deeply alarmed by the decree of June I on the press, and they denounced it as unconstitutional. On June 6 the government therefore
took a further step characteristic of its authoritarian regime by forbidding the urban councils to discuss or pass judgment on "affairs of
the state constitution, of the Landtag and of general politics." It
restricted their deliberations exclusively to local affairs as the only
objects legally within their jurisdiction, and it commanded the com.. See the debates in the Lower House, Nov. 19, 1863, in the St. B.; see also
Aktenstiicke zur Neuesten Geschichte Preussens 1863, Vol. I (Verwarnungen), No.
I-June, July; No.2-August, September, October (Berlin, 1863) .
•• See Die lnnere Politik, pp. 248-57.
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munal authorities to take all measures "with all decisiveness" necessary
to suppress these "illegal endeavors."44 Moreover, it advised the King
not to receive delegations from the town councils seeking to lay their
views on state affairs before him.45 Thereby, the Bismarck government
was endeavoring to restrict participation in political life as sharply
as possible. It tried to suppress one of the best organized and most
vocal centers of liberal opposition and preclude any possibility of
real and effective organization by the town councils, representative assemblies in themselves, for resistance to the government.
At the time that it isolated the King from petitions and delegations
from liberals, the government encouraged the Conservatives to use the
same means for expressing their devotion to the King and his government. The King was eager to receive every such manifestation of
loyalty. The aristocrats headed the procession, but handworkers,
peasants, and pastors were found who would also participate. The
most famous, or notorious, expression of loyalty was sent to the King
by peasants of the village of Steingrund in Silesia. The sentiments
may be regarded as typical of this kind of governmental support.
"We, Your Majesty's loyal subjects, again confront the elections to
the Lower House. Since Your Majesty calls, we shall come as good
Silesians are used to doing, whether into military battle or into election
battle. If it were possible, we should elect no one else than our King
and Lord." Since this was not possible, the petitioners asked the King
to tell them for whom they should vote; and the petition ended with
the promise to vote for those who supported devotedly the King and
the government. 46
Since Bismarck disliked and mistrusted officials, it was to be expected that he would be doubly hostile to a Lower House in which
a large percentage of members was bureaucratic. Under the Manteuffel regime the Conservatives had developed the system of using
the bureaucracy for purposes of political control. While still Prince
of Prussia, the King had objected strongly to coercion of an official to
support the Conservatives; but now that his policies and his ministry
had become the object of attack, he swung to the other extreme and
approved completely Bismarck's efforts to force the officials into pol iticalline. 47

.. Die lnnere Politik, pp. 199-200.
.. See Abg. H., St. B., Nov. 23, 1863; I, 133. See as an example,
der Stadt Breslau im 19. Jahrhundert, pp. 603-04 .
•• Abg. H., St. B., Nov. 11, 1863; I, 14-15 .
.. See Die lnnere Politik, pp. 149-50.
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The government's pOSItIOn with respect to the political attitude
of officials was stated by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of
Interior in orders to their respective personnel. Each aimed at the
same objective, but because of the difference in the nature of their
tenure justice officials could not be treated as arbitrarily as administrative officials. The order from the Minister of Interior read as follows:
The loyal and self-sacrificing devotion of the Royal officials
to the Crown is a foundation pillar upon which the Pruss ian
state is gloriously built. The government of His Majesty the
King must rely on this unconditioned devotion all the more
completely since the introduction of free institutions has assigned to the bureaucracy in the main the task of supportin~
the constitutional rights of the Throne. For that purpose it IS
indispensable that throughout the administration unity of spirit
and will, decision, and energy appear. The authority of the
Royal rule dare not be weakened and shaken in public opinion
by conflicts within its organs, and Royal officials may not misuse the prestige which their position gives them for the furtherance of political endeavors which run contrary to the views and
the will of the government.48
The circular order meant that the government was determined to
force the officials not merely to execute state business but to support
the government politically. This fact had been frankly explained by
Minister of Interior von Eulenburg in the Lower House during the
January debate on the address to the throne.
We do not doubt that all officials are loyal to the constitution. But we have had to note in the events of recent years
that the more sharply the political controversies come to the
fore, the more must the government muster its means in the
same way as individuals who stand at the head of the parties,
and it would sin against its duty if it did not attempt to gain victory according to its possibilities and with the use of all its
means.
In the Lower House you also call together your members in
every serious debate. You recommend discipline. You call
attention in all newspapers to the view that individuals must
submit to the decisions of the whole, that they have to place
restrictions upon themselves in order not to endanger the success of the whole.
Now, Gentlemen, how will you question the right of the
government to do that which you claim as a parliamentary assembly; how will you deny that the government cannot possibly
rule if it does not assure that unity of thought is evident in the
administration and that the power of execution is not broken?
•• Die Innere Politik, p. 132; Adress-Debatte, p. 22.
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Prior to the introduction of our present constitution th~ constitutional guarantees of the country lay in the laws and III certain institutions among which the bureaucracy also belonged.
The officials were at that time, more or less, not merely the
bearers of the Royal power, but also those through whom the
King and the government ascertained the opinions of the country. Since no great obstacles were to be overcome, one could be
more lenient toward political pronouncements of the officials
and request the freest expression of opinions from them as something within their duty. Today the voice of the people has
been placed in another body; it lies in you, in these Houses;
and the official has fundamentally another responsibility. He
must stand by the government. It is impossible to allow an
official to say: today I am an official and tomorrow a free man,
a deputy, then I will be again an official.
I say, an official who actively follows a line which contradicts that of the government, who opposes the government in a
noticeably agitational manner-with such an official the government cannot govern. If it must take measures to get rid of
him, the action is not to be blamed upon the government but
upon the official.
In other countries it is customary that when a change of
ministries occurs, so and so many officials are dismissed or have
the tact to resign. In our country this does not occur: one even
has the impression at times that certain officials demand that in
case of their opposition the ministry must retire. Such conditions are untenable, and assuredly times were better when one
spoke of Prussian officialdom as distinguished not merely by
intelligence but also by tact. Be convinced that we shall handle
all personnel questions sine ira et studio. It will not occur to us
to wish to eliminate an official merely because he does not please
us or is uncomfortable for us. We investigate carefully whether
his external behavior is in keeping with his position as state
official; and if we find the two out of harmony with one another, we shall take steps against him ... with all the means at
our disposal, even though he appears personally to be worthy
of respect or is in close personal relations with us. We take no
pleasure in such proceedings, but we regard them as our unavoidable duty.49
Acting according to plan, the government shifted liberal officials
from positions in the Western provinces or from larger towns to the
rural areas of the Eastern provinces, those areas of the purest possible
Junkerism, areas where the curse of industrialism, a free press, and
an active civic and cultural life had not yet fallen. A liberal deputy
estimated in 1878 that during the period of conflict the government had

•• Adress-Debatte, pp. 234-35.
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disciplined by transfer or dismissal more than a thousand officials,
among them twenty deputies of whom nine were judges. 5o
Since many liberal deputies were officials, it was to be expected
that they would be well acquainted with their legal rights and would
fight the government's policy. Few of them were administrative
offcials, because these, being most exposed to government pressure,
had kept out of leading political positions. The judiciary supplied
most of those deputies from the ranks of the bureaucracy; supposedly
secure from governmental chicanery, judges could take an independent
stand in politics. Even they had to defend themselves, for the govern·
ment had its own interpretation of the law on judicial tenure, an
interpretation which it concocted to suit its needs.
In the Lower House the deputies subjected the government's policy
to thorough denunciation. Deputy Waldeck, a former judge of the
highest court, cited the paragraph from the general law on the judi.
ciary by which the Minister of Justice claimed the power to force his
subordinates to refrain from actively working for the liberals. The
paragraph read as follows:
Also the private life ... and the conduct of the ministers
and subalterns of the courts must be the object of attention by
the presidents. And although it cannot be expected of or per·
mitted to them to interfere in the private and family affairs of
the judicial officials subordinate to them, they must nonetheless
take care that these officials lead in public an orderly and respec·
table life, carefully avoid all excesses and baseness, which would
arouse anger and offend the public and dishonor the dignity of
the office, and in general do or begin nothing whereby the
prestige due them and necessary to the exercise of the office is
endangered.
Deputy Waldeck stated that the minister found aggressive party
activity for the liberals bad, but that for the party supporting the
ministry good and worthy. He demanded the same personal rights
for justice officials as for anyone else, and among them he included
the right to be active in politics. He condemned the minister's order
as another violation of the constitution, another attempt to restore
absolutism. 51
Deputy von Vincke brought out the fact that the Minister of
Justice was aiming to force the state's attorneys to be Conservative.
Since those officials monopolized the power to bring criminal action

··Parisius, von Hoverbeck, 11,104·05,176; Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 347·51.
.. Adress·Debatte, pp. 22·25.
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against an individual, one could imagine to what extent in a police
state like Prussia they could be used to hound persons politically
active against the government. Deputy von Vincke stated that such
a condition had obtained under no previous government, not even
under absolutism. 52
Deputy von Bockum-Dolffs spoke for the administrative officials
of whom he himself was one. Countering the Minister of Interior's
accusation of their trying to be at one moment an official and at the
next a free deputy, he declared: "I will abide by the constitution as
a deputy in the same way that I do as official." He accused the
government of overstepping its legal rights. 53 His assertion was elaborated by Deputy Lette, who had grown old in bureaucratic service.
The old legal teachings of Germany which up to the most
recent time were assumed to be inviolable bases of German state
law hold that an official is in no respect subordinate to his
superior or has to resign his position because of his political and
religious opinions, but that of course he has to administer his
office loyally-the judge loyal in the sense and according to the
letter of the laws, the administrative official strictly and loyally
following also the instructions from the appropriate higher officials. But ... how very much apart from these are religious
and political convictions, how little the freedom and independence of them is conditioned by the requirement of fulfilling
one's official duty can be seen from an article in the constitution
the validity of which the Minister of the Interior has questioned
with respect to officials, namely, that no one can be made responsible for his vote in the legislative chamber and for his opinions
expressed there. According to my understanding the declaration
of the minister has gone so far that he demands of the officials
that they should as deputies and as officials represent and support identical political and religious views. 54
The minister had said nothing about religious conformity; that
practice of the Manteuffel era had at least not yet been restored. But
Deputy Lette correctly interpreted the minister's remarks with respect
to politics. This part aroused Deputy Immermann to speak.
These measures are objectively immoral because if executed
they would bring about a complete demoralization and debasement of the official class. In every person, also in every official,
there is a moral kernel; and in the person this moral kernel
should above all be loyalty to convictions. Shame and disgrace
to the person who recognizes something as completely right and
·'Ibid., p. 181.
•• Adress-Debatte, p. 238.
·'Ibid., p. 271.
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necessary and does not defend it in word and deed; shame and
disgrace above all to officials, shame and disgrace to the judge,
whose occupation indicates to him that if he has recognized the
right he should under no conditions deviate from the recognition of it but should manifest it in actions .... It is a vain delusion to speak of a Christian state devoid of legality, and it is
a vain delusion to wish to be Christian without first and above
all abiding by the law.')!'
The government did not bother to answer the liberal arguments.
It merely asserted the contrary opinions and depended upon its power
to enforce them. The liberals were correct when they said that the
ministers had different moral standards, different constitutional and
political principles from them, that they spoke a different language.
The conflict over the political rights of officials illuminated the
difficulties which arose out of the newness of the constitutional system.
Each side could claim to be in part correct, but each side pushed its
claim to an extreme-the government to the extreme of complete
political subordination on the part of the deputy-official, the opposition to the extreme of complete political freedom. It did seem paradoxical that a person who in his official capacity was subordinate to a
government should upon election as deputy fight that government
tooth and nail. Each side was trying to utilize its position to enhance
its strength. It must be said, however, that from the standpoint of
moral principles the government was sinning by its endeavor to corrupt the freedom of political personality of its officials in order to transform them into instruments for executing political orders. The
liberals did not break any comparable moral ideal. The government
accused the liberal officials of wrecking orderly government; the
officials aptly and justly replied, as Bockum-Dolffs did, that if the
government would act constitutionally the public business would be
transacted without any difficulty. While each side claimed to be
acting in accordance with the constitution, there can be no doubt
that the government was violating both the letter and the spirit of
that document and that it aimed at victory irrespective of the constitution. It refused to compromise on any but its own terms. It intimated that if the military conflict could be settled all other controversies could be arranged. 56 It did so while employing every constitutional and unconstitutional means at its disposal for crushing the
liberal opposition.

··Ibid., pp. 273-75 .
•• Die Innere Politik, pp. 237-38.
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Each side accused the other of a series of violations of the constitution. The liberals declared that evil begets evil, that once the constitution was violated, it would have to be violated again and again
in order to defend the first breach. The ministry accused the Lower
House of breaking every clause of the constitution57 which the liberals
accused the ministry of violating. The conflict became superficially
a matter of name· calling. Actually it involved the fundamentals of
governm~nt. In late 1862 Bismarck had coolly advised the liberals
not to take the conflict so seriously. By the autumn of 1863 he was
waging a fight for popular support against the liberals. His plan had
called for a process of softening up the opposition, culminating in an
appeal to the country in a new election. That election was held in
October and November, 1863. To understand it adequately, one must
analyze the liberals' interpretation of the constitution and the government's counter-arguments during the critical year of 1863.
"Absolutism, the noble genuine absolutism," wrote the Konigsberg
Hartungsche Zeitung on April 17, 1862, "has the objective of training
the people to the point at which it can cease to exist; for at a certain
stage of the people's development absolutism becomes impossible.
When industry, trade, the arts, and knowledge have advanced so far
that they will not endure arbitrary measures, even well-intentioned
ones, then in the course of natural development the constitutional state
replaces absolutism. We have reached that point." The liberals were
striving to make that "course of natural development" a reality.
Irrespective of party affiliation the liberals shared a common conception of the constitution. They expressed loyalty to King and constitution; they wished "a strong monarchy of the Hohenzollerns and
the full assertion of the rights guaranteed the people." They requested
"a constitutional, just, and liberal government and the development
of the constitution in that spirit by organic laws." The only difference
between the right-wing liberals, from whose platform the above quotations are taken, and the left-wing Progressive party arose over the fact
that the latter demanded more initiative on the part of the Lower
House and the liberals in the ministry. "We think," stated the
Progressive party in September, 1861, "that the new Lower House must
take a forceful initiative and must decidedly use its constitutional
powers to assure an independent and vigorous public life alongside a
strong government, a progressive development along with order:'58
51 Die [nnere Palilik, pp. 177-178.
5. Felix Salomon, Die Deutschen Parteipragramme (Leipzig and Berlin. 1912). I.
75-83, 87-88.
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The liberals recognized that they had been living in a state of
doubtful, undeveloped constitutionalism. They knew that they owed
their re-entry into the government in 1858 to the ruler. "The present
liberal conditions of administration," wrote a Berlin correspondent to
the Magdeburger Zeitung, "the mild practice of the government, etc.,
should not deceive one about Prussia and its existing legislation, namely, that Prussia is an absolutist state in which there are some exceptions sanctioned by the constitution. Apart from these exceptions
there is no state in Europe in which the state has such extensive power
as in Prussia."59
By early 1861 the Lower House of the Landtag was inclined to push
the center of power from the ruler and his ministers to the body of
representatives of the population. The Progressive party took the
lead in bringing about this shift.
When the editor of the liberal Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung in
November, 1861, tallied up the accomplishments of the New Era
government, he noted that some reforms had been accomplished in the
economic field, that almost nothing had been done for intellectual and
spiritual needs, and that
... in the stony and weedy field of constitutional and legal matters even these precarious and doubtful achievements become
ever scarcer and more questionable. We manifestly approach in
it the main stronghold of the opponents and feel at every step its
laming, dominating influence. One cannot entirely deny the
good intentions of the ministry and its dependents .... But our
ministers remain simply "royal servants."60
The liberals recognized that the constitution was full of gaps and
uncertainties. That document had been preserved after 1848 by a
Conservative government, but modified and conditioned in such a way
as to satisfy its wishes. A typical method had been to retain a clause
with a liberal content but to make its execution dependent upon
future legislation. That legislation would then never be passed,
and the status quo ante would be restored. Another method had
been to cancel the liberal clauses by temporary or transitional clauses
added at the end of the constitution and never repealed. Loose
phraseology had been employed which could be interpreted according
to the will of the government, or one clause had not quite agreed with
another one and was subject to interpretation by the government.
What had proved to be of especial use to the Conservative government
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had been the omission of terms in the constitution to cover certain
fundamental issues; thereby wide freedom of action by the dominating
authority had been retained.
When the liberals demanded the development of the constitution
and the establishment of a state ruled by law, they meant the abolition of the Conservative methods of preserving absolutism and caste
and the passage of laws making ,the constitution actually effective in
a liberal sense. They understood that constitutional development required as a minimum the introduction of reforms of provincial, county,
and local government and of ministerial responsibility. They knew
that these innovations would mean the transfer of political power from
the forces of the Old Regime, the absolute monarch and the conservative and military nobility, to those of the developing liberal
society of the middle class and its allies in the other social groups.
They recognized that a constitutional conflict involved a social conflict
and entailed basic institutional changes in Prussia. They regarded
these changes as a continuation of the achievements in favor of freedom during the Stein·Hardenberg period, changes called for by the
constitution. 61
The constitutional crisis arose over the fact that while the government demanded military reforms of such a nature as decidedly to
strengthen the power of the Conservative nobility and the military, it
failed to put through a single major constitutional reform desired by
the liberals. The latter found themselves in the quandary of being
expected to supply an enormous increase of men and money for
strengthening the most reactionary institution in the state while nothing was done in return to release the energy of the people by liberalizing the political institutions. Since absolutism and caste remained
in supreme control of those institutions or at least in a position to
obstruct change, the liberals perceived no reason why they should
strengthen even more the position of their opponents by acquiescing
in the military reforms, especially as they would have to bear the cost
and provide the manpower. The constitutional conflict broke out
in 1862 over this military issue.
The conflict centered on the question of financial power. "The
money is in our pockets," asserted the Progressive party in an election
appeal of April, 1862, "and the government always needs more money.
It cannot obtain new taxes until our representatives approve, and the
latter will only approve when they are convinced that the funds will

"Ibid" Nov, 7, 1861.
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be used for the benefit of the country."62 What would happen in case
the Lower House refused to grant the money requested by the executive
for maintaining permanently a military reorganization for which funds
had twice before been granted on a temporary basis? As soon as the
issue was joined, it drew into question other clauses of the constitution
than those about financial power, until it appeared that the entire constitution was at stake. Although practically all liberals refused consistently to admit it in words, the conflict involved the issue of
whether the King or parliament should have ultimate authority. Each
side phrased the issue in its own terms, and each swore that it was being
constitutional and denied the accusations of the other.. In reality the
liberals were interpreting the constitution in a forward-looking direction, and the King and the Conservatives in a backward-looking way.
Each was defending a conception of the constitution which the other
refused to recognize.
When Bismarck took office the Lower House had just rejected the
government's budget and passed a budget of its own, eliminating the
items for the military reorganization. How should the situation be
met? The House of Lords immediately rejected the revised budget
and approved the original one, and Bismarck's government continued
to collect taxes and to expend the public money for the military reforms as well as for all usual purposes-irrespective of the lack of a
legal budget. When the liberal majority of the Lower House condemned this action as a violation of the constitution and proposed to
appeal against the ministry to the King, Bismarck responded with a
brief but complete statement of his interpretation of the constitution.
He adopted what was known as the gap theory, first formulated in an
article in the semi-official Stern Zeitung in the previous summer.sa He
supplemented it with arguments and assertions of power of his own.
Bismarck initiated the defence of his views about the constitution
by an attack. He declared that the Lower House was fighting the
Crown for supremacy, that it was claiming rights which it did not
possess. He formulated the practical significance of its demands as
transferring the constitutional rights of the Crown to the majority of
the Lower House.
You clothe this demand in the form of a declaration that the
constitution is violated in so far as the Crown and the Upper
House do not bow to your will. You direct the accusation of

J'olksuitung, April 24, 1862 (Supplement) .
• s Die Innere Politik, pp. 26-28.
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violation of the constitution against the ministry, not against
the Crown whose loyalty to the constitution you place beyond
all doubt .... You know as well as anyone in Prussia that the
ministry acts in Prussia in the name of and on behalf of His
Majesty the King, and that in this sense it has executed those
acts in which you see a violation of the constitution. You know
that in this connection a Prussian ministry has a different position from that of the English. An English ministry, let it call
itself what it will, is a parliamentary one, a ministry of the parliamentary majority; but we are mInisters of His Majesty the
King. I do not reject the separation of the ministers and the
Crown, as you have assumed in the address ... in order to protect the ministry behind the shield of the Crown. We do not
need this protection; we stand firmly on the ground -of our good
rights. I repudiate the separation because by it you conceal the
fact that you find yourself not in conflict with the ministry, but
in conflict with the Crown for domination over the country.
Article 99 reads, if I remember correctly: all income and expenditure of the state must be estimated each year in advance
and brought together in a state budget.
If it followed that "the latter will be fixed annually by the
Lower House," then you were entirely correct in your complaints
in the address, for the constitution would be violated. But the
text of Article 99 continues: The budget will be fixed annually
by law. Now, Article 62 states with incontrovertible clarity how
a law is passed. It says that for the passage of a law, including
a budget law, agreement of the Crown and of both Houses is
necessary. That the Upper House is justified in rejecting a budget approved by the Lower House but not acceptable to the
Upper is, moreover, emphasized in the article.
Each of these three concurrent rights. is in theory unlimited,
one as much as the other. If agreement among the three powers
is not reached, the constitution is lacking in any stipulation
about which one must give in. In earlier discussions one passed
over this difficulty with ease; it was assumed accordingtoanalogy
of other countries, whose constitution and laws, however, are not
published in Prussia and have no validity here, that the difficulty
could be settled with the two other factors giving in to the Lower
House, that if agreement over the budget is not reached between
the Crown and the Lower House, the Crown not only submits
to the Lower House and dismisses the ministers who do not have
the confidence of the Lower House, but in case of disagreement
with the Lower House the Crown also forces the Upper House
by mass appointments to place itself on the plane of the Lower
House. In this way, to be sure, the sovereign and exclusive rule
of the Lower House would be established; but such exclusive
rule is not constitutional in Prussia. The constitution upholds
the balance of the three legislative powers on all questions, also
with respect to the budget. None of these powers can force the
others to give way. The constitution therefore points to the
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way of compromise for an understanding. A statesman of constitutional experience has said that the entire constitutional life
is at every moment a series of compromises. If the compromise
is thwarted in that one of the participating powers wishes to enforce its own views with doctrinaire absolutism, the series of
compromises will be interrupted and in its place will occur conflicts. And since the life of a state cannot remain still, conflicts become questions of power. Whoever has the power in
hand goes ahead with his views, for the life of a state cannot remain still even a moment. You will say that according to this
theory the Crown would be in a position to prevent the passage
of a budget because of any insignificant difference of opinion.
In theory that is indisputable, just as in theory it is also indisputable that the deputies can deny the entire budget, in order
thereby to cause the discharge of the army or the dissolution of
all government agencies. But in practice this does not happen.
Such misuse of the undoubted theoretical right of the Crown has
not occurred in all these fourteen years.
. .. The Prussian monarchy has not yet completed its mission, and is not yet ripe for becoming a purely ornamental
decoration of your constitutional edifice, not yet ripe to be
integrated like a dead part into the mechanism of a parlamentary regime. 64
In these few paragraphs Bismarck analyzed the situation created
when a constitution is introduced into an absolute monarchy. Irrespective of one's view of why it was introduced, whether through
fear of revolution or out of the goodness of the sovereign's heart, the
monarch would almost inevitably refuse to budge when the parliament opposed him on some favorite measure; he would be certain to
find loyal subjects willing to offer constitutional justification for his
stand.
How did the liberals meet the Bismarckian interpretation of the
constitution? Among their leaders in the Lower House the conception of the conflict as a question of power was generally repudiated.
To the enthusiastic applause of his colleagues, Count von Schwerin,
the former liberal Minister of Interior, spoke against Bismarck. He
attributed to the latter the assertions that "power goes before right,"
that "we have the power and therefore we will put through our theory,"
and he repudiated such views with vehemence. The Prussian dynasty,
he asserted, could not in the long run maintain itself on this belief.
Prussia's greatness and honor had depended and would continue to
depend upon action in accord with the opposite view, that "right goes

.. A dress-De batte, pp. 58-6(.
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before power."65 The count, like the other liberals, misinterpreted
Bismarck. The latter had made no such statement; rather, he had
said that when two opposite conceptions of legality came into conflict,
power would decide which one would win. The liberals objected to
considering the question from the standpoint of power at all; they
believed that they were right and had legality and morality on theirside and that their opponents had neither legal nor moral basis for
their actions.
The liberals steadfastly denied that they were attacking the King
or trying to take away his authority. They took the position that the
King should be above parties, that he could do no wrong. They consistently endeavored to exclude the Crown from the discussion. When
the King on one occasion in 1863 submitted a statement to the Lower
House not countersigned by the ministry, the liberal majority refused
to consider it. Deputy von Sybel explained the liberal argument as
follows:
The King can do no wrong. This old constitutional principle is nothing more than the juridic expression of the natural
necessity that a hereditary monarch can never intend to injure
the fatherland. In his position such an intention would be a
suicidal denial of himself and his family, for hereditary monarchy has its highest merit in the fact that it has succeeded in
placing in the service of the fatherland the strongest passions in
the human breast, egoism and love of family.
Hereditary monarchy would be insanity if it imposed upon
every successor to the throne the demand that he must be fully
educated and read in all branches of political science, in all
complexities of state law. The expert minister of the King is
responsible for every error which may be made in this respect,
even without a written constitution and without a constitutional
fiction. To call the attention of the bearer of the Crown, as our
address has respectfully done, to such mistakes of the government, particularly when they are of a doubtful, dangerous
nature, that is in the opinion of your commission not to insult
but to support the Crown.66
The ministers should make certain that the Crown, not able or
expected to be omniscient, abided by the law; if the King proposed a
measure which the ministers considered illegal or unconstitutional, the
latter should prevent the King from carrying out his plan or should
resign. The liberals regarded the practice of ministerial responsibility

•• Ibid., p. 78.
.. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
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as essential and as actual under either an absolutistic or a constitutional regime; they considered a law to that effect to be an integral
part of constitutional government. They accused Bismarck of violating
the basic principles about the position of the Crown and of exploiting
the Crown for his and his party's own purposes. Deputy Gneist contrasted Bismarck's behavior with that of the liberal ministers of the
New Era.
The former ministers have with piety interposed their own
persons in order to protect the person of the King.... against
this situation, in order to prevent the transformation of every
controversy of this kind ... into a personal conflict between the
King and his loyal subjects.
The present ministers have encouraged and furthered this
kind of controversy in every way. They have started agitation in
the country on a literal interpretation of the slogan, "for the
King and against the parliament." This is certainly not constitutional. I will add something more which one who has the deepest respect for the dignity of the King can add. You have done
the King a disservice by bringing him, the exalted bearer of the
crown of Frederick the Great, into such a situation that in our
country, as in the Swiss cantons, one votes over whether one is
for or against the constitution, and that one counts and weighs
by thousands what is for and what is against the King.
That is the worst service which a loyal servant could do for
the King. 67
The liberals, in a speech by Deputy Gneist, ridiculed Bismarck's
assertion that his duty was to execute the orders of the King.
This view of the ministry that the members do not have to
contradict when it is a question of law and the constitution, but
that they have only to execute the commands of His Majesty ...
this pOSItion is not one of parliamentary government. It is one
of rule by privy councillors. . .. The party slogan that you have
found, "Kmg or Parliament," was not badly thought out by a
party leader; but it is too palpably untrue. The real controversyis ... very dear: it is a question of government by privy
councillors or by the constitution.
To express it more plainly; it is a question of the new regiments or of the oath to the constitution.
Today constitutional ministers tell us that the orders of His
Majesty must be carried out, and nothing else. Since the ministers will not inform the King what is legal and what is not, the
Lower House must do so. It must say most respectfully that
His Majesty has high, holy, inviolable, immovable rights by the
., Ibid., pp. 249·50.
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grace of God; which God .preserve~ for him .f~r the ble.ssings of
his people, but not those nghts WhICh the Mmlster PresIdent ...
has proclaimed as the rights of His Majesty. The King has
neither inherited nor acquired such rights, neither by the grace
of God nor by the constitution of the country.
As long as a right of German rulers has existed it has never
been acknowledged that a German ruler personified the law.
No German ruler has ever had the authority from God or
anywhere else ultimately to decide according to his personal
opinion about the rights of his subjects. No German ruler has
ever had the power in case of conflict to order by decree from his
privy council what is right and what is wrong.
And what is true of the fundamentals of our constitution is
above all true of our military constitution, which of all the basic
rights of the Pruss ian people is that which was most dearly
bought.
The Crown has the highest command over the army and the
Crown is the highest bearer of the law about the military, but
these are not identical.
The law about the army, which is for us the cherished heritage of King Frederick William III and the War of Liberation
and which rests upon constitutional laws, may not be changed
except by law and except by hearing those who annually provide
40 million Thalers and 60,000 men for this army.
The Crown cannot almost double the size of the standing
army by orders in council; it cannot partially disband the Landwehr and partially push it to one side. And to determine where
the borderline of a change in the constitution lies is no military
question.
The Crown has the right to give laws, and no syllable becomes law in this country without the approval of His Majesty.
But the Crown does not have the right by orders in council
radically to change the basic institutions of this country which
have been purchased more legally and dearly by the blood and
money of the people than anything else in the country.
The Crown does not have the right by orders in council to
create hundreds and thousands of new officers' positions which
are not approved by the representatives of the country as new
expenditures, but are rejected.
The Crown does not have the right by orders in council to
empower the ministers to expend money for purposes which are
not approved by the constitution and by law. The Crown does
not have the right by orders in council to allow millions to be
spent which are not founded upon law or the constitution but
have been produced only by orders in council as new expenditures.
The Crown does not have the right by orders in council to
break off the budget negotiations for the current year, to break
off the deliberations over the budget law in the current year and
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to postpone them to a later year. The Crown cannot make good
the necessity of a budget by an order in councilor protect the
ministers against civil and criminal responsibility....68
The logic of the liberals seemed impeccable, unless the opponents
refused to be impressed. Bismarck and his colleagues simply denied
the validity of the liberals' arguments and met assertion of right by
assertion of other rights. "We take our oath to the constitution as
seriously as you do," declared Bismarck. 69 The King supported the
ministry absolutely, denouncing with heat the accusation that it was
violating the constitution. To a complaining address from the Lower
House, he replied:
The Lower House has justly denied all doubt about my serious and conscientious will to preserve the constitution of the
country, but it has cited orders of my government, issued with
my approval, as facts to justify the complaints about violations
of the constitution.
I should not have approved these orders if I had regarded
them as unconstitutional, and I must with complete conviction
reject the censure of my government as unjustified. 70
The King refused to be excluded from responsibility for the acts
of his government. He rejected absolutely the liberal idea that the
Crown could do no wrong, that the Crown was above parties. The
King took it for granted that he could and would do no wrong: that
went without saying for an absolute monarch by the grace of God.
He assumed that he did not take sides in party conflicts. A monarch
by divine right never behaved in a partisan manner; he always acted
in accord with the best interests of his country. The King did not
even understand the liberal position. His whole training and experience prevented him from regarding the liberals' policies as other than
an attack on the rights of the Crown.
The problem of the relation between the King and parliament
might have been solved by the introduction of ministerial responsibility, but the conditions were far from favorable for the passage of any
such law. The King intensely disliked any mention of the possibility.
When in 1858 liberals had advocated a law to that effect, the King
had replied with the simple statement, "Place your trust in me."71 By
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the end of 1861 the liberal ministers had persuaded him to agree to
introduce a bill, much against his will; but the content of the proposed measure left no doubt that it would be meaningless. It provided that a minister could be indicted only by a common decision
of both Houses. In view of the character of the Upper House, there
was no likelihood that under the proposed law a minister would
ever be called to account for anything. The liberal Kolnische Zeitung
commented that the bill sounded almost like ridicule of the repeatedly
expressed wishes of the Lower House, and the Freiherr von Hoverbeck
labeled it "shameless."72
The constitution dealt with the question of ministerial responsibility in two articles. Article 44 stated: "The King's ministers are
responsible. In order to be valid all governmental acts of the King
require the counter-signature of a minister who thereby assumes the
responsibility." The second article, 61, appeared to supplement but
actually opened a way to circumventing the earlier clause. "The ministers," it read, "can be impeached by a decision of one House for violation of the constitution, corruption, and treason. The supreme court
of the monarchy in united session decides such indictment. Further
stipulations concerning cases of responsibility, concerning procedure
and penalties will be reserved for a special law."
As long as no law was passed, Article 61 remained null and void.
The Conservatives had seen to it that up to 1858 nothing had been
done; and when Bismarck took over the presidency of the ministry, he
declared that the time was not ripe for introducing a bill on the subject. He definitely rejected a proposal in the Lower House that
questions of constitutionality be referred to the courts for decision.
As long as disagreement existed over the relative power of the Crown
and of the Landtag, he said, he would not allow the controversy to be
settled by any court. The issue affected the King too closely for any
such delegation of responsibility to be accepted. 73 Bismarck did not
intend to impose any curbs upon his power. In the constitution of
the German Reich he subsequently restricted the pertinent clause to
the same general statement that the Chancellor is responsible, without
saying to whom or in what sense.
The liberals were confused over the meaining of the term ministerial responsibility. In the fourth edition of his work on Preussisches
Staats-Recht, published in 1864, the prominent jurist von Roenne,
7. Tagesbericht, No. 21, Jan. 25, 1862, citing Kiilnische Zeitung, No. 25; Parisiu5,
von Hoverbeck, II, 7.
.. Abg. H., St. B., April 22, 1863, II, 952.
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himself a liberal, distinguished among several kinds of ministerial
responsibility.
The general usage of language designates with the expression
"moral" responsibility the responsibility before public opinion.
By "parliamentary" responsibility is meant the ministers' duty to
appear in the sessions of the representative assembly to give the
necessary information and explanations; it also include respon. sibility on the part of the ministers for their bad acts of government which do not violate the constitution. The designation
"political" responsibility is used in an entirely different sense,
for it may refer to (1) responsibility for the purely political misstakes of the ministers, (2) "parliamentary" responsibility in the
sense meant above, (3) the responsibility of the ministers toward
the sovereign or (4) the general duty of the ministers to withdraw
from office as soon as an insoluble divergence arises between
their views and those of the representatives of the people. In
contrast, the designation "juridical" or "legal" responsibility is
always applied to those cases where an impeachment of the
ministers on the part of the representatives occurs. These cases
differ widely, for among them one includes at one time violations of the constitution and of the law and at another, breach
of duty. The expression "constitutional" as well as "special" or
"legally punishable" responsibility is at times used as comparable to "juridic" responsibility. The customary so-called "moral"
responsibility before the tribunal of public opinion, the effectiveness of which is mainly conditioned by the degree of political
freedom and the sound political sense of a people, stands in no
relation to the ministerial position but applies to the judgment
of this court of decision and reaches everyone in the state. In
contrast, "parliamentary" responsibility, namely, the duty of the
ministers to stand to account to the representatives at any time,
to defend their measures and acts before them and altogether
to bring into harmony their views with those of the representatives, is of high significance for the life of the state, because in a
representative monarchy government and representative assembly can only fulfill their state responsibilities in common by
uninterrupted organic reciprocity. This kind of responsibility,
however, derives its significance and thereby its actual value first
from "legal" responsibility. If the ministers have caused damage
to the state or to individual citizens by violations of the civil
law, it is self-evident that of itself nothing opposes their being
brought before courts like other officials. Likewise there can
can be no doubt that they are subordinate to the general criminal law fOf common crimes or misdemeanors as well as for
special breaches of office like all other public officials who are
guilty of such punishable acts. The institution of "juridic" or
"legal" ministerial responsibility is therefore in no sense based
upon the idea that the ministers are responsible to the monarch
an~ his courts for illegal actions which they have committed of
thelf own accord. The purpose of this institution is especially
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that the ministers can be arraigned by the organs of the people
before an independent court in case they contravene the consUtution and the laws as organs of government. This special criminal
responsibility of the ministers for the observance of the constitution and of the constitutional rights is the most important
security for the preservation of the constitutional state of law.
Without it the constitution and the constitutional rights of the
people would be exposed at any time to the misuse of power by
the government, and the sole security would then consist of the
good will of the wielder of power. The realization of this responsibility forms, therefore, the keystone of the constitution and
the guarantee which vouchsafes all others their stability and real
significance. The Prussian constitution also recognized this
principle in that it (in Paragraph 61) stipulates "that the ministers can be impeached by a decision of one House for violation
of the constitution, corruption, and treason," and "that the
supreme court of the monarchy in united sessions decides such
impeachment."74
Von Roenne's distinction between "political" and "constitutional"
responsibility provides the key to the confusion in the liberals' thinking. They were advocating "constitutional" responsibility and were
honestly claiming that they were not aiming to infringe upon the
authority of the King. They merely wanted means by which to compel the ministers to abide by the constitution. Deputy Gneist called
the absence of a law on the subject "the only gap in our constitution"75
and believed that by filling it the problems of the relation between
the legislative and the executive branches of government would be
solved. At the same time the liberals insisted upon the ministry's
abiding by the decisions of the Lower House. A typical statement '
was that by Deputy Beseler in the Lower House in April, 1861. "It is
. . . ,a main complaint against the entire institution of ministerial
responsibility that it changes the center of gravity in our state life,
that it attacks the monarchical principle, that by means of it parliamentarism is established. This accusation can be refuted without
difficulty .... How can it be against the monarchical principle if the
inviolability of the Crown is protected and made possible by the
responsibility of the ministers?"76
The confusion arose from the fact that the liberals wished to make
the Crown inviolable, to elevate it above party strife, to make the
ministers responsible for government action, without infringing upon

.. Von Roenne, op. cit., II, 352-55 .
•• Adress-Debatte, p. 257 .
.. Abg. H., St. B., April 27, 1861; II, 943.
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the powers of a king who considered himself a monarch by divine right
with powers over and above the constitution. They were endeavoring
to evolve practical means by which they could exercise the control
over the government necessary for implementing policies which the
government opposed.
The liberals' understanding of the nature of ministerial responsibility may be gauged from the report of a commission of the Lower
House in 1861 on this subject. Practically all liberal political groups
agreed on the necessity for such a law, and this commission was established, not to propose a bill itself, but to urge a supposedly liberal
ministry, at least one containing liberal ministers, to introduce legislation to this effect. Besides a few Conservatives the commission was
composed of some of the most distinguished members of the Constitutional and of the Progressive patries. Of the members, Gneist
and Beseler were both professors, the former in particular being an
authority on law and jurisprudence and a profound student of English
constitutional practice. The report showed an extraordinarily high
level of learning and an equally extraordinary inability to reduce the
problem to its simplest, most manageable terms. These liberals had
not yet comprehended the difference between the procedure appropriate to the assertion of ministerial responsibility on the one
hand and a judicial process for handling violations of the constitution
on the other. The judicial experience of a number of them was being
misapplied in the attempt to solve an essentially political question.
Ministerial responsibility cannot be decided on a legal basis of whether
0r not the -ministers have violated the constitution. Such trials are
usually long and costly in time, emotions, and money; and pending the
decision, what is to happen in the conduct of state affairs? Ministers
maintain or lose the confidence of their supporters depending upon
the acceptability of their policies and actions. The English example
showed how simple the solution of this complicated political problem
should and could be.
In the report submitted by the commission of the Lower House in
1861 the opinions were almost as varied as the membership. The Conservatives frankly saw no justification for a law of ministerial responsibility. The time was bad for introducing one; there was afready too
much political controversy. Other articles of the constitution had
not been executed; why should this one be? Since it was called the
keystone to the constitution it should be introduced last. Such a law
W;lS not needed "because the necessary guarantee against constitutional
and legal violations is already found in the King's conscience." The
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law would create, the Conservatives argued, a dualism and a contradiction in Prussia, for it would make the ministers responsible both
to the King and to parliament, and this system would violate the
powers of the Crown.
One liberal member of the commission opposed advocating the
law at present. Since the ministers were liberal, he argued, such a
recommendation would seem like a vote of no-confidence. He and his
friends did not regard the matter as urgent. His view coincided in
general with that of a colleague who thought that the present system
was "not so bad." Article 61 at least prevented the ministers from
being regarded merely as the King's personal servants. Nor, said this
deputy, did the public demand the law.
Most of the liberals on the commission wished the law introduced.
"In the entire civilized world," they argued, "the view is held that a
constitutional regime without ministerial responsibility is incomplete.
. . ." The principle was not new in Germany, they declared; for in
the organization of estates the diets had participated in the making
of laws; they had had the power to grant taxes and by way of the right
of complaint to control the administration. The Reich courts had
also had the authority to try a prince guilty of illegal acts. One
liberal member of the commission in denying that ministerial responsibility violated the monarchical principle cited the precedent of England, where ministerial responsibility had obtained under four dynasties. Another denied that it would lead to "parliamentary party
government." Another distinguished between juridical and political
responsibility of the ministers and said that only the latter meant rule
by a majority in parliament. Repudiating any desire for the introduction of political responsibility, he stated that the liberals sought
only juridical responsibility, by which the existing legal responsibility
of all officials would also be imposed upon the ministers. Another
avoided the issue of the particular kind of ministerial responsibility
but emphasized that the Landtag must be able to prevent the ministry
from performing acts like the increase in the standing army without its
approval.
One member of the commission went at some length into a comparison of the English method of ministerial responsibility and the
conditions in Prussia. He found the two to be entirely different.
An English ministry is a parliamentary combination to put
through new laws and general measures and to fill certain offices.
The current administration is carried on by the officials of the
permanent staff according to fixed principles, that is, according
to old and new precedents of the courts which since the Middle
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Ages have exercised jurisdiction over public law which with us
lies in the so-called administrative agencies. Since 1808 in
Prussia the decision over controversial limits of police, finance,
and military authority, the interpretation of the laws with reference to them, and the decision over all important controversial
questions of public law rest ultimately in the hands of the ministers and in ministerial orders. This is for us the center of gravity of the position, while a responsible minister in England has
nothing to do with it. The English ministerial responsibility,
which is nothing more than the general responsibility of officials, has for centuries assumed that the courts would decide the
legality of an administrative act. It enters into question in a
supplementary way in the rare cases in which a court decision
could not be had or in which a minister refused to be bound
thereby. . . . In this subsidiary sense it is the keystone of the
constitution. But the guarantee for the legality of administrative action lies in the decisions of the courts, with which the
ministerial responsibility has for centuries stood in inseparable'
connection.
The speaker warned against trying to introduce the one part of responsibility without the other and urged that both be introduced. "Not
until the courts for public law again exist in Prussia will ministerial
responsibility assume its proper subsidiary position, and then we hope
that it will never be put into practice."77
Even the expert on the English constitution was not clear about the
nature and purpose of ministerial responsibility. He gave too legal
an interpretation to that term; he failed to understand the essentially
political use of the institution. He and almost all his colleagues made
it too intricate. They should have heeded one liberal who comprehended the problem, namely Schulze-Delitzsch. During the debate in
the Lower House on the address to the King in January, 1863, he
analyzed the question in some detail. Citing the ministry's use of the
King's name to cover its own acts, he denounced this practice as a
complete violation of the constitution which could not be "greater or
cruder." He condemned it as an attack on the Crown itself, for, he
argued, "the undisputed basic conditions of every monarchy, unlimited as well as limited, are the hereditary nature of the Crown
and the inviolability of the person of the bearer. If you attack one of
these you attack the monarchical principle itself." The speaker then
discussed the second of these bases.
The entire constitutional system depends upon the fact that
one is no longer ruled by the arbitrariness of one person .
.. Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1861, Vol. V, No. 156.
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Now with respect to legislation, approval of the budget, ordering of the state household, that is easy. On these matters the
people receive by way of their representatives a vote, a formal,
real participation, so that nothing can happen without their approval. But there remains the other equally important side of
state affairs, the executive. Here you cannot so proceed. A deliberative body cannot interfere in the executive ... ; it would
thereby not only work against the necessary unity in administration but would also come into decided opposition to the sovereign rights of the monarch. How is this to be dealt with? •••
The executive must also be limited or the whole constitutional
principle is nullified. How does participation in legislation
help the people if the bearer of the Crown is entirely free not to
observe the laws at all ... ? Of what value is the constitution if at
any minute the Crown is free to annul it or encroach upon it?
The sole solution which protects the just interests of the people
without infringing upon the sovereign's power is the institution of ministerial responsibility. In it we have the necessary
restriction upon the prince as executive. He can no longer act
alone; he cannot proceed arbitrarily if he cannot find persons
who are willing to assume responsibility for the acts. And what
do we gain by this order? On the one hand it protects the people; it gives them the guarantee of a constitutional, a legal government.... On the other hand it also protects ... the throne.
For it takes the responsibility for all government measures
away from the bearer of the Crown. Responsibility is incompatible with inviolability.... A constitutional minister may well
defend himself by citing his responsibility to the prince whom
he serves if measures are demanded of him for which he does
not dare to assume responsibility. But no constitutional minister may protect himself by the person and will of the King
against the responsibility which he bears toward the country.
The Minister President has by his deductions turned this situation upside down and has thereby violated one of his main constitutional duties. 78
If Schulze-Delitzsch's view had become valid, the ministers would
have been responsible not merely in a constitutional but in a political
sense. In practice the English system would have resulted. The
liberals' protests against the accusation of their infringing upon the
King's power would have had to be dropped. The liberals scoffed at
the divine right theory of kings; their newspaper loved to quote a
statement of 1850 by the historian Dahlmann: "Even if one is filled
with belief in the divine enthronement of princes, I should like to
see who can prove that the devil has installed the people. If he has

•• AdTess-Debatte, pp. 128-29.
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not done so, then who has?"79 Schulze-Delitzsch repeated his assertion
of 1848 that absolutism by the grace of God was bankrupt. He added
the general view held by liberals that monarchism should not be
identified with absolutism; he supported the one but not the other.so
Almost all his liberal colleagues failed to understand his line of reasoning for curbing absolutism by the simple institution of parliamentary
responsibility.
The liberals were not united among themselves in their attitude
toward parliamentary government in the English sense. Deputy
Gneist declared in 1863 that not even the slightest trace of any such
system existed in Germany.S! In April, 1860, von Forckenbeck denied
at an election rally in East Prussia "that the Progressive party has
striven for a government by the majority of the Lower House or has
wished to infringe upon the rights of the King.... Under the entirely
different social conditions of Prussia a government by parliamentary
majority as in England is neither possible nor desirable for freedom."
If anyone could be accused of desiring the rule of a parliamentary
majority, he said, it would be the majority in the Upper House, "which
had made impossible the former ministry by its consistent rejection of
every liberal proposal."82
Other liberals took a different view. "Parliamentary," wrote the
Volkszeitung in January, 1861, "is only a mild translation of the proposition that it is advisable for a government to defer to the voice of
the country when it notes that the country has more accurate views of
the needs of the time than one would like to force upon it." A year
later the same paper declared that granting a constitution had not
sufficed to stop revolutionary action, that a constitution was a contract
which changed the relation between a prince and his people. "One
may think about the question of parliamentary government as one
will," the paper said; "in practice the ministers must nonetheless
govern in accordance with the will of the parliamentary majority or
seek to do so by corrupting it. And the government must be at least
as unified as the present popular assembly."83
Two of the leading Progressive newspapers, the Kolnische Zeitung
and the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung in June, 1862, drew conclusions about the conduct of the controversy which showed realistic

79 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 3. 1861.
'0 Volkszeitung. Feb. 28. 1861.
., Adress-Debatte, p. 252 .
• 2 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, April 2. 1860; Philippson. op. cit., p. 110.
'3 Tagesbericht, Jan. 24. 1861; Jan. 24. 1862.
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understanding of the nature of a constitutional conflict. The former
stated that "the right of the King to appoint his ministers according
to his wish is undoubted, and our representatives can only gradually
and indirectly gain influence over it. It can aim to eliminate all
illiberal elements in the ministry by rejecting all illiberal measures,
even when introduced by liberal ministers."84 The Konigsberg journal
was even more explicit. It denied the accuracy of the government's
accusation that the Lower House wished to take over the powers of
the crown; and it equally denied the validity of the view of the leftwing liberals, Kirschmann and Waldeck, that ultimate authority
should be transferred to the Lower House.
Parliamentary government is not a legal question but a question of power and as such the product of development. No letter
of the law can bring it about; only a series of legal battles, of
surmounted illusions and disillusions, of long experience, can do
so. A series of good, conscientious parliaments which exercise
their budget rights unreservedly and self-confidently and which
make the feeling of dependence of every government upon its
financial control ... gradually become habitual: that is the only
way under our constitution to introduce parliamentary government. There should be added the consequent introduction of
self-government in the counties and the communities . . .
and therewith the legal elimination of a system of centralized
bureaucracy.85
"I am convinced," asserted the Catholic party leader Reichensperger,
"that in comparison with the importance of the main question, namely
the right of the Lower House to approve or to change the budget of
expenditures annually, all other questions recede into the background."
The liberals agreed fully with this view. They, as well as the Catholic
party, denounced the ministry's action with respect to Article 99 as
creating constitutional conditions worse than those under absolutism.
"It was the law of the Prussian monarchy even prior to 1848," Reichensperger said, "that the Crown could introduce no new taxes and make
no loans without the approval of the representatives of the country.
That was decided at a time in which there was no representative assembly, a striking proof of how necessary the monarchy regarded it
not to stand there with unlimited power." The liberal deputy von
Unruh completed the argument about finances by denying that the
government had any authority to expend any state money without a
legal budget for the year in question. 86
Ibid., Feb. 4, 1862.
Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, June 21, 1862.
88 A dress-De batte, pp. 53, 43, 68; Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 29.
8£
85
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To the liberals the gap theory not merely violated the constitution;
it destroyed the constitution. The mild and cautious right-wing Constitutionalist Deputy von Simson asserted in a commission of the Lower
House that "no one in the entire country would be so forsaken by
intelligence as to interpret Article 99 in any other sense than that of
the majority." Count von Schwerin accused the Bismarckian ministry
of "standing the law and the constitution on their head." Deputy
Twesten spoke for all in asserting that "the defraying of expenditures
in consequence of the failure of the budget law to be passed, solely
according to the judgment of the government, could be continued indefinitely until some catastrophe occurred which would put an end to
this theory by means of terror, but then probably not the theory
alone." Deputy Virchow denounced the ministry's interpretation of
the constitution as "the purest arbitrariness." Deputy Schulze-Delitzsch condemned the gap theory as equivalent to abolishing the constitution. If one questioned the budget rights and other rights of the
Lower House, he said, one could call in doubt any and every article
of the constitution, and one had absolutism. "When one supplements
one system by its opposite, when one supplements constitutionalism by
absolutism, the possibility of deduction ceases to exist for me." Deputy Gneist declared that Bismarck's extravagant personal views about
the constitution had suddenly become the law of the land.87
The liberals defended their position by reference to the constitution rather than by the arguments developed in England and the
United States of no taxation without representation. During the
three-day debate on the address to the King in January, 1863, only
one deputy, von Unruh, advanced the general claim that "it lies in the
nature of the newer state forms that those who pay the taxes also
have the foremost and most important authority to grant them."88 He
did not elaborate upon the thesis; he merely stated it in passing. The
liberals assumed that Prussia had developed beyond the point of having to defend first principles. Bismarck's seeming acceptance of the
constitution may ha~e deluded them into thinking that first principles
of constitutional government were not in question. In the light of
history one knows that they should have gone back to the assertion of
fundamentals and not have concentrated, as they did, upon legal rights.
They assumed that in case of disagreement among the three factors of
government a budget would not be forthcoming. When the govern-

.7 Parisius, von Hoverbeck, 11,144, 106; Adress-Debatte, pp. 88, 149, 126-27,248-49.
Ibid., p. 66.
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ment adopted the gap theory and continued to raise and expend money,
the liberals had no other line of attack than the defence of a constitution which the government denied was in any danger.
On only one point of general argument did the liberals attack the
government's position. They did so rather from the angle of politics
and statesmanship than of constitutionality. Bismarck had justified
his use of the gap theory on the grounds that "the state must live,"
that it could not stand still. Deputy Virchow asked:
Is this the sentence of a statesman? Can one approach a
representative assembly which is expected to grant money with
the thesis, the state must live; therefore you must give the funds?
Is this the entire result of our constitutional development that
the constitution, that the long struggle for the legal founding of
our financial system should finally arrive at the point where one
says to the representatives of the country: the state must live,
therefore you must say yes to everything? I shall not continue
these questions; one could easily arrive at an observation that
would touch a statesman too closely. But I believe that we must
most decidedly guard against the assertion of views so contrary
to written and sworn constitutional rights, views which were
drawn from an ancient time when perhaps a lord of the country
would justify to subordinate estates this or that conception by
saying, "I could not do otherwise, I had to act in this way, you
must acquiesce." ... The state must live and begs its way from
day to day. Is any plan at hand? Is there anything of that
which held in the old law of the land, namely, that a regular
financial administration should exist? Does this correspond in
any manner to the wise and well-weighed plans of Frederick
William III?89
"We find ourselves," stated Deputy Twesten in January, 1863, "in
one of the most dangerous crises in the history of the Pruss ian state."90
How did the liberals propose to gain victory? They had refused to
approve the budget demanded by the government only to find that the
latter conducted the public finances without a budget. They believed
that they could not compromise on this question without sacrificing
all their constitutional rights. They rejected any idea of revolution,
and disliked so intensely the proposal to refuse to pay taxes that the
populace overwhelmingly continued as usual to provide the Bismarckian ministry with funds. They depended upon the~ support of
public opinion, believing that the King and the government could not
hold out against the will of the population. They understood Bis-

S. Ibid., pp. 141, 149 .
•• Ibid., p. 911.
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marek's strategy to provoke them to anger, to exasperate them, to induce them to extreme measures,91 and they were determined not to let
him succeed. The power of liberal ideas and the force of history, they
believed, were on their side. Although they knew about the King's
hostility to them, his stand on military reform and his support of the
gap theory, they appealed to him against the acts of the ministry and
sought to win him over by information about what they considered to
be the true situation. In spite of the futility of this endeavor, they
stated to the King in May, 1863, that they could not work with the
present ministry, again in vain. The King and ministers considered
the declaration another unconstitutional attempt to infringe upon the
rights of the crown.
The difficulty of the liberals' situation may be judged from an exchange of correspondence in May, 1863, between two liberal historians,
the Prussian deputy, Professor von Sybel, and the Southwest German
professor, Hermann Baumgarten. Von Sybel listed the efforts of the
Lower House to overthrow the ministry, all of them legal and verbal;
"but," he continued, "we have no means of impeaching the government. It has money and soldiers and an old bureaucracy which is
stuffed with reactionary powers. So we frankly possess no material
power; we are not and never will be in a position to gain quick results.
We strive to preserve moral superiority." Von Sybel feared that any
radical measures would alienate the upper bourgeoisie as they had in
1848 and force it into the arms of the reactionaries.
Baumgarten replied with a rousing proposal for action.
Prussia's future will presumably be bad if its fate remains
tied to the views and will of the Hohenzollerns, if the people
cannot take affairs into their own hands. One must force narrow-minded and prejudiced persons to be reasonable or emancipate oneself from them entirely. I should prefer the former ...
and in view of experience elsewhere I should not despair of results even in this case. But one must be deadly serious and
arouse in the persons in question the very definite feeling that
everything is at stake for them if they do not very soon become
reasonable. For this purpose the speeches in the Lower House
do not appear to be enough. The entire country must bestir
itself and very decidedly express its will. It seems to us that up
to this time the conflict in Prussia has been conducted too tamely. Persons who scorn the constitution, reason and right as bad
boys must be made to tremble. One must arouse in them the
lively concern that one of these days they will be killed like mad
t1 Some (in Essen and the vicinity) refused to pay taxes. Heyderho/I, op. cit., J,
176; Philippson, op. cit., p. 109; Adress·Debatte, pp. 114, 157, 208.
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dogs. One must display to them the passionate determination
in case the worst happens to use extreme measures. Such a manner of fighting is certainly not according to the taste of civilized
man. But it is not a question of our taste; it is a question of
what is necessary. If you allow Bismarck only temporarily to
make headway, revolution appears to me unavoidable. If Prussia endured such a regime permanently its position in Germany
and in Europe would be at an end. The question, thus, is how
can one prevent such terrible dangers. Allow just anger to be
fully and energetically expressed. Send deputations to Berlin
from all towns and counties! Let them come into the palace by
the thousands accompanied by the most respected citizens and
speak very seriously and firmly. You would do only what the
English did in 1770, for example, against the North ministry.
It is possible that you will thereby convulse the peace. But .on
the other side stands the certainty of a fearful revolutionary
change or of deep humiliation.
Von Sybel replied with a virtual confession of defeat.
There has often been talk here since December of the plan
[of mass deputations] which you propose. I have always advocated it. ... But the leaders of the Progressive party have up to
now been of the opinion that it would be difficult to start people in motion particularly for this purpose; to petition about
this man would be most unpopular. And it would be a great
defeat if the demonstration turned out to be slight. On the
other hand, if it succeeded, the gain would be less than you
seem to assume. If forty thousand deputies came on one day
they would receive a polite negative answer and would return
home. It would be another chapter in agitation and indignation among the people, but I can assure you there is already a
surplus of this in Prussia. I cannot very strongly contradict the
estimate of the Progressive party. Our wielders of power have
long ceased to tremble over addresses and deputations and popular feeling. They know very well how categorically they are condemned by the latter. Their only question is, have we money
and reliable soldiers? They tremble before every under-officer
who reads the Volkszeitung, before every word in Parliament
that could attract the soldiers, but before nothing else. They
are correct in their judgment. As long as the army hold loyal
the people can use no physical force. Their regime will continue until the army declares for the constitution or until it is
defeated in a foreign war ... or it might be that we should have
the good fortune like that of the English in 1688 in the Prince of
Orange, a split in the leading circles themselves, for example, a
declaration of the Crown Prince for the constitution.
Von Sybel cited historical examples to show that a revolution
would not succeed without the support. of the army. He cited the
opinion of better-informed persons than himself to the effect that the

238

/

Prussia 1858-1864

present anny remained loyal to the Crown. And to clinch his argument of pessimism he said that no one doubted that Bismarck would
enthusiastically welcome an attempt at revolt.
During the summer of 1863 the liberals tried to mobilize the public
further for demonstrations against the government. A letter from
von Sybel to Baumgarten of June 17 described what was being done.
The state of mind here on the Rhine is excellent. In Bonn
the Catholics and the liberals united for a big celebration for
the deputies. The students aimed to stage a torch-light parade,
and when that was prohibited to stage a party. When that
suffered the same fate they sent in yesterday a memorial. In
Crefeld, where I was on Saturday, the entire town was in movement. The stores were closed, the Catholics, if possible, even
more zealous than the liberals. My speech at Crefeld has been
printed as a pamphlet. You will read it in the South Gennan
papers. This month we concentrate on addresses and deputations from town councils, electors, and so forth to the King. It
is intended to set in motion the chambers of commerce of the
monarchy in July. Also the Rhenish notables plan new action,
this time addressed to the ministry, somewhat more strongly
peppered than the earlier address to the King. In Berlin
ephemeral publications are being organized as a partial replacement of the newspapers. In short we do not doubt that we can
solve the present problem of keeping public opinion favorable
to us and active up to the end of the year. There is nothing else
at present to be done unless foreign affairs intervene. You would
not find in all Prussia a single person who did not regard steps
of open violence as foolishness and a crime, since they would be
sure of immediate suppression. What is frequently in the air is
the thought of paying no more taxes. But it is clear that for
this to be effective the upper bourgeoisie must begin, and for
them the matter must still ripen somewhat.92
The liberals' anger at Bismarck in 1863 could scarcely have been
greater. Deputy Twesten asserted in the Lower House that the
government was "in dangerous hands." In a private letter Von Sybel
stated the question he had put before the Crefeld notables: "If the
French overrun the left bank of the Rhine and plague you with
quarterings, war contributions, and so on, but in the House I still vote
against a loan or war taxes without a change of ministry: would I
receive a vote of no-confidence? The immediate and unanimous
answer was: 'A thousandfold vote of no-confidence if under any cir-

•• Heyderholf, op. cit., I, 147 If. In June. 1863. von Hoverbeck knew that the
King was to blame for the obstinacy of the government. Parisius. von HoveTbeck~
II. 169. See also Philippwn. op. cit., p. 87.
.
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cumstances you approve the smallest sum for this ministry:" When
Bismarck asked the Lower House at the end of the year to approve
a loan in connection with the Danish war, the liberals overwhelmingly
refused. In March, I 863, von Hoverbeck wrote a friend in East
Prussia: "The bitterness here in Berlin and among almost all deputies
against this ministry is so intense that I believe it cannot increase. A
part of it also falls back upon other responsible personalities."B3
What made the liberals so angry was their belief that Bismarck
could not be trusted, that he would do anything to gain his end, that
he had no principles except those of reaction and power. "You
[the government] do not understand our language at all," said Deputy
Virchow. "You have no conception of the fact that the written constitution really exists, that compromises are not first to be made, that
the law does not have first to be made, but that the only question is
one of preserving the law." Deputy von Sybel declared that the
ministers lived in a different world with entirely different basic beliefs
and views from those of the present day. Futher,
. . . Your political assumption is that the government
possesses from the beginning the power to dispose of the life and
property of the subjects, that the government is not allowed to
do only that which some law expressly forbids, and even that in
certain emergencies, naturally defined by it, the government can
cancel such prohibitions and take back the authority. Our assumption is the opposite, namely, that a citizen's money belongs
first of all to him and not to the government, and that the latter
first receives the right to expend it for governmental purposes
and for the country when the citizens have through their legal
representatives approved these expenditures.
Deputy Gneist openly asserted that "our government has lost the
power to distinguish between right and wrong." He summed up the
experience of the Lower House with the ministry by stating: "It is not
true that we have repulsed the hand of reconciliation. The hand has
on the contrary fallen upon us more roughly and insultingly from year
toyear."u
Deputy von Unruh stated the liberals' belief about the future.
History speaks for our views. . . . The attempt to restore
absolutism again in a constitutional state when absolutism could
no longer maintain itself has never gone unpunished. Even
more dangerous, even more serious, is the attempt to defend abI I A.dress-Debatte, p. 95; Heyderhoff, op. cit., I, 156; ParisiU5, von Hoverbeck,
II, 209, l~O.
..
..
.
.
•• Adress·Debatte, pp. 142, 215-16, 246, 258.
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solutism under the forms of the constitutional state ... because
it is especially dangerous for the dynasty. Sham constitutionalism cannot be preserved. It may last ten years, fifteen years; but
under all circumstances it will collapse, and as a rule the dynasty
collapses with it.
I boldly assert that not our opponents but we ourselves are
the supports of the monarchy ... in the only form possible in
our time and in the future. We shall persist in this endeavor, we
and those who come after us, . . . and we shall hope that the
monarchical spirit of our people will not be completely eradicated by interpretations, by granting and withdrawing rights ....
The struggle may last a long time. We with gray hair may
never see the end of it. But we have one positive conviction,
and that is, the future belongs to US!95

•• Ibid., pp. 77-78. See similar remarks by Twesten and Schulze-Delitzsch. Ibid.,
pp. 91-92, 122.

II
THE ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH
OF THE PARTICIPANTS

7 / The Public View of Political Parties
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HE political party em..-ged in response to practical
needs. As soon as representative assemblies were created, political
life had to receive some kind of organization. The selection of candidates, the conduct of the campaign for election, the preservation of
contact between the representative and his constituency, and the
orderly conduct of business within the representative assembly required
the establishment of facilities for large-scale cooperative action. The
work of the state and national assemblies in 1848 and 1849 introduced
conditions in which political organizations developed. The parties
in Prussia in the early 1860s conformed to the general pattern of
organization and purpose set at that period, not out of any sense of
imitation but as a practical way of meeting a common problem.
By the time of the elections of 1862 and 1863 in Prussia, the political organizations had scarcely had time in. which to assume their
ultimate role. They had not as yet become the standard vehicles of
popular activity. The number of Prussians who had had actual experience in the politics of modern constitutional government with representative assemblies was not more than a couple of thousand. In so far
as local elections had been held they had offered the voting Prussians
little precedent for political participation on matters of general state
concern. These elections involved local affairs, requiring the exercise
of judgment on grounds of practicality, efficiency and personality, but
not of principle. Where the elections were held on a class basis, as
in the case of those for representatives of the three estates in the county
and the provincial assemblies, the class itself afforded an adequate
organization for action and performed those functions which in a larger
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group of heterogeneous social and economic interests would have required the service of a political party.
The Prussian constitution of 1850, like that of the United States over
half a century earlier, contained no provision about political parties as
such. Parties were not regarded as an essential apparatus of government and were left within the area of private endeavor. Nonetheless,
the constitution established the conditions in which parties would
develop. In contrast with the county and provincial assemblies, representation in the Lower House of the Landtag rested not upon caste
or class distinctions but upon a numerical basis. The change entailed
fundamental adjustments in attitudes and ways on the part of the
different social groups, not merely of the Conservatives but of the
liberals, not merely of the aristocracy but of the middle classes, the
industrial workers and the peasantry. Under the system of county
representation by estates election campaigns were unnecessary, for
every member of the first two estates knew personally every other member, or in case of indirect elections the electors were or became personally acquainted. Voting was confined to social equals. The threeclass system for the state forced this personalized, informal, caste procedure to admit new methods. While preserving a degree of inequality,
it shifted the basis from legal privilege of caste to economic interest.
The inequality of political power under the three-class system did not
alter the new facts that almost all adult males had the power to vote
and that to win an election a person must be a candidate and seek
support in all three voting classes. He might have to organize a campaign and solicit the vote of classes socially below him. The shift from
a social to a political basis for elections entailed the introduction of a
degree of actual equality in practice and constituted an essential step
in the elimination of caste privilege and the development of equal
ci tizenshi p.
The significance of the shift may be noted in the difficulty with
which public leaders of upper-class origin adapted themselves to the
process of social change revealed by this requirement. During the
period under discussion, not even all liberal and democratic political
leaders were free from the traditional inhibition. The Conservatives
made only slight concession to the necessity of conforming to the ways
of popular elections and continued to rely mainly upon their accustomed means of exerting power. Their aversion to popular political action followed historic practice in the field of government,
wherein membership in a political body was considered a personal right
resting upon familial privilege. Although in Prussia the individual
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aristocrat was drilled to consider the welfare of the whole, he expected
to attain this end primarily by defending and furthering his own interest on the assumption that the welfare of the leading social group
determined the health of the whole society. He did not accept the
principle of representation, where the individual regards himself as
an expression of the will of many. He objected to subordinating his
will and personality to the interests and wishes of the many and to
developing qualities appropriate to a de-personalized representative
of people with most of whom he had merely a superficial contact. The
arist,ocratic Conservative in a popular representative assembly still
thought and acted essentially in accordance with his rejection of the
idea of equality. He still adhered to the counter-principles of social
and political hierarchy. In his control of the government he enforced
the policy that local governmental bodies should not be allowed to
show any interest in state or .uational affairs. They should concern
themselves solely with local matters, as befitted the hierarchical, orderly
division of government. Thereby, the Conservatives prevented the
growth of practical political experience at the level most important
for the development of democratic ways; but it is doubtful whether
they thought much about this aspect of their policy. They were continuing in the period of constitutional government and popular state
elections the division of function of an autocratic age. They were
still acting on the assumption of "the limited intelligence of a subject"
in state or national affairs and were endeavoring to prevent the development of the political man with all-round interests and personality.
They disliked the political party and press as forms of activity beneath
their dignity; and even though they had known about English customs,
they would have been loath to follow the example of the English Con·
servatives. 1
The attitude of the reactionary element among the Prussian Conservatives is strikingly revealed in the will of Count Diedrich von
Bacholz of Alme in 1861. The Count charged his heirs to give up none
of their feudal rights, judicial, police, hunting, or church, to oppose
the wielders of power and "their faithless, partisan, power-hungry
officials, ... to scorn the favor of princes as well as of the mob, in short,
without arrogance and conceit, without avarice and without extravagance, to be a true German nobleman, not according to the letter
but according to the deed."2 The Count was fighting both the ab-

1 Tagesbericht, No. 19, Jan. 23, 1862.
• Volkszeitung, Jan. 16, 1862.
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solutism of the Eighteenth Century and the liberalism of the N ineteenth. He remained loyal to the feudal ideals of aristocratic independence. He had not discovered the fact that modern political party
life had begun; or if he had, his will expressed his utter aversion to it.
A social group in which sentiments like these could be seriously expressed scarcely qualified as a supporter and practitioner of popular
politics.
The attitude toward politics taken by most Conservative aristocrats
lacked the defiant self-sufficiency of Count Diedrich. Most of his
peers had acquiesced in the fact of absolute monarchy and had established effective ways of protecting their interests by serving the King
at court and taking high positions in the government and the army.
Since the identity of interest between monarch and Conservative
aristocracy became well established in the first part of the Nineteenth
Century, the latter looked to the King and his government for political
guidance. After constitutional government, a state representative
body, and state elections had been introduced in 1848-50, the Conservatives had continued to rely upon them for maintaining this identity. In accordance with their name the Conservatives wished to preserve the structure of the state and the distribution of power as it
existed in the 1850s when they were in control, and a large number
longed for the restoration of pre-1848 conditions. They tended to
accept the government's program as their program, the government
bureaucracy as their political organization. They preferred to avoid
the establishment of a political party of their own in order not to
encourage political activity and in order not to lower themselves to the
level of the liberals and democrats by entering into competition with
them. During the period they constantly used their customary means
of influencing the government, namely, by way of private conferences
with the King, petitions and addresses of loyalty to him, deputations
with asseverations of devotion to him and of aversion to liberalism.
They worked through the officials at court, the officers in the army, the
church leaders, and the high bureaucrats. They practically surrounded the King in his private life and to a large extent in his public
actIvity. Like Minister of War von Roon they believed that "the
King must remain consistent; a change of government from Whigs to
Tories as in England should not spread among us." Political parties,
that is to say, should continue to playa minor role; the power should
remain with the King and his conservative officials. After being dismissed from authority, former Minister President von Manteuffel
showed his low estimate of the politics of popular representation by
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remaining silent in the Lower House of the Landtag, to which he belonged, and finally by resigning. He let it be known that he did not
regard the assembly elected by the people as the proper place for him
to defend his former administration. For him the honor of having
been appointed by and made responsible to the King outranked by far
the position of representative elected by the people. To justify himself before the other representatives of the public would have lowered
his dignity and might have been misinterpreted by the Lower House
as an acknowledgment of its enjoying some political significance. 3
When Prince William assumed the authority of regent for his sick
brother, he placed the Conservatives in a difficult and embarrassing
dilemma. He dismissed them from most of the ministerial posts, introduced into power his friends, the mildest of mild liberals, and proceeded to support a general line of policy which ran counter to that
of the Conservatives. The latter faced the problem of how to be conservative, to be above parties, and at the same time to oppose both the
King and the government. While persevering in the use of their timehonored political methods, they could no longer rely upon government
initiative in behalf of their political fortunes and had to enter the
arena of political action themselves. They had to organize a party,
augment their facilities for campaigning for votes, and compete with
the liberals and democrats for popular support. 4 The dialectic of
political party life and representative government was drawing them
into the kind of activity which was contrary to their principles and
repulsive to them in practice.
In spite of the embarrassment caused the Conservatives by the New
Era, they found a large amount of agreement with the King and his
ministers on the role of political parties. The governmental attitude
toward parties and their activities became administratively somewhat
more lenient under the liberal ministers than before; but the legal
control remained the same. The parties had to register with the police;
in order to hold a political meeting, they had to receive an official
permit. They were treated more severely than non-political private
organizations under the laws and ordinances concerning the right of
organizing and the right of assembly. The fact that they constituted
the means of enabling the people to express their will in government

• See von Bernhardi, op. cit., III, 310, 323·24, IV, 173; Tagesbericht, No. 25,
Jan. 30, 1861, No.7, Jan. 9, 1861.
• See as an example Preussisches Volksblatt, No.6, 1861, as given in Tagesbericht,
No.6, Jan. 8, 1861.
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did not gain for them any special rights. They were placed in the
same category with labor organizations, handicraft associations, and
all others. The police subjected party activities to the most careful
attention. Dossiers accumulated on them in the police files; the administrative officials reported regularly, although not in much detail,
on the general state of political opinion. The Conservatives, who had
made these laws, were inclined to consider opposition to the ruler and
his government as partaking of the nature of mutiny or treason, or at
least of subversive activity. They thought that the liberals and
democrats wished to shift the center of political power to themselves
and to transform the character of Prussian society, a suspicion that
manifestly was well founded. Being unable to think in political terms,
to accept the facts of changing conditions and the need for political and
governmental adjustments to these changes, they could conceive the
liberal and democratic action only in the light of the criteria of
power. They had no other experience by which to judge it; their
thought immediately applied military and police terms and symbols to
this new phenomenon, and the experience with the Revolution of
1848 had confirmed them in this suspicious view. When they opposed
the King and government, as they had to do between 1858 and 1862,
they did not apply this line of thinking to themselves; they considered
themselves as merely more royalist than the King, more governmental
than the government. They were maneuvering so as to force the King
back to their side. Even a king might err.
The liberals and democrats had been ~nd continued to be the driving force behind the institutions and practice of popular politics.
They expressed their power in state affairs by means of politics; and
while almost none of them recognized the full implication of popular
representative institutions for the character of government and of political parties, they at least understood the simple facts of their position.
They tried to conceal from themselves the impulsion of this system toward the English type of parliamentary responsibility and toward
equal suffrage and increased efficiency in the conduct of politics as
an organized profession. Many of them sought to maintain the right
to act as leaders with knowledge superior to that of the voters and to
decide issues not according to the wishes of their constituency but on
the basis of their personal wisdom. Nonetheless, they knew that in
the last analysis they served as representatives and that they owed their
position to public support. Although a few of the aristocratic right
wing of the liberals had close contacts with the King, the vast majority
of the liberals and especially the democrats had no such means of exert-
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ing influence. The liberals and democrats could have stirred up a
flood of petitions and deputations in support of their action in the
Landtag; but, as the Berlin correspondent to the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung wrote in October, 1862, they held it inappropriate to do
so. They represented the people and expressed the popular wishes;
additional means of expressing these wishes were thought to be unnecessary.5 Nonetheless, petitions supporting the Lower House were
signed and sent to it.
The decision aptly characterized this stage of development of
Prussian politics. It agreed with the attitude toward the pursuit of the
game shown in the indifference of the Landtag deputies to election
statIstIcs. That a Conservative government never published any
statistics of political affiliation according to local districts conformed
to their general inclination to reduce the significance of politics; but
such unconcern is less understandable in the case of a government of
liberals. The failure of the Lower House or of the parties to collect
and publish the full political statistics indicated the infancy of pol itical life. When the committees of the Lower House in 1862 and 1863
reported on whether the elections had been run according to the law
and on whether the members of the House had received a majority
of the votes and were entitled to be seated, they frequently did so without supplying any statistics on the vote of the electors for the winners
and almost never for the losers. Even less often did they supply
figures on the votes cast for the electors. Since elections had only begun to be held in 1848, party organization and policies were in the
beginning stage, and the population itself was even less advanced in
political thinking and acting than the leaders.
As soon as parliamentary institutions were established the liberals
and democrats faced the practical problem of purpose and organization
of the political parties. Contrary to their reaction to most lines of
activity of the period they hardly indulged in theoretical analyses. The
practitioners were concerned with working instruments rather than
with definitions. The concept party had not yet acquired the con-,
notation of partisanship which the Conservatives later succeeded in
imposing upon it in the mind of much of the public. The liberals;
and democrats would have repudiated any such accusation, for they
were seeking to introduce into Prussia and Germany a new way of life.
whole and complete within itself even though contrary to conservatism.

6

Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 2, 7, 10, '1862.
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They tended to distinguish between a "party" as the inclusive unit expressing the total view of life of the political group and a "fraction"
as a group within the party differentiated on points of lesser importance. They showed most concern over the question of functions of
the party or fraction.
The liberal KOlnische Zeitung published on February 5, 1862, an
article condemning parties for wasting time, for exhausting the participants in preliminary discussion, for preventing the few excellent
speakers from exercising their talents in the Landtag and exerting
public influence. The writer much preferred freedom of action for
the deputies to the restrictive influence of parties. If followed, his
advice would have led to the destruction of any kind of party organization. It would have crippled liberal and democratic strength in the
Landtag by enhancing the tendency toward anarchy. It sounded like
the desires of a certain type of German professor, loaded with knowledge, impatient of control by an organization, determined to live up
to his reputation as leader. The effects of this kind of political behavior were described by the historian Professor Baumgarten upon a
visit to Berlin in the first part of 1862. He said that he could not understand the conditions there. In spite of the wealth of intelligent, active
men nothing was being accomplished in politics. They carried on
politics, he said, as if it were a learned subject. They thought that
an issue was settled if it was thoroughly discussed. They talked too
much and did nothing about execution. "A great genius or a
powerful tyrant should arise here; but in Berlin such a person would
certainly not be great," he concluded; and he saw little hope for
Prussia to take the lead in Germany.6 Although Professor Baumgarten failed to recognize the source of the trouble, he at least did
not conclude that more freedom of action by the individual deputy
would cure the state of anarchy.
Manifestly writing from personal experience, a Berlin correspondent
to the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung dlscussed the problem with no
clearer understanding of what it involved than that of uninitiated
observers. His definition of a party as a number of deputies who
met every evening at a certain restaurant for debate revealed the
inadequacy of his own criticism. His description of the activity of a
party suffered from an exaggerated sense of the need for formal structure and slight comprehension of the value in political work of a

• Heyderhoff,

op. cit.,

I, 61-62.
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highly flexible and adaptable organization. He wished the party to
have definite and recognized leaders, probably a useful proposal,bu't
he did not explain that effective leadership would assert itself only in
time and that facilities had to be present for enabling the leading
personnel to change in accord with changing political situations. He
failed to perceive the advantage of the party as an instrument for working out and agreeing upon policies in an informal, non-public way,
as a means of saving much official time and at arriving at satisfactory
solutions without hasty and unfortunate public commitment.
The means which the correspondent offered for eliminating the
"fraction flaws," as he called them, can scarcely be called profound.
"The first would be the construction of a decent parliament building,
in which the deputies could comfortably satisfy their physical needs;
then the transfer of sessions to the evening, for in the evening the
human being is fresher and livelier."7
Apart from the absence of physical facilities for conducting business, the parties suffered from more fundamental shortcomings. In
view of the newness of parliamentary life many deputies were returned who had no previous party affiliation. Their alignment with
a party or fraction would not be known before the legislature met,
and they might be quite independent of the party at all times. 8 The
lack of clarity of the political situation between 1858 and the appointment of Bismarck in 1862 and the difficulty about promulgating
definite programs handicapped the formation of parties. As long as
the ministry contained both Conservatives and right-wing liberals,
many deputies did not know what line to pursue, what policies to
support, what attitude to take toward the government. They did not
know what should be the bases of political differentiation and party
organization.9
The advantage of party organization and a measure of party discipline among the elected representatives in the Lower House became
slowly apparent to certain leaders and voters. It would be an exaggeration to assert that the recognition extended to a large numer, but the
available evidence leads to the conclusion that by 1861 and 1862 the
editorial in the National Zeitung Oanuary 6, 1861) of Berlin represented a view of growing acceptance. It was a "lamentable illusion,"
wrote the paper, "to wish to stand above parties. To be a party man

• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, July 13, 1862.
• See Jlolkszeitu1\g, Jan. 15, 1862; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Feb. 2, 1862.
• Ibid., Feb. 2, 1862.
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means to have connected and, if possible, thoroughly considered ideas
about the desirable outcome of state affairs and to unite with fellow
citizens for the realization of them. Whoever does not attain this
firmness in thinking and acting stands not above but below parties,
for everything that happens in state affairs is accomplished over his
head."
The newly established Progressive party (1861) took the initiative
in trying to create a formal organization with a feeling of party responsibility among the deputy-members. As the youngest of the liberal
political groups and certainly as the most ambitious and the most aggressive, this party had a carefully formulated program. It needed the
additional power which organization would supply in order to press
its policies upon the other liberals and upon the government and
especially in order to increase the number of its voting supporters.
Although it split into several fractions and was unable to achieve the
unity needed, it did elect an executive committee each month of the
parliamentary session, and it succeeded in developing a habit of party
loyalty. One of its leading members, Freiherr von Hoverbeck, in
January, 1862, accepted a party decision which he had opposed. A
decade earlier he had asserted his independence of party. Pressure to
this effect was being exerted upon the deputies by their constituencies.
In December, 1861, Rupp, a candidate in Konigsberg for election to
the Lower House, was asked in a meeting of electors of the Progressive
party whether in case of election he would join a fraction and in how
far he would submit to party discipline even when the decision went
against his own conviction. Rupp replied that after his experience
in 1849 he regarded it as absolutely necessary to join a party and to
submit to party decisions. His statement was greeted "with great approval." In the Western part of the state, in Bielefeld, a few weeks
later Deputy Schulz had to explain to a political meeting, two-thirds
of which consisted of persons from the rural districts, why he had p-~t
joined the Progressive party in Berlin after he had been elected on its
program. His reply manifested his slight understanding of the value
which Rupp had recognized as early as 1849. He had aligned himself
with the Bockum-Dolffs fraction because he had found in it old friends;
but he had always voted with the Progressive party, and, he said, "that
is in the last analysis the main thing." At about the same date, the
electors in Aachen were taking steps firmly to remind Deputy Baur
that after having declared himself at the time of his candidacy in accord with the program of the Progressive party and having been
elected on that basis he should not then have joined the Grabow frac-
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tion. They were pressing him to correct his mistake and affiliate with
the Progressives. 10
The efforts of the parties or fractions to preserve enough unity and
identity without depriving the individual members of independence
led to the formulation among liberals of party rules of order. Those
of the Grabow fraction, published in the Kolnische Zeitung of January
19, 1862, contained the following points. An executive committee of
eleven members should be elected. One should be secretary, another
treasurer, the others should preside in turn over the party conferences.
Except for the secretary and the treasurer, the membership should be
renewed every four weeks, with the right of re-election. The party
should meet on the evening before each plenary session of the Lower
House. Any member of the party who aimed to introduce a bill or an
amendment in the Lower House or to support one introduced by
members of another party should inform the party beforehand of
his intention. He should not be prevented from following his aim
even if the majority of the party had spoken against him. If a member first planned to introduce an amendment during the course of the
plenary session, he should notify two members of the party executive
committee of his intention. Except on certain matters stated below
each member was entitled to vote in the plenary session against the
decision of his party, provided he had expressed his intention in the
party conference. If he had been absent from the conference or if he
planned during the plenary session to vote against the party decision,
he had to inform two members of the executive committee of his aim.
He had to abide by the party decision on the following points: the
despatch of an address to the King, the interpellation of ministers, the
introduction of and decision about a proposal for the establishment
of investigating committees, the proposal to change or supplement the
constitution. To make a party decision binding upon all members
required that the members be informed beforehand of the intended
action and that at least half of the membership be present at the conference. The measure had to be approved by a two-thirds majority of
those present. For special reasons the party might release individual
members from this obligation. In order to achieve unity among the
party members in case of votes· in the plenary sessions about such matters as proposals to adjourn or to close the session, the members should

,. Heyderholf, op. cit., I, 114; Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 5; Konigsberg Har·
tungsche Zeitung, Dec. 31, 1861; Volks%eitung, March 26, 1862; Tagesbericht, No. 45,
Feb. 22, 1862, on the basis of a report in the Volkszeitung, No. 45.
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take their cue from the vote of designated members of the executive
committee. Whoever was unable to attend a meeting of the party
should learn from a member of the executive committee about what
had occurred. If a member wished to resign from the party, he should
notify the executive committee in writing or should declare orally his
intention in a party meeting.
The rules reflected a high degree of bureaucratism. They read like
the statement of organization drawn up by persons trained in government administration who were trying to adapt the method and criteria
of precise definition of official function to a group of popularly elected
representatives. A party run according to these rules would have been
neat and orderly. Although party discipline was needed, it seems doubt{ul whether such formal rules were appropriate. Even the libera~
political leaders had not yet learned how flexible a political party has
to be in order to achieve efficiency. Such fixed rules seem contrary
to the nature of politics and a manifestation of political inexperience.
N or were the rules effective; the parties continued to be run after the
fashion of a local social club.ll

11

Wochenschrift des N6ticnalvereins, Feb. 7,
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8 / The Election System

T

HE conftk. be'ween .he libmls on .be one hand and
the King and the Conservatives on the other involved the question of
representation. Did the Lower House represent the people of Prussia?
Since the answer depended in part upon the nature of the election
system, it must be analyzed, and for that purpose three problems will
be considered-the legal conditions under which the deputies were
returned, the public's actual experience with voting, and the nature
of the liberals' and the Conservatives' own thinking about the social
bases of representation.
The elections were held under the terms of a law which most
political leaders, irrespective of party affiliation, considered adequate.
Government, Conservatives and liberals, Catholics and Poles were
sufficiently content with it not to make a fundamental transformation
or even a modification of it a major political issue. After the electoral
districts had been fixed by law in 1860 so as to prevent-though not
with entire success-further gerrymandering in favor of reactionary
candidates, the liberal majority in the Lower House of the Landtag
voted to postpone indefinitely any proposals for revision of the election law, and the New Era government either approved of or acquiesced
in the decision. The law seemed to be fulfilling its purpose of providing a neutral mechanism for the expression of the will of the politically active public.
The decisive evidence in favor of this view seems to lie in the
fact that since its promulgation in 1849 the law had served to return
in the first years an overwhelming Conservative majority of deputies
and after 1858 a decided liberal majority. Other factors than the
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nature of the election law were rightly regarded as accounting for the
change in political expression, and each side thought at the time that
under the terms of the law it could win future elections. In significance
political and social issues ranked so far superior to other matters in the
struggle between the old Prussianism and the new liberalism that
neither major group was much interested in the conditions of representation.
The system of voting used in 1862 and 1863 had been introduced
on May 30, 1849, as a means of re-establishing Conservative control
over the fading revolution. It had been drafted by the government
headed by Count von Manteuffel with the approval of King Frederick
William IV. It had first been issued as a royal decree and then legally
accepted by the Lower House of the Landtag elected according to its
terms.
The Manteuffel government incorporated the basic principles of
the election law into the constitution of 1850. They were to be found
in Articles 69, 70, 71, and 72, and contained the following provisions:
The Lower House should be composed of 350 members. The election districts should be fixed by law. Every Prussian who had completed his twenty-fifth year and had the right to vote in local elections
in his community was entitled to vote. Plural voting was not allowed.
An elector should be chosen for every 250 people. The voters should
be divided into three classes according to the amount of direct state
taxes they paid, in such a way that each third had the power to cast
one-third of the entire vote. The total amount should be calculated
for each community or for each election district in case the latter was
composed of several communities. 1 Voting separately, each class
should elect one-third of the electors, who could be chosen from any
of the three classes. The deputies were chosen by the electors meeting and voting as a body. In those communities which paid the
milling and slaughter tax, this sum should be counted in lieu of the
direct state tax. The only essential point of the election law not
repeated in the constitution was that requiring the open ballot.
By the provisional Article 115 the constitution validated the decree
of May 30, 1849, until a new election law, foreseen in Article 72, should
have been approved. Since the new election law was never passed, the
decree of 1849 remained in force during the entire life of the constitutional monarchy in Prussia.
1 Aceording to the decree on the execution of the election law of 1849, an election precinct should not contain more than 1,500 people. Abg. H., St. B., 1849, Vol.
I, Part 2, pp_ xiii-xv.
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The origin of the three-class system of voting remains obscure. 2 It
may have been first suggested by David Hansemann, a Rhineland
banker, a leader of the liberal bourgeoisie and a minister in the first
Prussian revolutionary government of 1848. He was acquainted with
the system in the Rhine province, where it had been introduced in the
law on community government of 1845. In the local form, in which
numbers of voters were relatively few, the election had been direct,
whereas for the state elections the law of 1849 required indirect elections. Apart from the use of the secret ballot in the community election as contrasted with the open voting for state elections, the state
law may be considered an elaboration of the local decree to fit the
needs of voting in a large area with large numbers involved.
The Rhenish bourgeoisie should not be given complete credit for
having originated the system of voting in 1849. The idea of inequality
underlay the social and political life of the entire Prussian state and
was accepted as a reality by almost all liberals as well as by the Conservative vestiges of the Old Regime. The structure of local, county
and provincial government expressed much more inequality than even
the new Landtag. The three-class system of voting actually marked
an advance in the direction of equality over many of the practices in
the lower branches of government. The population was accustomed to
inequality in political power, including the right to vote, and, whenever it dared or had the opportunity, it protested primarily against
extreme manifestations of this inequality. Doubtless the purest
example of the age of privilege survived in West Pomerania and the
island of Rugen, where the officials of the municipalities selected new
colleagues by co-optation; a written code of laws did not exist and the
officials reigned like autocrats. 3 In the villages throughout the state
the right to participate in the community meeting depended upon a
property qualification, which divided the residents into two groups, one
with some political power in the decision on local affairs, and the
other in a position of dependence.
The one exception was provided by the law of 1808 associated
with the name of Freiherr vom Stein. This law had given the male
population of the towns and cities of all the provinces except the
Rhineland and Westphalia a basis of voting so liberal and progressive
that it had remained a matter of concern to the conservative or reactionary nobility. By this law vom Stein had abolished the associa• See A. Wolfstieg, "Wer ist der 'Vater' des Dreik1assenwah1rechts in Preussen?"
Preussische Jahrbilcher, CLXIV (1916), 349-55.
• See Abg. R., St. B., 1862, Vol. II, No. 15, pp. 102-03.
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tion of the vote in town affairs with property as a personal privilege.
He had supplanted this feudal conception by the modern practice of
equal manhood suffrage and secret ballot. Although the Prussian
government had whittled away certain of the liberal rights of the town
decree, many essentials remained intact in 1848 and did not succumb
to reaction until 1853. In that year the government had extended the
three-class system of voting to town and city elections of the six Eastern
provinces and had abolished the secret ballot.
The county assembly (Kreistag) and the provincial Landtag remained in 1862 what they had been prior to the Revolution of 1848.
As bulwarks of aristocratic privilege and power and of authoritarian
domination, they afforded few opportunities for popular elections.
In so far as elections were held, they threw the force of custom on
the side of unequal voting power and of discouragement or prohibition
of popular participation. The first estate in the county assembly and
the first in the provincial assembly, or where in the latter assembly
there were four instead of three estates, the first two were restricted
almost entirely to the owners of noble land holdings. Certain holdings
carried the hereditary right to a seat in the first estate, while the others
entitled the owners to vote for representatives to the assembly. In the
case of the second estate, representing the towns and cities, the same
practice applied. Certain cities possessed the right of direct election
of a representative, and the others chose electors who met together to
select representatives for the assembly. In either case the power to
vote was restricted to the members of the town or city council, and the
number of deputies to which they were entitled was far fewer than
that of the first estate. The practice in the villages for choosing
representatives to the lowest estate was also indirect, resembling that
in most of the towns and cities, and was about equally restricted as
to representation in the assembly. Balloting in these elections was
secret.
A subject of the King in 1862 and 1863 would have found the threeclass system of voting, with one exception, entirely within the limit
of his experience gained in provincial and lower elections. In the
Western provinces he would have been fully acquainted with the
division of the voters into three groups according to the amount of
taxes they paid. In the other provinces he would have been accustomed
to differences in voting strength based on other, but nonetheless real,
criteria. In all provinces he would have understood the workings of
indirect elections, either from actual participation or from the experience of others. In all provinces he would have lived under the rule
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of assemblies in which the upper class was legally and traditionally
entitled to far more representatives than the lower ones-in the province and in the county, the nobility over the townsmen and the
peasants; in the towns and cities, certain burghers over the rest of the
burghers; in the villages, certain peasants over the others. With the
one exception of elections for municipal officers in towns and cities
between 1808 and 1853 in the six Eastern provinces, the pattern of
voting was consistently discriminatory. If one uses the popular right
to vote as a standard, the election law of 1849 under which the Lower
House was elected in 1862 and 1863 marked a substantial improvement on the norm established in the years of pre-revolutionary reaction.
When the government proposed the three-class system of voting in
1849 it had arranged its justification according to the three basic
principles of the bill: first, the division of voters into three classes;
second, the use of the amount of taxes paid as a criterion for the division of voters into these classes; and third, the open ballot. Critics
of the bill and subsequent law necessarily followed the same form; and
a comparison of the remarks made about the several terms in 1849-50
and again in the early 1860s may help to illuminate the degree to
which Prussian political leaders of this period understood the character and purpose of elections.
In 1849 and 1850 both the government and the liberal deputies
disapproved the French system of direct elections based on a high
property qualification, and this aversion persisted among liberals in
the early 1860s. They had seen a revolution develop out of the system
in France in 1848, and had watched Louis Napoleon manipulate it to
the advantage of his imperial control since then. They wished an
election law which would reflect not merely numbers but the differentiation of social and political forces. They approved the threeclass method of voting, and argued in favor of it, to use the government's justification, as follows:
The forces of the citizens, on whose harmonious cooperation
the existence and prosperity of society basically depend, are in
part physical or material, in part intellectual and spiritual in
character. Among the material ones the ability to pay taxes
occupies a preeminent position. It provides the most general
measure of individual contribution to the public welfare. It
therefore seems reasonable to regulate voting power according to
the tax situation. Thereby one tries to abide by the demand of
equal duties, equal rights, and one takes into account the fact
that a very important right of the deputies, whose election is being considered, concerns the power to levy taxes. Although the
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tax yardstick is very unsatisfactory, one can expect from the
allocation of votes according to the amount of taxes paid an appropriate result, for conditions are by and large such that among
the poorer elements of the population there is usually the greater
sum of physical force and among the richer there is usually the
greater amount of spiritual and intellectual power, and there~y
the importance which one apparently attributes to material
property accrues to the benefit actually of the higher intelligence.
It is not necessary to prove further that the amount of property owned is more or less decisive for the interest in the state
organs which protect this property.
. . . When one decides on the three-class system, that decision
rests not merely upon the fact that it is regarded as the least
offensive form of division or that it furthers the formation of
parties less than a two-fold division would, but much more upon
the experience that as a rule three main classes of the population can everywhere be distinguished by the amount of property they own, and that the members of each class in other relations also usually have most in common with each other. Thus
the system is more organic than on first glance it appears to be.
The government rejected the proposal to divide the population for
voting purposes according to occupation. The occupational structure, it said, was still too complicated. When a new social structure
had developed, it would be possible to allocate political power accordingly; but at present any attempt to do so would arouse far too
much opposition.
The government recognized that the proposed election system had
many shortcomings. Some arose from the fact that the state did not
possess a uniform system of direct taxation. Another lay in the fact
that the first class had too few members to be regarded as a genuine
election body. These, it thought, could be subsequently corrected. 4
In its recommendation of the bill to the King, the government
added another argument, with an unusual gift of aphasia about the
events of the preceding year.
The similarity of interests of the individual classes of the
population is not as externally recognizable as it is real, and the
measuring of relative importance among them is so difficult that
we do not wish to undertake to advise Your Majesty to try to
fix it in law. We have therefore held to the simpler external
manifestation of this relation, the participation in the payment
of taxes. Since only three classes of voters are formed, we have
permitted wide leeway to the association of interests and have
taken the particular situation in each locality and in each district

• Abg. H., Drucksachen, 184950, Vol. I. No. 40, pp. 3 If.
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into due consideration in that the classes are to be formed in
each community or in each voting district composed of several
communities according to the amount of taxes paid in that community or district and not according to a tax standard for the
entire state.5
The government's defence of open voting incorporated all the
standard arguments employed then and in subsequent years by those
determined upper-class supporters of responsibility and courage in
politics. "Since the principle of publicity and oral procedure has
come to obtain more and more in the conduct of public affairs in the
other branches of state life," the ministry argued, "many esteemed
persons have spoken in favor of introducing it in voting as well. ...
It was most unwelcome apparently," the ministry continued, "to those
who wished surreptitiously to thwart the main tendency of the principle of voting classes, in that they hoped to win at least the votes
of the masses for the false friends of the people." While recognizing
that open voting was also subject to impure influence, it regarded this
influence as small in comparison with "the cancerous affection which
would be able to grow undisturbed under cover of the secret, written
procedure." In a free people, the individual must have the courage
to express his convictions openly. "In no other way will the parties
learn to know, to respect and to understand each other better." Moreover, the government continued, since the poorest classes were the
most illiterate, their vote would be known anyway. "Public voting
treats all alike and exposes no one to the humiliation of exceptional
handling."
Public voting, the ministry stated, would be most effective in uncovering bribery and other irregularities at elections. Public opinion
would condemn such practices and the investigation of the election
procedures would impair their success. Whoever sought to misuse
his influence to prevent others from freely expressing their convictions
would be damned by the press. Whoever suffered from voting according to his conviction would receive public support. Open voting, the
ministry concluded, would help to establish the constitutional monarchy and "would keep at a distance the destructive play of political
passions and intrigues."6
In spite of these arguments it is not clear why in 1849 the government advocated the introduction of open voting. By tradition that
manner of voting had been associated with revolutionary terror. The
• Abg. R., St. B., 1849, Vol. I. No.2. pp. vii-viii.
• Ibid.; Abg. R., Drucksachen, 1849-50, Vol. I. No. 40.
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Jacobins in 1792 had used it to obtain a majority and had threatened
to send advocates of the secret ballot to the guillotine. Stein's law on
town government of 1808 had introduced the secret ballot; the revision
of that law in 1831 had not changed the system; the law of 1845 on
Rhenish communal government had used it; even the Rhenish Westphalian Church law of 1836 had done so for the express purpose of
assuring a free and honest manifestation of opinion. The provincial
and county elections had been held by secret ballot. In fact, open
voting was an innovation of the 1850s, first in the Landtag elections
and in 1853 in the communal elections. Apparently the government
reasoned that it could exert sufficient pressure upon voters in open
elections to win their support. 7
The general acquiescence of both liberals and Conservatives in the
election law was manifest at the beginning. The membership of the
committee of the Lower House recommending the approval of the bill
in 1849 consisted of representatives of both groups. On that committee, the liberals, from diverse parts of Prussia (Kiihlwetter, von
Beckerath, Count von Schwerin, Simson, von Saucken-Julienfelde,
Pfeiffer, and Gessler) outnumbered the Conservatives by seven votes
to four.s The committee reporter, the Rhenish liberal industrialist von
Beckerath, stated to his colleagues in the Lower House that direct
elections had much in their favor but that there was much to be said
in favor of indirect elections. According to experience, the latter
were, he continued in this profound vein, a guarantee for conservative
voting (he meant anti-revolutionary voting), which was "very important" at present. He recognized that the recommended system of
voting rested on the principle that the state was entitled to decide who
should vote, who should form the pillars of government. He admitted
that the three-class system of voting was "not entirely the correct one,"
that it was a "crude instrument," and that property was not an
accurate measure of "the highest political right," but, he said, there
was still much to be said for it. 9
These remarks of von Beckerath's are impressive because of the
extraordinarily paternalistic authority conceded to the government (ex
post facto to the representatives of the people) to decide on (1) who
should participate in state affairs even to the modest extent of voting,
and (2) what should be the conditions of voting. They disclosed the
• See H. von Gerlach, Die Geschichte des Preussischen Wahlrechts, (1908), pp.
34-39:
• Abg. H., St. B., Dec. 13, 1849, pp. 1690-91.
I Ibid., Oct. 27, 1849, pp. 900-01.
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frank approval of material wealth as the basis of political power. If
one wished to increase his political influence he should increase his
wealth. The advice belongs in the tradition of the continental bourgeoisie, Guizot and Louis Philippe.
From the beginning of the New Era requests for the reform of the
election law were made occasionally in the Lower House of the Landtag, always without success. The government even promised in 1859
to introduce a reform bill, but that particular ministry gave way to another before any steps were taken. Count Schwerin, the next Minister
of the Interior, had served in 1849 on the Committee of the Lower
House which had recommended the approval of the election law; and
in 1861 he persisted in his support of the old law. His successor in the
same office, von Jagow, refused to agree to any modification of the law
on the grounds that the views of the country were divided on the
question.1 0
The Lower House voted in April, 1861, in support of a declaration
that a new election law was an "urgent need";l1 but in the same declaration it postponed any consideration of this "urgent need," and the
available evidence attests to the accuracy of Minister von Jagow's
estimate. On the issue of the best method of voting in state elections
the liberals could not agree among themselves. When the Progressive
party was founded early in 1861, the leaders admitted this dissension
publicly in their official program and had to omit any expression of
party policy about it. They called the method of voting an open question. A few leaders vigorously advocated the abolition of the present
system in favor of universal equal manhood suffrage and the secret
ballot. Others, apparently a great majority, opposed this change with
equal vigor; and rather than split the new party, the proponents bowed
to the fearful ones. Freiherr von Hoverbeck, Krieger, certain leaders
from Berlin, a few from Breslau, some from the Rhineland, and
Schulze-Delitzsch led the proponents, while Twesten and professors
like Theodor Mommsen were absolutely opposed to their views. In
general, the Old Liberals and members of the other liberal groups to
the right of the Progressive party lined up against the reformers. 12
The arguments deserve analysis as evidence of the state of political

10

Ibid., Feb. 26, 1859; I, 256. Ibid., April 6, 1861; I, 650 f. Ibid., Aug. 20, 1862;

III, 1337.

Ibid., I, 658.
Parisi us, Politische Parteien, pp. 36-39; Parisius, von Hoverbeck, I, 209; von
Gerlach, op. cit., pp. 211-14.
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thinking at the time among those who sought to align Prussia with the
liberal forces of the century.
As early as September, 1849, Maurach, a member of the Upper
House, had disapproved the voting law. He had predicted that the
law would separate the deputies from the people and had denied that
persons not voting or unable to vote were necessarily stupid. "As
representatives of the people," he had warned, "we must go along with
the entire people. Only then can we win and maintain the bases of
our power and influence,"13 In 1861 Schulze-Delitzsch stated to the
Lower House the views of a small group of deputies which justify their
being ranked among the most clear and honest thinkers and the most
thoroughly liberal leaders of the century, irrespective of country.
Although he was speaking on the subject of conditions for voting in
town and city elections, the ideals which he supported had general application. An election should assure that real interests, he said, were
represented. He believed that important social interests exerted their
due influence most effectively under a general election law without
property qualification. A factory owner, the owner of a large estate,
a person of outstanding intelligence would gain a position of influence
irrespective of the nature of the election law. He accused the opponents of equal suffrage of confusing unjustified social equality with
a thoroughly just political equality. He argued that the three-class
system stimulated class antagonism, and that the restriction of voting
rights by a property qualification was no improvement. He stood out
staunchly for equal and secret suffrage,14
The arguments of Maurach and Schulze-Delitzsch might well have
been heeded. These leaders realized that the existing election law
divided the public into voting groups in such a way as to deprive the
liberals of increasing support from the public. They saw that the law
encouraged an authoritarian relationship between government and
the governed and tended to preserve the ways of life of the Old Regime,
that it caught the liberal bourgeoisie in the framework of Conservative
rule and prevented it from gaining the popular backing which it
needed. They recognized that the defence of the three-class system
of voting could not be reconciled with the liberal program of their
party.
The liberal opponents of universal equal suffrage feared that this
method of election would lead, as Karl Twesten declared, to "the

,. I. Kammer, St. B., Sept. 7, 1849; II, 625 .

.. Abg. R., St. B., 1861; II, 1049·50.
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dominance of dilettantism and charlatanism in politics." The occasion for their most vigorous denunciation arose in 1866 and 1867 when
the introduction of equal and direct suffrage was being considered for
the proposed North German Confederation; but their opinions as expressed then applied equally to the earlier years. "In normal times,"
Twesten said, "the pressure of the government and in abnormal times
of excitement that of radical agitation would produce undesired results
and falsify the voice of the people."15 His colleague, Professor von
Sybel, used even more Cassandra-like expressions. To the professor
this was a matter of conscience. His historical knowledge showed him
that the introduction of direct and equal suffrage marked the beginning
of the end of all parliamentary government. He thought that such an
election law could be accepted only under ideal conditions, when all
men were good, all were socially equal, all had the same measure of
intelligence, when the lion lay down with the lamb. While he believed in progress, he thought that mankind had not arrived as yet at
the conditions necessary for it. He declared that the right to vote was
the right to select the lawmakers, that this was a right to political
dominion and should not be considered in the same category with the
right to work or travel or associate with others. A person was not
born with a right to select legislators; he had to prove that he possessed
the ability to do so. Von Sybel preferred indirect elections to direct
ones. The latter, he said, especially with a wide suffrage right, stirred
up the passions and killed discussion; it meant the death of independent political life and opened the way to every form of influence. It
made people think they were equal when they were not. In Prussia
two years ago, he declared, there were about 6,000 students and 44,000
pupils in the gymnasiums and other high schools. Using these figures
as a basis, he reckoned that there were about a million men in Prussia
with education above the most elementary. He thought that the same
relations held true with respect to the degree of social independence
and property holding. He denied that the common people knew
enough to elect an able man to parliament; he associated democracy
with Caesarism. 16
The liberal leaders failed to agree on the issue of secret versus
public ballot almost as completely as they did on that of the three-

15 Abg. H., St. B., Sept.
18Norddeutcher Bund,
Robert von Mohl, Politik,
deputy, von Morawski, in

12, 1866, pp. 335-36.
Reichstag, St. B., March 27, 1867, pp. 427-28. See also
(Tiibingen, 1869) , pp. 715-24; and the views of the Polish
the Prussian Lower House on March 23, 1860.
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class system of voting.17 More of them seemed to be willing to support
secret suffrage than the equal and direct vote; but persons like Count
Schwerin preferred open voting on principle, and Deputy Beseler, the
. -liberal professor of law, shared his opinion. Open voting, hOe said,
corresponded more "to the moral dignity of a free people" and was
closer to "the Germanic principle" of "publicity." Whoever voted for
a deputy, he added, should not feel as if he were acting as a private
person, but rather as if he were exercising an official public function.
Beseler's support of open voting was shared by a leader of the Polish
fraction in the House, Doctor Liebelt, who asserted that a voter must
have the courage to express his opinions publicly. The advocates of
secret voting included persons as far to the right among the liberals
as Freiherr von Vincke. Both von Vincke and the far-from-liberal
Catholic deputy Reichensperger from Geldern, who agreed with his
views in this matter, remarked that open voting had not been customary
in Prussia before 1849 in any elections. Von Vincke accused the Polish
deputies of preferring the open ballot so that they could be certain of
the vote of their Polish constitutencies, and he had no illusions about
government pressure on the voters throughout the state in favor of
Conservatism. Reichensperger quoted from the decree of 1836 in
which King Frederick William III had ordered the use of the secret
ballot in Rhenish-Westphalian church affairs so as to avoid any suggestion of influence upon the voters.IS
Many liberal deputies offered irrefutable evidence about the feelings of the public on open voting. They cited numerous petitions from
their constituencies asking for the introduction of the secret ballot.
Deputy Frystatzki declared that ninety per cent of the people favored
it, that open voting was hated. In his district, he said, half the ones
eligible did not cast ballots. Everyone said, Frystatzki added, "Why
should I go and let myself be ordered to vote for a particular person?
I love peace and ... this open voting opens the door to ambition and
selfishness." Deputy Professor Gneist expressed his conviction that
three million signatures could be obtained in favor of the secret ballot.
Too many voters had had an experience like that described to the
Lower House in 1859 by Deputy Mettenmeyer. The Landrat of Stargard
County had kept careful record of how each person voted; when a
druggist had voted against his wishes, the Landrat and the Conserva-

See von Gerlach, op. cit., pp. 34-39.
See the debates in Abg. H., St. B., April 6, 1861; I, 640, 656. Ibid., Feb. 26,
1859; I, 256-58.
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tives had seen to it that he immediately lost one-fourth of his business
and had tried to deprive him of the rest. One understands why many
deputies did not agree with the government official representing the
Minister of the Interior, who told the Lower House in 1861 that the
introduction of open voting in Prussia was a "sign of progress." Nonetheless, the House never took active steps to replace it by the secret
ballot. It always postponed consideration of the question. 19
The seeming diffidence of the liberal deputies toward reform of
the system of voting for state elections did not extend into the area of
town and city elections. The forty-five years' experience under the
Stein law in the six Eastern provinces, that is, in all but the Rhineland
and Westphalia, had won the devotion of the urban population to the
practice of equal and secret suffrage, and the towns and cities of these
provinces especially sent impressive petitions to the Lower House in
favor of the restoration of the former system of voting. A list of
those from which the city or town councilmen sent petitions would include urban centers of all sizes, large, small and medium. The
councilmen of only two towns, Breslau and Liegnitz, made an exception: they wished to retain the three-class system, but not, at least in
the case of the Breslau councilmen, the open voting. In the two
Western provinces the sentiment favored the retention of the threeclass system; but many townsmen of prominence disapproved it in their
petitions, and almost everyone sought the introduction of the secret
ballot.
The evils of the three-class system and open voting were condemned
in almost identical terms. As typical as any was the statement sent to
the Lower House by a group of 226 prominent citizens of Breslau. 20
According to this system, the petitioners declared, out of 6,992 voters
some 362 belonged to the first class and had one-third of the voting
power; 1,669 belonged to the second class, and 4,961 to the third.
Even apart from the inequality and injustice of this division of political power, the petitioners complained, the system introduced social
differences based on income into a communal organization, and involved social distinctions in political controversy. A community had
many functions, like poor relief, in which all citizens should cooperate;
instead of uniting it, the three-class system of voting tended to divide
'"Ibid., May 6, 1861, p. 1268; Aug. 20, 1862, III, 1333·38; Feb. 26, IS59, I, 255 ff.;
May 16, IS61, pp. 1272-73; Feb. 26, IS59, I, 263; March 16, 1860, I, 558; April 6,
IS61, I, 657-5S.
20 See Abg. H., Drucksflchen, IS59, Vol. III, No. lOS. 1860, Vol. VI, No. 262. 1861,
Vol. V, No. 160. St. B., May 2, 3, 16, IS61; St. B,. 1862, Vol. II, No. 15.
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the citizen body. An artificial organization of the citizens thereby replaced a natural one. The petitioners denied that the three-class system was necessary in order to prevent mass rule and asserted that a
small property qualification or intellectual qualification, as in the old
town law, would suffice. Too many persons who should be town
leaders were now forced to vote in the third class.
The Landtag deputies could not have ignored the flood of petitions
even if they had wished to. As soon as the New Era began, the liberal
majority of the Lower House appointed a commission to report on
the problem, and as early as 1859 the majority of the latter declared
that the three-class system was not suitable for town elections. Apart
from the arguments used by the petitioners in Breslau, the liberal deputies cited one convincing piece of evidence, the tremendous decline
in voting since the introduction of the new procedure. One example
may suffice. In Berlin under the Stein law over seventy per cent of
the voters had cast ballots; after the introduction of the three-class
system, in 1858 and 1860, not over twenty-six and twenty-five per cent
respectively voted in the third class, not over forty-two and fifty per
cent in the second class, and not over sixty-three and sixty-five per cent
in the first.21 With each newly elected Landtag, until the fight with
Bismarck monopolized attention, a new commission picked up the
work of its predecessor and recommended almost the same liberal reforms for town elections-the secret ballot and equal suffrage with a
low property qualification.
The Conservatives manifested much less interest in the manner of
voting than the liberals. They disapproved the entire system of government and society in which popular elections were required and felt no
strong devotion to any particular method. Their basic demand about
elections was that the Conservatives be kept in power, and their willingness within the space of a decade or less to shift their support from
the three-class system with open ballot to that of equal manhood suffrage with secret ballot attested to their persistence in using any means
to achieve their end. In 1849 the Conservative theorist, Professor
Stahl, a member of the Upper House of the Landtag, could scarcely
find adequate phrases for his scorn of universal and equal suffrage.
Speaking with the assurance of a constant communicant with the
Absolute, he had denounced elections by individual suffrage as "unbearable tyranny," as mass rule by the propertyless, by those incapable

"Ibid., Drucksachen, 1861, Vol. V, No. 160, pp. 15-16; 1859, Vol. III, No. 108,
Fp· 26-30.
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of governing. Like the liberal Professor v6n Sybel he had regarded the
right to vote not as a personal one but as a public duty to be exercised by a competent few. 22 His colleagues had taken a less doctrinaire view and had followed the government by approving the threeclass system.
After the elections turned against them, the Conservatives began
to lose some of their preference for the three-class system of voting.
They now feared that the present method suffered from some serious
defects. As early as 1858 Deputy Count Pfeil condemned the use of
indirect elections. When elections were bad, he said, they were made
much worse by the electors. When the voters inclined left, or right,
the electors voted extreme left, or right, and the true voice of Prussia
was not heard. 23 The year after the first major defeat of the Conservatives in the election, Deputy von Blanckenburg stated to the
Lower House that if the secret ballot had been employed, many members of his party would have won. Speaking in 1861 for the same
group, Deputy von Krosigk declared that there was no such thing as
free elections, that influence was exerted upon them from either above
or below. He and his friends admitted that in case of open elections,
it was possible for government officials to influence the voters; but,
he said, the secret ballot opened the way to demagoguery and pressure from below. He continued to prefer the open ballot. In the same
session of the Lower House his fellow Conservative, Deputy Wagener,
the--editor of the main Conservative newspaper, the Kreuzzeitung,
twitted his opponents for preferring the secret ballot. Indeed, he said,
"there has never been a constitution resting on the constitutional
principle of the majority which lasted longer than a few decades." He
accused the liberal proponents of the secret ballot of being inconsistent;
they based their political system, he declared, upon the virtues of independent, spartan-like citizens, who did not have the courage to vote
openly. Wagener condemned liberal government by elections as built
upon" a political falsehood."24
You tear asunder state and society; you recognize no other
citizen than Plato's well-known two-legged animal without
feathers, whom you abstract from all possible social conditions
and endowments, and then you wonder why in every concrete
case reality makes itself effective as over against this abstraction .

.. Herrenhaus, St., B., Sept. 7, 1849; II, 622.
•• Abg. H., St. B., April 20, 1858; I, 604-05 .
.. Ibid., Feb. 26, 1859; I, 258. May 16, 1861, p. 1271. April 20, 1858; I, 604-05.
April 6, 1861; I, 653-54.
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Apart from his social position one has no political significance at all; the social and the poltical significance of a man lire
identical.
Look at France, Wagener continued, where one had so-called despotism
and the secret ballot, or at America "where one stands at the ballot box
with revolver and dagger." Wagener did not regard the present system
of voting as ideal; but he still preferred it to any other Prussia had had,
because, he said, "even if only in crude form, it does contain the
thought that the political importance of a name should be graded according to its social and political achievement and significance."
As defeat after defeat rolled over the Conservatives in the elections
to the Lower House during the period of constitutional conflict, they
sought some other system of voting to stop the liberal victories. Bismarck offered a solution, not for Prussia, where the election law remained unchanged, but for the proposed North German Confederation.
In 1866 as soon as the Austro-Prussian war ended, he recommended
the introduction of universal, direct and equal manhood suffrage, and
he acquiesced in the use of the secret ballot as a matter of minor importance. Liberals were startled. Several deputies in the Lower
House of the Landtag mistrusted the proposal as an attempt to undermine the influence of their political groups and of the Lower House.
Others, as has already been stated, condemned it on principle in absolute terms. Most of the liberals accepted Bismarck's recommendation with amazement and seemingly without much relish. The hated
Junker had stolen the thunder of the most leftist of the liberals.25
So far as Bismarck's intentions were concerned, the liberals' fears
were justified. The Minister President did not aim to strengthen the
liberals or introduce popular government-quite the contrary. As
early as the meeting of the United Landtag in 1847 Bismarck had believed that the lower classes were much more conservative and monarchical in their thinking and feeling than the middle classes and that
especially in the agrarian provinces of old Prussia the property-owners
would be able to control the vote!> of their workers even under a system of universal suffrage. 26 At the time, he had rejected both this
method of voting and the three~class system, declaring in 1849 that
the Prussian people were politically so immature that elections would
be "a lottery," "a gamble." The experience with elections during the
"Ibid., Sept. Il-12. 1866; Norddeutscher Bund St. B., March 28, 1867. Abg. H.,
St. B., Nov. 26, 187l!; I, 95-99. I09-Ill!. Il8-20.
"See G. von Below, .Das parlamentarische Wahlruht in Deutschland (Berlin,
1909), p. 90.
.
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1850s had inclined Bismarck toward a broad popular basis for voting.
In 1854 he had opposed curtailing popular participation in the state
elections by a high property qualification, for, he had argued, "the
classes excluded thereby are better royalists than the rest of the bourgeoisie and upper classes, even apart from the arbitrariness of any
property qualification and the damage resulting from endless playing
with constitution-making." After watching the same election system
return a Conservative majority to the Lower House in the 1850s and
a liberal majority in the 1860s, Bismarck stated that whatever the law
might be, the elections always expressed the opinions of the time. It
is doubtful, however, whether he actually believed his own words;
otherwise, he would not have proposed an election law for the North
German Confederation which was the reverse of that of Prussia. He
expressed his views more frankly in a circular despatch to Prussian
ministers abroad in March, 1866, that is, even prior to the defeat of
Austria and to the election defeat and split of the Progressive party
later in the same year.
I consider direct elections and general suffrage greater assurance
of a conservative attitude than any artificial election law calculated to achieve manufactured majorities. According to our
experience, the masses are more honestly interested in preserving
state order than the leaders of those classes which would be preferred by the introduction of some property qualification for the
right to vote.
I may assert as a conviction based on long experience that the
artificial system of indirect and class elections is much more
dangerous in that it obstructs contact of the supreme power with
the sound elements which form the kernel and the mass of the
people. 27
Bismarck wished to gain popular support for the new North German Confederation by this move. His use of the election law proposed in April, 1849, by the Frankfurt Parliament as the basis for his
proposal may be interpreted as a bid for liberal aid in founding the
new German Reich. He hoped to be able to control the vote in favor
of conservatism by direct and universal suffrage even with secret ballot
and to use the support of the lower classes a a means for weakening the
liberals. His miscalculation reveals Bismarck's extraordinary lack of
understanding of the social and economic forces of his age; but the
fact remains that, in so f='lr as one may make a dogmatic statement
about so uncertain a subject as politics, he had very little choice. He

'7 Quoted

in von Gerlach,

op.

cit., p. 83.
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could accept either an election system restricting political power to the
liberal bourgeoisie and their supporters, whether by the three-class
system or by some high property qualification, or one based on equal
and direct suffrage for all male adults. A Conservative, agrarian
Junker, even if a Bismarck, had had enough adverse experienci! with
the bourgeoisie; he preferred to try the ma~ses. 28
The glee of the Conservatives in supporting Bismarck's proposal
can be felt even in the dry pages of the parliamentary debates. They
now strode confidently behind their leader, and a mere ideological
somersault caused them no qualms. They did it quickly and with as
much poise as a Pruss ian Conservative could preserve in such an act.
Strosser, an average Conservative deputy, declared in 1866 that equal
suffrage had been contrary to the Conservative views up to now, but
that if the government favored it he would heartily give it his approval. "Under any election system," he said, "it depends upon the
energy and strength of the government whether one attains good election results."29 A few days later Deputy von Blanckenburg denied
that support of direct elections violated Conservative principles. He
believed that this kind of election could be trusted more than the
indirect method. For example, he said, in a system of indirect elections a deputy like Dr. Jacoby, who had recently said about the AustroPrussian War, "This war does not redound to Prussia's honor or to
Germany's welfare," would be protected by the electors; in a system of
direct elections the voters would not tolerate such a representative. so
The most perfect somersault was made by the expert in Conservative debate, Deputy Wagener. He disagreed with his political friends
that the method of election would not change the outcome. He now
favored direct and universal suffrage, and opposed as unjust not merely
the three-class system but even a property qualification on voting. In
this society of compulsory military service there should be equal
suffrage. Indirect elections were and are, he said, the true source and
bearer of factious opposition and rule by a clique and did not favor
the intelligent bourgeoise. He still preferred open voting, but was
willing to follow the government's proposal. Devising a social theory
•• On Bismarck's views. see Heinrich Herrfahrdt. Das Problem der berufsstandischen Vertretung von der franzasis'chen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart and
Berlin. 1921). pp. 58-61; von Gerlach. op. cit.; Abg. H .• St. B., Sept. 12. 1866. pp.
307-08, 320; Protokolle der Deutschen Bundesversammlungen, April 9. 1866. Pl"
102-03. See also the embellished account in Bismarck. Gedanken und Erinnerungen,
II. 68-70.
• 9 Abg. H .• St. B., Sept. II, 1866. p. 286 .
•• Ibid., Sept. 12. 1866. p. 332.
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to support the new line, he said that general, direct suffrage was a
necessary sign of a certain social and political condition. The old
corporative forms which had been the basis of suffrage had decayed
and new ones had not yet developed. He hoped that universal suffrage
would further this development. He recognized the danger of the new
method of voting, but he knew nothing better to offer. He did not
believe that a Berlin merchant with a big bank account should have
three or ten times as much voting power as a war veteran. The main
attraction of general, direct suffrage was that it would affect persons
at the most sensitive point: it would affect their social position and
force them to defend that position "not by words" but "by positive
social and political action." Thereby Wagener thought that social
and political power might once again be united, a line of argument
which, except for the difference in objective, was remarkably like that
of Schulze-Delitzsch.31
The core of Wagener's thought about the new election system consisted in his wish that the Conservative party and the government
would seize the initiative in the use of it; for, he said, only thereby
would they prevent the institution from getting out of control, only
then would they make it serve them. 32 The advice was no doubt
sound, but the Conservatives had let loose a Frankenstein monster. 33
Bismarck soon found that not even the lower classes followed his
dictates. Mass parties turned against him; the people did not always
think like Bismarck and the Conservatives. The Conservatives themselves sometimes failed to support him; all the pressure of which the
powerful government disposed failed to win docile majorities. At the
end of his dominance in 1890, Bismarck was devising means of abolishing the Reichstag, the creation of his own election system.
Subsequently Prussian liberals did not fare well under the retention of the three-class system and open voting of 1849. Within a few
years after the German Reich was established the subject of reform of
31 Norddeutscher Bund, Reichstag, St. B., March 28, 1867, pp. 420-22 .
•• Abg. H., St. B., Sept. 12, 1866, p. 333.
3. A small group of diehard reactionaries had never reconciled themselves to the
existence of elections at all. It should be remembered that this group had broken
with Bismarck, who was too modern for it. Deputy von Gerlach expressed its views
in September, 1866, as follows: "Every election is a misfortune," but we should not
abolish the three-class system of voting, deficient as it was. We should improve it.
Universal suffrage was no improvement; it merely presupposed an atomized people.
Society should be organic, and the "natural" leaders should dominate, each in his
appropriate sphere, the Schulze in the village, and so on. In other words, von
Gerlach wished the election system to be built on the caites of the Old Regime. See
Abg. H., St. B., Sept. 11, 1866. pp. 299 f.
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the election law came up again (1873) in the Lower House of the
Landtag. Once more the liberals postponed consideration of the
problem.34 A Catholic deputy accused them of avoiding it out of fear
of the loss of their political influence.3li A left-wing member of the
Progressive party had at the time of the Austro-Prussian war privately
expressed the same suspicion.36 The evidence does not bear out this
view. Most of the liberals seem rather to have opposed universal and
equal suffrage on grounds of both material interest and principle. Bismarck and the national situation pushed them into accepting it for
the Reich; but they undoubtedly preferred the vote to be restricted to
the upper classes. After a few years the liberals lost their chance to
change the system, for with the change in the social and political situation the three-class system returned a steady majority of Conservatives
and their allies which could not be ousted until the Revolution of
1918.
Most liberals, even as the Conservatives, accepted social inequality
as a fact, and most liberals wished to divide political power in the
same way. The two groups, with the exception of some left-wing
liberals, were not far apart in their views about an appropriate election law. They faced a common problem-how during a definite movement toward legal equality to change from a type of representation
based on estates and caste to one based on classes. The Conservatives
sought an election system which would preserve as much of the power
of the estates as possible; the liberals sought one which would retain
enough authority to prevent revolution and would nonetheless give
the bourgeoisie the power safely to reform state and society in their
interest. The three-class system afforded a neat compromise. It retained the principle of inequality; it did not apply a yardstick of the
ownership of a specific amount of property to all Prussia but rather
left the qualifications for voting to the localities in such a way as to
retain the existing relationship of economic and to some extent social
power in ea~h locality. It based political differentiation upon the relative amount of taxes paid, a patriotic or civic basis on which one could
counter any accusation of selfishness. It widened the group of the
powerful without destroying the old ruling group and supplied a
q.eutral foundation for a merger. Its importance, however, depended
upon the importance of the institution for which elections were held .
•• Abg. H., St. B., Nov. 26, 1873; I, 118-20.
•• Von Mallinckrodt, Abg. H., St. B., Nov. 26, 1873; I, 109-10.
•• L. Dehio, "Die preussische Demokratie und der Kreig von 1866," FOTschungen
%UT Brandenburg-Preussischen Geschichte, XXXIX (19%7), 258-59.
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The failure of the liberals to develop the Lower House into the
dominant institution of government relegated the elections and consequently the election law to a position of lesser significance, and the
Reich method of voting deprived it of further prestige.
The Prussian election law of 1849 was significant for the character
of the political standards of the people and the leaders. The discussion of it offered insights, confirmed in many other ways, into the
level of cultural life of Prussia. Being in vigorous transition from the
caste state to the modern state of high social mobility, this society was
setting standards and forms for a long future. Apart from a few on
the left, the liberals failed to appreciate that fact and to seek a broad
popular basis for their ideals. The historians among them led the
fight against this reform. The preservation of the three-class system
of voting by the liberals offers an example of their shortsightedness
and is one of the reasons why they failed to gain authority. The liberals
helped to preserve a political system which within a few years became
the bulwark of reaction.
The only respect in which the government of the New Era changed
the system of voting had to do with the creation of election districts.
The constitution called for the fixing of these districts by law (Article
69), but the Manteuffel ministry had conveniently ignored that clause
and had arbitrarily changed voting districts by administrative act. Its
one standard in doing so had been that of returning a Conservative
deputy. Wherever necessary, it had split counties among several election districts; it had joined Germans and Poles in such a way as to
assure a victory for the former, or Protestants and Catholics in order
to defeat the latter. It had taken into consideration the state of transportation and wherever possible had forced the opposition voters to
travel long distances over bad roads. It had frankly stated that it
gerrymandered and had assured the Landtag that it would continue
to do so. Even some Conservatives became critical of such flagrant
corruption.
In 1860 Minister of Interior Count Schwerin introduced an election
district law, the first one which the state adopted. After thorough
consideration by the Lower House, the bill was somewhat modified and
passed. Catholics and Poles, as well as Protestant Germans, warmly
endorsed the law. It went to the Upper House, where it again passed
with only minor changes. Once the Manteuffel government was
eliminated, the Conservatives in that stronghold did not have the
moral affrontery to defend the practices of their former leaders.
The new law introduced as fair and just conditions for everyone as
were possible. The liberals agreed that a normal voting district should
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contain two counties but that in some cases one county might be used
and in others more than two might be combined. Counties were
selected for union on the basis of historic or cultural associations or of
practical considerations. Of the latter, two were of essential importance, the presence of good roads and bridges which would enable
the voters (the electors) to come together even in bad weather and
the existence of a building sufficiently large to hold the voters and the
presence of quarters for them and their teams. A county which had
road connections with one neighbor but not with another would have
to be attached to the former. A county without a building adequate
to hold all the voters assembled to cast ballots by voice should be associated with one which had. A church, an inn, a railroad station,
were usually selected; but some counties had none of these large enough
to contain the voters. Think of keeping seven hundred or eight
hundred voters crammed in a church, one deputy exclaimed, while
each expressed his vote by voice! The act of voting would continue
an day, voters would fill the church and overflow, evening would come
and candles would have to be used. Think of the confusion! One
can understand why the committee of the Lower House consulted
each deputy before recommending the composition of the election districts, and why another deputy, a Catholic who had not been on the
committee, urged the House to pass the bill as submitted by the committee and not to tamper with its details.
The only major objection which a few reactionaries in the Upper
House made against the law concerned the relation of rural and urban
population. The law designated each city of 50,000 population and
over a separate election district for the self-evident reason that one
deputy was to be elected for every 50,000 people. In the case of towns
of lesser size the law merged them into the county along with the rural
areas. Some Conservatives wished to keep the two distinct for fear that
the town voters would outnumber the rural ones, or that the former
would by superior strategy in campaigning win the latter to the side
of liberalism. They wanted to keep the rural areas as dormant as
possible. Nonetheless, the administrative difficulty of separating town
and country in voting was so clearly evident that the criticism was not
pressed. The reactionaries could not justify a division for voting between a town and its surrounding region when for every other purpose
the two were interdependent.
A few liberals and Conservatives preferred the single county as a
basis of representation, arguing that the county formed an organic,
historic unit. They were unable, however, to sustain their proposal
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against criticism. The sponsors of the law used the most recent census,
that of 1858, as the basis of arranging districts so as to be numerically
just; and they pointed out that if the county were selected great unfairness would result, since many counties lacked the amount of population necessary to merit a deputy. They stressed the value of the
larger district as a means of reducing the political prestige of the
Landrat and other traditional wielders of power, and of allowing a
larger choice of candidates than at present. More persons would then
vote, the committee of the Lower House stated, because they would
see greater possibility of their votes' being of some weight. In a small
district where the distribution of political strength was already known,
it said, the persons on the side certain to lose would be inclined not
to vote at all.
The law was manifestly intended to reduce the material obstacles,
bad transportation and inadequate quarters, and the psychological
deterrents to voting. It was intended to encourage the voters by assuring them of fair treatment. It vastly improved upon the Manteuffel system; but it did not altogether stop gerrymandering. Bismarck revived the practice, not in the creation of election districts,
for these were fixed by law, but in arranging the boundaries of the
voting precincts within the districts. He was not able to accomplish
much by these tricks; he hardly needed to do so. He simply ignored
the results of the elections.
The liberals made their mistake in not transforming the three·class
system of voting into one of equal manhood suffrage. Then the voters
might have come to the polls in numbers comparable to those appearing in town elections under the Stein Ordinance of 1808, and the
liberals would have had far more popular strength against Bismarck
and the King then they were able to muster. The shortsightedness of
the liberals was apparent from Deputy Lette's remark that the new
districting law was "perhaps more important" than a new election
law. 37

.7 Abg. H., St. B., May 22, 1860; II, 1229. For the discussion in the Landtag of
the districting law see, Abg. H., St. B., Feb. 7, 1856; ibid., Jan. 20, March 22-23, 27,
May 19, 22, 1860; St. B., 1860, Vol. IV, Nos. 66,67; Herrenhaus, St. B., 1860, Vol. III,
No. 35; Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1855-56, Vol. VI, No. 256; Abg. H., St. B., Feb. 7,
1856; ibid., April 20, 1858; Herrenhaus, St. B., May 19, 1860; Abg. H., St. B., Oct. 26,
1849; Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1854-55, Vol. V, No. 214; Abg. H., Drucksachen, 1855-56,
Vol. III, No. 149; Abg. H., St. B., Sept. 12, 1866; Abg H., St. B., 1858, Vol. 11, No. 65.
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nME 01 the two election, 011862 and 1863 the
political alignment had reduced the parties and fractions into two
major groups, with the Catholic Center party tending to divide,
especially in 1863, in the same way. On the one side stood the Conservatives, as rock-ribbed, intolerant and defiant as ever; on the other
was to be found an assortment of liberals and democrats, essentially
agreed on fundamental objectives, forced by the government's behavior to act in unity, but suffering from a variety of centrifugal tensions which deprived them of the power of fully harmonious and
organized cooperation.

The Relations Among the Liberal Parties
In spite of the fact that all liberals advocated an almost identical
program, they split easily into fractions for reasons too insignificant for
many intelligent and well-informed contemporaries to grasp. During
the first two years of the New Era the Constitutional party dominated
the liberal movement. Its leaders held ministerial posts, were friends
of the ruler, and acted on the political slogan, "Do not press." They
were liberals of the older generation, many of them men of the highest
aristocratic standing, who disliked speedy action. They appreciated
the wide scope of power of the King and were more concerned with the
problem of leading the monarch slowly and gently along the road to
constitutional government than they were with that of satisfying immediately the public demand for action in that direction. Accustomed
to positions of dignified prestige in the local community as in the
state, they preferred to act as individuals and disliked party organization, party control or discipline, campaigning for votes, or anything
278
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associated with popular politics. They were people who signed only
their family name to a public statement, without Christian name,
initials, or any designation of position or location. They expected
the public to know who they were and to respect them as public
leaders of long and mature experience and ripe learning. "Never in
my life have I sought the position of representative," declared one of
them, Deputy von Vincke of Hagen, in the Lower House in May, 1861;
"I have not sent a single statement to my voters. I have never received an address from them expressing confidence or no-confidence.
I have forbidden it every time. I believe that, with respect to my
voters, I am in a completely independent position."!
The caution and slowness of the Constitutional party so thoroughly
exasperated many liberals and democrats, both those in the Lower
House and those outside, that in 1861 a group of critics came together
in Berlin and formed the German Progressive party. "New people
must be elected to the Lower House," declared the Niederrheinische
Zeitung early in that year; and although the new party was formed
mainly by East Prussians and developed its main strength in the
Eastern and Central provinces, it undoubtedly responded to a statewide desire for action. It did not wish to destroy or weaken the unity
among the liberals in the common struggle against the Conservatives;
it sought rather to bring together men of all liberal groups, from the
right-wing Constitutionals to the leftist democrats, who wished to
work vigorously for the execution of the liberal ideals and national
unification. 2 The party divided into several fractions, but on the
whole it worked as a cohesive group.
In the Western provinces of Westphalia and the Rhineland but
also to some extent in the Central provinces, the liberals in the main
held together and without much difficulty made the transition from
old liberalism to views and policies similar to those of the Progressive
party.3 The two strongest fractions of the liberals of the Western
provinces took their names from the deputies who acted as leaders,
Grabow whose group formed the right wing and Bockum-Dolffs whose
group kept close to the Progressives. By the time of the two elections
of 1862 and 1863 the increasingly reactionary deeds of the government
Abg. H., St. B., May 28, 1861; III, 1440.
• Tagesbericht, No. 50, Feb. 28, 1861; Parisi us, Politische Parteien, p. 40; National
Zeitung, Nov. 21, 1861.
• In a letter to Baumgarten, March 25, 1862, von Sybel, a Rhenish deputy, wrote
that the liberal majority in the Western provinces was "entirely for harmony," and
he hoped that the Progressive party would not cause trouble there. Heyderhoff,
op. cit., I, 86.
1
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led to the decimation of right-wing liberals in the Lower House and
to the actual unity of all liberal groups under the direction of the
aggressive and positive leaders, primarily from among the Progressive
and the Bockum-Dolffs, or Left-Center, groups. Petty differences gave
way before the common need of defending liberalism against its
enemies.
The fact that the liberals and democrats could cooperate in the
case of practical necessity does not detract from the actuality and importance of the differences among them. The immaturity of the political life, the struggle for power among the parties and fractions, the
search for bases of party distinction, the survival of social and political ways of the pre-parliamentary period, as well as the personal and
psychological friction to be found in all forms of group activity at all
stages kept the liberal groups apart, but conflict over principles and
objectives scarcely existed at all. The right-wing liberals mistrusted
the democrats and accused them of endeavoring to introduce parliamentary government and full political equality; but the democratic
forces never became strong enough to alarm them. Contemporary
comment gauged the relations correctly when it explained the differences on other bases than those of ideal or general objectives.
"Our party [the Constitutional] is a pitiful party," said the historian Droysen to von Bernhardi at the end of 1860. "Our party is
discrediting itself in the state," lamented at about the same time another liberal who, like Droysen, had been supporting the government
of the New Era. A member of the von Saucken family, disgusted with
Minister of Interior von Schwerin for leaving all the reactionaires in
office, declared that the liberal ministry had helped no one in the
state except the Jews. In November of the next year, 1861, Doctor
Kosch, the chairman of a political rally called by the Progressive party
in Konigsberg, declared, according to the Konigsberg Hartungsche
Zeitung,
Not only the so-called Constitutional party but we also are
"constitutional." The name "ministerial party" fits the former
more precisely. They, the Constitutionalists, are blood of our
blood, but very much less flesh of our flesh. They are so gentle,
they are so soft that every raw breeze affects them unpleasantly.
The Progressives are of a less sensitive nature; their energy distinguishes them from the others.
A right-wing liberal accurately described his party as "moderate," the
Progressives as "agitational." The Progressive party aimed to supply
the political energy, stated the National Zeitung, which the "learned
liberalism" of the Lower House lacked. The left-wing Volkszeitung of
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Berlin distinguished between the Constitutionals and the democrats
in a cruder way. After stating that both wished to establish a legal
state and differed at most over the guarantees for it, the paper declared
that the democrats vigorously demanded the legal state, whereas the
Constitutionals requested it "with apparent submissive loyalty." Or
as the same paper declared three days later, the von Vincke form of
constitutionalism wished consciously to "swindle the prince out of his
former rights," whereas the democratic party stated freely and openly
its demands. 4
The opposition between the two liberal parties varied according to
the traditional strength of the Constitutional group. In places like
Halle, Magdeburg and Konigsberg, where the Constitutionals had occupied the leading role, they disliked the competition of a young,
fresh, vigorous group and felt hurt and indignant at the accusation of
lack of activity. They had local vested interests and social prestige
to protect. 5 Self-conscious about their superior experience and wisdom, they found reasons to object to many of the Progressives' acts.
Even if the reasons seemed flimsy in actuality, they revealed that curse
of a highly intelligent people learning the ways of practical politics,
disagreement over methods and timing. They had to disagree or be
swallowed by their more vigorous ally. One member of the party,
Deputy Riedel, frankly said in a political meeting in Berlin that he
had changed his stand from affirmative to negative on an amendment
proposed in the Lower House because in the second instance a younger
member, Freiherr von Hoverbeck, had introduced it. "It is not our
custom," he said, "to support measures which are taken up by young,
inexperienced members of the House."6 They suffered from personal
antagonism toward the Progressives and, wrote Wilhelm Dilthey in
May, 1862, from the illusion that they alone were capable of governing. 7 They had great difficulty in swallowing their pride, and only the
pressure of the reaction in 1862 induced them to do SO.8 The Con-

• Von Bernhardi, op. cit., IV, 75, 71; III, 278-79; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung,
Nov. 20, 1861; Wochenschrtft des Nationalvereins, April 17, 1863; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 16, 1861; National Zeitung, June 12, 1861; Tagesbericht, No.
60, March 12, 1861; ibid., No. 63, March 15, 1861.
• See Volkszeitung, March 29, 1862, for a despatch from Magdeburg; ibid., April
15, 1862 from Halle; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, April 10, 1862.
• Despatch from Berlin to the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 29, 1861.
7 Heyderhoff, op. cit., I, 89.
• See the statements by the Constitutionals in Konigsberg in the Konigsberg
Hartungsche Zeitung, Sept. 25, 1861, March 7, 1862. How unfortunate the intransigent attitude seemed to the other liberal groups was made clear in an appeal to
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stitutional party paper, the Stern Zeitung of Berlin, in April, 1862,
blamed the failure on the part of the liberal factions to ally and to
dam back the democrats not on "the well-tested leaders but on the
younger, uncontrolled combative forces." The paper deplored the
coalition which had begun in 1858 between the Constitutionals and
the democrats, and accused the latter of having intentionally poisoned
the liberal supporters of the Constitutional ministry and turned them
into opponents.1I The Constitutional leaders were looking for a scapegoat for their failure in the government. 1O
Since issues of such gravity for the future of Prussia and Germany
were at stake, the Progressives had great difficulty in comprehending
the instransigent stand taken by the Constitutionals. Fortunately for
the cause of liberalism, the attitude remained confined to groups in a
very few places. In towns like Stet tin and Breslau the news of the
composition of the new Conservative ministry in 1862 led the Constitutionals to drop their plans for a separate election campaign and to
join forces with the other party.H Already in the preceding year the
liberals of all parties had united their strength in the rural areas and
in those urban centers where the Conservatives could muster sufficent
votes to constitute a threat. The continuation of competition in
elections between the Constitutional party and the Progressives was
restricted to the larger cities and to those election districts where
reactionary influence scarcely existed. 12 Even the fact of their disagreement revealed in those localities the general strength of liberalism.
The Progressive party had advocated unity of action among the
liberals from the beginning. When the liberals in the ministry were
eliminated in 1862 and the government became composed exclusively
of Conservatives, the force of events achieved what the Progressives
alone had been unable to do. The four liberal fractions in the Lower
House began in March, 1862, to meet together from time to time in a
social way.1 3 A few weeks later there occurred a final rebellion. The
the Constitutionals in April, 1862, by the election committee of the Progressive
party in the election district Konigsberg-Fischhausen, ibid., April 2, 1862; see also
Kolnische Zeitung, Oct. 12, 1863_
• Tagesbericht, No. 57, March 8, 1861.
10 One Constitutional paper tried to find a social basis to distinguish the party,
but the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung was unable to discover any proof for this
view. See Parisius, Politische Parteien, p. 61; Tagesbericht, No. 66, March 19, 1861;
Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, March 21, May 25, 1862.
11 See Volkszeitung, March 22, 1862, on Stettin; Kolnische Zeitung, Sept. 21,
Oct. 4, 1863, on Breslau.
12 See National Zeitung, Dec. II, 1861; Kolnische Zeitung, Jan. 13, 1862.
,. Kolnische Zeitung, March 5, 1862.
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Grabow fraction, the current right-wing group of liberals, split into
two groups over the question of cooperation with the Progressive party.
The small minority under the leadership of that most difficult individualist, von Vincke, refused to accept the recommendation of
Grabow in favor of cooperation and formed a separate fraction. 14 The
actual effect upon the political strength of the liberals was so slight
as to be negligible. This kind of jealously was taken care of by the
voters, who increasingly returned to the Lower House those persons
able to unite with others against the hated government.

Leadership, State and Local
An analysis of state-wide and local leadership should afford insight into the strength of liberalism in the population. The issues at
stake between the liberals and the Conservatives involved the basic
organization of society, that is, whether it should be that of caste,
privilege and absolutism or that of freedom; and social and occupational interests were sufficiently uniform to enable one to gauge the
attitude of these groups from the political affiliation of their leaders.
The method of inference must be used with caution, for without
additional information it would not suffice to establish the political
alignmeRt of the social and occupational groups. It should work best
for the industrialists, merchants, and bankers, those who were most
aware of the value of liberalism and most eager to open new opportunities. It should be least effective in disclosing the attitude of
the aristocracy and the handworkers, the groups that remained closest
to the Old Regime. For insight on the politics of these two groups
one must know whether they regarded the preservation of the old order
as more important than the development of the new opportunities
which liberalism would bring, a question more of choice of ideals than
of occupational or social interest. In the case of the peasantry one
needs to ascertain whether they had heard of the issues, whether they
understood them, and whether they had enough freedom to dare to
pursue their own interest. If one keeps these limitations in mind,
however, information about the social and occupational bases of political leadership should offer useful evidence on the attitude of the
various groups in the conflict,
The types of persons selected as deputies did reflect the changing
structure of the population. In the two decades of the 1850s and 18608
the rapid development of industrialism in the state added an in.. See Parisius, Palitische Parteien, pp. 54-55, 61; Kolnische Zeitung, May 26, 1862;
Parisius, von Haverbeck, II, 47-48; von Bernhardi, ap. cit., IV, 194-95.
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creasingly strong bourgeois element to the old society of the castestate. The bases for public leadership became diverse. Certain
social groups and certain occupations which had supplied public guidance under the regime of agrarianism and absolutism continued that
function after a popularly elected parliament had been introduced.
At the same time industrialism created the need for new types of public
leaders; and by affording many new opportunities for individuals to
rise in the social scale it began to provide the personnel for taking on
these functions. In many cases the leaders reflected in varying ways
and degrees both the Old Regime and the new industrial society; in
others they represented one and not the other. The characteristics
of a transitional period appeared in the diversity of criteria.
The aristocracy continued to be expected to provide public leaders
and did so. Accustomed to dominance in a society without a written
constitution and a popularly elected parliament, they had over the
members of the other classes the great advantage of traditional prestige
and the habit of leadership. Their difficulty lay in the fact that in
order to remain leaders they had to sacrifice their legal privileges and
caste status and accept the principle of equality before the law. They
had to become natural, useful leaders, depending for their position
upon ability. While the liberal aristocrats were willing to do so, the
Conservatives refused. Whether liberal or Conservative, the arist<r
crats instinctively disliked seeking popularity and vying for votes,
for these actions violated their standards of upper-class personality.
Since the competition in politics had not advanced far enough by the
1860s to require much of this kind of political behavior, members of
the aristocratic class continued to be accepted and to serve as public
leaders in politics while preserving many characteristics of the Old
Regime. The unconscious assumption of social superiority toward the
mass of voters and the preservation of a certain degree of dignified
aloofness rather enhanced their prestige, provided they were willing
to accept the principles of liberalism, to associate on a basis of equality
with the leaders from the other classes, and to respect the dignity of
even the little man. The public liked leaders whom they could respect,
on whom they could rely, to whom they could defer. A good family
name seemed to assure the necessary guarantee. Lacking experience
in politics and not having as yet developed many new leaders in the
Landtag's brief existence, the public turned to members of well-known
aristocratic families for deputies. While they did not need to be equalitarian in social practice, they were expected not to adhere too rigidly
to the aristocratic tendency toward subjectivity in political behavior
or toward a highly personal attitude in political affairs. If they did,
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as in the case of von Vincke, they lost standing and were subject to
political defeat. They had to conform to the discipline necessary for
political action.
Among the lower classes, the burghers and workers of the towns and
cities, the middle-class landowners, and the peasants, position in the
social structure had relegated them by tradition to the role of subject
or at most of local leader among social equals. They lacked the
aristocracy's unselfconscious feeling of superiority in experience and
wisdom. In the period under discussion, the urban industrial workers
hardly exerted any political influence; they had not yet developed the
strength of numbers and organization which a few years later enabled
them to become politically impressive. They supplied no political
leaders in the Landtag. The peasants were active only in the local
elections and did not count as a source of potential state leadership.
In contrast with the constitutional assembly in Berlin in 1848, not a
single peasant was sent as deputy to the Lower House in the elections
of 1862 and 1863, even though these elections were the most liberal
of any between 1849 and 1918. The urban burghers and the landowners of middle-class or aristocratic origin supplied the state political leaders for the lower classes and developed the new standards for
political leadership and action in an industrial society. The needs of
the institution of politics coincided with many of the basic middleclass traits of character. The burghers were accustomed to a rational
approach to problems, to compromise and other manifestations of
mutual respect, and to action by a group. As contrasted with that of
the aristocracy, their strength depended in addition to their intelligence
and aggressiveness upon their large numbers and upon their ability
to subordinate themselves to and to cooperate for the achievement
of a common objective. Having to learn by experiment the ways
which politics required of its practitioners, they made mistakes and
did not always understand the nature of the new kind of activity; but
they supplied the driving and creative force in it, and they had a more
abiding interest in its successful development than the liberals among
the aristocracy.
The selection of political leaders depended far more upon occupation than it did upon the social class to which one belonged. In a
society as bureaucratically organized as that of Prussia, social prestige
varied to such a degree with occupation that the two could not usually
be distinguished. Certain occupations of the Old Regime which had
carried with them the expectation and responsibility of public leadership continued to do so both in areas and among social groups remain-
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ing economically largely in the Old Regime and in those being transformed by industrialism. The government official, the lawyer, the
professor and school superintendent, the pastor or priest, the owner
of large or middle-seized landed estate, the wholesale merchant-these
occupations retained their prestige. To them the industrial society
added the industrialist, the banker and insurance director, the newspaper editor, and with the increase in scientific knowledge, the physician. Practically all the Landtag deputies of the New Era and the
years of the constitutional conflict came from these occupations; many
belonged as well to the aristocracy. A person like Schulze-Delitzsch,
able to live by being what one may call a professional public leader,
stood out as a rarity; even he had begun his career as a county judge.
Not yet reached was the stage of development of modern industrial
society when politics was a profession, when economic undertakings
were large enough to enable certain members to concentrate on public
relations and public service and to enter into political life as part of
their jobs.
An analysis of the data on the deputies in five Pruss ian political assemblies between 1848 and 1866 will show the relative prestige of the
occupations for public leadership.1 5 The landowners and the government officials, especially the justice officials, played the dominant role.
Each of the other occupations, the professors, merchants and industrialists, even the retired officials and officers, provided a small
number in proportion. Prussia remained, as it had been for two centuries, a state led by landowners and government officials. These two
groups merged, for the landowner usually had some official duties.
The two groups had served absolutism loyally and diligently and had
managed the subjects of the Hohenzollerns in the name of autocracy.
They claimed to reflect whatever public opinion existed, to be the
guardians of freedom and the exponents of responsible government,
that is, of government responsible to them, who in turn would attend
to the welfare of the King's other subjects. The majority of them had
become liberal in the course of the Nineteenth Century and were by
the 1860s assuming the leadership of the King's subjects in a new
capacity and in a new way. The bureaucratic leader and the agrarian
lord were being returned to the Lower House of the Landtag in
popular election to represent the public. The two were adapting
themselves to the changed conditions of society and the state; extraordinary as it may seem, they were striving to transform the old state
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and society in which they had ruled supreme under the King into a
new state and society of liberalism and German national unity.
From the beginning of the parliamentary history of the state the
prussians were impressed by the advantage of having government
officials serve as deputies. In October, 1849, Deputy Scherer had declared in the Lower House that the officials enjoyed the confidence of
the people, as one could see from the large number elected to the Landtag. Their theoretical and practical knowledge, he said, was indispensable for law-making; without their aid the Lower House would
often not know how to proceed. Certain officials were especially
suited to be deputies, Scherer stated, namely, the administrative and
the justice officials, "who through their direct and continuous contact
with the people know and understand their needs best. I mention
here for example only the Landrats and the justices of the peace."16
Almost twenty years later, Windthorst, the Catholic leader in the
Reichstag of the North German Confederation, expressed an identical
opinion. "In the present stage of development of our social and public conditions it is unthinkable," he said, "that all officials could be
excluded" from the Reichstag. He estimated that about 190 officials
held seats in the present assembly, and he regarded their participation
as a healthy sign.17
Not all government officials were equally available for election, for
some were more dependent upon the ministry than others. Two
categories should be distinguished, those in administration and those
in justice. The former were subject to disciplinary action by the
government; they could be transferred at will, from an interesting
position in a town or city like Cologne with varied social and cultural
opportunities to some monotonous work in a wretched garrison town
in Posen. Or there were those who could be retired on half pay at
::my time. Whatever their political sentiments, they usually stood in
too great dependence on the government to act very often against its
will, above all to become deputies and openly to oppose it. If they
were Conservatives, they would enjoy official support in the elections
of 1862 and 1863; but they could not win enough votes to be returned.
Few openly became members of either the Progressive party or the
Left-Center party; for apart from the fact that many were restrained
by fear of government reprisal, they had largely been retained in office
from the Manteuffel period and many were more or less opponents to

,. Abg. H., St. B., Oct. 27, 1849, p. 908.
Norddeutscher Bund,Reichstag, St. B., March 28, 1867, p. 425.
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even the mildly liberal government of the New Era. I8 Among these
administrative officials, the most likely ones for election as deputy,
the Landrats, personified as a rule the characteristics of autocracy and
caste which the liberals and democrats sought to abolish. They had
had themselves elected to the Lower House during the Manteuffel
regime and had constituted the bulwark of that reactionary rule.
Even apart from their usually reactionary views, the administrative
officials occupied a position which ill suited them for the role of elected
representatives. "1£ the opposition especially were led by them," wrote
Professor Bluntschli in his famous book Allgemeine Staatsrecht,I9 "the
unity and authority of the governmental body would be damaged; if
the ministry tried to support itself by them in the Chamber, the independence of the Chamber would be endangered. In times of vigorous
struggle the voters would, therefore, do best as a rule to elect no administrative officials outside the responsible ministers." Deputy Mathis,
a member of the Constitutional party, favored making this class of
officials ineligible for election as deputies. That the candidates and
the voters were aware of this handicap may be seen from an 1861 election appeal in Bielefeld to support the former judge and staunch
liberal Waldeck.
Do not let yourself be mislead by the illusion that an industrialist would better represent your interests or that an administrative official knows more accurately your needs.. Think of the
many considerations which an administrative official has to
think of when it is a question of opposing openly and freely the
misdeeds of the bureaucracy, and do not forget how often in
the recent past apparently liberal views in these circles have bowed before superior influences. Elect Waldeck. 20
It would be wrong to conclude that a large percentage of the administrative officials did not favor liberalism. In spite of government
pressure to support the Conservatives, many bureaucrats showed independence and courage in openly aligning with the liberals, and a
considerable number were elected as deputies. Far from having been
drilled effectively in political docility, they seem to have been convinced by the experience under the Manteuffel regime of the necessity
of liberalism; and as soon as the government of the New Era relaxed
control over their political behavior they emerged as champions of the
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new ideals. Some of them possessed independent means, for example,
Bockum-Dolffs, who was a big landowner and felt secure against any
official coercion. Most, however, occupied positions of economic dependence and felt compelled to gauge the degree of their public participation in favor of liberalism by the attitude of the ministry. When
the latter allowed such freedom, they worked for the liberal parties;
when it called them to account, they grew cautious and outwardly
reserved. The number willing to risk official punishment for the sake
of principles, however, was so large that one may regard them as the
heroes of this conflict.
The justice officials occupied a different position. They enjoyed
life tenure and were legally protected against official chicanery. They
could act with independence; they had a distinguished tradition of
preserving the laws and, whenever it became necessary, of resisting even
the royal authority in defence of the law. The story of a judge's defiance of Frederick the Great had become an essential part of Prussian
folklore. The reactionary Berliner Revue might write in 1862 that
this independence of the judiciary had become "a curse for our Fatherland"; but until Bismarck's breach of this tradition in 1864, the Prussian government had on the whole respected the independence of the
judges.21
Among the judicial officials the county judge stood closest to the
masses of the population. In a state which preserved the police
authority of the Old Regime the duties of the county judge were
necessarily wide. This official became acquainted with conditions in
the area of his jurisdiction as no other one did, not even the Landrat.
Into his court there came the everyday life, its difficulties, its problems, its hopes, its frustrations. He viewed it as a judge, seeking to act
according to the law, and imposing a code of conduct based on general
principles of equity. He had to understand the mentality of the people with whom he dealt, those brought before his court, those who
formed the society in which they lived. He saw them as they were,
and he realized what they needed in order to become better social beings. His intimate knowledge of the law enabled him to perceive how
the government worked and to comprehend by experience in what
respects the law should be changed for the welfare of the people. He
lived and acted for and was responsible to the government and to the
people at that crucial point where government and people might

11 KOlnische Zeitung, April 29, 1862. See the statement in Parisius, von HoveTbeck, J, 194, that the county judge was more iridependent than an Oberprlisident.

290

/

Prussia 1858-1864

collide. He was able to look in both directions, to know what the one
should do and what the other needed. His profession required careful
training in abstract thinking, in thinking through and testing general
principles by practical application. He had other criteria than the
Landrat's standards of administrative utility, caste or class interest, and
prejudice. He could not imitate the Landrat and other administrative
officials in clearing his mind of some unfair or inhuman act by throwing the responsibility upon the government or upon orders from his administrative superiors; he had another criterion, the law, and another
guide, his own conscience. He served as natural leader of the locality,
a person whom one could respect and trust, a person thoroughly acquainted with the locality and its needs, known to everyone, and independent of official or of any other kind of pressure. His liberalism
reflected the wish to make his knowledge useful. The New Era opened
the way to political activity, and he became one of the heroes of the
constitutional conflict, fighting in the vanguard especially of the Progressive party.
The county judge as a political leader aroused the severe criticism
of some other liberals, particularly those to the right politically and
those who prided themselves on their superior wisdom. The Constitutional party leader from Konigsberg, von Simson, a judge of a higher
court, complained in March, 1861, about the doctrinaire spirit of the
county judges, of whom he said there were seventy-two in the Lower
House.
They wish to conduct politics acconiing to the articles of the
legal code, and oppose the ministry in everything; whoever has
relations with the ministry is an unreliable person to them ...
for in their opinion they were sent here to control the ministry.
That is their conception of parliamentary government, and they
consider it their duty in all cases to oppose the government. They
cannot go calmly to bed at night without the feeling of having
attacked the ministry during the day.22
Since von Simson supported the mildly liberal government of the New
Era, his opinion scarcely partook of that judicious frame of mind appropriate to one of his profession. The county judges understood
the mood and wishes of the people far better than this gentlemen did,
and they aimed to act as befitted representatives of the people, not as
persons trying to humor the ministers, who in turn were trying to
humor the ruler. The deputies were learning the ways of politics and
making mistakes in methods and procedures; but they were also, as
•• Von Bernhardi. op. cit., IV. 103.
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another liberal crItIC, Professor von Sybel, was soon to discover, defending principles, the bases of a free way of life; and they were doing
so tenaciously.
While the presence of such a large percentage of officials in the
Lower House caused some complaint from both agrarian and industrial
and commercial groups, the criticism did not assume any significance
in political relations and party affiliations, and it did not affect the
course of events. Except among the Conservatives, the use of politics
as a major means of protecting or furthering special economic interests
had not begun. The political issues involved the character of fundamental Prussian institutions, whether the country should preserve
caste structure, autocracy and mercantilism or become liberal. Until
these issues were settled, controversy among the liberals over representation of economic interests could scarcely serve any purpose. Why
quarrel over the proportion of occupational representation until one
knew what authority, what role in the state the representatives would
have?
The criticism is nonetheless of value for understanding the social
and occupational background of political activity of the period. In
analyzing the composition of the Lower House elected in 1863, a
writer in the Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift noted that the rural population was under-represented. It constituted two-thirds of the people,
he said, but not even one-third of the deputies consisted of landowners.
The urban population predominated; but even in this element only
some forty deputies actively engaged in business, while the others were
government officials, teachers, professors, lawyers, physicians, and so
on. The reasoning and reflecting elements in the population predominated, the writer stated, and he deplored the fact that the same
persons approved the taxes as deputies and spent the money as officials.
Nonetheless, he said, the Lower House was a truly representative body_
Although, he concluded, it would be an exaggeration to say that the
entire people stood behind the House, a real and significant proportion
gave it full support. 23
While the author of the analysis correctly judged the dominant
driving force of the urban elements in the political struggle for a
liberal society, the fact that agriculturalists constituted nearly onethird of the Lower House and in number ranked only slightly behind
the officials requires explanation. The conditions of their kind of
life must have enabled them to assume this active political role. The
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peasantry can be eliminated at once from consideration;· it provided
no deputies. It lacked the political interest, the training, the selfconfidence, and the time to serve as deputy. A peasant felt that he
had to concentrate on the cultivation of his piece of land, if he had
any; and he was accustomed to leaving state affairs to the upper classes.
The large and middle-sized landowners or cultivators of large rented
holdings assumed the leadership of the rural population, whether
Conservative or liberal, and were elected as deputies to the Landtag.
Agriculture made them independent of government and enabled them
to decide matters for themselves. The ruler and the bureaucracy could
cause them social discomfort and many inconveniences, but could not
deprive them of their economic self-sufficiency. The seasonal nature
of agiculture enabled them to leave for several months to serve in the
Lower House without suffering economic harm. In some cases their
holdings were large enough to require the service of a manager, to
whom responsibility could be given during their absence in the Landtag. They were accustomed to political activity and leadership in the
county and provincial Landtags; and they felt responsible toward the
rest of the population, especially the rural, for the protection and
furtherance of common interests. They did not stop at rural affairs,
however, but endeavored to concern themselves with the welfare of
the state as a whole. They knew a good deal about government from
having the responsibility for police and judicial matters in their
locality. Since even in the late Eighteenth Century agriculture had
begun to assume capitalistic methods, many of these agrarians had
characteristics and interests in common with the capitalistic urban
population. The community between the two groups had increased
in the Nineteenth Century by the rapid turnover of landed property
and its purchase by urban families who had turned agrarian.
The industrial and commercial forces of the population showed a
low percentage of occupational representation in the Lower House,
a percentage which at the time expressed fairly accurately their number but which was out of proportion to their economic role in the state.
As far as economic independence was concerned, they could withstand
government pressure as well as the agrarians. Nor did the economic
leaders suffer from lack of political knowledge and social self-confidence. They had definite objectives in view, summed up in the term
liberalism. They were accustomed to participating in town and city
affairs, and for several decades they had been taking an increasing
interest in state and national matters. As potential political leaders
in the state they suffered from one serious handicap. Unlike the upperclass agrarians, they had as a rule to attend constantly to their business.
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The dynamics of capitalistic activity were particularly strong in these
years of the 1850s and 1860s with the great expansion of industry and
commerce, and to seize opportunities these persons had to remain
closely at their business. The international crises, the Crimean War,
the wars of Italian unification and the American Civil War, enhanced
the uncertainty. The businessmen of sufficient prominence to be
elected as deputies rarely had time to assume the responsibility.
Even if the leading business personnel had felt free to serve as deputies, they would not have regarded themselves as exponents of
special material interests; they would rather have worked for the establishment of legal conditions making possible the development of a
liberal state and society. In this society industry and commerce would
enjoy the advantages of freedom from the mercantilist state, and the
middle classes would share the benefits of social equality and selfgovernment; but these would accrue to everyone in the entire state,
and not merely to the industrial and commercial interests. Although
in the last part of 1861 the Berliner Borsen Zeitung24 wished that more
persons in commerce and industry would serve as deputies, the general
attitude of business, expressed in a meeting of the merchants' association in Konigsberg in July of that year, was that in view of the seriousness of the times a deputy representing the entire people was needed
more than one to look after special business interests. Even at that
early date business interests preferred to play an indirect role. 25
The popularity of the professor as a public leader had declined
since 1848. Conditions had changed, and needs and experience had
modified the conception of the kind of person to choose as deputy in
the Landtag. A long editorial in the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung
of October 30, 1861, described the characteristics of an able representative. He should have sound judgment about the general world situation, especially about the situation of the fatherland and the immediate
tasks of legislation. He should possess a general knowledge of state
finances and of the productivity of the people. He should have a good,
all-round education and a general understanding of Prussian government, but he should not be expected to be acquainted in detail with
all the matters with which he would be called upon to deal. He could
find plenty of experts to supply him with the special information. He
should be firm and dependable in his views and never sacrifice prin-
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ciples. Of course, he had at times to make concessions on points, but
he should do so only for the purpose of furthering the implementation
of his fundamental principles. The writer of the editorial had an
entirely different kind of person in mind from the all-wise professor,
the examiner of the Prussian people, the master of the classroom, the
friend of pure ideals, the expert on everything. The writer was working toward a conception of a representative who should not personify
what the people should be or do but who should represent what they
were and what they specifically wished. The writer lacked the experience necessary to clarify this conception fully, but he showed remarkable improvement over the thinking of 1848. That he stressed the
importance of firm defence of principles reflected the actual needs of
the situation. The political conflict between liberals and government
involved differences of principle of the most fundamental kind. In
such a time men of character were far more essential than persons of
expert knowledge.
In every period of parliamentary history some individuals personify the qualities which a representative should not have and some
others display those which constitute the ideal type. As nearly as it is
possible to select any individuals for these roles for the early 1860s one
might choose Freiherr von Vincke to illustrate the first and SchulzeDelitzsch the second.
A Westphalian aristocrat and one of the most prominent liberal
leaders in the New Era, von Vincke failed as a party or fraction leader.
He split the party to which he belonged, and after having had great
difficulty in obtaining a seat in 1862, he was defeated in the election
in the next year. Stubborn and haughty, he had an exceptional faculty
for transforming any minor difference of opinion into a moral issue
and a personal affront. Heedless of political effect he was irascible,
bold with words, easy in the use of irony and in denunciation, and
quick to attack. His liberalism in principle was unquestioned. He
had a reputation for being a leader of the people, an aristocrat who
understood the peasant and defended the interests of the lower classes.
He publicly attacked fellow aristocrats, democrats, or his own colleagues with the fury and the wealth of expression of his extraordinary
mind. The National Assembly of 1848, Waldeck, anyone who opposed
him received ample attention. He was too proud to ask anyone to
vote for him and he refused to report to anyone on his actions as
representative. In March, 1861, the Magdeburger Zeitung accused
him of servility and erratic conduct. One day he praised Garibaldi
and the Revolution, and the next day, it said, he put on his uniform
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of the Order of St. John and appeared at a big political festival as a
colleague of the Conservative. A year later after even more experience, the same newspaper drew up a balance sheet on von Vincke as
follows. He was a crank who was incapable of being a party leader.
H he had lived a hundred years earlier, he would have been a very
liberal person. Unfortunately he was born too late. His father had
praised the English for having already undermined the system of entail
in the Fifteenth Century. Since 1848 the son had been fighting for the
preservation of this aristocratic privilege in Prussia. His father believed in and practiced equality, whereas, said the paper, during his
entire life the son had struggled unsuccessfully against his own Junker
traits. 26
Von Vincke refused to cooperate with the Progressive party and
split his own party over the issue. He was blamed by some for having
misled the liberals at the beginning of the New Era into provisionally
approving the money for the military reforms and for having thereby
caused all the subsequent trouble. When the conflict broke out, so
his critics asserted, he withdrew from politics and declared that his
duties as guardian of minors were more important than those of Landtag deputy and party leader.27 As the Magdeburger Zeitung said,
he remained an aristocrat of the age of caste and privilege, and his
retention of the characteristics of that type in the period of political
parties, parliaments, and the spreading social forms of liberalism
doomed him to political failure.
Heinrich Schulze had had in the course of time the name of his
birth place, DeIitzsch, added to his name in order to distinguish him
from the numerous other Schulzes to be found in Germany. The custom was not uncommon; it was applied to him of necessity as he became famous. His family lacked any mark of distinction; but the
social changes occurring in the two middle quarters of the Nineteenth
Century offered him opportunities to rise in the world. After studying
law he served as county judge and soon became interested in organizing
cooperative associations for helping the handworkers to maintain themselves in the developing industrialism. Since participation as a democrat in the Revolution of 1848 ruined any expectation of an official
career, he devoted his energy to the cause of the cooperatives and to
other forms of non-official public activity. His sympathy for the
•• Tagesbericht, No. 62, March 14, 1861, summarizing an article in Allgemeine Zeitung, Berlin; No. 59, March II, 1861, quoting the Magdeburger Zeitung; Konigsberg
Hartungsche Zeitung, June 1, 1862.
27 Wochenschrift des National Vereins, May 2, 1867.
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lower urban groups and his struggle by means of cooperatives to prevent the handworkers of the lower middle class from succumbing to
industrial competition and becoming proletariat endeared him to both
handworkers and the developing bourgeoisie. The latter hoped that
he had found the solution to this particular social problem and would
overcome the threat of socialism. He wrote numerous articles and
books, edited a journal, and earned a deserved reputation as a brilliant
popular orator. The position which he developed for himself made
him a point of contact between the upper and lower classes, between
capitalism and the handicrafts, between the small town and even the
village on the one hand and the city on the other. He was equally at
ease and equally welcome and respected in the home of a small craftsman, a peasant, a wealthy industrialist, and an able and distinguished
professor. His reputation spread over the state as that of an honorable,
courageous friend of the people.
Schulze-Delitzsch personified the ideals of liberal democracy, and
he understood these ideals in their practical working and in their full
social implications as almost no other Pruss ian leader did. His
speeches and writings disclosed a mind which had thought through
the democratic principles to their simplest elements. Among the many
confused utterances of this highly verbal generation of liberals his
assertions possessed the clarity and emotional conviction of a man who
appreciated the meaning of his own words. In the early months of .
the New Era the contrast between the precision of his views and the
too often theoretical nature of those of his liberal colleagues, even
the ablest and most learned, was striking. As the conflict with Bismarck grew in bitterness the liberals were forced to use Schulze's ideals
as the logical conclusion of their position. They had to go beyond
their own compromising or halfway views to the fundamentals of
their ideal objectives. The fury of the battle with Bismarck and the
sudden collapse of their defence in 1866 prevented them from cornprehending the full meaning of their ideological assertions, and many
of them surrendered to Realpolitik. With Schulze-Delitzsch these
democratic ideals, more akin to English liberalism than those of other
Germans, had become too firmly embedded in his character for him to
change. The surprising fact was that although his policies and ideals
were far more liberal than those of most of his colleagues he enjoyed
such wide popularity. In November, 1861, the National Zeitung of
Berlin declared in an editorial that "today throughout the entire
state from the East Prussian to the French frontier no name is more
popular than that of Schulze-Delitzsch and no one is considered more

The Liberal Parties I

297

indispensable for the Lower House than he is." Needless to say,
FreiheIT von Vincke did not agree with this estimate. 28
In discussing the subject of local political leadership among the
liberals, one must distinguish among three types of situations, that in
a rural community, that in an urban center with wide and diversified
economic interests and relations, and that in a town which remained
primarily dependent upon the economy of the surrounding rural area.
The first type was to be found over most of the state, but particularly
in the Central and Eastern provinces. The second type was most
numerous in Westphalia and the Rhineland, but included towns and
cities like Berlin in other provinces. The third type predominated in
the Eastern provinces. The social composition of each entailed essential distinctions in the nature of the political leadership.
Rural life presented natural obstacles to the development of new
political organizations and leadership which under existing conditions
were almost insurmountable. The scattered distribution of the people
and poor transportation facilities made it difficult to hold meetings for
political discussion and agitation. Instead of election committees, as
among the urban people, the rural communities depended for guidance upon the traditional leaders. In the village the Schulze assumed
the new role as an extension of his regular functions, and he carried out
the responsibility of close personal rapport with the villagers in the
same way as he did his other duties. The class consciousness of the
rural population made it difficult for even a liberal landowner of the
upper class to join peasants in any kind of equalitarian election committee; neither lord nor peasant would have felt at ease in such an
organization, and both would have regarded it as superfluous. The
upper classes in the rural areas lacked the diversity of interests and the
actual numbers necessary to make a formal committee.
The urban centers offered a situation favorable to the emergence of
political leadership. The large numbers of voters, the complexity of
interests involved, the habits of discussion, and the availability of
instruments and personnel for political action made the conscious
selection of leaders necessary and possible. The Constitutional party
tended not to encourage the development of new local leadership; but
the other liberal parties sought to arouse the initiative of local individuals in all occupational groups, except those like the day laborer

•• National Zeitung, Nov. 22. 1861. See also the enthusiasm of Konigsberg liberals
for him. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 27. 1861. Numerous other examples
could be given.
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and the industrial worker, who still lacked social and political significance.
The best evidence about the personnel of the local leadership can
be seen in the membership of the election committees. Except for
certain officials subject to direct government pressure, the lists contained the names of the most prominent members of the community.
They showed that in spite of the unwillingness of merchants and industrialists as a rule to take the time to serve as Landtag deputies,
these groups devoted many hours of service to secure the election of
liberals from their district and were actively concerned not merely
with municipal affairs but with problems of state and national life.
The lists also included the names of numerous officials, judicial, and
administrative, and those in such fields as education. They revealed
that the dominant influence lay with the economic upper bourgeoisie
but that associated with them were the other local middle-class leaders,
the newspaper editors, the professors and teachers, the doctors and the
lawyers. Although furnishing some personnel for the local committees,
the handworkers lacked the power and drive of their wealthy colleagues.
In the Western provinces of the Rhineland and Westphalia the
division of function in the economy had progressed sufficiently by the
1860s for the main lines of the society of industrialism to appear. Urban
centers had become so plentiful and large that the population of
numerous towns no longer depended mainly upon the immediate rural
neighborhood for their market and the source of their supplies and
income. The expansion of economic interest beyond the locality or
immediate region had been accompanied by a growing social differentiation and the establishment of political organizations predominantly
or exclusively for the urban population. The rural people assumed a
secondary role. They tended to look to the urban centers for guidance
and initiative; and while they cooperated with their more aggressive
urban compatriots, they did so in the position rather of a follower than
ora group of comparable or equal political interest and influence. Industrialists, bankers, insurance directors appeared as political leaders
in the locality and province along with the traditional merchants.
With increasing industrialization, the professions became specialized
and assumed new functions. The lawyer in particular appeared more
and more as the exponent of industrial interests, frequently in the
capacity of public representative, of secretary or executive head of an
organization set up t9 further certain interests. Government officials
assumed much less significance as public leaders than in those prov-
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inces where industrialism had not yet broken into the old structure of
society. Where an election committee for a province was established,
the owners or managers of .large landed estates hardly figured at all.
An analysis of the structure of a few election committees will
illustrate the political significance of the occupational changes in
Westphalia and the Rhineland. The liberal election committee of
Dortmund called a meeting of political leaders of the province for the
purpose, among others, of discussing the advisability of creating an
election committee for the entire province. The meeting, held at
Hamm early in November, 1861, approved the proposal and selected a
committee composed of five lawyers, two other professional persons,
one school director, three justice officials, one former administrative
official, one estate-owner, one physician, three merchants, one surveyor, and five industrialists. 29 At about the same time an election
committee was created in Mulheim and Siegburg which consisted of
one estate-owner, one teacher, one justice official, one physician, three
industrialists, and two city councillors. At Dusseldorf, a similar committee contained a more diversified personnel-two painters, one writer,
one editor, one director of an institute, one watchmaker, one apothecary, one estate-owner, one innkeeper, one justice official, one director,
one retired colonel, four merchants, nine industrialists, two lawyers,
two other professional persons, and one with no occupation listed.
Others were added later. In Cologne the local committee included
three city councillors, one of whom was a prominent textile manufacturer, two justice officials, one gymnastics teacher, one director, one
banker, one master tailor, two lawyers, one assessor, one writer, one
bookseller, two merchants, and one without a profession listed. Of
the membership on all these committees, only four belonged to the
nobility-a director, a retired colonel, an industrialist, and an estateowner.so
The campaign in 1863 aroused much more bitterness throughout
Prussia than any preceding one and caused the liberals of all shades
to unite in opposition to the government. At Halle in September a
large liberal committee was organized for the elections. The personnel
indicated the occupational spread of the liberal groups. It contained
one banker, one brewer, eleven merchants, ten industrialists, two city
councillors, three justice officials, one lawyer, two other professional

•• National Zeitung, Nov. 6, 1861.
30 National Zeitung, Nov. 14, 5, 10. 1861. City councillors were in every town
usually prominent businessmen or persons closely related to busines.
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persons, one confectioner, one bookseller, five professors, one master
saddle maker, two millers, one agriculturalist, a master cabinetmaker,
five local officials, one mining official, one owner of a printing establishment, one retired official, one landscape gardener, one director, two
estate-owners, two owners of noble estates, one rentier, and twO for
whom no occupation is given. Of this group, one person belonged
to the nobility.
For Berlin the urban pattern was revealed clearly in the personnel
of the election committees for each of the four electoral districts and
substantiates the conclusions drawn with respect to the Western provinces. As the capital of the state, however, Berlin showed a certain
distribution of occupational emphasis which was lacking elsewhere.
The importance of the capital as a center for news enhanced the political role of the press and of newspaper editors; at the same time it
offered opportunities for persons to live by serving private organizations intended for public purposes. Hence the Berlin election committees contained representatives of these two occupations to a greater
extent than elsewhere. If in the industrial cities of the West the
executive secretary or public relations expert for economic associatio~s
was appearing as a type, in Berlin the same kind of person was beginning to find an occupation with a wider variety of associations than
economic ones. Berlin also offered a third type of public figure, the
retired official who now stayed in public life by means of political
activity, the town councillor and other persons who were beginning to
make a career of public life.
The membership of the election committees of the Progressives and
center or left liberals in Silesian towns and cities varied from that in
the Western provinces. It included, relatively speaking, more members of the older occupations, merchants and handicraftsmen, and fewer
industrialists. Nonetheless, all the important occupational groups
found representation on these committees. The merchant particularly
remained the prominent leader. At Gorlitz in July, 1861, the election
committee contained twenty-three members-one master coppersmith,
one agent, one estate-owner, one cloth manufacturer, one engineer, one
lawyer, one gold worker, one watchmaker, four town councillors who
were usually prominent merchants or industrialists, one merchant, one
factory owner, one justice official, one iron merchant, one master
carpenter, one Economic Commission Councillor, and four editors.
A few months later a committee in Liegnitz number~d three noble
estate-owners, a banker, a schoolmaster, and two without occupation
given. Two members belonged to the nobility. Of the noble estate-
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owners one had the rank of Freiherr, another also belonged to the
nobility, and the third had the title of lieutenant. For Breslau the
committee in April, 1861, contained a lawyer, three merchants, a
physician, a non-conformist preacher, and two whose occupation was
not listed. By November the membership had changed and consisted
of a lawyer, three merchants, an editor, a banker, an accountant, a
master furrier, and a bricklayer.31
The committees organized in East Prussia expressed the predominant significance of commerce and agriculture, and the interdependence of these two economic activities. Relations between town
and country had to be close, for, except in a very few coastal cities, industry had hardly begun to emancipate the towns and cities from
major dependence upon the locality. The committees were frequently dominated by rural agrarian leaders instead of townsmen.
Government officials constituted the third element of leadership. In
the committee for Niederung county in 1861 the relationship is clear
-two justice officials, three estate-owners, a lawyer, and one other
professional person .. Not a single member belonged to the nobility.
The committee for the rural counties of Insterburg and Gumbinnen
showed a different occupational interest, but the same dominant position of agrarians-a master bricklayer, a merchant, a justice official, a
schoolmaster, and six agrarians. The difference between the occupational makeup of the committee for these predominantly rural
counties and the one for the electoral district composed of Konigsberg
and Fischhausen counties grew out of the location of the city of
Konigsberg in the latter. Commerce and the university received places
on the committee which lent it a distinctly urban character. Industrialists were absent from it, while handworkers played a considerable role. The membership of the committee reflected the economy and society of the pre-industrial period. On the committee
there served in May, 1862, two town councillors, (one retired), a bank
director, six estate-owners, one estate-renter, two professors, a consul
(which means that he was also a merchant), a master cabinetmaker,
a lawyer, a master shoemaker, four merchants, a master bricklayer,
two physicians. 32
Although not as selective as in the case of the election committees,
further evidence about local leadership may be gained from an analysis

31 National Zeitung, July 23, Oct. 10, Nov. 23, 1861; Polizei·Bericht, Breslau, April
15, 1861.
I I Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Sept. 4, July 27, 1861.

302

/

Prussia 1858-1864

of the occupational compositIOn of the electors. The membership
varied according to the nature of the economy in the same way as did
that of the election committees. While it is impossible to differentiate
between those who voted liberal and those who voted Conservative,
the fact that persons of certain occupations were chosen as electors has
some bearing on the question of the occupational distribution of political interest and prestige.
Judging from samples of urban and rural areas in the East, West,
and Center of the state, the electors represented the main groups of the
voters even more accurately than the committees did. Only those of
the lowest income, such as the day laborers in both town and country,
were usually lacking. At the election of April, 1862, in one district
in the Western provinces, the voters chose among the 460 electors 222
from trade and industry, sixty-four handworkers, twenty-two military,
twenty rentiers, seventeen brewers, fourteen advocates, thirteen innkeepers, twelve administrative, judicial, and city officials, nine physicians, five apothecaries, one pastor, one teacher, one writer, and three
lawyers. The dominant influence lay with the business representatives;
the handicrafts ranked a poor second, and the other occupations showed such a scattered return as to be relatively unimportant. 33 At the
Eastern end of the state the counties of Konigsberg and Fischhausen
chose electors in keeping with the character of the area. Of a total of
704 electors elected in 1862, 402 were re-elected, and 302 were new.
The electors were composed of 153 handworkers and tradesmen, 103
merchants, 258 estate-owners, landowners and rentiers, six inn or
tavern keepers, thirty-two physicians, apothecaries, writers, booksellers,
printers, artists, thirteen agriculturalists, ten apprentices and workers,
fifteen teachers, eleven pastors, twenty-two communal officials, eightyone royal officials and military personnel.34 In this area where agriculture and commerce predominated, where apart from Konigsberg
the towns remained small and largely rural in character, one would
rightly expect merchants, handworkers, and agrarians to show the
largest number of electors. Nonetheless, the size of the group of officials
and military personnel is impressive evidence that in this region the
old structure of society-merchant, handworker, agrarian, and official
and officer-remained in control.
Berlin, as the capital and the largest city in the state, revealed in the.
occupational spread of its electors the rapid change into industrial

.. Kolnische Zeitung, May I, 1862 .
.. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, May 4, 1862.
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society. Among the electors chosen in 1863 were some 550 merchants,
240 industrialists, seventeen brewers and distillers, three bankers,
forty-three listed as city councillors, who were most likely also
prominent in the same fields, and 325 handworkers. The last-named
igure is undoubtedly misleading, for many handicrafts had already
begun to assume capitalistic proportions-the building industry, clothing, furniture, and other industries exploiting the market provided by
a large concentrated population-and they must be classed with the
industrialists and merchants. The attractiveness of Berlin as a
residence accounts for the 125 rentiers and the eleven estate-owners,
and 150 officials would not be an excessive number for a city of
bureaucrats. That 120 physicians, apothecaries, and assistants in the
field of health should have been politically active points to the opportunities in the city for members of these professions and to their
characteristic interest in politics at this period, not merely in Prussia
but in other countries. When added together, the number of teachers,
professors, doctors of philosophy, writers, editors, artists, booksellers,
and publishers chosen as electors seems unusually large. They totaled
almost 200, a showing that could not be equaled even on a proportionate scale in any other city in the state.35
By way of comparison, the electors in the villages and in rural areas
in general consisted of peasants, Schulzes and the owners or renters of
landed estates. The estate-owners and other agrarians were elected and
served along with the representatives of the inferior and more numerous lower class. A teacher, a pastor, or handworker frequently served
for the rural community in the same capacity.
Affiliated Organizations
In May, 1860, the Prussian police received a report from one of its
secret agents about a discussion among guests in Habel's Restaurant
on Unter den Linden, Berlin. The guests had spoken at length about
the establishment of ever more political and other Vereins not merely
in Berlin but throughout Germany. The agent reported:
It was said that if the relevant officials do not soon restrict
this activity entirely or at least somewhat and particularly do not
observe and control it more carefully, Germany will in a few
years have another revolution. The present-day youth, especial-

•• See A. M. Hayn, Die Abgeordneten-Wahl fur Berlin am 28. Okt., 1863 mit der
Nachwahl im 1. Wahl·Bezirk am 16. Nov., 1863 (Berlin, 1863). Preuss. Geh. Staats·
archiv·Dahlem. Pro Br. Rep. 30, Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, W. 178.
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ly, is being totally corrupted by these associations, for there is an
almost incredible rage ... to become a member of some association. Almost daily, for example, here in Berlin little clubs are
being formed under some favored name in beer halls, private
residences, even in schools which, although they seem to be
harmless, may become dangerous to the state.36
The report did not exaggerate the vogue. About a year later
(March 21, 1861) a writer to the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung
from the little town of Gumbinnen in East Prussia doubted whether a
Schiller Verein could be established there because of the large number
of Vereins already in existence. Handworker Verein, Gesang-Verein,
National Verein, Charity Verein, Orphan Verein, Credit Verein, Peace
Verein, Gustavus Adolphus Verein, Agricultural Verein, Bible Society,
Town Club, lodges, and other Vereins already existed. The article
spoke of "a certain Verein satiation."
Except for the economic ones, the list contained the names of the
typical associations for all Prussia. The New Era produced in every
field of activity organizations which strove to spread over all Germany
and to supply the popular basis for political unification and liberalism.
Within a decade after the Revolution of 1848 the population sought
forms for the expression of its wishes which would a second time be
effective. It created them in religion, education, politics, cultural and
social affairs and economics. In Prussia, although to a varying extent,
people from all classes and occupations participated. The townspeople took the lead, but many burgher and aristocratic agrarians with
large estates joined the movement, and even handworkers and peasants
participated as much as they could. The only groups lacking were the
Conservative aristocrats and their followers, numerically a small minority. While most Vereins were unable to exert much influence upon state
action, they did express the longing of the popular masses. In the case
of certain economic associations, the Pruss ian and the German Commercial Associations, the Congress of German Economists, the various
organizations of mining interests, of iron and steel, and of other special
interests, the power controlled by them had to be respected even by
the Prussian government.
The new stir and movement in national public life originated in
North and Central Germany, that is, in Germany north of the Main.
The drive was associated primarily with the expansion of industrial
and commercial activity in the 1850s, the establishment of banks, the

a. Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94. Lit. 7.
377, Vol. II.
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construction of railroads. and the creation of insurance companies.
It was accompanied by a rise in prices. pardy the effect of the in-

creased amounts of gold available from California. and was manifested
in an outburst of entrepreneurial spirit and optimistic speculation.
The new forces were getting well under way when the commercial
crisis of 1857 struck them and made clearer than ever before that
golden opportunities were at hand if only. in Prussia. the bureaucratic
state would drop its social and mercantilist paternalism and grant the
private economic interests the freedom to take the initiative. All the
demands or objectives of all the associations merged in liberalism and
national unity.
The organizations provided essential means by which liberal persons
of various classes and occupations could participate actively in public
affairs. Membership enabled individuals to work for liberalism and
nationalism without having to run the risk of joining a political party.
The organizations concentrated on building a liberal society as a
necessary foundation for liberal politics. They all opposed common
enemies, absolutism and the conservative society of the Old Regime,
monarchy by divine right, feudal aristocracy, caste and privilege, and
state particularism. As we have seen, the freedom of the individual
entailed the rise in importance of each person; with each person free,
active. conscious of his own worth, able to take the initiative, the feeling of nationalism would grow, the feeling of the importance of the
nation as a brotherhood of intelligent. alert, self-reliant individuals
united by the common national bond. The unification of the nation
would have to follow from the pressure of these free individuals; the
enemies of national unity, the same enemies as those of liberalism,
would be compelled to give way.
The close relationship between these organizations and the Prussian
political parties or fractions was substantiated at both the highest level
of leadership and at the lowest. The prior existence of these non-party
organizations made it possible for the political parties and faction~ of
the New Era to build upon them and to become strong quickly. The
Progressive party actually grew out of the Pruss ian units ofthe National
Verein. The name "Progressive," already being used by new political
groups in other states, had been sponsored and popularized by the
Verein. The addition of the name "German" to the title of the Progressive party in Prussia was suggested by the same source and attested
to the growing respectability and prestige of such a revolutionary act.
A few examples from localities in different areas of Prussia will
show the value of the organizations to liberal politics. They pertain
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primarily to the two most active political groups, the Progressive and
the Left-Center, but even the Constitutional party members took an
active interest in the organizations and, although to a lesser extent,
shared the benefits of their work. In the small town of Pillau in the
far northeast corner of Prussia the local members of the National Verein met late in July, 1861, and in preparation for the next election to
the Lower House agreed to establish a local election committee which
by co-optation should expand into a committee for the entire county.
Two months later the meeting of the National Verein, after discussing
the forthcoming elections, decided to draw up a list of candidates for
electors in Pillau. 37 At Danzig the local members of the National
Verein in February, 1861, sent thanks to the forty-two deputies in the
Lower House who had voted for the liberal Stavenhagen Amendment. 3s
In July of the same year the Danzig conference of the National Verein
of the provinces of Prussia, Pomerania and Posen approved almost unanimously the program of the Progressive party and involved itself
further in politics by passing, among others, two resolutions,39 one in
favor of electing to the Landtag men who would work for national
unity, the other in favor of the complete transformation of the Upper
House. In September the local members of the National Verein in
Danzig agreed that it was time to begin activity for the election of
deputies to the Lower House, but they thought it advisable to consider
the matter in a special meeting called for that purpose. 40
In Elbing the Economic Congress,41 instead of the National Verein,
. played the political role. Deputy von Forckenbeck reported to the
Congress in February, 1861, about the split in the von Vincke fraction
in the Lower House. A year later the Congress concentrated upon the
consideration of the matters before the Lower House, became entirely
political in its interests, and discussed in some detail the liberal legislation before the Landtag. It was educating the local pop'ulation in
political affairs. The next month it laid plans for the campaign for
the elections to the Lower House. As the report of the meeting stated,
"We are sufficiently well organized to be able by the activity of our
trustworthy associates in the smaller centers to compensate at present
for the lack of mass activity."42 That is to say, the Economic Congress

'7 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung,

Aug. 2, Sept. 17, 1861.
•• Tagesbericht, No. 46, Feb. 23, 1861, from Volkszeitung.
•• National Zeitung, July 30, 1861; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, July 28, 1861.
40 Ibid., Sept. 14, 1861.
.. This was the regional unit of the Congress of German Economists .
•• Tagesbericht, No. 44, Feb. 21, 1861, based on Neuer Elbinger Anzeiger, No.
1679; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Feb. 9, March 18, 1862.
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supplied the organization and the contacts for conducting the political
campaign. Deputy von Forckenbeck participated in the meeting and
delivered a speech defending his and his party colleague's action in the
Landtag.
In the counties Osterburg and Stendal in the Altmark, according
to an article in the National Zeitung of December 11, 1861, the activity
of the members of the National Verein had been mainly responsible
for breaking the domination of the Conservatives and returning liberal
deputies by a large majority. At Halle the local members of the same
organization passed a resolution in August, 1861, which manifested the
interdependence of the program of the National Verein and of the
liberal political movement in Prussia. Goerlitz and Breslau in Silesia
were centers of similar endeavor: the National Verein took a vigorous
part in politics and campaigned for liberals. In Breslau it included
as members persons belonging to the Progressive party and to the
Constitutional party; on national affairs, the two could cooperate. At
Elberfeld on October 6, 1861, Schulze-Delitzsch spoke to about 800 to
900 members and friends of the National Verein on the relation of
the members of that association to the election. He advised against its
taking the campaign actively in hand, but he said that participation
of its members in the election campaign was "natural and necessary,"
and he defended the program of the Progressive party as a coalition of
democratic and constitutional members of the Lower House. In nearby Dortmund the Navy Committee actually transformed itself in
October, 1861, into an election committee with a full-fledged liberal
program. 43
Almost every organization in the towns and cities became a center
of politics in support of liberalism. At Magdeburg late in 1861 the
Conference of Elder Merchants heard one of its members, a deputy
in the Lower House, emphasize how absolutely necessary it was for
more merchants, industrialists, and other businessmen to be elected
to the Lower House than heretofore; for, he said, the most important
business was transacted in committees and more experts in economic
affairs were needed. 44
The town and city councils, composed of elected representatives,
and the Biirgervereins extended their activity into politics, not merely

•• National Zeitung, Aug. 22, 1861; Tagesbericht, No. 56, March 7, 1861, from
Breslauer Zeitung, No. 109; Volkszeitung, March 19, 1862; National Zeitung, Sept. 20,
1861; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 11, 1861; National Zeitung, Oct. 12,
1861.
.. Berliner Borsen.Zeitung, Dec. 5, 1861.
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by passing resolutions in support of the Lower House against the King
and the government but by furthering the election of trustworthy
deputies. The meetings of the councils offered excellent opportunities
for discussing election matters and planning the campaign. A few
examples may be chosen from many. The council in Unna, a small
town in Westphalia, called a meeting of the local citizens in January,
1862, at which it was decided to organize a Biirgerverein for the discussion of political and communal affairs. At Stralsund the local
Biirgerverein, which in 1848 had opposed the Revolution and had since
then kept free of political discussion, in 1861 changed its policy and its
views and by an overwhelming majority became a supporter of the
Progressive party. Two of its oldest directors resigned from the Verein
in consequence; but the vote in the Verein of Il5 to 39 in favor of the
Progressive Landtag candidate could not be changed by such an act.
At Magdeburg the Biirgerverein invited the two deputies in Berlin
to speak to it about the developments in the Landtag. 45
In Ravensberg the liberals founded a Culture Verein which sought
to spread information and enlighten people in all classes of society
"in a liberal sense." This type of Verein became popular as a means
of educating the public in the new ways of constitutional government,
of keeping it informed about state affairs and of having an effective
means of exerting influence in a liberal direction. In Breslau in 1861
the leading citizens organized a Verein of Supporters of the Constitution with III members. In Dortmund a similar one, called "Progress,"
was intended to discuss political questions at regular meetings and
especially to follow the debates in the Landtag. At Bonn, one took the
name of Constitutional Verein.46
One of the most effective and widespread centers of political life
proved to be the Stadtische Ressource, a social club for the middle
class, found usually in every town and city. As an organization already
in existence, it offered opportunities for the citizens, ostensibly assembled for social purposes, to talk politics, to hear speeches supposedly of a non-political character, and to plan steps in favor of liberalism.
The one in Breslau may be used as an example. The police reported
•• Tagesbericht, No. 26, Jan. 31, 1862, citing Westfiilische Zeitung, No. 26; see
also National Zeitung, June 3, 1863; J. Stein, Geschichte der Stadt Breslau im 19.
Jahrhundert, pp. 603-04; Tagesbericht, No. 34, Feb. 10, 1862, citing Kolnische Zeitung, No. 39; Tagesbericht, No. 53, March 4, 1862, Magdeburger Zeitung, No. 52.
•• Tagesbericht, No. 20, Jan. 24, 1862, citing Elberfelder Zeitung, No. 24; PolizeiBericht, Breslau, Feb. II, 1861; Tagesbericht, No. 22, Jan. 27, 1862, citing Westfiilische Zeitung, No. 22; Tagesbericht, No.1, Jan. 2, 1862, citing Kolnische Zeitung,
No.1.
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to the government in March, 1860, that the Stadtische Ressource
formed, together with the Morgen Zeitung, the center of democratic
endeavor in Breslau. With 383 members it had recently begun to expand its activities by petitions and addresses. It had passed a resolution in favor of joining the National Verein and sent it to the Landtag
deputies from Breslau; it had signed a petition supporting Italian unification, another advocating the abolition of the reactionary school
law, another defending the limitation of military service to two years,
another for complete freedom of occupation. The next year it organized a political election committee, which entered into combination
with the Verein of Supporters of the Constitution to aid the National
Verein and to prepare for the elections. In March, 1861, it listened to
an address by Pastor Hofferichter in which that worthy divine showed
on the basis of history that empires had been hostile to the idea of
nationality and that Germany must give up the dream of Charlemagne.
and create a German kingdom of German people alone.47
The Stadtische Ressource, on the liberal side in politics, was often
the strongest, the oldest, the most respected of local organizations. Its
membership included every middle-class citizen of significance in the
urban population. The organization was difficult for the police to
control. Its respectability and dignity scarcely invited espionage and
police raids. If the members discussed political matters and laid political plans, who was to censor or effectively to forbid them? When
the leading citizens of an urban community became actively liberal and
opposed the government, the latter found it extremely difficult to treat
them like communists or the revolutionists of 1848. They were not
single radicals or small groups with which the community was out of
sympathy; they constituted the responsible, directing intelligence indispensable to the locality and to the state. The government had not
found adequate new means of controlling them, and the old means
of autocracy and mercantilism no longer sufficed.
About the middle of 1860 the Berlin police received the following
report from one of its secret agents: "I recently heard a leader of the
democrats say: 'If the reactionary party knew what a power we are
developing for ourselves in the gymnastic and singing Vereins, one
which can be used against it at any moment, it would not rest until
the last of these Vereins was abolished: ... And so it is in factI Every

•• See Tagesbericht, Nos. 58, 59, March 9, 11, 1861; Polizei-Bericht, Breslau, March
12, Aug. 27, Nov. 5, 19, Dec. 5, 17, 1860; Zeitungs-Bericht fur ]uli-August, 1860,
Marz-April, 1861, Regierungs-Bezirk, Breslau.
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newly established Verein (and in all areas, even in the rural ones,
there is a veritable mania for founding Gymnastic and Rifle and FireDefence Clubs) provides the democrats with new manpower .... "48
The police agent no doubt reproduced accurately in his report the
belief of many Germans. So far as speeches and other forms of verbalization were concerned, the Vereins did participate in the spread of
liberalism. They were organized and directed in a liberal way, and
by keeping in close touch among themselves and especially with the
National Verein, they served as popular channels for the new ideals.
While especially devoted to the objective of national unification they
had of necessity to be involved in the work of achieving liberalism within Prussia as a requisite change for the other. While not supposed to
participate in politics, they could not keep away from that subject,
and their work helped to account for the victory of liberal deputies in
the Landtag elections. This type of organization had a long history in
Germany and was regarded as eminently respectable.
The Berlin police received a secret report about the Main Valley
Sangerfest in September, 1859. Although no one of any importance
from North Germany was present and the agent noted no unusual occurrences, the police wished to be informed. The number in attendance, 1,200 singers and 20,000 to 25,000 visitors, was unusually
high. The singers came from the "educated middle class" and also
from the workers, but numerous rural people were also present. In
addition to the entertainment those present engaged in "excited political discussion" which concerned itself with one topic, "National
Party, reform of the Diet, unity under Prussia's leadership."49 Two
years later, the Festival of North German Singing Societies held in
Bielefeld invited Deputy Waldeck to speak. For two hours he addressed the singers on the policies of the Progressive party.50 The
relation between music and politics could hardly be closer. When local
admirers wished to pay tribute to a leading Ruhr industrialist active in
liberal politics, they serenaded him. The German liberals had found
a safe kind of political activity: they sang.
Although it might be supposed that the Rifle Clubs had more
importance in politics, in reality they proved to be similar in nature
to other such groups, expansive in hopes, strong in words and weak

48 Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30 Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit.
T. 102, Vol. II .
•• Preuss Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit.
D.335.
5. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Aug. 3, 1861.
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in deeds. The German Rifle 4ssociation, organized in July, 1861, as
a means of furthering national unification, declared its purpose to be
the fraternity of all German riflemen, the improvement in the art of
rifle shooting and the increase in the defensive power of the German
people. 51 How important the Rifle Association considered itself may
be gathered from the report of its first big festival published in the
Wochenschrift des National Vereins (No. 119, 1862), an account
which the Pruss ian police thought worthy of preservation.
One must have experienced the enthusiasm which from the
twelfth to the twenty-second of July surged through the free city
of Frankfurt. One must have been moved and gripped by that
inexpressible mood which for ten full days ruled the meeting
place, the rifle range and the festival hall, in order to be able to
speak of the significance and expressiveness of this first German
federal rifle festival. This was not merely a shooting contest,
although the guns were shot a half-million times, nor was it
merely a spirited contest, although the prizes of honor, estimated
at a value of 150,000 Gulden, most of them ennobled by artistic
hands, were worthy of the sweat of a knight. Nor was it merely
a festival where tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands
banqueted, drank, and celebrated. It was all this together, but
it was more; it was a great national act and the consciousness of
this national act.
It is not true that the movement for improvement in which
we have all worked since 1858 depends on the graciousnessofany
single person. The fool's fancy that "The Lord has given, the
Lord has taken away" is not true. On the contrary, the revival
roots in the people; the people themselves have taken affairs in
their own hands and to all the other demonstrations of our folk
spirit, the Singing Societies, the Gymnastic Vereins, the economic
parliaments, they have added the concluding, the crowning
movement: the German shooting festival. It befits this demonstration, which signifies the initiative of the people in popular
arming and military training, that it should be made in the most
ceremonious manner possible. It has been held in this manner,
and the nation owes the free city of Frankfurt the heartiest
thanks for having preserved the honor of the German people so
nobly and for having staged this national act in the worthiest
way.
When the guests arrived at the festival they found that a storm had
blown down their hall. They set immediately to work in fraternal
spirit to rebuild it and within a day or two that historic demonstration
of freedom and national unity had been completed. Shooting con-

51

Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pr. Br. Rep. llO. Berlin C. Pol.. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit.
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tests and banquets, toasts and speeches followed one another in
ecstatic order. Proclaimed Friedheim from Solingen:
Oh, may the hope soon be fulfilled that ou~ princes all unit~
to build a great ReIch ... for the use and blessmg of our beautIful German fatherland; may they out of free love renounce all
sense of sovereignity and have for Germany's greatness only one
heart! Then we shall be strong and powerful within and without and can calmly look about us. No enemy will dare to disturb us, to hinder us in our work, for our power is great through
love and trust. We would then stand as firmly as the cliff in the
sea through our own harmony, which adorns and blesses and
strengthens us. Once the goal is reached, the end is good!
Up, believing, loving, hoping, let us rise with a single cry:
Long live Germania!
Doctor Luning, the democratic physician from Rheda, proclaimed,
"The day will come ... when the Prussian eagle, now much curbed
and chained, will lift its powerful wings and offering protection and
demanding protection will with powerful beat of its wings descend
under the black, red, gold banner of the German Reich (unbounded
enthusiasm) ."52
According to its participants, the first German Rifle Festival was
a tremendous demonstration by the German people for national unity
and for the ways of personal initiative and freedom. The Progressive
Election Verein in Breslau had contributed a cup to it, as had many
other organizations, and the festival received enthusiastic publicity. 53
The gymnastic clubs had a half century of patriotic tradition upon
which to develop their activity for national unity and individual
liberty. Like the other Vereins after 1848 they had subsided into
purely local, non-political activity and had first stirred to new life
under the stimulation of the National Verein. In the early 1860s the
German Gymnastic Verein was founded as an expression of the will
to German unity, and the executive board contained personnel identical with that found in the Rifle Association and the National Verein.
The first attempt to unite the gymnastic Vereins occurred at the
festival held in 1860 at Coburg. Thirteen hundred gymnasts, as well
as numerous visitors, assembled there. The secret police of Saxony
reported the number present, the toasts, the songs, even a long

•• Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30 Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, S. 1123 .
•• See Zeitungs-Bericht filr ]uli.Aug., 1862, Regierungs-Bezirk, Breslau, Sept. 8,
1862. But what is one to think of the Statutes of the Schiltzen·Verein der HandlungsGehil/en in Stettin of 1863 which did not even mention national unity? See Preuss.
Geh. StaatsarchiV. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. G. 465.
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patriotic poem written for the occasion and recited by the author to
an enthusiastic audience. The proposal to establish a German Gymnastic Verein did not receive full approval, especially from the South
Germans, and the effort had to be postponed. Differences also arose
over whether to favor the use of the German colors of 1848, black, red,
and gold, and over the question of whether politics should be discussed. 54 The South Germans particularly were disinclined to unite
with their northern colleagues. They were not yet attracted by the
inspired phrases of a writer in the Deutsche Turner Zeitung (1860) to
"build a temple" of unity "under which the spiritual and physical
welfare of the people will be furthered, a bulwark against which the
attempts of foreign conquerors will miserably shatter."
By August of the next year, 1861, the members of the National
Verein in Saarbriicken and its vicinity had progressed so far in their
enthusiasm for German unity that they approved the proposal to unite
the. German Gymnastic Vereins and the RifteClubs for training persons
in the use of a common type of gun, thereby to create a popular army.
They wished in this way to prepare for a reduction in the size of the
standing army.55
The celebration in 1863 of the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of
Leipzig stirred the gymnastic Vereins to new efforts of heroism. The
third German Gymnastic Festival was held in Leipzig in August; the
closing ceremony described in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the
motto of which was "Truth and Justice, Freedom and Law," conformed
to the pattern of action by this type of organization: "a jubilant celebration," a parade of the gymnasts accompanied by singers, a ceremony
in the meeting hall introduced by the singing of "Die Wacht am
Rhein," the patriotic speech by Professor Treitschke, which was received with "enthusiastic bravos."56
More serious business faced the gymnasts toward the close of 1863.
The controversy over Schleswig-Holstein was reaching a climax and
war was imminent. The executive committee of the German Gymnastic Vereins issued a call to the comrades to prepare themselves for
military service by exercise in marching, gymnastics, parading, bayonet
work, shooting, and so on, wherever possible under the direction of a

.<

See police report in Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol.
Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. T. 102, Vol. II .
•• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Aug. 1, 1861.
•• Deutsche Algemeine Zeitung, Leipzig, Aug. 7, 1863. The article is to be found
in Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pr. Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. T.
102, Vol. II.
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trained military person. They should join an army to be developed
for Schleswig-Holstein and help to save those territories for the beloved
German fatherland. 57 Unfortunately the gymnasts did not win the
war; the regular troops of the Prussian and Austrian armies performed
so well that the aid of the gymnasts, except in so far as they served as
regular troops, was not needed.
Like the other Vereins the gymnastic societies denounced caste
feelings as contrary to their ideals. Their membership consisted mainly of handworkers and merchants, with few teachers, students, intellectuals and officials. Only one Verein, that in Munich, contained
officers; higher officials, pastors, and rural people were lacking in
almost all of them. The gymnastic clubs were a thoroughly middleclass affair, a product largely of the small towns emerging from the
Old Regime. 58
The close relation between the gymnastic Vereins and the liberal
parties becomes evident from the names of the persons interested in
them. The police noted in 1862 that in Breslau the gymnastic Verein
"Forward" was directed by Stein, the liberal editor of the Breslauer
Zeitung, and other leaders of the Progressive party. 59 The invitation
to a gymnastic festival for East and West Prussia to be held in Elbing
in 1861 was signed by the leading liberals in the area, men like von
Forckenbeck and former Burgomaster Philipps. A year later a group
of prominent citizens of the same area issued a call for funds for the
furtherance of gymnastics. The list of sponsors of the request reads
like the roster of the liberal deputies in the Landtag-Bender, von
Forckenbeck, von Hoverbeck, von Hennig, Philipps, two von Sauckens,
Schubert, Techow, and many others.60
Knowing about the close relationship, the government held the
Vereins under observation. In this work it kept in touch with the
Saxon government and probably with others. From Dresden in May,
1861, it received a secret report that all the Vereins of whatever sort
had a secret central executive committee of unknown personnel which
received instructions from a revolutionary committee in London led
by the fugitive Carl Blind. The Prussian government took this report
with a grain of salt, but in the next year, 1862, when the constitutional

•• J'olkszeitung, Dec. 12, 186~ .
•• See the article in the Ergiinzungsheft zur Deutschen Turn-Zeitung (Leipzig,
1860); Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. ~O. Berlin C. Pol. Priisid. Tit. 94, Lit.
T. 102, Vol. II .
•• Potizei Bericht, Breslau, Nov. S, 1862 .
•• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, June 6, 1861, Nov. 7, 1862.
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conflict was growing intense, it became somewhat concerned. In
August, September, and October, Minister of Interior von Jagow
secretly ordered the police department in Berlin, which had jurisdiction over the police of the cities of the state, to learn whether the
gymnastic Vereins were training persons with weapons. If this were
the case, the matter was to be brought immediately to the attention
of the minister, for such practice with guns might lead to revolutionaryaction. The minister was assured that these Vereins, including
the rifle clubs, were harmless.
Toward the end of 1863 Minister of Interior Count von Eulenburg
felt it necessary to prohibit the arming of the gymnastic Vereins. From
Dresden came a report emphasizing the liberal and democratic political tendencies in the various Vereins and the close connection between them and the National Verein and suggesting that the governments of the various states keep in touch on these matters. Early in
1864 the police report from Dresden admitted upon investigation that
there was no danger of the defence and other Vereins being organized
for arming and training the population at large in the German states,
in fact, that the existing Vereins were not dangerous and that in
Saxony the rifle clubs were even regarded as reactionary. The alarm
died down. 61
The statistical evidence which is available supports the judgment
of the police. In 1860 only forty-five gymnastic Vereins with a total
membership of about 4,300 persons existed in the entire State of Prussia. By March, 1861, the number in Germany as a whole had increased from 224 to 506, and in Prussia from forty-five to 144. Even
if the total membership had grown in similar proportion, it would
have remained insignificant for any but political purposes.62
However harmless as revolutionary threats, the singing, shooting,
and gymnastic Vereins helped to popularize the cause of liberalism
and national unification. They aided in electing men of these views to
the Landtag. They supplied part of the organizational basis of the
liberal political parties by reaching particularly the lower income
groups of the middle class. They enabled these people to associate
with the upper middle class, and they offered channels by whichCthe
latter could influence the lower groups in the liberal and national
cause. Through these Vereins the timidity and fearfulness of the

01 Polizei Vierteljahrbericht, Dresden, Dec. I, 1863; Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv.
Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. S. 1123, Lit. T. 162, Vol. II •
•• See Bremer Handelsblatt, July 13, 1861.
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middle class about participating in politic!! and having opinions on
public affairs could be combatted, the example of the liberal leaders
could be made real to them, and a feeling of personal responsibility
and the value and possibility of showing some independence of the
authoritarian government might be imparted. The beginning practice
of social equality in the Vereins would be useful in developing a sense
of the political importance of the individual. As policy formulaters,
as sources of potential physical power, these Vereins played no role;
as channels of liberal and national expression, they proved to be
eminently usefu1. 63
The cooperatives, guided by members of the Progressive party,
especially by those of a democratic leaning, belonged in a similar
category. The movement owed its development primarily to SchulzeDelitzsch, who even prior to 1848 had begun to work for the establishment of these associations. He perceived the democratic character of
the cooperative and believed that from this cooperation in economic
affairs would develop similar ways and habits in politics.
The movement became popular with the upper middle class and
the capitalistic bourgeoisie as a means of preserving the middle-class
character and affiliation of the handworkers. The cooperative was
expected to enable the handworkers to adjust to industrial capitalism
while remaining skilled craftsmen. It aimed to prevent them from
becoming a proletariat and succumbing to the enticements of socialism
or communism, or, almost as bad, from allying with the forces of reaction. The bourgeoisie supported the cooperatives not merely or not
even primarily out of self-interest; the threat of radicalism on the
left did not appear sufficiently dangerous at this period for them to
be thinking mainly of withholding new socialist recruits, and the threat
of reaction on the right could be countered by the spread of information about the advantages of liberalism along with positive assistance.
The bourgeoisie felt proud of the traditition of the handworkers and
sought to maintain it as a valuable factor in the national culture. The
work of Schulze-Delitzsch early received the general reputation of being
safe, reliable, practical, and patriotic. Liberal thinking did not extend
very far into the field of labor economics, for relatively few liberals
had had any practical experience with factory industry. The craftsmen
were to be preserved by way of cooperatives; the factories were in
some unknown way to obtain labor which would remain middle class,

.S See among many others the estimate in the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung,
Dec. 11, 1861.
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perhaps by cooperatives also; a proletariat was not to arise, it was
hoped, to alarm the middle class and the bourgeoisie. Just how this
happy situation would be achieved was not clear. The social changes
involved in the emergence of industrialism had not advanced far
enough for problems of middle-class relations with labor to become
acute. Schulze-Delitzsch's cooperatives seemed at this stage the solution to the social question; in addition they could help to win support
for liberal politics.
The transitional character of the workers' position in society was
clearly evident from the proceedings of the German Workers' Convention held at Leipzig, October 23-25, 1864.64 The meeting showed almost no proletarian character. A personal greeting from the burgomaster inaugurated a conference mainly devoted to the discussion of cooperatives, education, freedom of movement and domicile throughout
Germany, and German unification-an agenda scarcely distinguished
from that of any middle-class association. The recommendations in
favor of social insurance, to enable the worker to accumulate
capital for his old age, and in favor of shorter working hours were acceptable in middle-class circles as well. The condemnation of socialism and the subjects for the numerous toasts hardly seemed in keeping
with the presence of the future socialist leader, August Bebel, and
with his selection as a member of the executive committee. The social
problem considered at this meeting remained essentially the condition
of the handworker: how could he be preserved as a member of the
middle class even when he became a factory worker? The ideas and
interests of Schulze-Delitzsch and of liberal economists like Wirth
dominated the conference; the presence of Bebel was significant only
for the future. The split between the middle class and the proletariat
had not yet occurred. Liberalism and democracy rather than socialism
expressed the objectives of the workers.
The Lassallean socialist organization proved to be so weak in the
early 1860s that it scarcely did more than provide a little work for the
police and considerable opportunity for literary polemics between the
elegant Lassalle and his democratic or liberal opponents. In Berlin
Lassalle had a following of a couple of hundred members. The case of
the Berlin cigar workers may illustrate the attitude of skilled workers.
The Progressive party had many supporters among the cigar workers.
In Berlin the organization of these workers asked Schulze-Delitzsch

•• See the police report in Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C.
Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. A. 212.
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whether it should join the German Cigar Workers' Association. The
distinguished democrat replied that although approving the statutes
of the Association, he did not like its Lassallean leadership. The cigar
workers chose to ignore the advice and in 1866 the members joined the
general Verein. Two years later, however, they broke aw-ay from it
and formed a cooperative. The fact that they chose to associate with
the newly established Hirsch-Duncker organization of cooperatives
rather than the one guided by Schulze-Delitzsch did not indicate any
diminution in the strength of liberal and democratic principles. 65
The potential significance of the cooperatives for the liberal and
democratic parties cannot be gauged from the small number of the
Vereins and of their members.66 Among a social group as nearly
homogeneous as the handworkers the example of liberalism offered by
even a small organized minority must have attracted others. The same
social elements supplied many supporters and members of the gymnastic and the other Vereins; they tended to be the ardent patriots, the
proponents of national unification; they upheld the democratic left
of the liberal movement.
The emergence of the society of modern industrialism in Prussia
could be seen in the increased number and enlarged scope of economic
organizations. A few of these gained particular importance for the
state and for the entire German nation, while a large number of
smaller ones expressed the needs and wishes of regional or local interests. All the organizations were interrelated by personnel and
program. They all aligned with the liberal groups and constituted
the backbone of liberal strength in the urban population. Although
they claimed to be non-political in character and purpose, their programs and policies were primarily concerned with governmental action
-the transformation of an absolutistic, mercantilist government into
one with a liberal administration guided by liberal economic policies,
the achievement of German national economic unity. With respect

eo Walter Frisch, Die Organisationsbestrebungen der Arbeiter in der deutschen
Tabakindustrie (Leipzig, 1905), pp. 39-40.
00 In 1861 in entire Germany there were 364 credit cooperatives with a membership of about 50,000, and in 1864 some 889 with a membership of 135,000. In 1861
there were in addition some 129 raw materials and consumers' cooperatives, but these
were less important than the others. In Prussia in 1861 there were 188 credit cooperatives, and in 1865 some 436. Their distribution according to provinces was
as follows: Saxony 101, Brandenburg 89, Silesia 85, Prussia 50, Pomerania 44, Rhineland 26, Posen 25, Westphalia 16. The raw materials and consumers' cooperatives
were fewer and much less important. Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30.
Berlin C. Pol. Priisid. Tit. 94, Lit. G. 465.
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to the first part of the program one economic aSSoCIatIOn might be
more aggressive than the other or more inclusive in its objective; but
all agreed on fundamentals. The second part, the question of the form
and degree of national economic unity, especially of the political implications of economic unity, also caused little dispute. Most Prussians favored a unified Germany under Prussian leadership with Austria
excluded, while relatively few demanded a greater-Germany solution
with Austria, at least German Austria, included.
The three leading economic associations, the Pruss ian Commercial
Association, the German Commercial Association, and the Congress of
German Economists, were established between 1857 and 1861. Of
these the Prussian Commercial Association developed out of a conference in Berlin in May, 1858, of the executive committees of the
chambers of commerce in Konigsberg, Elbing, Danzig, Stettin, Posen,
Breslau, Berlin, Magdeburg, Halle, Leipzig, and Cologne, that is, of
about half the cities with a population of over 20,000. At the conference the Pruss ian Minister of Commerce expressed regret that the commercial class did not represent its interests more fully than it did.
Acting on his suggestion-another instance of the initiative on the part
of the absolutist state-the representatives of the chambers of commerce in the Prussian towns and cities met and organized the Prussian
Commercial Association. 67 Thereupon, the Bremer Handelsblatt 68
advocated the establishment of a similar body for all Germany, arguing
that none of the questions proposed for consideration by the Prussian
Commercial Association concerned Prussia alone. In 1861 the larger
organization was created.
These two powerful associations were formed at the time when
controversy over the future character of Prussia and Germany began
to grow acute. The associations met each year, with representatives
of the important chambers of commerce present, with committees
reporting on their work during the past year, with recommendations
being made by the combined force of Prussian and German economic
leaders. Wherever controversies arose in the German Association they
as a rule pertained only to the tariff question; on problems of the relation between government and business the opinion was usually unanimous. Almost every business representative disliked the vestiges of
mercantilism. He wished economic freedom, and he wished the

.f See Bremer Handelsblatt, Aug. 31, 1861, quoting from Der Jahresbericht der
Handelskammer zu Koln fur 18elJ; Der Deutsche Handelstag, 1861-1911 .
•• Nov. 5, 1859, p. 385.
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government to devote more funds and attention to the furtherance of
the economy-technical schools, roads, railroads, and the like. In
these respects, the decisions of the German Association agreed with
those of its Prussian counterpart. On the whole the initiative was
taken in the German rather than in the Prussian organization, but the
weight of both was thrown on the side of economic liberalism.69 The
objectives were almost identical with those of the Congress of German
Economists and the liberal parties in Prussia. The relationship among
these organizations was maintained by the bond of common personnel
in leading positions in all of them. Representing Prussia in the
executive committee of the German Association in 1861, for example,
were the well-known liberals Behrend of Danzig, Weigel of Breslau,
von Sybel of Dusseldorf (not the historian but a prominent businessman), Classen-Koppelmann of Cologne, and Hansemann of Berlin
(whose influence proved to be less than that of some of the others).7o
Behind the chambers of commerce and the commercial associations
were to be found a large number of special business associations. The
Berliner Borsen Zeitung estimated the number at the beginning of 1861
to be about 400 for all Germany, with 101 of them located in Prussia. 71
The fact that Prussia had the largest number reflected not merely her
size but also the vigor of her economy. Highly industrialized Saxony
with eighty-three associations had a larger number than Prussia in
proportion to the size of her land area, but no other state approached
either of them in economic significance. In the Rhineland and Westphalia, according to an estimate in the Berliner Borsen Zeitung, January 26, 1861, there existed in addition to some twenty chambers of commerce many other economic organizations. The paper gave the name
of nine of them and then had recourse to a double etcetera. One had
to do with the marketing of coal, another with mining, another with
iron and steel, another with the reduction of freight rates on iron, another with projects for canal construction, each concerned with a
special interest, each showing the considerable degree of specialization
in the industry of this region. In Silesia the Silesian Central Industrial
Association was founded at a meeting of 436 persons in Breslau in
April, 1862. It represented thirty-seven individual associations with
about 5,000 members and also some 130 single persons, among them
twenty-three m,erchants, twenty-two manufacturers, twenty-six officials,
thirteen teachers, and some handworkers. Containing as members the
, '··oSee remark in Bremer Handelsbldtt, Feb. 10, 1866, p.48.
•• Der Deutsche: Hande/stag, I, 18, 211-24. ,',
' ,
71 Berliner Borsen Zeitung, Jan. 9, 1861.
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leading economic personnel of the province. it resembled the Congress
of German Economists rather than the special-interest organizations
of the Western provinces; but it functioned in a way and for purposes
similar to those of the other economic associations. 72 The business
world was feeling the same enthusiasm for entrepreneurial action that
stirred the political leaders to form new organizations. This was the
founding period, rich in energy, rich in experimentation, unable as yet
to gauge the most efficient distribution of strength and the proper
organizations.
The economic associations did not assume as active a role in the
other provinces as in the three most industrialized ones of Silesia, the
Rhineland, and Westphalia. Nevertheless, they existed elsewhere
and in cooperation with the chambers of commerce helped to strengthen the liberal forces. Numerous conferences of economic groups were
held with the government. A few examples will show the range of
interest and the methods and channels used to uphold them. The
Zollverein Beet Sugar Verein had members in 1861 serving as deputies
in the Lower House of the Prussian Landtag and planned a conference
at which these deputies would be present to discuss how to defend the
beet-sugar interests. Representatives of the private banks met in Berlin
in 1861 to prepare material to submit to the Landtag about their
difficulties and needs. The Merchants' Association in Konigsberg
complained to the government about the tariff on grain and seed.
From Magdeburg came lamentations about the tolls on the Elbe. The
papers were full of reports of conferences among business interests,
often with Lower House deputies present, for the purpose of exercising pressure on the government in favor of liberal reforms.73
Throughout the state the well-established, eminently trustworthy
men of commercial and industrial property were profoundly concerned with the outcome of the elections, and they saw to it that candidates
sympathetic to their views were selected. An instance of the intimate
relationship between economic and political liberalism was afforded
in the growing industrial town of Dusseldorf. The local members of
the Commercial and Industrial Verein for Rhineland and Westphalia
met in October, 1861, to discuss the elections to the Lower House of
the Landtag. A similar conference was held in Duisburg. The members urged the election of businessmen as electors and as deputies, and
several names were proposed as possible candidates for the Lower
•• See Bremer Handelsblatt, Nov. II, 1865, pp. 400-401.
.s Berliner Biirsen Zeitung, May 14, Jan. 16, Sept. 30, 186); This paper was.espedally active in reporting these meetings.
.
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House, in particular those of the industrialists von Sybel, Hugo Haniel,
Gustav Stinnes, and the young Hammacher, who was to make a dis·
tinguished career as a professional representative of the Ruhr.74
The third of the most important economic associations was created
on non-Prussian initiative. In May, 1857, the Bremer Handelsblatt
published a call for the establishment of a Congress of German Economists. The idea of such an organization seems to have been derived
from Belgium. In the preceding year an International Congress for
Tariff Reform had been held in Brussels which had led to the founding
of an International Committee for Economic Reforms with headquarters in the same city. The North German towns as the greatest
commercial centers of the country had been especially interested, and
by the middle of 1857 local committees of the Brussels organization
had been established in Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, Berlin, Cologne.
Stettin, Hanover, Heidelberg, Frankfurt a. M. and Mannheim. The
International Committee had not interpreted its function narrowly
as pertaining solely to tariff problems, but had proposed to deal with
all questions that adversely affected international trade. It aimed, according to the Bremer Handelsblatt, to further freedom and security
in trade and to arouse a feeling of individual responsibility by spreading knowledge of the natural laws of economic activity.75 The Bremer
Handelsblatt used this association as a precedent for the one it was
proposing: the new organization should be a place where theory and
practice went hand in hand and men of knowledge cooperated with
men of practice. The Handelsblatt thought that the future Congress
of German Economists might affiliate with the international committee; but it pointed out that alongside the problems common to other
countries Germany had special ones to deal with, the problems of
freedom of occupation, movement and domicile, indeed all the prob·
lems caused by German disunity. Since Germany had to solve these before it could catch up with the other countries, the Congress was to
assist in the achievement of this goal.
The proposal to establish the new association received the enthusiastic support of the liberal newspapers. When the International Welfare Congress met at Frankfurt a. M. in September, 1857, the German
delegates used the occasion to call for the establishment of economic
Vereins in the larger and smaller towns of Germany either independent
of or in conjunction with the existing commercial and industrial or

"Ibid., Oct. 25. 1861.
•• Bremer Handelsblatt, June 27. 1857.
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agricultural organizations. The aSSOCIatiOns were to endeavor to
spread the knowledge of accurate economic concepts and to arouse
active interest in better economic institutions and ways. The Prussians
who participated in the proposal and signed the call were President
Doctor Lette of Berlin, Professor Schubert of Konigsberg, SchulzeDelitzsch, and Doctor S. Neumann of Berlin, all prominent liberals. 76
Together with eighteen others from the other states of Germany, they
set up a small provisional committee to pursue the work, and the first
German-wide Congress met in Gotha in September, 1858. From then
on the organization was well established, with an enthusiastic membership and, from 1862, with even its own journal, the Vierteljahrschrift
fur Volkswirtschaft und Kulturgeschichte, edited by Julius Faucher
and Otto Michaelis, two prominent Prussian liberals. It proved from
the beginning to be a highly effective organ of liberalism, emphasizing
the economic aspects but doing so with the full realization of their
political implications.
The first Congress was composed of those persons sufficiently interested to attend. No other conditions were set. One hundred and
ten individuals participated; among them were to be found members
of all the important occupations in Germany, for example, about forty
government officials, three agrarians with large-scale holdings, six
handworkers, two manufacturers, ten merchants, eight lawyers, nine
editors, three writers, two teachers, four professors, two pastors, four
bankers and bank employees, one physician, one apothecary. The
number of handworkers may be misleading in that it may have included individuals who while retaining the title of master had transformed their business into a thoroughly capitalistic enterprise. The
title of professor was also not very revealing, for of the four one represented the Industrial Society of Weimar, one taught economics and
served as editor of a journal, one taught in a technical school, and one
was an authority on law. Most significant was the large number of
editors and writers, approximately one-fifth of the persons present.
The purpose of the Congress, to unite men of theory and men of
practice and to spread enlightenment about economic problems and
criteria, was reflected in the membership and became increasingly
evident as the work of the Congress developed and the membership expanded. The active participation of Schulze-Delitzsch, Otto Michaelis,
Julius Faucher, Prince Smith, Bergius of Breslau, Hubner of Berlin,
G. Weiss of Berlin, Wolff of Stettin, and Lette of Berlin assured close

.. Ibid.; Sept. 26, 1857.
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cooperation with the Prussian liberal parties, so much so that in 1861
a group of about twenty deputies in the Lower House of the Prussian
Landtag, most of them active in the Congress, formed an informal
economic committee to further the work of reform along the lines of
the proposals of the Congtess. The committee contained persons
from the various liberal groups, from the right wing across to the left;
even when the liberal parties could not agree on other matters, economic problems brought them together.
The Congress encouraged its supporters to organize in local and
regional Vereins. Like the National Verein it had on association to
respect the strict laws of Prussia, not to mention other states. For this
reason as well as for the practical purpose of demonstrating the
efficiency of liberalism it preferred to decentralize its operations. Reliance on local initiative encouraged the habits of self-help, individualism, freedom and personal responsibility. Wherever appropriate
organizations already existed, it worked together with them. In some
areas of Prussia, like the Western provinces and Silesia, it played a role
secondary to that of the industrial Vereins, the chambers of commerce,
and the specialized economic associations. The economy and society
of the Western provinces and to a lesser degree of Silesia had already
advanced beyond the stage in which the proposed type of economic
Congress could be of much value. In the Central provinces except for
Berlin, which as the capital, the largest city in the state, and developing
center for industry, commerce, and banking, was already won to
liberalism, the work of the Congress was needed, but it failed to be
as significant as that in the East. The area in which the Congress led
the discussion and formulation of economic policies and furthered the
spread of information about them was East and West Prussia. Associations were established in such number that in June, 1861, one
was created for the entire region. The invitation to found the Economic Society for East and West Prussia was signed by the prominent
liberals of the area, many of them deputies in the Lower House.
The occupational representation in the Economic Society for East
and West Prussia included merchants, large-scale agriculturalists,
bankers, lawyers, an editor and a professor, but no handworkers. By
the end of 1861 the Verein had 520 members, all of whom one can assume belonged to the upper middle class and the liberal land-holding
nobility. At its congress held in December in Konigsberg about llO
members were present, and the list of speakers again reads like that of
the liberal representatives in the Landtag from this area-Ropell,
Schubert, Philipps, von Henning-Plonchet, Behren~, Jo~,.voJll;lover-
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beck, Papendiek-Liep. Its standing executive committee, Behren~
(Danzig), von Forckenbeck (Elbing), von Hoverbeck (Nichelsdorf)/,
A. Philipps (Elbing), and C. Ropell (Danzig), were all promineru
leaders of the Progressive party and Landtag deputies;77 but the participation of persons like Professor Schubert of Konigsberg, a leader
o.f the Constitutional party, attested to the full agreement of the liberal
political groups on economic problems. With such individuals as
leaders, the Economic Society could not have kept out of politics; it
acted as a vigorous center of political organization and propaganda and
formed an essential support for the liberal parties, especially the Progressives.
The National Verein proved to be one of the most influential of
the new associations. It developed in 1859 out of two almost contemporaneous meetings, one in Hanover of North Germans, the other
in Eisenach of South and Central Germans. Finding that their programs were similar, the two groups called a further conference at
Eisenach for August of that year, at which a statement of policy was
promulgated. Germany, it said, should be unified under Prussia's
leadership. A national convention should be held for the purpose of
drawing up a German constitution. All parties that loved their country, whether democratic or constitutional (it did not even mention
Conservatives), should work together for the unification of the nation.
One of the members, Metz from Southwest Germany, read an explanatory statement in which he formulated the plan for accomplishing this
objective. Local Vereins should be organized and other legal means
should be used; a "national progressive party" should be developed. 78
In this way liberals and democrats should win control of the parliaments in each state and force the rulers to work for national unification.
Power and freedom were inseparable, a broadsheet of the National
Verein stated in 1860; absolutism was unable to unite the people in
enthusiastic defence of the country. The new Verein should be the center for all activity aiming at the single objective of a free, united, and
self-governing German nation.
Metz's explanation received the general approval of the conference
but was not attached to the declaration of policy for tactical reasons:
it might have caused difficulty for persons not present to sign the
declaration, and the primary objective was to gain open adherents to
the basic proposal.79 Nonetheless, Metz stressed the essential inter.. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Dec. 14. Nov. 24. 27. 1861.
•• National Zeitung, Sept. 2. 1860 .
•• Ibid., Sept. 2. 1859.
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dependence of national unity and of liberalism and democracy and
introduced the significant phrase "progressive party." When new,
aggressive political parties were organized in several German states
during the next year or two, the founders took this name, for example,
the German Progressive party in Prussia. The name indicated the
relationship of the party to the national movement and its guide, the
National Verein. The intimacy was well known, so much so that the
Neue Preussische Zeitung early in 1861 described the address to the
throne of the Lower House of the Prussian Landtag as a political program in accordance with the principles of the National Verein, and the
Mainzer Journal stated that in addition to the three usual factors in
law-making Prussia now had a fourth, namely, the National Verein. so
The meetings of local members of the National Verein in Prussia
proved to be useful in organizing and campaigning for the Progressive
party. They were acting in accord with the plans to elect liberal deputies to the Landtag who would use their official position not merely
to introduce liberalism in government and society but also to bring into power a government which would support the National Verein program for national unification. s1 The enthusiasm with which the Wochenschrift des National Vereins welcomed the formation of the Progressive party in Prussia was unbounded. "For the first time," it stated,
"the ban of particularism in the chamber of one of the larger German
states has been broken; for the first time there arises among the representatives of the people a party which declares the German point of
view to be foremost, which places the watchword Germany upon its
banner. "82
The National Verein did not align with anyone liberal party, not
even with the one using the magic words "German Progressive" in its
name. It sought to unite all liberals and democrats in its ranks. The
Progressive party in Prussia had the same intention; it welcomed
liberals and democrats of all shades and hoped to become the sole
or the main liberal party on the basis of common devotion to freedom
and to national unity. In the local National Vereins the Progressives

Tagesbericht, No. 29, Feb. 4, No. 52, March 2, 1861.
See, for example, the statements by Roepell and F. W. Kruger in the meeting
of the members of the National Verein in Danzig, September, 1861. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Sept. 14, 1861; National Zeitung, Sept. 20, 1861. Also see the story
of the predominant success of the National Verein members ih the counties of Osterburg and Stendal in 1861 in winning the voters away from the Conservatives, so that
instead of a Conservative majority, the counties voted for 237 Progressives out of
a total of 332 electors. See ibid., Dec. 11, 1861.
02 J'olkszeitung, Feb. 1, 1862.
00
01
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and the right-wing liberals were almost always able to work together,
even though they quarreled over the means to employ.s3
The close association between the Prussia liberals and democrats
and the National Verein became evident from the fact of common
personnel in leading positions. At the conference in 1859 founding
the National Verein, five Prussians participated, Schulze-Delitzsch,
Franz Duncker, the liberal editor of the Volkszeitung in Berlin, Julius
Frese of Berlin, Victor von Unruh, an industrialist and future liberal
deputy, and Franz Zabel, editor of the liberal National Zeitung in
Berlin. s4 The first executive committee of twelve members included
threePrussians, Schulze-Delitzsch, Veit, bookseller and at the time
a liberal member of the Lower House of the Landtag, and Victor von
Unruh. The next year the guiding committee consisted of twenty-five
members, among them the Prussians Doctor Otto Luning, a liberal
physician from Rheda in Westphalia and future deputy in the Lower
House; Theodor Mullensiefen, a prominent industrialist at Krengeldanz near Witten and a liberal political as well as economic leader
and future deputy; Schulze-Delitzsch; von Unruh; Veit; and Cetto, an
estate-owner at Trier and future liberal deputy.s5
Almost every Prussian attending the conference in Frankfurt a. M.
in 1859 when the National Verein was formally established was a
well-known Prussian liberal leader. Franz Duncker of the V olkszeitung, Zabel of the National Zeitung, Streckfuss, H. Ruckert of the
Danziger Zeitung, President Lette, Veit, the physician Doctor G. Weiss,
von Unruh, Frese, and City Councillor Duncker of Berlin were all
prominent liberals. Schulze-Delitzsch, Cetto, the manufacturer Berger
from Witten on the Ruhr, the manufacturer Friedberg of Berlin,
Doctor Luning of Rheda, Dietzel, connected with industry in Cologne,
and Consul Muller of Stettin were present, along with a couple of lessknown physicians, Stamm and Norman of Berlin, and Assessor Fischel
of the same city. Government officials were conspicuously absent. In
contrast to the Congress of German Economists the National Verein
was not a safe place for the official of a German state to be. The relative number of editors and physicians (three from Prussia) was high;

•• See, for example, the split among the members of the National Verein in the
Lower House over the Kiihne amendment to the military bill, Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, June 6, 1861.
•• See National Zeitung, Sept. 2, 1859 .
• 6 Verhandlungen
der ersten General-Versammlung des deutschen National
Vereins am 3, 4, 5 Sept. 1860 (Coburg, 1860). Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep.
30. Berlin C..Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. D. 335.
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but the group included a fairly wide representation of occupations.
The Prussian liberal agrarians were to join in force, but they moved
more slowly than the urban residents. 86
The first general conference in 1860 in Coburg attracted about 500
members. The secret report about the meeting to the Berlin police
headquarters, contrary to what one might expect, coolly appraised it
as of no great consequence. Among those present, it said, were Wilhelm von Humboldt's son, two Wurttemberg peasants in costume, a
large number of lawyers, many editors, and some Jews. Of the fifteen
or twenty persons from Berlin no one, it said, was important.87
The secret agent misjudged the personnel; at that conference were
to be found once more, and in larger number than ever, the liberal
leaders of Prussia, especially those who were to form the Progressive
party. Over fifty Prussians attended, among them the prominent
liberals Bramer of Gumbinnen, Cetto of Trier, Franz Duncker of Berlin, The Lucas, Doctor Luning, Lawyer Martiny of Kaukehmen in
East Prussia, Parisius, Rohland of the province of Saxony, SchulzeDelitzsch, Werner Siemens of Berlin, Steinitz, the future secretary of
the Progressive party, Streckfuss, Temme and von Unruh of Berlin,
and von Vaerst of Herrendorf near Soldin. The occupations represented included that of bank director, physician, lawyer, merchant,
manufacturer, estate-owner and knight's estate-owner, baker, bookseller, teacher, engineer, editor, master mason, and official. Peasants,
workers, professors, and pastors were lacking; otherwise the main
occupations were fairly represented, especially those independent of
government pressure.
At the general conference held in Leipzig in October, 1863, far
larger numbers of Prussians participated, but most of the prominent
liberal leaders were forced to remain at home because at that time the
election campaign for the Lower House was nearing its close. Nonetheless, the number of Prussians present (ca. 175) was three and onehalf times as great as in 1860 and tJ.:te occupational representation was
wider in spread. An extraordinary number of handworkers attended,
from small towns as well as the cities. All areas of Prussia were represented, but the largest number came from Leipzig, the region nearest
to the meeting place. To judge from the size of their delegations, small
towns with growing industry like Luckenwalde and Torgau showed
particularly active interest .
• 8 See the list in the National Zeitung, Sept. 19, 1859.
•• Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Priisid. Tit. 94, Lit. D.
335.
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By the date of the general conference in 1865 the Prussan libera~s
had become so deeply involved in the fight with Bismarck that less
than a dozen appeared. The continuing failure of their struggle to
reform Prussia along with the intense hostility to Bismarck and his
national policy in the rest of Germany disinclined most liberals from
-venturing to attend a conference at which they could only make excuses for Prussia and hang their heads. 88
The plan of operation and the organization of the National Verein
were described by Streit, the executive secretary, at the general meeting in 1860 at Coburg. The Verein would seek to use the right of
association in the German states to solve the problem of national unification. Streit recognized that this task faced tremendous obstacles,
such as the habits of obedience engendered by years of absolutism, the
disappointment over the outcome of 1848, the hostility among parties
and classes, the organized, well-established power of ultramontane and
reactionary forces. Nonetheless, the National Verein aimed to overcome these obstacles by legal means and to spread understanding of
the political need for liberalism and national unity. Streit repudiated
any revolutionary intentions. The German people lacked the revoltitionary spirit found among other people, he said, nor were conditions
such that they needed to develop this spirit. He did not know whether
the struggle for the Verein's objectives could succeed by legal means,
but he added that no one had ever tried thoroughly to employ them.
He considered the free press, the right of association and of assembly
to be "powerful levers," and since the German people possessed them
to such a large extent, he thought that by using them efficiently and
tenaciously over a period of years the goal could be reached.
Since the laws of the German states prevented the establishment
of branches, the National Verein organized as a single association on a
nationwide basis. Each member belonged and paid dues to the national
body, not to a local or regional chapter. The high degree ofcentralized authority had both advantages and disadvantages, but since
an alternative was impossible the Verein made the best of the situation.
A large executive committee was selected so that there would be
actively interested members on it from each part of Germany. In
addition, agents were appointed to serve as centers of endeavor in
smaller districts. In this way a considerable number of persons would

88 See the list of those in attendance given in the Verhandlungen of the conferences, published at Coburg, 1860, 1863, and Frallkfurt aM., 1865. Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep~ 30. Berlin C. Pol.ptasid. TiL 94, Lit. D. 335.
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be directly responsible for pushing the work of the Verein and would
be aided by and report to the central office. The disadvantage of not
having local branches with elected officers and means of arousing
enthusiasm might thereby be overcome. The Wochenschrift was
started in 1860, but without the expectation that it would earn its own
way. It should serve the usual purposes of agitation and information
and be a rallying point for all members.89
The membership in the Natio,nal Verein never grew very large.
According to the business report made to the general conference in
October, 1865, the Verein had in the previous year (1864) 303 agents
and 17,862 members. In addition, there were sixty-four agents and
3,160 members who were in arrears on their dues. If they were included, the Verein would have had a total of 21,022 members. Of the
17,862 members, 8,355 were found in Prussia. In August, 1861, the
Wochenschrift showed a normal sale of 5,324 copies. Of these 1,865
were sent through the mail, 206 were forwarded in other ways, and the
rest were sold through bookstores. The only separate figures available
about Prussia were those for the number sold in bookstores, namely,
864 copies.
The National Verein suffered most from inadequate financial support. At the general conference in 1863 the secretary reported that the
Verein had an annual budget of 55,807 Florens. He contrasted this
sum with the £50,000 with which the Anti-Corn Law League had begun
in England, the £100,000 which it had raised after the initial sum had
been exhausted, the two million Guldens which it had spent over a
period of fifteen years of agitation. If the English spent such sums for
the repeal of the corn laws, he asked, how much more ought the Germans to give for the cause of national unification? A member from
Frankfurt a. M. was so concerned over the state of finances that he
proposed a three-class system of self-taxation to be introduced for
members. His suggestion was rejected. 90
Neither the urban nor the rural supporters of the objectives of
the National Verein, neither its industrial nor its agricultural members,
saw fit to contribute large sums to the cause. Although they were
89 Flugbliitter des deutschen National Vereins. Hrsg. im Auftrag des Ausschusses
vom Geschaftsfiihrer (Coburg, 1860), Vol. I, 3rd printing; Verhandlungen der ersten
General-Versammlung des deutschen National Vereins am 3, 4, 5 Sept. 1860 (Coburg, 1860).
Verhandlungen der vierten General-Versammlung des deutschen National
Vereins, Leipzig am 16 Okt. 1863 (Coburg, 1863). The rate of exchange at the
time was approximately twelve Florens to the British pound. The Gulden current
throughout Germanic Europe and England, was equivalent to the Floren.
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prospering and would greatly benefit from the victory of liberalism
and nationalism, they were disinclined to expend their own money. A
reporter from Elbing to the Konigsberg Hartungsclle Zeitung (September 8, 1861) explained the lack of response as a result of years of governmental paternalism and absolutism. Unless the state forced them to do
so, the people gave little money to public causes.
The Verein aimed throughout to appeal to the upper classes,
primarily the middle class and the bourgeoisie. From the towns the
influence was to spread among the rural people in the surrounding
area. 91 The membership dues were too high for peasants and most
handworkers to afford. One of the members, Habicht of Gotha, proposed in 1860 that the Verein publish an inexpensive popular paper
for handworkers and peasants, as the W ochenschrift itself was intended
for the educated upper classes. The handworkers were, he said, easily
interested in political ideas and news. It would be more difficult to
influence the peasants; but the work of agricultural associations and
expanded educational activity were bringing greater mobility in the
political views and interests of even this class. The peasant, he continued, read only one paper completely and loved to hear the school
master read to him on Sunday out of a popular journal. This paper
should be put out by the National Verein. Habicht's speech failed to
convince the audience, and no action was taken to implement the
proposal.
The National Verein encouraged the local members to gain the
support of the masses for the cause, but it did almost nothing to help
them. By this approach it would not tamper with the existing social
structure, except to undermine privilege. While seeking to abolish
legal inequality it would continue to recognize the fact of social inequality. It would uphold the liberal principles of reasonableness and
the liberal methods of discussion, compromise and agreement. Like
its Pruss ian counterpart and ally, the Progressive party, it did not
express an official view on the subject of equal and universal suffrage.
When urged to oppose the general idea of equality, of which suffrage
provided one example, von Bennigsen, the head of the National Verein,
refused on opportunistic grounds. He feared that such a step would
by indirection alarm the propertied classes who might think that after
all the National Verein was unwittingly stirring up revolutionary
sentiment. The Progressive party in Prussia, he said, suffered from
the same dilemma. 92
9. See Wochenschrift des NatiOnal Vereins, Jan. 24, 1862, pp. 745·46 .
•• See Volkszeitung, May 25, 1862.
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It should not be inferred that the National Verein was composed
of political and social snobs, unconcerned about the welfare of the
masses and even afraid of them. The strategy may have been at fault;
the Verein might have fared better than it did if it had stirred up a
popular following and sought by means of a popular national assembly
to exert mass influence both upon the state governments and directly
in favor of the unification of the country. However, the members recalled the failure of this policy in 1848 and wished to avoid a repetition. They disliked revolution in any violent form on grounds of
principle. They believed, and they had a reasonable right to believe,
that the nation could be unified and made liberal in the way they
proposed-by building up liberal and national parties in each state
that would take over the governments and then fulfill the dream of
unification by agreement. The German nation would be united with
the least upset; the foreign enemies, especially France, would not dare
to intervene, as they might in case of a revolution; bloodshed and revolutionary action would be avoided; the even course of business
would not be interrupted; in fact, everyone would benefit from this
kind of action-the middle classes, the peasants, the capitalists, the
agrarians, the workers, everyone except the supporters of autocracy and
caste, the vestiges of the Old Regime, the bulwarks of particularism
and privilege. Local political and social leadership by liberals and
democrats would not be supplanted by some far-away, alien group
with headquarters in Coburg; the natural sources of leadership and
strength as they existed would be encouraged to practice the liberal
principles of private initiative and civic responsibility. Liberalism and
democracy would lift themselves by their own bootstraps; the people
would receive training by practice. The German nation would unify
itself; it would not have unity imposed from above to the advantage
of authoritarianism and the detriment of liberalism. It would be a
model for the world of what to do in politics and society and business,
and of how to accomplish ends with most efficiency and economy, with
most reasonableness and freedom. This approach was the antithesis of
Bismarck's methods and ways.93
The social and economic character of the provincial and local
leadership of the Verein was in keeping with the intention and strategy.
Well-known liberals of the upper classes everywhere controlled the
.~ Hermann Oncken, Rudolf von Bennigsen, ein deutscher liberaler Politiker
(Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1910). I, 359·60; Wochenschrift des National Vereins, April
25, 1862. p. 847. The latter warned that the educated classes must keep in close
touch with the manes.
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local groups. For example, in Breslau, the lawyer Fischer served as
agent of the National Verein in 1862. He, the wholesale merchant
Molinari, and Moecke, the editor of the Schlesische Zeitung, were
all active for the National Verein and at the same time served as
guiding spirits in the Constitutional party.94 In the former they cooperated with the leaders of the Progressive party; but according to
the police report of 1865, the National Verein never became strong in
Breslau.95 In Tilsit, a teacher and pastor took leading roles; in
Fischhausen County, two merchants, an apothecary, and two knights'
estate-owners; in Konigsberg, Bender, Professor John, Medical Councillor Doctor Moller, City Councillor Stadelmann, Teacher Witt, City
Councillor Bohm, City Councillor and Bookseller Bon, Professor of
Medicine Jacobson, Merchants F. A. Kadock and H. Welle, Falkson,
Johann Jacoby, Theodor, von Facius, Kleeberg, Professor Hanel; in
Gumbinnen, Bramer, Frentzel-Perkallen, and Headmaster Marcus; in
Danzig, L. Biber, Th. Bischoff, Professor Bobrik, Lievin, F. Rattenburg,
H: Riickert, F. Schattler. 96 Leadership in other regions of Prussia
was of comparable significance.
The occupational distribution of membership did not necessarily
depend upon the degree of exposure to governmental pressure. Government officials, especially those in the administrative positions and therefore susceptible to discipline, tended to keep away from the Verein.
The same was true for pastors, the trainers in Christian obedience, the
moral preservers of the old order; but some did participate in the
meetings and support the Verein in spite of pressure. The teachers
were active to an extraordinary degree. National unification meant
for them the realization of such an enticing ideal and opened such an
opportunity for this sheltered profession to work and even to suffer
for a noble cause that many of them joined the Verein and devoted
their efforts to it notwithstanding the danger from their dependence
upon the government. 97
. The association had the largest number of members and supporters
in the cities and towns, where the population was densest, opportunities
for organization were most numerous, and the ability to resist government 'Coercion by mutual assistance was greatest. In reporting a banquet held in Berlin in honor of von Bennigsen, the head of the Na-

., •• 'Volksieitung, March 19. 1862 .
•• Polizei-Bericht, Breslau. Nov. 5. 1865..
.. See the contemporaneous issues of the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung .
•• See. for example. Wochenschrift des National Vereins, May 17. 1861. March 7.
1862; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Feb. 27. 1861; Tagesbericht, Jan. 30. 1861.
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tional Verein, the Vossische Zeitung (March 13, 1860) analyzed the
audience of 500 as follows: it contained some pastors and elderly
military personnel, no one from the Upper House, numerous judges
and lawyers, few city councillors and even fewer members of the city
magistracy, a large number of the most important industrialists and
merchants, the overwhelmingly majority of the booksellers, numerous
professors and teachers. The analysis agrees in general with that made
by the police of meetings of the National Verein in Berlin in December of the same year and in January, 1861. Of the 350 present at each
conference, the police found that the overwhelming number belonged
to tl,le "better and well-to-do middle class," namely, merchants,
doctors of philosophy, writers, lawyers, and so on. Handworkers were
few, laborers were entirely absent.98
The National Verein for Konigsberg and the surrounding region
had 294 members in February, 1862, among them 107 merchants,
seventy-one estate-owners, thirty-five handworkers, twenty-seven physicians, eighteen teachers and professors, ten brokers, seven officials,
and three writers.99 In the small town of PiIlau, nineteen of the most
respected businessmen joined the National Verein.lOo In Danzig by the
last of September, 1859, a large number of merchants, four or five
physicians, several teachers, manufacturers, brokers, rentiers, apothecaries, brewers, bankers, and the editor of the Danziger Zeitung had
already become members of the Verein. 101
In other towns, especially the smaller and medium-sized ones in the
Eastern and Central provinces, within a few months of the founding
of the Verein, the signers of the Eisenach Program included a wide
spread of occupations. Particularly significant among these signers
in the small towns were the names of many handworkers. In Bromberg
participation was active, for the conflict with the local Polish population made the Germans acutely aware of their nationality. Of the
upper-class occupations only certain officials were unable to join:
Minister von der Heydt would not allow them to do SO.102 In the
Western provinces the leadership and the personnel belonged to the
same occupations and classes as everywhere in the state, the same ones
that supplied the support for the liberal parties .
•• Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit.
D.335 .
•• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, No. 40, Feb. 16, 1862. The breakdown was
given by Professor John of the National Verein.
100 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, No. 121, May 28, 1861.
101 National Zeitung, Sept. 23, 1859.
10' Wochenschrift des National Vereins, April 26, May 17, 1861.
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One group, the youth and especially the students, which had been
traditionally active in liberal and national movements, was discouraged
from participating. That the students were interested in the Verein
and that many would have signed the Eisenach Program seems certain.
The reason for their exclusion was explained very simply in the
Wochensshrift: 103 the students were too young; this was a man's affair
youth inclined toward impetuous action and revolution; the National
Verein relied upon calm, persistent moral and intellectual persuasion
and parliamentary influence; if youth became members they might involve the Verein in trouble with the police; it was better to deny them
official membership and to restrict their participation to being told
what the objectives were and what the adults were accomplishing.
The National Verein membership should be mature and safe.
The participation of the workers and the peasantry raised difficult
problems. Neither could be expected to assume much, if any, initiative in the cause of national unification. Their economic status, their
lack of knowledge and the absence among them of a tradition of political action kept them as a whole in a passive position. In many cases,
however, peasants actually did officially belong to the National Verein.
In the Goldene Aue along the Sa ale the well-to-do peasants joined in
large numbers. 104 The same was true for the peasants of Carwitz,
where as early as 1859 some nine joined, of Schlawin and of Notzkow,
in each of which in the same year over a dozen became members. One
could cite other examples, all taken from the contemporary press. If
given the opportunity numerous peasants would have signed the
Eisenach program. lOll
The collection of funds for building a Prussian fleet illustrated the
way in which the National Verein and its supporters operated. It
provided an opportunity for arousing the interest of the various social
groups, including the lower classes, in the question of national unification. The movement set a goal understandable by all, the collection
of funds with which to build naval vessels for the defence of the German coast and of German commerce-a goal which in its concreteness
symbolized the cause and need for German unification. One may assume that if the lower classes with a modest donation supported the
plan for building a Prussian fleet or adding ships to it, they were interested in national unification.

,.3

Ibid., July 12. 1861.
, •• Volkszeitung, July 29, 1862.
, •• See. for example. the National Zeitung, Oct. 28, 1859.
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Navy Vereins had been popular in 1848 as an expression of the desire for national unification. Dormant during the years of reaction
in the 1850s, they had revived with the New Era; and the war of
Italian unification, the outbreak of the Civil War in the United States
and the threatening trouble with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein
aroused them to vigorous activity. The Navy Vereins collected funds
continuously, but in 1861 a campaign was inaugurated to obtain a
large sum for a special number of ships. The National Verein took
a leading part in the entire matter; usually the members of the local
Navy Verein were also local members of the National Verein. The
two worked intimately together, even to the extent of the local Navy
Verein's sending its collections to the National Verein headquarters
for despatch to the Prussian Ministry of Marine. While some Cunservatives supported the Navy Vereins, the usual attitude of their colleagues was decidedly negative. They disliked a fleet, commerce, and
all that went with them. The stronghold of their power lay in the
army, and they wished no competitor to develop.106 The staunch support of the navy came from the middle and lower classes, the same
ones which formed the strength of liberal and democratic parties and
the national movement.
The campaign started in Leipzig and Dresden and was immediately
taken up by Hamburg 'and Bremen, not one of them a Prussian town.
The Rhineland and Westphalia showed less interest than other parts
of Prussia and Germany. They did not feel the same need for naval
protection, for they had few overseas interests in trade as yet, and so
far as defence was concerned they were most afraid of France. The
Pruss ian areas most active for the fleet for economic reasons were
those of the Center and of the East. They traded by sea in grain,
textiles, and colonial products, and they felt danger from the superior
power of the Danish fleet. Nonetheless, the main force behind the
naval collection was not economic but political. As Schulze-Delitzsch
said in August, 1861, it was recognized that the couple of hundred
thousand Florens collected during the drive would help very little;
but, he added, "the question was one of moral aid and of new pressure
for Prussia finally to devote itself to the national cause."lOT
The agitation aimed at the creation of a fleet capable of defending
the sea coast of Germany not merely in the Baltic but on the North
Sea. It was to protect German interests on the high seas as well.

See Volkszeitung, Jan. 30, 1862.
,., National Zeitung, Aug. 29. 1861.
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Although Prussia had no territory on the North Sea, the sponsors wished it, as the largest state, to assume responsibility for the defence
everywhere of the entire German people. The plan called for building
a German fleet under Prussian control; it fitted into the klein-deutsch
solution of the problem of German unity as supported by the National
Verein. While some Prussians may have felt that donations for this
purpose could not cause anyone to question their loyalty to Prussia and
that in making them they were safe from governmental or social reprisals from the Conservatives, the public statements made the issue
clear that the donations were for a German fleet under Pruss ian leadership and responsibility. Donations could hardly be viewed as other
than a mark of approval of and desire for national unity in some form
and for its concomitant, liberalism.
Danzig, Konigsberg and all the Baltic coastal towns and cities in
East Prussia were active in the collection of funds. Without danger
the burgomaster in each place could and did assume a prominent role.
In Konigsberg the executive committee of the Navy Verein contained
fifteen members, of whom eight were merchants, one a master cabinet
maker, one a banker, one a lawyer, one a manufacturer, one the burgomaster, one an estate renter, one of no listed occupation. lOS
In one town a restaurant proprietor placed a large box in a
prominent place so that the guests could contribute and obtained "a
considerable little sum" for the fleet.I09 At Darkehmen the handworkers donated seventy-five Thalers to the Navy Verein out of their
guild treasury. In the Lithuanian rural counties in East Prussia the
peasants became enthusiastic about the German fleet and aimed to
donate enough funds to make possible the construction of a boat to be
named "Mukkit," that is, "Attack."llo Silesia took an active part. At
Breslau the burgomaster, Elwanger, a Conservative, served as head of
the Silesian Committee, composed, as it was, of the most prominent
citizens.lIl At Gorlitz the organization showed that in a popular cause
the people knew how to conduct an effective campaign. The committee was composed of eight town officials and twelve members of the
town council. The burgomaster called together the members, the
officials in charge of district affairs within the town and the representatives of the press and discussed how to make the collection thorough.
It was decided to publish a call in the press, to use printed lists of the
, •• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 22, 1861.
, •• Tagesbericht, No. 74, March 28, 1861, citing Danziger Zeitung.
11. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 2, 1861.
111 National Zeitung, Sept. 15. 1861.
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citizens and to have everyone covered by the house-owners. The guilds
were to be asked to contribute out of their treasuries. So successful
was the effort that on March 8, 1862, the head of the committee for
Silesia was able to send 55,100 Thalers to the ministry for the construction of a cannon boat "Silesia."112 At Berlin the committee was
equally active, but the title it chose did not stress the objective of
national unification as sharply as elsewhere, even though the purpose
was the same. The Berlin group called itself the Committee for Collecting for the Prussian Fleet to Protect Germany. The title used in
other areas of the state was dearer-the Committee for the Collection
of Funds for the German Fleet under Pruss ian Leadership. The membership of the Berlin committee, merchants, bankers, officials, editors
of newspapers, most of them prominent liberals, manifested the fact
that the latter title would have expressed its sentiments more accurately, but the other title was apparently chosen so as not to prevent even
Conservatives from contributing. The committee felt so patriotic
that it issued an ardently nationalistic appeal for funds even to the
workers. 113 The other towns followed suit, and the newspapers reported the exact amount of contribution from each individual. The
total sum did not prove to be large, but it expressed the longing for
lib~ralism and national unity of almost every donor, with only the
few Conservatives excepted.
The National Verein took an interest in the other popular movements for strengthening German defence comparable to that for the
construction of a fleet. Its relations with the gymnastic Vereins and
the rifle Vereins were very dose. The executive secretary of the National Verein and editor of its paper, Doctor Streit, edited also the
official organs of the other associations and was prominent in their
central administration. The common membership and interlocking
directorate were as characteristic in these cases as in those of the other
liberal and national organizations. Within a few months of its founding the National Verein approved at its general conference (September
5, 1860) two resolutions submitted by von Rochau in the name of the
executive committee. One advocated military training in the schools
as part of the education of all the youth. The other called for the
establishment of shooting societies so that young people could be

110 Ibid., Sept. 27, 1861; J. Stein, Geschichte der Stadt Breslau im 19. Jahrhundert,
p.587.
118 National Zeitung, Sept. ll, 1861; J7olkszeitung, Jan. 18, 1862.
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taught the use of arms.1l4 The next year, 1861, at the general conference in Heidelberg the National Verein returned to the same question and passed among others a resolution in favor of the creation of
military societies for training civilians all over Germany.llli It stirred
up interest in national unification among all groups and classes, including the workers and peasants, and used the many related associations for this purpose.
The success of the National Verein depended upon the outcome of
the conflict in Prussia between the liberals and the Conservatives. n
the liberals won, the National Verein would have a strong chance to
achieve its goal. If they lost the society saw no immediate prospect of
its own success. It therefore encouraged the liberals in every possible
way. At local and regional meetings outside Prussia the members
passed resolutions supporting their battling colleagues and denouncing
the Conservatives. In October, 1863, Chairman von Bennigsen condemned the policy of the Prussian government under Bismarck as
"suicidal blindness," and declared that the conflict in Prussia could
not prevent the Verein from continuing its work. The political report
of a committee to the general assembly of the Verein at the same time
stated realistically that "the near future of Germany depends upon the
speedy victory of the constitutional party in Prussia." So it did,
although not in the implied sense, for the constitutional party lost
the battle.l16

The Press
The Conservative Preussisches Volksblatt early in 1861 asked the
question, who supported the present ministry-the mildly liberal ministry of the New Era, which that journal despised. The journal supplied its own answer: "It does not depend upon the handworkers and
the peasants who together amount to fourteen million souls, pay most
direct and indirect taxes and almost alone provide the entire force
for the Prussian army. Nor can the ministry depend upon the other
three million. What does it depend upon? First of all upon so-called
public opinion. But who is public opinion? All the newspapers of

11< Verhandlungen der ersten General-Versammlung des deutschen National
Vereins, am 3, 4,5 Sept. 1860 (Coburg, 1860).
115 National Zeitung, Aug. 27, 1861.
116 See resolutions of support from Frankfurt a. M., Braunschweig and Gera,
Darmstadt, Dresden, to cite a few examples, in Volks%eitung, Feb. 5, March 22, 26,
28, 1862; see also Verhandlungen der vierten. General-Versammlung des deutschen
National Vereins, Leipzig am 16 Okt. 1863 (Coburg, 1863).
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the Prussian State, mostly edited by Jews, have scarcely 100,000 subscribers, of whom a part do not even belong to the ministerial party!
And this enormous 'minority' of 100,000 persons is the solid foundation of the ministry!" The accusation must be investigated. What
was the size and significance of the liberal press?
The creation and continued operation of a press may be said to
have been in itself an act of liberalism. Respect for ideas, confidence
in the efficacy of reason based upon free information, recognition of
the value of knowledge, of news, of data on which people could decide
issues for themselves bespoke the acceptance of the liberal way of life.
The contrast in tone between the Prussian liberal or democratic and
the Conservative journals revealed how harshly and crudely the latter
adapted itself to the methods of a free press. The Conservative papers
could not and would not discuss an issue coolly and reasonably, for a
Conservative did not feel reasonable. He damned and blasted and
employed bitter irony to bludgeon his point through. He did not
respect his opponent; he was convinced that morality sided exclusively
with him. The liberal and democratic press set itself a different purpose and gauged its role in a different way. Where the Conservative
journals, with lavish use of superlatives, denounced and demanded,
claiming a monopoly of wisdom, virtue, and statesmanship, the liberal
and democratic press had a more modest conception of its function.
Each kind of press reflected the ideals and ways of its form of life.
The one dictated to the people on the basis of dogmas and beliefs;
the other sought to express the views of the public. The one scorned
a public to which it unfortunately had to appeal; the other sought
to enlighten and to interpret the mind of that public, which it respected even when it thought the policies and views of certain groups to
be wrong,117 The mild classical liberal of the old school, Rudolph
Haym, took this responsibility as editor of a periodical so seriously
that he refused to seek election as deputy in the Lower House. He
argued that the political views of the public were not entirely reflected
in the Lower House and he believed that the press was needed to supplement the work of that body,118
Liberalism and democracy implied the union of ideas and practice,
popular enlightenment, and appeals for support on the basis of facts
and understanding, not merely for the bourgeoisie and middle classes
but for all social groups. All the leading papers throughout Prussia
11. The editor of the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung wrote on August 6, 1862,
"We liberal newspaper men do not make public opinion with our editorials; we
only interpret it,"
118 Heyderhoff, op. cit., I, 128-30.
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upheld the liberal or democratic principles and supported one or the
other liberal political party or fraction. In Berlin, apart from the
K reuzzeitung, the organ of the Conservatives, liberalism and democracy
had the field of journalism almost to themselves. The Volkszeitung,
edited and published by Franz Duncker, catered to the democratic elements. The National Zeitung, edited by Zabel with the aid of Otto
Michaelis, served as the leading organ of the Progressive party. The
Spenersche Zeitung expressed the views of the right-wing Constitutional
party, while the Berliner Borsen Zeitung acted as the main vehicle of
liberal economic interests. The Danziger Zeitung, the Ostsee Zeitung
in Elbing, the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, the Morgen Zeitung,
Schlesische Zeitung and Breslauer Zeitung in Breslau all advocated
liberalism in their respective geographic areas of influence. So did the
Magdeburger Zeitung, the Kolnische Zeitung, and the leading newspapers of the Ruhr. In fact, not merely the prominent papers of statewide or regional appeal but almost all those of merely local circulation
supported the liberal side. In Gumbinnen the liberal large landowner John Reitenbach, a cousin of Deputy John Frenzel, founded
and directed the publication of the Burger-und Bauernfreund for
peasants and the lower middle class. 119 The leading members of the
Progressive party urged its support. The liberals living in the counties of Stolp, Schlawe, Lauenburg, and Butow established an Intelligenzblatt for their area. 120 At Neurode the democratic Allgemeine
Dorfzeitung, subsidized for a time by Count Pfeil in Hausdorf, began
to appear in the 1850s.121 Back of the liberal journals financially stood
booksellers, publishers, bankers, industrialists, merchants, even big
landowners.
Contrary to the Conservative accusation, very few of the owners
or editors of the liberal or democratic papers were Jews. Of the Berlin
papers, the Volkszeitung had two Jewish editors among a large number of gentiles. The other papers were in the hands of Christians.
In Breslau, the popular Morgen Zeitung was controlled by Jews, and
the Breslauer Zeitung, owned by Christians, in 1860 came under the
editorship of another prominent Jewish liberal, Doctor Stein; the
other papers remained under Christia~ control. Evidence that race or
religion affected the editorial policy of the papers is entirely lacking.

Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Feb. 27, 1861; Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 84.
Volkszeitung, Jan. 15, 1862.
121 Klawitter, Die Zeitung und Zeitschriften Schlesiens von den Anfiingen bis zum
Jahre 1870, pp. 6-7.
119

120
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The editorial standards of a popular newspaper of the time may be
judged from a statement in October, 1861, by the editor of the Tilsiter
Zeitung. In the political section, he wrote, the paper would bring
short articles about the events of the day. With respect to the internal
and foreign affairs of Germany it would continue to follow a decidedly
liberal policy, to further political progress, to spread political education, to write short, intelligible editorials, which aimed "less at gaining adherents to a definite political party than at stirring up the
political conscience of the citizens." The journal would report news
from the other towns in the province and supply information about
trade, shipping, industry, agriculture, and the like. Finally it would
provide material for social conversation, the recent news about the
theater, concerts, literature, and so forth.122
The main newspapers throughout the state utilized the services of
many kinds of correspondentS. The Landtag deputies frequently
wrote long despatches about events in the capital, especially political
events, for their local papers. Professors did likewise for various favorite
papers. The universities and the popular press were in close contact,
for in the case of the leading newspapers the academic and the newspaper personnel came from and appealed to much the same social
class. Prominent citizens when travelling, including businessmen,
sent back reports, and a growing number of free-lance journalists was
available.
An example of the number and geographic spread of correspondents
of a prominent paper is had in the case of the non-Prussian Augsburger
Zeitung. The journal was widely read by intelligent circles throughout Germany and enjoyed the service of a large assortment of writers,
probably few if any of them being professional journalists. In 1867,
according to a Berlin police report, it had one or more correspondents
in each of forty-three towns. Twenty-three of these were in towns in
Germany, the largest contingents being in Munich (thirteen), Frankfurt a. M. (eight), and Berlin (six). The others were located in Austria,
England, the Ottoman Empire, France, Italy, Switzerland, and
Sweden. 123
.
Most papers merely took news items from others, either reprinting
whole articles with a credit line or condensing the information. The
range of information provided in local papers was wide as to topic
and geographic coverage. However, the need for better facilities led

"2 Konigsberg

Hartungsche Zeitung, Sept. 27, 1861.
Berlin-Dahlem, Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Bi'. Rep. SO. Berlm C. Pol.
Priisid. Tit. 94, S. 129.
111
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to the establishment of the Berliner Liberale Correspondenz, the first
issue of which appeared in January, 1863. It proposed to serve the
local papers which did not have regular correspondents in Berlin.
The leaders of the Progressive party agreed to write for it and especially to provide news about affairs in the Landtag and about party conferences and decisions.124 The degree of success of this service may be
estimated in only a rough way. The news appeal of the constitutional
conflict in Prussia was so high that an abundance of items was available
for an eager public, and the service responded to the demand.
Statistics on the edition of the important papers were frequently
published at the time. In December, 1862, the Magdeburger Zeitung
made the following estimate. The Berlin liberal press paid a tax on
a daily edition of about 100,000 copies. In the provinces the liberal
press turned out probably 150,000 copies, not including the small local
papers. Thus the liberal press printed a total of 250,000 copies each day.
By way of contrast, the Conservative Press in Berlin, even when the
Volksblatt and the Stern Zeitung were included, printed probably
15,000 copies. It was much more centralized in Berlin than the liberal
papers, for many liberal journals in the provinces competed with those
in Berlin, while among the Conservative ones the K reuzzeitung stood
alone. The feudal papers in the provinces probably printed 20,000
copies, making at most 40,000 subscribers for Conservative journals.
If five readers are reckoned to one subscriber, the liberal press had
1,250,000 readers, the Conservative press 200,000. One should also
add the liberal non-Pruss ian papers or periodicals read in Prussia, for
example, the Gartenlaube, of which out of an edition of 130,000 copies
at least 40,000 were subscribed for in Prussia. 125
Figures about the size of the edition in Berlin, Breslau, and a few
other larger cities tend to support the estimate of the Magdeburg
journal. For Berlin these are available for the years 1858 and 1863,
as follows:
1858
1863
Neue Preussische Zeitung
4,000
8,500
(Kreuzzeitung)
Spenersche Zeitung
4,000
8,000
Vossische Zeitung
15,000
13,000
National Zeitung
8,500
5,000
Volkszeitung
36,000
9,000
... National Zeitung, Jan. 10, 1863.
us Article reprinted in Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Dec. 2, 1862; Allgemeine
Zeitung (Augshurg), Oct. 31, 1863.
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In Breslau in 1864 the Schlesische Zeitung published 7,520 copies daily,
the Breslauer Zeitung 5,004, the Provincial Zeitung 1,800, the Morgen
Zeitung 12,200, the Schlesisches Morgenblatt 4,000. By way of comparison, the Kolnische Zeitung printed in 1858 some 14,000 copies. The
available figures on the number of out-of-town papers distributed in
a particular locality tend to show that readers mainly relied upon
regional or local journals, and that those with a state-wide reputation
achieved that position not through the spread of their circulation but
by enabling the local papers to borrow the important news stories.
For example, of the two main local papers in Trier in 1857 one had a
circulation of 696, the other of 559. The Kolnische Zeitung was
subscribed to by 389 persons there, the Vossische Zeitung and the National Zeitung of Berlin by sixteen and fourteen respectively. Cologne
had even fewer subscribers to outside papers; the KOlnische Zeitung
sufficed for local needs. The same conditions held true in Breslau.1 26
The quality of articles in these liberal and democratic papers compared favorably with that of the best articles in any journal in England
or other countries of free institutions. The superior intelligence of
the writers, whether professional editors, professors, public personages,
businessmen, or lawyers and members of other professions, was manifested in the broad range of interest, the marshalling of evidence, the
clarity and succinctness of expression, and the thoroughness of analysis.
The reader could rely on finding in each issue a compact article giving
facts and expressing a balanced opinion in a cool, reasonable tone. In
the liberal press of this period German journalism reached a peak.
Facts were not omitted or warped to conform to an editorial policy
as they were later under Bismarck and his successors in all but the few
best papers like the Frankfurter Zeitung. While news and editorials
were mixed together, the latter interest had not yet begun to cause
violations in the accuracy of reporting. The articles or despatches,
written usually by public-minded private citizens, not professional
journalists, were intended for persons like the authors, persons of intelligence whose judgment deserved respect; they were not meant to
flame the public or to serve a tactical purpose in a political game
among professional politicians. The journalism of upper-class liberalism still prevailed; and the liberal papers for the workers, peasants,
and lower middle class adopted equally high standards. The Prussian
people in the towns and cities were well supplied with objective news

"6 Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv Dahlem. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit.
94, z. 81, 169, P. 383; Polizei-Bericht, Breslau, March 4, 1866; Allgemeine Zeitung,
Oct. 31, 1863.
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and with calm, objective analyses of the news. The rural areas were
not as yet able to obtain the news service that they needed to keep
informed, and the liberals criticized themselves for not taking steps to
develop a widespread local press for the agricultural communities.
Nonetheless, in some regions big landowners of liberal or democratic
views were beginning, with the aid of persons of similar views in the
towns or cities of the region, to establish journals for these social
groups.
The relatively high cost prevented the lower classes as a rule from
being able to afford the newspapers. Many middle-class persons preferred to read them in the public reading rooms, which were found in
each large town and city. There all the journals were at the disposal of
those paying a small entrance fee, and together with the numerous
rental libraries for books they enabled every person to keep informed
at a low cost. 127 The estimate of the Magdeburger Zeitung that each
copy of a newspaper had about five readers may be considered as fairly
accurate. The people in both town and country were accustomed to
lending their newspapers and journals to others; and since time and
speed had not yet become for most of them an essential factor in
regulating their lives, they did not object to an issue's being several
days old. Reading material was not yet so plentiful that they would
pass by a paper or journal merely because it was out of date. They
read carefully and conscientiously, and especially the upper middleclass members in town and country tried to arrive at their own conclusions on the basis of the evidence.
One may strongly doubt whether the Conservative government's
efforts in 1862 and 1863 to restrict the freedom of the press had any
appreciable effect upon the spread of news. The repression certainly
failed to change opinion in favor of Conservatism. The fact of government censorship became immediately known far and wide and increased the extent of antagonism to the existing ministry and its.
policies. The liberal and democratic papers in Berlin had as early
as May, 1862, followed the practice of destroying manuscripts as soon
as they were used, so that in case the police searched the newspaper
offices they would be unable to identify the authors.1 28 It may be assumed that other newspapers adopted the same procedure. Under
these circumstances the readers acquired the faculty of knowing when
12. Breslau alone had in 1863 some thirteen of these libraries and ninety other
localities in the province had 163. Jahresbericht der Handelskammer in Breslau,
1863, pp. 95-96.
128 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, May 23, 1863.
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and how to read between the lines, and that fact enhanced their
antagonism to the kind of regime that forced them to do so. The
suppression of the freedom of the press in a society beginning a period
of vigorous economic and political development afforded sufficient
news in itself to induce the social forces back of this develqpment to
oppose an oppressive government.

The Organization for the Elections
When the New Era began, the liberal political parties had had
little experience in conducting election campaigns. During the years
under discussion the diversity of methods and policies employed not
merely by the different parties or fractions but often by individuals
or groups within them showed that they were learning the ways of
politics by trial and error. The Constitutional party never did develop
anything approaching adequate facilities for party activity among the
voters; and, setting the example as usual, the Progressive party experimented most and in spite of mistakes achieved the best results.
Each party created a central election committee by having its
deputies in the Lower House choose a couple of dozen members from
among their number, with considerable power of subsequent co-optation in case of need. The fractions within the Progressive party never
became so independent as to establish their own committee, and for
the elections of 1862 and 1863 the Left-Center fraction and the Progressive party joined forces under a common committee. The LeftCenter, or Bochum-Dolffs, fraction, in fact, never established any kind
of permanent organization. The Constitutional party had its own
committee, but in the elections of 1862 and 1863 it also declined in
the main to compete with the central organization of the other liberal
parties and left the responsibility for political action to the local
groups. As a rule, for these two elections all the liberal parties and
fractions agreed to help each other against the government candidates.
Wherever the one liberal group had had a representative in the prevvious Lower House, all liberals were to support his re-election.129
On the whole the central election committees did not rank in practical importance with the local committees. That of the Progressive
party drew up a program for the entire state, not as a body of dogma
but as a basis for common action on the part of the local election
committees. Any local group was free to change the program according

... See Parisius, Politische Parteien, p. 56; Parisius, von Hovef'beclr., II, 108; Kolnische Zeitung, March 29, 1862.
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to its wish, but the central committee expected it to serve as a statement of proposals acceptable to all. The party leaders sought a
minimum basis of agreement with maximum freedom for local action
and initiative. l30 They were practicing their ideals of responsible
government.
The central committee of the Progressive party served as a clearing
house for information and advice. lSl The value of this work was
recognized. A Berlin correspondent of the Konigsberg Hartungsche
Zeitung, who manifestly had close working contacts with the committee or was even a member of it, declared in an article auly 4, 1861)
that
. . . the main deficiency of our popular representation rests on
the isolation of the election districts and the resulting preponderant influence of local authorities. If the proper candidates are lacking, the so-called respected people, the officials and
rich landowners, will be victorious; and, since the representation
of the rural population is larger than that of the towns, an unfree representation of too conservative a character must arise.
This deficiency can only be overcome if the election committee
becomes very active and proposes a sufficient number of liberal
candidates and sends them to places where prospect for them
exists.
The central committee of the Progressives received a number of
requests from the local groups for a list of names of reliable and
worthy persons whom they might propose as candidates for the Lower
House. The localities often lacked the means of transportation and
communication which would enable them to keep well informed.
They could not know whether their political views agreed with those
held elsewhere in the state, and whether the persons for whom they
might vote on the basis of merely local knowledge were in harmony
with the party as a whole. Recognizing the practical need for the
list, the central committee prepared one and in the autumn of 1861
sent it confidentially to the party leaders in the various localities. The
list contained names of individuals of the Progressive and of other
liberal political groups; for, true to its original intention, the party
aimed to unite all shades of liberal and democratic opinion for the
purpose of positive action. By the time of the election of 1863 the
events of the constitutional conflict had aroused the population so

110
101

1861.

See statement by Virchow, National Zeitung. July 17, 1861.
See National Zeitung, Nov. 8, 1861; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 3.
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intensely that central guidance on personnel had become unnecessary.132
That the guidance offered by the central committee was welcome
appears proven from the large number of places in which the local
election committee discussed and approved the program-to mention
merely a few, Tilsit, Gumbinnen, and Lotzen in the East, Cologne and
Dusseldorf in the West. ISS Whether the advice on the names of
worthy candidates gained much attention is less certain. In the urban
areas of the East and Center and throughout the Western provinces
the advice was not needed, for adequate information already existed
about available candidates. The quality of political activity in these
regions ranked superior as to knowledge, experience, and supply of
current information to that in the rural area of the Central and
Eastern provinces.
Throughout the state the party leaders organized election committees on a local basis, or for a county or an election district. The adherents to the party usually did so by vote in an open political meeting. At Pillau, for example, the party instructed its local election
committee to co-opt persons known and respected throughout the
county and become an organ for the entire county. In November,
1861, the election committees of Cologne and Dusseldorf called a conference of representatives of the local committees of th"e Rhineland
province. Most of the local committees actually sent delegates, especially those of Coblenz, Bonn, Dusseldorf, Trier and Aachen. The meeting decided to form a provincial committee which would continue beyond the election, would work closely with local committees, and would
further the political education of the population by party literature and
meetings. IS4
The extent of organization in the cities and towns varied according
to the degree of enthusiasm of the local leaders. In Berlin, for the
election of 1861, the Progressives established a committee in each of
the four election districts and usually in the precincts. ls5 The election
of 1862 was announced so short a time ahead that in the first election
district of Berlin the party was unable fully to organize the campaign
and had to rely upon the initiative of a leader elected for that task
in each precinct to call rallies and maintain contact with the election

See Kolnische Zeitung, Nov. I, 1863.
, •• See Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Aug. 6, July 27, Sept. 28, 1861; National
Zeitung, Nov. 17, 1861.
, •• National Zeitung, Nov. 17, 1861.
135 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 5, 20, 1861.
132
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committee for the district. 136 It was evident that in the capital the
party had established no continuing local organization. At Cologne
the city election committee of 120 members of the Progressive party
prepared more efficiently for the election of 1862. It divided the city
into fifteen sections and arranged for each section to name its own
committee with a president. 137 At Elbing the Progressive party in
October, 1861, held a meeting of about 300 members to discuss the
necessary preparations for the campaign. The chairman of the meeting, Burgomaster Philipps, proposed that a committee of twenty-five
persons be selected by secret ballot to draw up the list of electoral
candidates. The list, he said, should then be submitted to a subsequent meeting of the party members for discussion and ultimate approval. Another liberal criticized this proposal as not encouraging
public participation in political affairs and suggested instead that public meetings be held in each precinct to select candidates and that the
central election committee for the district restrict its work to making
certain that in these meetings the party performed its duty. The
majority of the members, however, found even Philipps' proposal too
complicated and asked him to select a committee to recommend candidates. He did so, and about a month later the liberals approved
the list by acclamation. 13s
For the election of 1862 the party in Elbing put into practice the
more liberal suggestion. Instead of referring the task to a large committee it stirred the voters into action and held small meetings in each
precinct for the selection of the electoral candidates. A contemporary
observer wrote:
This independent participation gives the voters a far greater
interest in the victory of their candidates. It has the further
advantage that in individual precincts associations are formed
in these political meetings which plan to come together periodically for social and political conferences and especially during
the time of the Landtag sessions will work beneficially for the
political development of the members.
The party likewise had agents in the small rural localities around
Elbing and helped them to spread information about issues and candidates among the peasants. In this way it expected to overcome the
handicap of impassable roads which prevented the rural voters from
attending the city rallies.1 39
Volkszeitung, April 20, 1862.
Kolnische Zeitung, April 10, 1862.
138 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Oct. 4, Nov. 14, 1861.
13. Ibid., March 18, April 26, 1862.
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The laws caused such difficulty in establishing associations and
subjected them to such close supervision that party leaders had tended
in 1861 not to create election associations but to be content with the
more flexible and less formal institution of the election committee.
As the conflict with the government grew in intensity, liberals in certain areas, for example, Konigsberg town and county and Dortmund
and the surrounding area, established associations (1861 and 1862) for
spreading knowledge of the constitution and of politics, so that "in
the most remote and the smallest cottage one would find alongside
the Bible and an almanac a copy of the constitution."14o They were
a kind of society for adult education in constitutional government and
were supported by the most prominent liberals in the region. In
numerous places all over the state local leaders created informal groups
of electors and even voters to keep in touch with the deputies during
the Landtag sessions. Many liberal deputies wished to maintain these
close contacts. They sent reports to friends for circulation or wrote
articles for the local paper. Whenever possible, as in Berlin, the
deputies appeared in person at meetings, spoke and discussed with
those present the course of legislation in the Landtag. Voters and
electors singly or in groups sent letters or resolutions to their deputies
on many subjects.1 41 Indeed, the evidence points to the conclusion
that in the vast majority of cases the relations between liberal deputies
and their constituencies were close all the time. For the election of
1862 the issues were clearly understood by upper classes and numerous
members of the handworkers and peasantry. For the election of 1863
the liberals did not even consider it necessary to campaign as vigorously as before.1 42 It required little effort to gain votes for the liberals.
The fact that the elections were fought over basic principles of society
and government, the meaning of which could be dramatized by concrete details, made it relatively easy for the liberals to win the lower
classes to their side. A couple of speeches or a pamphlet were usually
enough to show the classes, provided they were sufficiently independent to risk antagonizing their Conservative masters, that their advantage lay with the liberals. u3

16.

Ibid., July 10, 1861, May 9, 1862; J'olhszeitu.ng, Feb. 21, 1862.

'01 See the many examples in the contemporary press.
, .. See Kolnische Zeitu.ng, Oct. 20, 1863.

, .. The small amount of money spent on an election points to the same conclusion, that the political propaganda of the liberals was carried on largely through
the normal channels of .social influence, the press, and personal contacts. The expenditures of the Progressive party election association of Breslau for the election
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In a few cities, Breslau for example, the Progressive party even extended its activity to the election of city councillors and through them
to the election of the burgomaster.144 On the whole, however, the
liberal political parties kept elections for local offices separate from
those for deputies to the Lower House. They still distinguished between issues of what they called a political character, namely, of statewide significance involving principles, and problems of only local import, problems merely of detail. Few of them perceived the advantage
for self-government of stimulating political activity at all levels, of
associating local with state politics as a means of increasing political
interest and providing concrete, practical ties between the two for the
benefit of each, of expanding the area of politics as far as possible for
purposes of general education in individual political initiative and
civic responsibility. Without the close affiliation with local organizations, vigorous in every election, local or state, the organization would
not be permanent, the interest would not be all-inclusive and continuous, the liberal deputies in the Landtag would lack the wide institutionalized support which comes from the intimate inter-relatedness of
local and state politics. The Conservative government would be able,
as it actually was, to prevent wide-spread activity in politics by obstructing the development of a sense of political responsibility in local
as well as state affairs. It succeeded in keeping politics at the state
level, where they seemed too exalted and offered too few opportunities
for the common man, the bulwark of democracy, to participate. An
occasional use of the ballot did not afford much opportunity for him
to learn about politics; the election of local officials and the deciding
of local issues on a party basis would have enhanced his opportunities
and would have increased the vested interests in popular government.
The action of the Progressive party in Breslau was sound and healthy,
but it lacked sufficient imitators.

of 1862 amounted to l,lll Reichsthalers, 16 silver Groschen, and ~ Pfennig. Of
this amount 185 Reichsthalers were used for advertisements and 275 Reichsthalers
for printing. See Poli%ei-Bericht, Breslau, July 2, 1862 .
... Poli%ei-Bericht, Breslau, July 21, Oct. 27, Nov. 24, 1862.
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HE NUMBER of deputies elected by the Come",",iv"
to the Lower House of the Landtag declined from 181 in 1855, to fortyseven in 1858, to fifteen in 1861, to ten in 1862; it rose to thirty-six in
the election of 1863. What kind of party was it that fell from power
so completely and so fast?
The Conservatives differentiated themselves sharply from every
other political group. Occasionally the members were willing to cooperate with other parties on a local basis, as in Konigsberg and Breslau, where in November, 1861, the Conservative committee of the electors proposed cooperation to the election committee of the Constitutionalor right-wing liberal party. In Konigsberg the offer was refused,
but in Breslau the two parties traded support so that in 1861 each elected one deputy.l In the Western provinces, the Conservatives actually
did establish working relations' with conservative Catholic voters. On
the whole, however, they defended such reactionary political, economic
and social principles that they repelled every other party or fraction.
Minister von Roon privately criticized them for refusing to give any
support to the government of the New Era because it contained a few
right-wing liberals. He thought that they felt the need of adapting
themselves to the constitutional system and of aligning with the
government, but that personal antagonism between them and the
liberal ministers, who had opposed them for over a decade, made
rapprochement difficult.2 It is more than questionable whether the

'Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Dec. I, 1861; National Zeitung, Dec. II, 1861.
• Von Bemhardi, op. cit., IV, 174.
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Conservatives ever thought of cooperating with other groups except on
their own terms. In politics they were fanatical dogmatists.
Upon Prince William's becoming regent in 1858 the Conservatives
found themselves in an embarrassing situation. Many of them had
openly opposed the Prince's being given this power, for they knew
that he intensely disliked many of the acts of the Conservative Manteuffel government. They considered him far too friendly toward the
liberals; and they wished to delay as long as possible his coming to
authority and ending their happy regime.
When Prince William dismissed the most objectionable of the
ministers in 1858 and appointed right-wing liberals instead, the Conservatives lost their political power. Since the new Minister of the
Interior issued a directive to the officials to remain neutral in the
Landtag election, the Conservatives lost their party organization. The
Prince Regent's somewhat liberal program of government deprived
them of a political directive. Their fundamental political problem
became that of how they could be Conservative and at the same time
loyal to a ruler who was not Conservative. After having become accustomed to receiving what they called a "tip from above," a "Wink von
Oben," they were suddenly not receiving it. Deprived of the "tip from
above," deprived of their political workers, the bureaucrats, deprived
of the royal sanction of their policy and activity, what should they do?
The Conservatives were not accustomed to taking the initiative in
political activity. Those in the bureaucracy as well as those in private
life had been brought up to receive political orders. Those outside
the bureaucracy disliked intensely having to organize political activity
and to seek votes. Such work seemed utterly out of keeping with
conservatism. They were too comfortable and apathetic as a group
to cope with the extraordinary situation of having to fend for their
political lives. They understood almost nothing about political
propaganda or party organization and instinctively disapproved of any
such activity. In a well-ordered state with a sensible, that is, conservative ruler, one did not have to lower oneself to this kind of behavior.
The loss of the election of 1858 did not shake the Conservatives
out of their apathy. In fact they seemed so stunned by the appearance
of an apparently liberal Hohenzollern ruler that they could not reconcile themselves to the continuation of such an aberration. They
worked by way of their contacts at court and in the army and by
means of the Conservatives remaining in the ministry to bring the
ruler back to their policy. They supplemented these efforts of social
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persuasion by actions aiming to place the ruler in such a position of
difficulty that he would be forced back into their camp. This was a
matter of political strategy, and Prince William lent himself admirably to it by his adamant stand in military reform. They also
endeavored to develop a political program and organization of their
own and on their own responsibility and initiative to regain strength
in the Lower House by entering into political party battles. The first
and second lines of action have been treated above and need not be
reconsidered here; the third deserves some analysis. It should be kept
in mind that the Conservatives did not again become a powerful political party until they were able to line up once more behind the government and to use official resources for winning political victories.
The Neues Preussische Sonntagsblatt, an offshoot of the Kreuzzeitung, wrote in June, 1861, that the Conservatives needed "a firm,
integrated organization in which the individuals would willingly
sacrifice their favorite personal views and opinions for the sake of the
great good for which we fight, and attaching themselves to the larger
totality would feel themselves to be important and effective members
of the entire party." Although a few Conservative aristocrats were
advocating the same proposal, the bourgeois lawyer Wagener had to
take the necessary steps for executing it, and one can say without
exaggeration that during the next few years he alone organized and
led the party.s
Through his speeches in the Lower House of the Landtag, of
which he was usually a member, and especially through the articles in
the Kreuzzeitung, which he edited, Wagener called the Conservatives
to battle and strove to arouse them to the necessity of organization.
He constantly pointed to the example set by the Progressive party and
urged his colleagues to learn from their opponents. The elections to
the Lower House forthcoming in the autumn of 1861 afforded the
occasion for concrete steps to be taken, and by this time the Conservatives received a "tip from above." In the summer of that year
the King said to a deputation of Conservatives, "Think about the next
elections!"·
Early in June, 1861, a group of Conservatives in Berlin formed a
small committee to develop an organization. The committee, composed of Count Eberhard zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, von Below-Hohendorf, von Blanckenburg-Kardemin, Baron von Hertefeld and Wagener,

• Miiller. op. cit., pp. 19, 42. 62. 67.
• Ibid., p. 20.
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sent a confidential letter to all the Conservative men known to it in the
provinces. The committee urged them to campaign even where prospects for success were slight. They should cooperate with the handworkers in this activity and should volunteer their services in organizing
a Conservative association in each election district to direct and push
the campaign. The committee decided against issuing a central
election program, since according to experience such a program caused
more division than unity. It urged the group in each district to
promulgate its own and to make certain that copies of the program
were widely distributed. 1i
The committee found an ally in the central election committee of
Pruss ian handworkers. The latter had come into existence by a change
of name. With the organization of the Prussian Handworker Congress
for the Preservation of the Industry Law, an executive committee had
been established to protect the interests of these guild-minded handicraftsmen against the threat of freedom of occupation. The organization defended the law of 1849 by which some of the monopolistic
privileges of former days had been restored to the guilds. The members now transformed their executive committee into an election committee, and since the raison d'itre for the handworker organization
conflicted with the essential principles of liberalism the committee had
to line up with the Conservatives. It provided the popular aspect to
the latters' endeavor.
In September, 1861, the Conservatives, including the handworkers,
held a convention in Berlin. The invitation had been a general one
throughout the state to all friends "irrespective of class and influence"
who were ready to hold firmly together "under the banner of loyalty,
justice and morality." It was expected to found at that convention the
Prussian Volksverein as a party organization to combat especially the
Progressive party and the National Verein. Over a thousand persons
attended, nobles, large and small landowners, hand workers, pastors,
teachers, intellectuals and workers. The conference was opened by
Vice-Superior Master of the Hunt and Second President of the House
of Lords Count Eberhard zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, and among the
well-known personalities present were retired Presidents von Meding
and von Kleist-Retzow, Lieutenant General von Maliscewsky, Major
General von Winterfeld, Counts von Wartensleben and von Finckenstein, Barons von Waldow-Reitzenstein and Senfft-Pilsach, Ludwig von
Gerlach, Wagener, and the handworker leaders Master Cobbler Panse

"Ibid., pp. 23-24.
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and Upholsterer Wohlgemuth. The Verein was created amidst an
outburst of speeches and started on its indifferently successful career.
"Hundreds and thousands," said the propaganda of the new organization, joined the Pruss ian Volksverein immediately; within a year the
membership numbered about 12,000 to 15,000 persons. Nonetheless,
the central election committee of the handworkers refused officially
to the join the Verein or to sign the program. Panse declared that
the handworkers would cooperate loyally with the Conservatives without accepting the latter's program. He explained his decision on the
grounds that the handworkers had to prevent the suspicion from
arising that they were merely "instruments of a political party otherwise alien to them." Their chief aim at present, he said, was to elect
a few handworkers to the Lower House of the Landtag to protect their
interests.
In the course of the next few months it became clear that the handworkers had nothing in common with the Conservatives except the
defence of the Industry Law of 1849. While the Pruss ian Volksverein
claimed, with truth, that many handworkers joined the organization,
it also knew that many did so unwillingly and that others declined the
invitation because of fear of what the Kreuzzeitung called the "jeers
of the masses." Panse was reported in the liberal newspapers as having
said on October 30, 1861, at a public meeting of the Conservatives in
Berlin that "all handworkers would decidedly go with the liberal
party, if the latter had not written the fatal words 'freedom of occupation' on its banner." The alliance seems not to have been a happy
one. Almost at once after the founding of the Volksverein the leaders
of the handworkers were complaining that they had no opportunity to
discuss matters privately with the central election committee of the
Conservatives.6 The Count This and That, the Lieutenant General,
the Vice-Superior Master of the Hunt seem not to have had much interest in the problems of the handworkers. Let the latter make suits
and mend shoes and lay stones, and vote Conservative. 7
The Prussian Volksverein established headquarters in Berlin and
selected a central election committee composed characteristically of
thirteen nobles and one burgher, the latter being the indispensable
Wagener. It set to work so bureaucratically and with such authoritarian zeal, at least in words, that Professor Leo of the University of
• Ibid., pp. 29-30, 33-34, 40, 42.
• There was also complaint that the aristocrats preferred to buy their clothes from
elegant stores and not to entrust their business to mere handworkers. See Tages.
bericht, Feb. 17, 1862.
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Halle, one of the party's most prominent and devoted members, complained. In order to counter the criticism that this was a feudal or
Junker party, he said, the committee should have included others
besides nobles. He urged that the mistake be corrected so that the
party would draw those with conservative sympathy but without
sufficiently strong convictions to be immune to the attractions of
liberalism. He acknowledged that in the existing "war situation of
the party" the member should be obligated to pay dues, but he condemned the bureaucratic way in which the committee proposed to
assess and collect them. He disliked the committee's complicated and
impractical method of conducting correspondence and its failure to
establish personal contact with local leaders and to use them as local
agents responsible for party affairs in their district. If the committee
continued its present methods, he concluded, the Volksverein would
soon lose every member in Halle. He urged that the management be
vigorously decentralized.s
In one respect Professor Leo's criticism was accepted. In December,
1861, the central committee became composed of seven aristocrats and
£our burghers, Eberhard Count Stolberg-Wernigerode, von BelowHohendorff, von Blanckenburg-Zimmerhausen, General Count von
Finckenstein - Trebichow, Count yon Piickler - Ober - Weistritz, von
Krause-Schwarzow, Wagener, Baron von Hertefeld-Liebenberg, Burgomaster Strosser, Knight's Estate-Owners Andrae-Roman and LoschOber-Stephansdorf.9 Of the burghers two were knight's estate-owners
and the other two were officials. Burgher businessmen, handworkers
and peasants were not included.
The Volksverein scarcely attempted to meet Professor Leo's other
major criticism, that the organization was too centralized and bureaucratic. It was unable to develop branch and local Vereins because of
the prohibition contained in the law on associations of March 11,
1850, a law which the government, composed at the time of Conservatives, had passed against the liberals. It followed the example of the
hated National Verein in creating only one central Verein-the Prussian Volksverein-to which all members belonged. These could meet
in local groups as members of the central Verein in Berlin and conduct
the necessary business. 1o The county and the mail station were
selected as the natural geographic units of activity. Every county
could have as many local divisions of the Volksverein as there were
Miiller, op. cit., p. 36.
• Ibid., p. 55.
10 Ibid., p. 55.
8
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mail stations. If possible, every rural community with more than
twenty members of the Verein should constitute a separate group.
The local group should establish direct connection with the leader
of the county organization, the county commissioner. It could likewise enter into direct relations with the central agency in Berlin.
The executive committee of the Volksverein recommended certain
measures to be taken by the county and local groups. First, the members should be invited to a discussion in order to elect a chairman.
The latter should prepare a list of members, attend to the correspondence with the central office in Berlin and keep the local members informed. The members should pay a small fee to cover expenses. The
chairman was expressly empowered to collect the fees and disburse the
sums for Verein business.
Anyone entitled to vote could become a member of the Verein by
signing the program. If any member acted in public in an antimonarchical or in a democratic manner, he should be excluded from
the Verein by a decision of the county or the local organization.
The local chairman or the county commissioner had the power to
constitute the organization as he saw fit; the form should be appropriate to local or county needs. At the local level it could just as well
be a social organization, a loan association or any other. If a Conservative organization already existed which could be used as the
local representative of the Volksverein, it should be kept as it was,
irrespective of name, with the influential members also being members
of the Volksverein. If sufficient members were available in a locality,
the group should select an executive committee, which from time to
time should hold social gatherings in order to attract new members.
During the summer at least one social event should be held, in common with neighboring local groups, with a full display of flags, shields,
and other patriotic emblems. The famous events in the country's
history should be celebrated with speeches and other forms of commemoration. Above all, discipline should be carefully preserved in
the Vereins so that no democratic elements could creep in and gain
the upper hand.
All correspondence, printed material, petitions and so forth sent
out by the central committee would be individually addressed at the
central office to the members in the local division, but in order to save
postage they would be sent in toto to the county commissioners. The
latter should then forward them through the mail. The same system
should be used in case of correspondence from persons at the local
level to the central committee; it should be sent to the local chairman,
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by him to the county commissioner and by him to the central committee. A semi-annual report should be prepared at the local level
about loss and gain of members and sent via the county commissioner
to the central committee.l l
The pattern used in these instructions was manifestly that of the
organization of the Prussian government. Orders were issued from the
center to be carried out in the provinces. Instructions were written in
detail; a semi-annual report on accomplishments should be made; the
necessary literature for dissemination should be despatched by the
central office; the expenditure on postage stamps should be carefully
watched; a commissioner in the county and a chairman in the community should be selected, as the equivalents of the Landrat, the
burgomaster, the Junker on his estate, the village Schulze, who were
responsible for the local activity; membership should be restricted to
the pure who signed the pledge, and orders were issued to exclude
all persons disloyal to the King or suspected or guilty of being democratic and liberal. The organization reflected the habitual dependence
upon the government. Just how the Volksverein expected to win
popular support with such an organization is not clear. It seemed
scarcely suitable to perform the functions of a political party.
In 1862 Wagener claimed that the Volksverein had 16,755 members
not counting those in East Prussia. It numbered 462 local units
organized in seventy county "commissariats" as follows: 12
Prussia
Pomerania
Posen
Brandenburg
Silesia
Westphalia
Saxony
Rhineland

12 Commissariats with
13
"
"
4
"
"
9
"
"
15
"
"
4
"
"
13
"
"
10
"
"

56 local groups
64 "
"
22 "
"
121 "
"
96 "
"
38 "
"
55 "
"

The Volksverein reached the peak of its strength in December, 1865,
when it claimed to have over 50,000 members of whom 1l,145 were in
Berlin, 34,508 in the provinces, and over 9,000 in a specially constituted Verein in Konigsberg. These were organized in 534 locals. 13
The Conservatives lacked a press adequate to express and defend
their views. They despised newspapers too much to be concerned
llIbid., pp. 55-57.
Ibid., pp. 67-68.
11 Ibid., p. 86.
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with establishing and maintaining their own organs. They disliked
the stir which the press caused; they were averse to the obligations of
continuous intellectual effort which it entailed; they intuitively felt
that any public discussion of issues, even by controlled Conservative
journals, would arouse public interest and disrupt the traditional
acquiescence of the masses in upper-class dominance. They had relied
so long upon the government to supply whatever organs seemed necessary for imparting information to a docile public that they were unable to change their attitude quickly and expand their own press to
cover the state. As a Silesian Landrat exclaimed in the 1850s, "What
governmental newspaper, no matter how small, does not need subsidies
to existl" Even then it was hard to keep the journal alive.14
The New Era found the Conservatives unprepared to use any other
than the 'accustomed methods of action. They had only one newspaper of any consequence, the Kreuzzeitung, established during the
revolutionary years of 1848-49 and edited by the redoutable Wagener.
Supplementing it were the Neues Preussische Sonntagsblatt, which was
actually put out by the former, the Volksblatt fur Stadt und Land,
the Preussisches Volksblatt, and the Berliner Revue. The organ of
the handworkers, the Deutsche Burgerzeitung, may perhaps be added;
and the list is exhausted. A considerable number of local papers were
founded during the early '60s to assist in the propaganda; a humorous
journal was established; a Preussischer Volks- Vereins-Kalender was
published for popular consumption; Wagener's Staats-und Gesellschafts-Lexikon continued to be edited; and a large amount of pamphlets, broadsheets and similar literature was produced. A correspondence bureau was created in Berlin in January, 1862, to supply news
four times a week to the provincial and local press about the debates
in the Landtag. By March of that year its services were subscribed
for by some fifty papers. At the same time an office was opened to
provide the provincial and local papers with editorials and long articles
at a modest price.
A few Conservatives recognized the weakness of the party press and
urged the party to change its habits. One writer deplored the feeling
of superiority toward the press on the part of the Conservatives and
cited the example of England where the Conservative papers flourished
and editors associated on terms of equality with the highest personages.
What a contrast with Prussia, he exclaimed. He urged that editors

.. Willy Klawitter, Die Zeitungen und Zeitschriften Schlesiens von den Anfiingen
bis zum Jahre 1870 bezw. bis zur Gegenwart (Breslau, 1930), p. 8.

The Conservative Party

/

361

be accepted in a "fraternal, comradely" way by the party leaders.l 5
The central Verein took up the problem and recommended the following procedure for establishing a local paper which, it said, had
proved successful. One should not concentrate on obtaining subscribers but should be much more concerned with arousing personal
interest in the existence of the paper. To that end one should issue
stocks in the paper and sell them in the county at from one to five
Thalers each. A competent pastor or teacher should assume the
editorship and the stocks should be repaid from the profits. By following this procedure, the central Verein stated, each stockholder
would work to secure subscriptions and advertisements and at the
same time would as part-owner represent and defend the journal.I6
In 1862 the Conservatives controlled only thirty-three newspapers
in the entire Pruss ian state. They were beginning to move, however,
and local groups of Conservatives were in the process of founding small
local papers to fight the liberals. In the Grafschaft Ravensberg appeared the semi-weekly Konservativer Volks Freund; in Posen, the
Neue Bromberger Wochenschrift. In Silesia, after months of delay,
the Conservatives succeeded in founding, in October, 1862, the Provinzial Zeitung fur Schlesien and in beginning to transform the
Breslauer Kreisblatt and the Breslauer Polizei-und Fremdenblatt into
political journals. Good Conservatives in Silesia were thereby able
to escape the necessity of reading the liberal Schlesische Zeitung.u
As soon as the Conservatives returned to control of the government,
the process of transforming existing government papers into political
journals became much simpler. The local papers which the government had created for publishing official information, many of them
in the preceding century, were turned into political supporters of
Conservatism. The change occurred throughout Prussia and offered
a solution in keeping with Conservative standards. The government
took the initiative, paid the bills, created nothing new and merely
identified itself with Conservatism and employed the resources of the
bureaucracy in the fight of Conservatism for survival. How efficiently
the bureaucracy set to work may be seen from the police report from
Breslau, July 4, 1863.

Tagesbericht, No. 19, Jan. 23, 1862.
Miiller, op. cit., pp. 43, 58·59.
17 Parisius, von Hoverbeck, II, 109; Tagesbericht, No.1, Jan. 2, 1862, Nos. 12,
16, Jan. 15,20, 1862; Zeitungs·Bericht tilr Mai-Juni, 1861, Regierungs·Bezirk Breslau,
July 8, 1861.
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The Breslau county paper has been transformed into a political weekly for the purpose of opposing the demagoguery of
the popular democratic little morning papers. A similar change
is being prepared here in the city. The Breslau Polizei-und
Fremdenblatt has already appeared since the first of the month
in a larger format and will be organized on a basis similar to that
of the Decker Berniner Fremden-und Anzeigeblatt. Great efforts
will be made to obtain many subscribers for the paper and by
many advertisements to make it a necessary directory and guide
for strangers and natives. As soon as this is achieved the paper
is gradually to be transformed into a local Conservative political journal.
The Prussian Volksverein proved to be a one-man organization.
Wagener ran it from the start; the other members of the central
executive committee were incompetent in popular political activity
and inclined to do nothing. In the provinces the leadership was, if
possible and with not over a dozen exceptions, even worse. The Conservatives were apathetic. Accustomed to issuing and to receiving
orders, they understood intrigue at court or among a select few of the
upper class, but they had neither the inclination nor the ability to
cater to the masses for votes. Apart from Wagener and a few others,
they could not make speeches; they could not debate; they could not
write popular articles or pamphlets; they could not maintain their
position in a public argument with the liberals. They soon learned
to avoid public debate with their opponents and sought to exclude the
latter from their political rallies. 18
The political ineptitude may be illustrated by the following two
stories, one of the city, one of the rural area. On October 30, 1861, the
Conservatives held a rally in the first election district in Berlin. The
invitation had contained the statement that "Master Cobbler Panse
has promised to attend." Captain von Zastrow opened the meeting,
and after announcing that Panse had had to go to Danzig he prepared
to read the latter's speech. Vigorous objections were voiced by the
liberals and democrats in the audience. These visitors used the opportunity to refute and denounce their opponents so completely that,
as Colonel von Alvensleben was reported to have said, the Conservatives were "totally and openly defeated," and a liberal took over the
conduct of the meeting. At that moment Panse appeared, declared
that he was a "shamefully abused sacrificial lamb" of the Conservative
party, and denied that he had anything to do with politics. He asserted
that the only reason for the handworkers' aligning with the Conserva18

Muller,

op. cit., pp. 41-42.

The Conservative Party

I 363

tives was that the liberals advocated the abolition of the law protecting
the handicrafts, that otherwise they sided entirely with the liberals.
When he spoke in favor of preserving the examination for those wishing to become handworkers, the liberals revealed the fact that he himself had never taken the examination and that far from being a bona
fide handworker he owned a store which sold shoes made by others.19
The second example of political incompetence occurred at a meeting of Conservative voters in November, 1861, at Cumehnen in Fischhausen county. About twenty-six persons assembled, estate-owners,
peasants and handworkers. O. W. Fischer from Konigsberg spoke in
his usual vein about the imperfection of all mortal acts. Only the
eternal laws of God and His will as revealed in the Christian religion,
he said, should be held holy. Several members of the Progressive party
were present and objected to the assertions. They emphasized that in
state affairs one could manage neither with the divine moral law nor
with revelations, that one needed definite laws. They led the meeting
to their side, leaving only the seven nobles in a determined minority.20
Except for the handworkers and to some extent the factory workers,
the Conservatives aimed their propaganda not so much at townsmen
as at the rural people, the large landowners, the peasantry, the pastors
and county school teachers. They also sought to influence the officials,
but as long as the government remained neutral in the elections they
had slight success. Throughout the years of the New Era and the
constitutional conflict they used their economic and social power over
dependent persons to the limit. These means were especially recommended by the executive committee of the Volksverein. Even before
the latter had been established, the Conservative committee in Berlin
had sent out the following advice:
In the rural districts the estate-owners should endeavor to
have everyone subject to their influence cast a ballot. They
should use every proper and legally permissible means of influence on their subjects and on those with whom they do business.
The women should also exert their influence. At the time of the election the most respected Conservatives should be present in the room
during the act of voting. 21

Ibid., p. 42 .
•• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 17. 1861.
.. Muller. op. cit., pp. 45. 37; Parisius. Politische Parteien, pp. 40·41; National
Zeitung, Aug. 31, 1861.
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In 1861 the Conservatives were a little careful about carrying out
the recommendations of the central committee. They complained that
Minister von Schwerin's election decree on the attitude to be taken
by the officials toward the election lacked clarity and decision. They
argued that it was not impartial, that it favored the liberals as
against the Conservatives. Since it permitted the officials to participate
in the activities of the National Verein, for example, it should also
allow full freedom to the Landrats and the other administrative
officials in behalf of the Volksverein. 22 The reason for their concern
was expressed in a letter which Moritz von Blanckenburg, one of their
leaders, wrote in December, 1861, to Minister von Roon. "I shall not
let my courage fall, but against the governmental stream the Conservatives are completely powerless. . . . If the King does not bestir himself, not necessarily now but soon, very soon, these serious democrats
will quietly and piecemeal do away with what is left of the monarchy.
I have hope in nothing, for I do not think anyone has courage."23
When in 1862 the Ministry of the Interior was turned over to a
Conservative and officials were instructed to use their power to help
return a pro-government majority, the Conservatives once more had
fighting troops and backing for vigorous deeds. They became bold
and optimistic; they had power; they had good speakers; they could
attack the enemy, even beard him in his own political rallies, and
challenge him to debate, either written or oral. The officials, who
had formerly been curbed by Count Schwerin, could, in fact had to,
come out on their side. The Conservatives could now march ahead,
for they had a leader; their King was once more calling them to battle.
The detailed instructions on each step to take in winning the conflict
were again in the finest authoritarian, bureaucratic tradition. The
future seemed bright for "King and Fatherland."
The full display of Conservative "freedom of elections" occurred
in 1863 after Bismarck had become Minister President. In preparation for the elections the Conservatives in Berlin issued a broadsheet
entitled "Advice on Conservative Election Agitation in Town and
Country."24 The advice was divided into two sections, that for Berlin
and the larger towns and that for the rural areas. The section on the
cities came first. In each election district an election leader was to be
named who would choose leaders in each precinct; he in turn would
select efficient agents to assist him. These persons were to be respon22 Miiller, op. cit., pp. 37.38.
"Von Roon, op. cit., II, 56·57 .
•• Miiller, op. cit., pp. 73·75.
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sible for the campaign. They should by writing or by word of mouth
get in touch with the known Conservatives in their area and in private
discussion gain further assistance and plan the campaign. Not merely
prestige and wealth should be decisive in the selection of these agents,
but influence, reliability and energy. Each should be assigned certain
houses and streets in which he should learn the views of the residents,
win over the undecided and stir up the lazy to participate in the
election. The election leaders should work especially on the officials
to vote the right way.
Servants and workers dependent upon Conservatives should be instructed about the significance of the election and held strictly to
account for their vote. They should be allowed the opportunity to
attend Conservative rallies without any penalty for lost working time.
In case of a large number of servants, the leader should first be won
for the Conservative cause. Conservative landlords should place every
possible obstacle in the way of agitation by the opponents. They
should not permit propaganda by the opponents to be posted on their
walls or literature to be distributed on their premises and should immediately notify the Conservative agents of any attempts to do so.
After the agents had found a sufficient number of supporters they
should call a meeting to discuss political issues. In that discussion the
danger from democracy to the existing social order should be emphasized and voters urged to participate in the election. All should
promise verbally and by a shake of the hand to campaign for the
Conservatives. The meeting should select the candidates for the role
of elector in each precinct for all three classes.
General district meetings should be attended in person in order to
keep an eye on the opponents and openly and firmly to combat them.
The liberal leaders should be sharply watched and reports should be
made to the Conservative district leaders about the activities of these
persons. Improper conduct of officials should also be reported. "All
persons dependent on the government or bound by material interest
and honor" should be kept under close observation. The Conservative
pamphlets and broadsheets should be carefully read and used as a
source of material for debates with opponents. The accuracy and
completeness of the lists of voters should be checked. To cover costs
of postage, publications and so on, a silver Groschen should be collected from each member at each party meeting.
For the election itself the names of the candidates should be published under the superscription "Vote for the Monarchical Party Loyal
to the King." Election literature should be posted and distributed
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among the voters. On election day "stalwart and fearless men" should
be stationed in front of the voting place and should once more distribute literature to the voters. The candidates should present themselves to the voters of their district, including the opponents, personally
or by letter or by a printed address in calm language, and should ask
for their support. Above all, one should see to it that at least one
reliable member of the Conservative party should be in the election
commission so that no unfair act could occur. The names of the
candidates should be spoken loudly and firmly and Conservative elector
candidates should vote for themselves. Any illegal acts should be
quietly witnessed, and if the election favored the opponents, protest
should be raised against the legality of the election. All voters should
remain in the room until the conclusion of the balloting so that in
case another ballot was necessary the Conservatives would not lose
votes.
The Conservatives regarded the campaigning in the rural areas as
simpler than that in the towns and cities. First of all the Conservative leaders should arrive at an understanding with the pastors, the
officials of the local government, and the estate-owners. These should
have the duty of explaining the issues to the voters-"the dangers
threatening them from the growing proletariat, the parcelling of
estates, the expanding bureaucracy, the harm to church and school
from separating them, the equalization of proletariat and taxpayers,
of propertyless persons and peasants, the representation of rural interests merely by county judges, the increasing predominance of the
cities." Each meeting should be opened by prayer and song and three
cheers for the King. The sense of military honor and the memory of
military exploits should be aroused; the "old Prussian feeling," "national pride" and "the old love for the Royal House of the Hohenzollerns" should be strengthened. "One should make it a duty and an
honor, an expression of Prussian loyalty and love, to vote for the King:
that is Conservativel"211
The central election committee sent to the provinces in 1863 a list
of persons whose return to the Lower House should be especially
pressed. The list read as follows: 26
King's Counsel Wagener in Berlin
von Blanckenburg of Zimmerhausen
President von Gerlach in Magdeburg
H Summarized in Muller, op. cit., pp. 73-75; also in Kolnische Zeitu"g, Oct. 9,
1863.
•• Printed in Kolnische Zeitung, Oct. 10, 1863.
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General-Director von Hiilsen in Merseburg
Appellate Court Judge von Prittwitz in Breslau
Superior Forest Master von Wedell in Erfurt
von Tettau-Tolks
Burgomaster Strosser in Herford
Privy Administrative Counsellor Elwanger in Breslau
von Nathusius in Konigsborn
Professor Glaser in Konigsberg
Consistory Director Noldechen in Magdeburg
County Court Director Ebert in Liegnitz
Appellate Court President von Brauchitsch in Stettin
Chamberlain Count von Piickler of Weisteritz
State's Attorney Wendt in Stargard
King's Counsel Hiibner in Breslau
Infantry General on Active Service von Brandt in Berlin
Privy Superior Administrative Counsellor von Kliitzow in Berlin
Superior Administrative Counsellor von Nordenflycht in Minden
Active Privy Counsellor von Olfers in Berlin
Privy Superior Administrative Counsellor Stiebel in Berlin
Guild Supreme Master Neuhaus in Berlin
Retired Major von Bliicher in Berlin
von Rathkirch-Track of Panthen (Silesia)
Landrat Prince von Hohenlohe of Lublinitz
Landrat von Seydewitz in Garlitz
Baron von Hertefeldt
Appellate Court President Holzapfel in Ratibor
City Court President Breithaupt in Berlin
Count von Oriolla of Ruchendorf near Reichenbach
Privy Superior Administrative Counsellor von Krocher in Berlin
Retired City Councillor Doctor Woeniger in Berlin
Retired King's Counsel Gerloff in Berlin
The list contained the name of only one with even a title of handworker. All the other persons were gentlemen, nobles, officials,
officers, pastors, professors, lawyers. Twenty of them belonged to the
nobility; the other fourteen were burghers. Such was the social distribution of candidates with which the Conservatives expected to win,
if not the election (for they were doubtful about so great success), at
least a large number of seats.
In 1862 the number of stories of pressure on little people began
to increase. The Conservatives threatened to cease patronizing hotels
which allowed the liberals to use rooms for meetings. They withdrew
trade from liberal merchants, restaurant owners, handworkers, and
anyone else with whom they had business. They brought pressure to
bear upon the peasants. When one merchant protested against such
treatment, his client, the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein-SonderburgAugustenburg zu Primkenau replied, "You demonstrated in favor of
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the Progressive party; the men of the Progressive party are revolutionary, subversive elements; they are the most dangerous people in
the state. If they are re-elected, we have to expect revolution."27
The vigor with which the non-official Conservatives followed the
advice of the heads of the Volksverein may be seen from two incidents.
One concerned industrial workers, the other, the rural people. Herr
von Diiring, manager of the Saarbriicken Railway and of the Royal
Machine Company, instructed his workers to vote against the liberal
candidates for the Landtag. The workers refused to follow his counsel, and after the election he dismissed four of them. Believing that he
intended to punish all 150 of them by gradual dismissal, the workers
announced that they would all quit of their own accord. Nothing
more of Herr von Diiring's plan was heard. 28
The rural incident occurred on the estate of Prince von Pless in
Upper Silesia and revealed the great amount of power over the peasants
possessed by a big landlord, the methods by which the latter was able
to use that power, and the extraordinary courage required on the part
of the peasants to resist the pressure. The event was fully investigated
and discussed in the Lower House of the Landtag, and the facts were
well established.
In the regular election a doubtful liberal named Rygulla had been
victorious in the sixth Oppeln District. Because of election irregularities, the Lower House had refused to seat him. When a new election
was held, Landrat von Seherr-Thoss was returned, only to have the
Lower House refuse to seat him pending an investigation. Requested
to report on the election, the Landrat Baron von Richthofen did so
on the basis of material supplied mainly by Prince von Pless and failed
to interview any of the persons protesting to the Lower House against
the validity of the election. When a committee of the Lower House
investigated the case it disclosed the following facts. Prince von Pless
owned the largest estates in the district and had in his hands the
economic fate of his numerous subjects and of many others with whom
he· dealt. He had served on the government commission to conduct
the elections along with the Duke of Ratibor, the second largest landowner in the area. The Prince von Pless was involved in controversies
with individual peasants and entire communities over the settlement of
the former servile economic obligations, and witnesses agreed that the

'T See Volkszeitung, April 25, May 3. 14. 1862; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung,
Nov. 29. 1862; Tagesbericht. Jan. 15. 27. 1862.
•• Abg. H .• St. B., Nov. 28. 1863; I. 200-01.
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prince's speech to the local peasant leaders given below and the voter's
response were acts in this continuing battle,
Schulze Wrobel was present at the prince's speech and later testified under oath before a court as follows:
I know only the Polish language and since the last election
I have been an elector. Shortly before the election of a deputy
held on July 23, 1862, at Sorau a messenger from the Prince von
Pless brought me , .. an invitation to Pless. I heeded the summons and found at least forty peasant Schulzes or electors gathered in the Princely riding stables where the Princely Recorder
Sarganeck received us in person. He invited those present to
eat and drink. On the table meat, bread and butter were laid
out and two casks of Bavarian beer, each cask being about half
a tun. Sarganeck added: when we have become better acquainted we shall discuss something.
After those present had eaten and drunk, Prince von Pless
appeared and made a speech to us, his guests, in the German
language which Sarganeck translated word for word into Polish.
The Prince had papers in front of him on the table. I cannot
recall the exact words of the speaker, but I do remember the
sense of it. The Prince exhorted us to vote at the next election
of a deputy, not again for Rygulla but for Landrat Baron SeherrThoss. . . . Recorder Sarganeck actually said, "Whoever does
not vote for Baron Seherr will feel it." I do not remember that
the expression was used that anyone not voting for the Landrat
would be ejected. We replied to the speaker that not all those
Schulzes present were electors. Sarganeck then said, "The
Schulzes who are not themselves electors should report to the
electors of their communities what has been said here and
should request them to vote for Baron Seherr; otherwise all will
feel it." No more was said, but all of us present knew what this
warning referred to, namely, the permission to gather leaves,
branches and moss in the Princely forests at low prices for use
in our own economy. This proved to be true. I did not let myself be influenced and cast my vote for Rygulla. When I subsequently spoke to the Princely Forester Kleist at Wyrow about
buying the forest refuse and moss, he refused me with the statement that I should receive nothing. I know that the community
Wilkowy, whose electors Pilch and Spyra voted in Sorau for
Baron Seherr, have received moss and forest refuse from the
Princely Forester for nothing. Pilch was, as I recall, also at the
breakfast.
Another Schulze who had been present at the meeting told several
witnesses that if they failed to vote for his candidate, von Seherr, "it
is possible that ... the Prince would not rent land to us any more."
What did the Prince von Pless actually say to the peasants? Fortunately, the prince had kept a copy of his speech. As an example of
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an election address by an aristocrat living according to the standards
of the Old Regime it is worthy of preservation.
I have summoned you as the most influential men in the communities in order to speak a serious word to you in this very serious time. You know that I have always lived with you in the
fullest harmony and I can openly testify that I have always been
proud of you, of your devotion to me and my house, of your
trusting love for our King and Lord. When I have been together
with the King and his highest servants I have often mentioned
you with praise. When I speak a serious word of exhortation to
you today I do so in order for this friendly agreement to continue. The matter is simple. Formerly we were always in agreement on our acts; now you have given ear to persons whom I do
not know and also refuse to know, persons who spread calumny
against the intentions of our beloved King and against my intentions, persons who did not even have the courage to put their
names to the communication sent to you. That you have believed this calumny is proved by the way in which you participated in the Landtag election while I was away from you, and
by the way in which you openly regarded as your enemies me
and those upon whom I bestow my trust. There is in this behavior such appalling ignorance of the truth that I must speak
to you some words of clarification. Your welfare goes hand in
hand with mine. I am a landowner as well as you, and since I
am a large landowner, all the disadvantages which strike the
landowner strike me in a greater measure. I have therefore only
one interest-to care for your welfare because your welfare is also
my welfare. That one or the other of you or even an entire community becomes involved in some controversy with one of my
officials or even has a lawsuit, does not pertain to this matter.
After all, this sort of thing occurs among neighbors. Instead of
considering this simple fact you believed the persons who said to
you that I am your opponent. I speak frankly to you and you
be frank to me. Let one of you cite an instance in which I have
intentionally offended one of my peasants, or, if he were in need,
where I have not attempted to help him as much as possible. If
no one can cite such an instance, what right have you to believe
the lies spread against me? Now it is time for the elections
again, and you have the opportunity to show what will be our
relations in the future. I can only assume that if you choose a
different deputy from me you place no confidence in me and do
not wish to live in friendship with me any more. Although I
shall be sorry not to be able to live with you in friendship any
longer, I shall withdraw myself from you, since I shall assume
that you, if you do not vote as I do, do not wish to live with me
in friendship any longer. The results arising from this split
desired by you are of your own making and you will dearly see
that I shall not suffer from them.
Now go in peacel Report to your communities what I have
said to you. I make it your duty to do this at least before the
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elections in Sorau on the twenty-third of this month so that the
communities cannot subsequently excuse themselves on the
grounds of ignorance, and the blame for the disadvantageous results of your neglect will not fall on you. Tell the electors that
I expect them to appear at the election and to do their duty
toward the King and the state. Once more. It is a question of
showing at the election whether you wish friendship or hostility
from me. The results of hostility will become apparent. Now
vote as you wish.
The effects of the prince's speech were immediately evident in the
extent of participation in the election. The electors from a number
of communities who had voted for Rygulla failed to appear at all.
Fewer electors voted for all candidates than had in the preceding
election voted for the winner alone. Such was the manner in which
Landrat von Seherr-Thoss was returned.
When the Lower House refused to seat the winner, the Conservative deputy Count Bethusy-Huc argued against the decision. Influence
on an election, he said, could be exercised not only from above but
from below. Pressure from one's equals, he asserted, was much more
effective than that which was wielded from above upon individual
votes. Such influence was entirely private in character, and so long
as it did not violate the law it should not be considered by the Lower
House. The Prince von Pless, he declared, had not overstepped his
rights at all; if one considered the moral side of the case one should
far more question whether one should annul the election of a deputy
receiving the votes of these electors or annul the election of electors
so susceptible to the attraction of a breakfast. Human nature could
not be changed, he concluded, and so long as it remained what it was
one had no guarantee of free elections in a moral sense and should
restrict himself to preventing the exercise of illegal influence by state
officials.29
The story contained all the elements of the lord-peasant relationship in a period of transition. The lord used his manorial power to
preserve his authority under a system of parliamentary representation.
He blended a nice assertion of friendship with a threat of punishment
in case of disobedience. He entertained the peasants in a barn and
appeared personally for a few minutes in order to read a warning
speech. He glossed over the main source of trouble, the controversy
with the peasants over the sum to be paid for the lord's having to re-

•• See the documents in Abg. H., St. B., Aug. 16. 1862; III. 1228. Ibid., Jan. 31.
April 15, 1863; I. 140-43. II. 835-43.
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linquish certain properties and rights to them-a part of the process
of peasant emancipation. The peasants, who noted the exact measurement of the casks of Bavarian beer, were aware that they furthered
their own interests best by voting liberal. While many of them were
frightened away from the voting booth or were induced to vote as
their lord wished, a great many understood the meaning of the election for peasant interests and defied the lord. Equally illuminating
was the Count Bethusy-Huc's confusion of pressure from above and
pressure from one's peers. To this good count the latter seemed worse
than the former. Just how one could have elections without some
influence from one's peers, he did not say. How one could continue
to hold elections of any significance when pressure from above could
be freely applied, he likewise did not say. He had recourse to the old
Conservative argument: man is an evil being and as far as the law
allows he must in private life be controlled by his superiors.
The uniformity of Conservative election orders may be seen in the
instructions issued to his subjects by Herr von Saldern of Meffersdorf,
Lauban county:
To the Royal Prussian voters of the Manors Meffersdorf,
Schwerta and Volkersdorf. His Majesty our most gracious King
and Sovereign has commanded that on the twentieth of this
month the elections shall occur and has stated that the elections
will be free only in case those persons are elected who agree with
the views and wishes of His Majesty and His ministers. The
former deputies of our election district have voted against the
will of His Majesty and His ministers. Since I do not wish that
those Royal Prussian voters who vote for electors who vote for a
deputy in Garlitz on the 28th of this month who opposes the
will of His Majesty and His Majesty's ministers should stand
henceforth in any kind of business relations with me, I have
commanded as follows: those voters who act to the contrary, if
they are laborers in the forest or in the economy, be dismissed,
and that the same be done to those in the brick-kiln, the peat-bed
and the factory for oven and clay wares; that the officials of the
forest, the economy, the garden, the mill, the bakery, be given
notice; that final accounts be settled with artisans who have
worked for the estates or for the other administrative branches,
as well as with merchants who have sold them anything; moreover that those who have rented a dwelling or land or a forest
be immediately notified that as soon as the contract has expired
it will not be renewed. I demand from all the above mentioned
voters who stand in any kind of relations to me that they participate in the voting on the twentieth of this month. Whoever
fails to supply me personally with a satisfactory explanation for
remaining away from the polls will receive the same treatment as
those voters who vote for new deputies in opposition to the will

The Conservative Party

/

373

of His Majesty and His ministers. My manager, Inspector
Demnitz, is given the commission to supply me with the information according to individual categories from the election lists for
Wigandsthal, Meffersdorf, Grenzdorf, Neugersdorf, Strossberg,
Bergstrass, Heide, Heller, Ober-und Nieder-Schwerta and Volkersdorf. Since the shortness of time does not permit inspection
here of the election lists, Inspector Demnitz will ride to Garlitz
for this purpose and have them laid before him by Election
Commissioner Landrat von Seydewitz immediately after the
election of deputies on the twenty-eighth of this month, in order
at the same time to obtain information about the votes of the
electors.so
The gentleman covered the situation even more thoroughly than the
government. He was a model Conservative.
The Conservative method of campaigning in the rural areas was
accurately described in an election appeal by the Progressive party in
1862 as follows:
The matter is made more difficult for you [the peasants] than
in the towns. You lack the societies in which you can discuss your
affairs. You are merely called together when you are to work on
roads or pay new taxes or listen to the reading of an order from
the Landrat. But when it comes to voting all sorts of instructions are issued to you, and if you do not wish to obey you are
threatened with all kinds of real or imaginary terrors. Here
comes your Schulze, there the police administrator, here the
Landrat decrees, the pastor preaches at you what you should do.
The one says the village, the other the county, the third the state,
the fourth Christianity, the fifth the Church, and finally even
your poor soul itself is in danger if you do not vote as you are
told. s1
The administration of the Administrative District of Breslau explained in 1862 the success of the Progressive party in the election by
the fact "that its doctrines are much more attractive for the masses
than the drier and much more reserved doctrines of the different Conservative political groups, and that almost all local papers and the
larger daily papers with very few exceptions know how to exploit in
the cleverest way the very attractive teachings of complete freedom and
equality, of self-government, and to further the efforts of the advanced
liberal parties." The writer reported complaints from the country
that the bonds of discipline were loosening and that all personal
authority was beginning to disappear. s2
Reprinted in the Kolnische Zeitung, Oct. 25, 1863, from the Gorlitzer Anzeiger.
• , See in Volkszeitung, April 24, 1862.
32 Regierungs-Bezirk Breslau, May 8, 1862, Zeitungs-Bericht fur Man-April, 1862_
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What were "the drier and more reserved doctrines" which the
Conservatives offered? The only fundamental tenet of the Conservatives was expressed by von Kleist-Retzow: "We demand of our
people that they select us; then we must take care of them."ss Since
the people were not quite satisfied with this program the Conservatives
had to embellish it. In 1861 the Volksverein offered the following
points to the ~lectors:
I. Unity of our German Fatherland, not in the way of the Italian
kingdom through blood and fire, but by the unity of its princes
and peoples and in firmly holding to authority and law. No repudiation of our Prussian Fatherland and its glorious history; no
sinking into the filth of a German republic; no robbery of the
Crown and nationality nonsense. II. No breach with the past
in inner affairs of our state. No elimination of the Christian
foundation and of the historically preserved elements of our
constitution. No shifting of the center of emphasis of our
European position through weakening the army. No parliamen·
tary regime and no constitutional ministerial responsibility. Personal rule by our King by the grace of God and not of a constitution. Church marriage, Christian schools, Christian authority,
no furtherance of the ever-spreading demoralization and disrespect for divine and human order. III. Defence of and respect
for honorable work, property, rights and class. No favoring and
exclusive rule of money capital. No sacrifice of the handworkers
and of landed property in favor of the mistaken teachings and
usurious arts of the time. Freedom of participation of subjects
in legislation and in the autonomy and self-government of
[feudal] corporations and communities. Freedom in the firm
preservation of protecting order. No surrender to bureaucratic
absolutism and to social serfdom by way of limitless and uncontrolled anarchy and the imitation of the political and social
forms which have led France to Caesar ism. Development of our
constitution in the sense of German freedom, in love and devotion to King and Fatherland.s4

The program of 1861 had been composed when the Conservatives
had lost favor with the King. When early in the next year the King
began to return to the fold, the party changed its platform from one
of extensive negation to the simple and clear statement of support of
the King. In an election appeal of March 19, 1862, a group of party
leaders declared: "The campaign cry for which we fight today should
be no other than that of the maintenance of the power of the Crown,

•• Quoted in Dr. Sigmund Neumann. Die Stuten des Preussischen Konservatismus
(Berlin. 1930). p. 75 note .
•• Salomon, op. cit., I. 83·84.
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the preservation of the full constitutional rights of the monarchy as
the highest and decisive authority which, although bound by the rights
of the representative assembly in certain respects, should never be subordinate to the will of the majority."35 The party did not deviate
from this platform during the rest of the constitutional conflict. At last
its loyalty to the crown was reciprocated by William's loyalty to the
Prussian tradition. The party thereby made the strongest appeal of
which it was capable to the voters, but still more to the monarchy, the
court and the government.
To know the thoughts and proposals of these Conservatives is
difficult, for by nature they were disinclined to put their few ideas
into words. They much preferred the status quo, and no fuss. Their
ablest politician, Wagener, was vocal in the expression of Conservative
views; but it is questionable whether his colleagues by and large
bothered to follow his lines of reasoning or understood fully his proposals. The more popular type of Conservative thinking may be
exemplified from speeches made at local meetings. In September,
1861, in Berlin the members were urged to "acknowledge our Lord
Jesus Christ as the Lord and Savior of the world of Hearts" and to see
to it that "in addition to continuous prayer for this important affair
they should work according to their power in favor of the election of
only God-fearing, sensible men as electors and deputies." At Bromberg
in October, 1862, von Massenbach cited Psalms 66, Verse 14, to a
conference of Conservatives and expressed fear that "divine punishment must soon strike the present world." He could not look into anyone's heart, he said, and did not wish to damn anyone; but the Progressives were "worse than all Frenchmen, for they wish to abolish all
religion and even grant all sorts of rights to the Jews." Agreeing with
these assertions Pastor Reinhardt added that "the Democrats even wish
to mediatize God just as they wish to mediatize the King and everything else."36
A few months earlier the Kreuzzeitung published an article about
the speech which Grabow, liberal deputy and high administrative
official, had made in opening the sessions of the Lower House of the
Landtag. In the article occurred the passage, "Woe to those who eat
the Kings' bread and betray them; woe to those who seek to swindle
the hearts of the people away from the King; woe to those whose
8. Milller, op. cit., pp. 125-26 .
•• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Sept. 8, 1861. By "mediatize" the Conservatives meant the subordination of independent Prussia to the position of one state
within a unified Germany. Volkszeitung, Oct. 25, 1862.
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tongues are spears and arrows." About a year later a right-wing liberal
aristocrat, von Flottwell, attended a lecture on "Monarchy by Divine
Right" given by Ludwig von Gerlach in the Evangelical Verein. The
ladies present applauded the speaker's assertion that "even the authority of the slave owner" is "a divine command and a law justified by
God's grace."37
An appeal by the Conservative election committee in PreussischHolland, October, 1863, may be regarded as a classic of provincial
Conservative thought and style.
After secure hands of dead-tired steersmen have guided our
ship of state through the storms of the shameful year of 1848
over the roaring waves into the harbor of ordered conditions
and noble peace, after the basis of all people's welfare appeared
to be made secure among us again, the benefactors of the people unjustly calling themselves Progressives, whose objective is
to establish popular rule by the mob and who must therefore
always be called by their true name "Democrats," have again
raised their Hydra head and undermine by lies, suspicion and
distortion the foundations of our new state constitution. Just
as they have the precious life of our blessed King [Frederick William IV] on their consciences, so they are now laying hands
again on the rights of his Most High Successor who bears his
Crown by the grace of God; and since the elections are upon us,
a word of warning to all voters appears to be necessary to guard
against those false prophets who go in sheep's clothes but are
really rapacious wolves. We must once more take up the battle
against Beelzebub and his devilish companions; through the
sound sense of the folk we must call a halt to this prevailing
democratic epidemic and enter in the breach against heathenism
and judaism, against mob rule and the murder of our brothers. 3s
At about the same time the distinguished Professor Leo in Halle
defined freedom to the full satisfaction of the Kreuzzeitung as follows:
\Ve also wish freedom, that is, the real feeling that wherever
the welfare of our Fatherland or the discipline necessary for it
does not set natural limits we can develop ourselves without
restriction. But we have also had this feeling completely before
there was talk of a constitution among us. Under our King, we
were actually the most completely free people on the earth even
though the liberal slogans did not fit us. We shall feel ourselves most free again when firm discipline and respect for the
Royal authority once more are everywhere firmly fixed in our

'7 Volkszeitung, May 28, 1862; Manfred Laubert, Edward Flottwell, Ein Abriss
seines Lebens (1919), p. 99.
8. Kiilnische Zeitung, Oct. 14, 1863.
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hearts. Abstract freedom represented by mechanical means in
majorities and the like, we do not need at all. And that to a
certain degree we can bear them is the best evidence of how
much discipline still sticks everywhere in our hearts. But we can
bear it only as long as a powerful monarchy stands in our midst.
Whoever imagines that this discipline will remain as soon as
sovereignity in Prussia has left the throne and has taken its seat
in the majority of the deputies, is in politics a child.39
When the Conservatives spoke of their opponents, they chose words
and phrases of color without much restraint upon their emotions.
Those around Elbing divided the Pruss ian people into two groups, the
"well-disposed rural people" and the "real and incipient criminals and
stock-exchange Junkers." In the latter category were put the Progressives. Another favorite phrase applied to the industrialists was
"robber knights behind the smoke stacks." In one piece of election
literature produced under the auspices of the Volksverein, the author,
von Olfers, accused the liberals of robbery. "Whether one sticks his
hand in his neighbor's pocket to steal five Thalers or whether he
stretches out his hand after the King's Crown, the result is the same,
for theft is theft and stealing is stealing." The same author asserted that
the liberals aimed to parcel out the land in such small lots that horses
could no longer be used in agriculture, that cows would have to be
employed, and that finally "our artillery will have to be drawn by oxen
and our cavalry ride on goats."40
The accusations made by the Conservatives against the liberals, if
believed, should have filled the population with shudders. When hard
times hit Rosenberg county in 1861, the Preussisches Volksblatt blamed
modern industrialism, "which plays such a great role in the New Era."
An anonymous broadsheet entitled "The German Progressive Party
and Its Aims" listed as the ultimate goal of that party "the abolition
of property." From Elbing came the report that a Conservative had
spread the statement "that if the Progressive party won the election
(1862), Prussia would be partitioned within a year; the French would
receive one part, the Russians another, and the Jews the third." Antisemitism was cultivated by the Conservatives as a Christian virtue
which they accused the liberals of trying to destroy. The following
incident in 1858 at a Kreistag in Silesia was typical. With the beginning of the New Era five Jewish owners of noble estates appeared for

•• Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 4, 1863 .
• 0 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Dec. 21, 1861. Deputy von Beughem, Abg. H.,
St. B., March 18, 1861; I, 519·20. Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 21, 1863.
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the first time to partiCipate in the proceedings. Von Haugwitz protested against the participation of the Jews in the corporation of the
first estate, and Count Saurma-Jeltisch proposed to pay two Friedrichs
d'or out of the county treasury to each Jewish owner of a noble estate
who would voluntarily remain away from the Kreistag. When one
of the Jews protested, the presiding officer, the Landrat, refused him
the floor.41 The Conservatives specialized in arousing both class hatred
and racial hatred.
The liberal ideal of the legal state aroused the Conservatives' scorn.
In the Lower House of the Landtag Deputy von Blanckenburg declared that "the liberals are either not aware of the fact or do not
wish to be aware of it that their principles ... always lead to ... half
measures and tolerance of both sides, above and below." A Conservative paper declared early in 1861 that "to transform Prussia into a
legal state means nothing more than to put Prussia in the hands of
a few so that they can exploit the country in their own interest, promulgate laws which are of use to them, place the taxes on the masses while
they use the money for themselves. The legal state of the liberals
means plutocracy, oppression of religion, art, knowledge, the working
force of the masses." In keeping with this thinking, the Berliner Revue
declared in April, 1862, that "the independence of the judiciary . . .
has become a curse for our country.... Freedom of the press is also
degraded for egoistic purposes, and in this wise we shall inevitably
attain a situation where the survival of the state demands emergency
curbs on egoism."42
.
In keeping with their line of belief the Conservatives constantly
accused the liberals of revolutionary intentions. In Prussia, they said,
the liberals aimed to destroy the constitutional powers of the King
and reduce the sovereign to a figure-head. The forthcoming elections
in 1862, they stated in an election appeal in March, laid upon them
"the sacred duty" of opposing these forces with all their power and
energy. Not the Prussian people but their betrayers, they said, intended to make the Prussian representative assembly a workshop for
a German revolution, to use the constitutional rights of the people
as a means of insurrection and anarchy. In 1861 Deputy von Blanckenburg had already warned the liberals that "if you change the power of

U Tagesbericht, No. 51, March 1, 1861; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, April
15, 1861; Valkszeitung, April 25, 1862; Miiller, ap. cit., pp. 40, 70. J. Stein, ap. cit.,
p. 581.
•• Abg. H., St. B., May 28, 1861; III, 1433. Tagesbericht, No. 11, Jan. 14, 1861.
Kolnische Zeitung, April 29, 1862.
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the Prussian monarchy, if you weaken it to the level of a constitutional
parliamentary regime, then ... just as the military reorganization was
put through in spite of you, so will the power of the Prussian monarchy
also stride over the constitution." As a rule, however, the Conservatives did not speak so bluntly. The more usual formulation was
exemplified by that of Wagener, who in 1863 in a meeting of the
Prussian Volksverein was reported to have said that only a royal dictatorship would solve the present conflict in Prussia. He explained
that he did not mean by dictatorship the abolition of the constitution;
on the contrary, the dictatorship should preserve this "sacred constitution" to which the King had sworn and should defend it against the
intended overthrow by the Progressive party. The Conservatives had
sworn allegiance to the constitution in the sense intended by Frederick
William IV: it should be so developed that it would be possible for
the King to rule. "According to the constitution the deputies swore
allegiance to the King, not the King to the deputies," Wagener stated.
If the liberal parties sought to destroy the constitution, he continued,
"by seeking to introduce into it the spirit of parliamentary despotism
which is entirely alien to it, then the royal dictatorship must counter
such actions .... We shall always follow the flag of the Hohenzollerns,
but never the bell or the hat of the president of the Lower House."
Wagener was stating in Conservative constitutional terms what von
Blanckenburg had said more frankly: the King's power should be
preserved at any cost. The end justified the means. 43
The Conservative program and methods failed to arouse the voters.
In April, 1862, the Berliner Revue condemned its party for political
ineptitude:
One does not win battles ... with army orders alone; and
with election decrees, no matter how well meant and resolute
they are, one will hardly emerge from the election battle as victor. ... As matters are at present the election decrees have accomplished nothing but anarchy, a "pleasant anarchy," which is
all the more disorganizing and depressing the more courageous
and resolute the words sound at the beginning. 44
The results were evident in the number and personnel of those who
won seats in the Lower House. Of the ten who were elected in 1862,
five were Landrats, who in order to qualify for this position had to

.s Miiller, op. cit., p. 125. Abg. H., St. B., Feb. 5, 1861; 1,69. Augsburg Allgemeine
Zeitung, Oct. 15, 1863 .
.. Quoted in Volkszeitung, April 23, 1862.
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own knights' estates; four others were owners of knights' estates; the
tenth was a state's attorney. All belonged to the nobility. In the
election of 1863 the party returned only two persons, Wagener and von
Blanckenburg, whose names had been placed on the preferred list
quoted above. The roster of their thirty-six deputies contained twelve
Landrats and one former Landrat; twelve other owners of large
estates, most of them being knights' estates; one renter of crown land;
two lawyers; two ministers of state and one former minister of state;
one major; two justice officials; and two administrative officials.
Twenty-seven of the deputies were nobles; the other nine were
burghers. Apart from the absence of a member of the handicrafts, the
delegation represented fairly well the Old Regime.
Unfortunately for genuine conservatism it became tied to the Bismarckian kind of government policy. Possessing almost no popular
appeal it had to follow the lead of a government that gave the illusion
of moving in its direction. Bismarck carried the Conservatives far
beyond the point at which they had wished to stop. The economic
reforms in which he acquiesced were liberal rather than Conservative.
His objective of national unification coincided with that of the
liberals and not the Conservatives; and his methods of unification were
in some respects as repugnant to one as to the other. While Ludwig
von Gerlach and a few of his friends were utterly opposed to Bismarck's policy of unification, most of the Conservatives followed the
Minister President faithfully in the act but not in the interpretation.
They loved the military victories and the Pruss ian conquests, but they
hated to see the existing legal structure of Germany violated and so
many princes toppled. The Prussian Volksverein wished to be neither
Bismarckian nor isolationist, neither German nor national; it sought
to be Pruss ian and to preserve Prussia's power and influence against
Austria or anyone else.
Taken in tow by one of its own kind, a Prussian Junker, the "small
but powerful party" did not recover from the shock of Bismarck's success until the agrarian troubles of the 1870s brought it vociferously into
the public arena once more in defence of its economic interests. Bismarckian unification of the nation along with industrial and commercial expansion left the Conservatism of the 1860s rather behind the
times. Nonetheless, Wagener's confident statement in 1863 expressed
the assurance that this old-style Conservatism was far from dead:
We must never disappear from the battleground. Never
under any circumstances. For we have to represent not merely
human plans! We have claimed and still claim today that in
addition we represent eternal truths and eternal principles of
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state and society. Let us hold firmly to our principles and our
truths in all circumstances, whether the times be good or bad,
whether they please human beings or not.411
The Conservatives held to them until the Nazis and, in the Eastern
part of Germany, the communists delivered their death blow.

.. Muller, 01'. cit., p. 76.

11 / The Government and the Elections
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HE ROLE of the govemment m the dectio", of 1862
and 1863 was determined fundamentally by King William himself.
The Conservative ministers were happy to follow his general orders,
which agreed entirely with their own desires; and Conservative county
officials most responsible for the execution of the orders, the Landrats
above all, improved upon them with enthusiasm. In a somewhat
tentative and limited way in the election of 1862 and with full force in
that of 1863 the government turned partisan and utilized the resources
of the powerful bureaucracy to sway the vote in its favor.
King William had been so disgusted at the chicanery and hypocrisy
of the Manteuffel ministry under his brother in its handling of elections
as well as other matters that on becoming regent in 1858 he had
determined to stop such immoral action, as he called it, and permit
free elections. As early as April of that year he had stated to von
Vincke that the officials would not be allowed to interfere in the next
elections as they had in the previous ones. 1 In the autumn of that year
Minister of Interior Flottwell issued the first election instruction to the
officials under the authority of the Prince Regent. Since the instruction exemplifies the fundamental dilemma of William's attitude, it
needs to be summarized. The government placed great value upon
the unchanging loyalty, reliability and legality, as well as the political
insight, of the deputies, and it was therefore the indispensable duty of
the royal officials concerned directly or indirectly with the elections to

1

Von Bernhardi,

op. cit.,

III, 32.
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work to the effect that men of these qualities were returned. At the
same time the officials should take care not to exert official pressure
upon the voters. They should not seek to intimidate the voters by
threats of withdrawing certain advantages and rights which the
bureaucracy disposed of. They should, however, cooperate with the
important private individuals in their particular district to assure the
return of reliable deputies. Government officials might run for office,
Flottwell stated; but before they did so they should carefully consider
whether they would be of more use to the state by becoming deputies
or by remaining at their present positions. In case they were elected,
he implied that they should support the ministry.2
Within a few weeks the minister had to send further instructions
to stop the provincial officials from interpreting the decree as meaning
that they should assist only one party.3 The fact that this corrective
had to be issued revealed the confusion of the Prince Regent's and the
government's position. On the one hand, William wished free elections; on the other, as has been shown, he was determined to preserve
intact his authority; on the one hand, he aimed to uphold the constitution and the law; on the other, he opposed "the stereotyped phrase,"
the "far-fetched ideas" of liberalism; on the one hand, he wished to
develop the state on "sound, strong, conservative bases"; on the other
he wished his subjects to follow him. In his confused mind he opposed what he called both extremes, the reaction of the 1850s and the
radicalism of 1848. He expected to rule in accordance with "truth,
legality, and consistency," but he did not know what these terms
meant. 4 He wished to govern with the aid of mild and cautious
liberals, like Schwerin and Flottwell, and of Conservatives, but not
reactionaries, who would follow his line of constitutional absolutism.
As soon as he discovered that the majority of the deputies returned by
the elections disapproved his theory and practice of rule, he immediately proposed to interfere and to force the public to elect supporters of his conceptions of rule.
Early in 1861 the King aligned himself publicly against the liberals.
To the burgomaster of Berlin, a city overwhelmingly liberal, he declared: "I know that a party exists in my country which aims to renew
the conditions of the year 1848. What was able to occur then by reason
of surprise will not again succeed; one will find me prepared." As

• Preuss. Geh. Staatsarchiv. Pro Br. Rep. 30. Berlin C. Pol. Prasid. Tit. 94, Lit. A.
198.
• Ibid.
• Horst Kohl, op. cit., pp. 3-8.
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the year continued similar and even more pointed stories began to appear in the press, for example, one about the King's reply to a deputation from Schweidnitz.
I thank you for the patriotic views which you have expressed
to me.... Manifest your patriotism and your love for Me and
My House in the ... elections for the House of Representatives.
I wish neither reactionaries nor democrats. Elect only such men
as deputies who will go hand in hand with me. If that occurs
then we shall certainly see each other in friendly manner again.1>
When new elections were held in the autumn of 1861 the King
wished to intervene personally, but was finally persuaded by the
Minister of Interior von Schwerin to permit elections "freely and
without hindrance." The officials were to vote according to their
convictions; but if they disagreed with the government they should
manifest reserve. Their sense of duty and honor, stated the minister's
decree, would show them the way to harmonize the exercise of their
rights as citizens with their duty as officials. 6 Although sense of duty
and honor did not lend itself to uniform interpretation, Count Schwerin succeeded in reducing the pressure of officials on voters to an extent that was reached in no other election. To the King the results
were tragic: more and more liberals were returned. 7
Early in 1862 the ministry had to prepare for another election. This
time the King believed that he should interfere personally, and in
instructions of March 19 he ordered the ministry to use the officials
for explaining to the public the King's policies and wishes. Since the
liberal resistance to the government's, that is, the King's, program had
led to the dissolution of the Lower House and the holding of new
elections, it is clear that the King expected the officials not to support
the opposition in any way, that he expected them to assure the return
of a Lower House favorable to his policies. s
By this extraordinary document the King took side definitely
against the liberals, even against those mild ones who had been his
ministers, and asked his people to support him. He reiterated his program of 1858 and once more identified the welfare and safety of Prussia with the preservation of Hohenzollern power within that state. He

• Tagesbericht, No.7, Jan. 9, 1861, citing Preuss. Volksblatt, No.7; National
Zeitung, Nov. 20, 1861. See also the King's statement to the burgomaster of Bran·
denburg. Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Dec. 24, 1861.
• Abg. H., St. B., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, p. 605.
• See ibid., July 4, 1862; I, 1862.
• Die lnnere Politik, pp. 9·10.
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appealed for a better-informed public, with his officials acting as the
sources of enlightenment. He distinguished between the liberal deputies and the public as neatly as any Conservative politician would
have done, and called upon the awakened and corrected public to vote
in support of his ministers. Making the election a personal affair he
asked for a vote of confidence in his conduct of government. The document revealed a confusion of absolutism and constitutionalism, expressing again the King's desire and intention to have his own way,
to rule absolutistically in accordance with the constitution. The inconsistency of this position was not at all evident to him, for as certain
contemporaries saw, he had no idea of how a constitutional government worked. The election therefore became one of the liberals
against the King. The liberals tried to deny the fact, as we shall see,
but the Conservatives took up the election stand of the King and
fought valiantly for it. With monarchy versus parliamentarianism as
the issue the makings of a thoroughgoing constitutional conflict were
present.
A few days later Minister of Interior von Jagow sent to the officials
an order concerning the elections that was in keeping with the King's
instructions. While the instructions were given to all officials in all
departments, they were particularly directed to those who had charge
of the execution of the elections. The officials should make clearly
understood "the guiding policies and intentions" of the government
and prevent any misunderstanding or falsification of them. They
should make it known that the government stood upon the authority
of the constitution, and that it was its "absolute duty" to preserve the
power of the Crown and to prevent a so-called "parliamentary government" from being established. There should be freedom of voting,
but at the same time the officials should unify, organize and assist all
groups willing to support the government. They should participate
actively in the campaign against the Progressives and other opponents
of the government and King and in favor of the loyal elements. The
instructions aligned the government and all officials with a few ultraright liberals and especially with the Conservative party.9
It is difficult to comprehend how freedom of elections could be pre-,
served when officials were expected to assist the election of candidates
of one particular party. Those officials who supported passionately
the Conservatives and hated the liberals interpreted the instructions

• Ibid., pp. 10-12. See the contemporary press for numerous denunciations of this
decree, especially those by the universities.

386

/

Prussia 1858-1864

according to their own wishes_ When these acts were brought to the
minister's attention in the Lower House in July, von Jagow denied
that officials had ever been ordered to give up their party preference
and follow the views of the government; but, he added, they had been
forbidden to participate in hostile agitation. He disclaimed any
knowledge of excesses and promised to take steps against "illegal and
unjust" acts to influence the elections.lO
The full program of action was drawn up and placed in operation
only after Bismarck became Minister President in the autumn of 1862.
His ministry employed every means at its disposal to coerce the public
into supporting it. In a state with a powerful bureaucracy, a large
army with a militaristic tradition, a dovetailing of administrative and
military authority and social position and prestige, a tradition of
authoritarian rule, the resources available to the government affected
practically every part of Prussian life. The transitional and indefinite
character of much of Pruss ian law enabled the government time after
time to interpret the law in its favor. The advantage to the monarchy
and to the Conservatives of having kept the terms of the constitution of
1850 as vague as possible was now manifest. Whereas the liberals
sought to construe these clauses and the laws derived from them in
favor of freedom, the government undid the liberal gains of the New
Era by interpreting the clauses and laws in a reactionary sense. Since
Bismarck had an extraordinary gift for picking holes in legal documents to his own advantage and was devoid of respect for or fear of
any force or any human being that opposed him, the fight against the
liberals reached its fullest scope. In the election of 1863 the government mobilized all its resources against the liberals. Every means
used up to that time was brought into action and many new ones were
added. The work of the Manteuffel ministry was greatly improved
upon, and the King heartily endorsed the far more ruthless acts of
Bismarck and his colleagues. It made a difference as to whose ox
was gored.H
The main instrument of the government for influencing the election
in its favor continued to be the powerful, numerous and inclusive
body of officials under its control. Count Eulenburg aimed to use
them to the fullest extent. First the government obtained a statement
from the highest court which placed the judiciary on its side in favor
of restricting the freedom of officials to vote. N ext, the ministry is-
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Abg. H., St. B., July 4, 1862; I, 460.
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sued an order declaring that henceforth any official elected to and
serving as deputy in the Lower House must pay the cost of his substitute while away from his official position; the money would be withheld at the treasury. The government refused any longer to cover
these costs.1 2 Then on September 24 the Minister of Interior instructed
officials regarding their behavior in elections.
Whoever as official has sworn to be loyal and obedient to the
King his most gracious Lord is freed from this oath neither as
voter nor as representative, and when His Majesty definitely
delineates the constitutional way along which his officials must
accompany him, they are all obliged to obey, and those whom
because of special trust the King's grace has called to positions
of political importance are also obliged to support actively the
King's government. 13
By this order every official had to support actively the election of
deputies favorable to the government. All pretence of neutrality was
tossed aside; all respect for the rights of officials as citizens to vote as
they saw fit was rejected. The officials were not permitted to remain
inactive; they were required to take a vigorous and public part in
securing the election of governmental supporters. The order was
definitely based on the view often expressed by Conservatives that with
the most powerful machinery in the state at its disposal, namely the
bureaucracy, the government ought to win an election easily. It merely
needed to apply its legal authority over the officialdom. It would
thereby have with one determined act, so the Conservatives argued,
an organization for political purposes incomparably more effective
than any other in the state. It would possess the financial resources of
the state for its political work; it would deprive the liberals of one of
their most active and influential groups, namely the many liberal officials, many of whom sat in the Landtag, many more of whom were
chosen as electors and cast ballots for liberal candidates, and even more
of whom voted for liberal electors. It would destroy one of the main
sources of the organization of liberal strength, that derived from the
close association of officials. It would take away from the liberals one
of the most respected large groups of leaders in local and state affairs
which it possessed. The only question was how to force the officials
into line and make them work actively for government supporters.
Such a thing as an individual's conscience and convictions did not
bother these aristocratic Conservatives. An official should have no
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other master than his superior and over him his King, he should have
no other convictions than those which his superiors allowed him to
have. The government plan was inclusive; in the execution of the
plan it attempted to be thorough.
The instructions were sent to all officials in all ministries, in provincial, district, county and local government, in church and education,
in the economy. Only the army was excluded; for this government
wished to keep it out of political controversy.14 The orders were even
imparted to town and city councillors and to comparable members of
village government, persons chosen by the local voters and not directly
responsible to the state government. Officials had to watch over and
be responsible for the political activity of their subordinates. Count
Eulenburg stated that in case an official faced a problem too difficult
for him to handle, he should report it to the government. The advice
must have had extra point since this government's ability and willingness to utilize the law, legally or illegally, to its own ends was becoming
well known.
Among all the officials to whom the election instructions were sent,
the most important for the government's purpose were the Landrat and
the village Schulze, the latter being subject to the control of the
former. In the cities and towns the government lacked an official with
the authority, will power and political views of the Landrat. It was
always restricted by the greater ability and willingness of the urban
centers to resist pressure than was the case with the scattered rural
population; but its authority to approve the selection of the local
officials and its use of these officials to execute state laws enabled it to
exercise considerable influence, even though not so much as over the
peasants.
The full weight of responsibility for influencing elections fell on
these officials; they were to utilize their prestige as popular local
leaders to gain votes for the pro-government candidates and to ward off
votes for the opposition. They were subject to pressure to participate
actively in their dual capacity, as officials and as local popular leaders.
They could slip easily from one capacity to the other in favor of the
government party. An ideal arrangement was for both Landrat and
Schulze to be elected as electors, who then would vote for the Landrat
as a Conservative candidate for deputy to the Lower House.
The significance of this combination arose from the predominantly
rural character of Prussian life. In 1864 over 13,000,000 out of a total

USee Abg. R., St. B., 1864, Vol IV, No. 95, pp. 606·07.
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population of nearly 19,000,000 lived in the country. The village vote
could have won the election for the Conservatives. For example, in
Salzwedel County out of a total of 172 electors, 143 were elected by the
186 rural communities. If the Schulze or his two assistants could have
been chosen as electors throughout the state and controlled for the
Conservatives, the results would have been an overwhelming victory
for the government. 15 The Schulze and the villagers felt the full force
of government pressure.
The election law of 1849 imposed upon the Landrat and the
Schulze certain responsibilities which enhanced their ability to influence the voting. The Landrat or the community official, who except
in the largest cities would also be under the authority of the former,
drew up the list of voters, listened to and decided upon complaints,
divided the voters into the three classes, and fixed the boundaries of
the voting precincts. In their capacity as officials the Landrats acted
as election commissioners who handled the administrative details of
the voting. 16 It will be seen how these duties opened up opportunities
for the Landrat to try to affect the outcome of the vote.
A few weeks before the election the government threw the influence
of the King publicly into the campaign on its side. The public that
read the newspapers and that had contacts with prominent persons
already knew how the King felt, for on many occasions he had openly
expressed his desires about the outcome of the election. These statements had appeared in print even in the liberal papers. When the
Steingrund peasants sent to the King their protestation of ardent
loyalty, the latter replied in a letter which became widely known. The
essential part read as follows:
If the community wishes to show loyalty to Me in the election it can do so only by the election of such men as have the firm
resolve to support My ministers in the execution of the tasks
imposed by Me upon them. A hostile attitude toward My
government is not in harmony with loyalty to My Person; for
My ministers are called to their positions by My confidence in

Abg. H., St. B., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, p. 623.
Count Schwerin had as Minister of Interior forbidden Landrats to serve as
election commissioners in case they were candidates in the election. Bin von Jagow
had already repealed the order before Count Eulenburg assumed office. Under the
latter, Landrats were encouraged to act in the dual capacity, as Landrat Hoffman
in Jiiterbogk-Luckenwalde discovered. Upon being selected by the Conservatives to
run for deputy to the Lower House, he offered to resign as election commissioner,
but his bureaucratic superior refused to agree. The government liked the combination. Abg. H., St. B., Nov_ 23, 1863; I, 120-28.
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them and have to support Me in the fulfillment of My great and
serious duties.17
After the election was held and the Landtag convened, the new
Lower House appointed a commission to investigate the violations of
freedom of election. The evidence brought forth in the Lower House
by individual members and by the commission vividly revealed the
character of Prussian politics of the period. The role of the government in politics, the political conceptions and behavior of officials, of
aristocrats, burghers and peasants, of Conservatives and of liberals,
were all disclosed with the authenticity of actual participation. A
cross section of Prussian society was offered, a portrait of social relations, of cultural standards and moral values, of the mixture of the Old
Regime and of modern, Western ways that characterized Prussia in
this period. The evidence from the election of 1863 will be supplemented by a few examples of similar behavior during the preceding
two elections, those for 1861 and 1862, when the government tried to
exercise some restraint upon its subordinates.
In accordance with the hierachical order of the bureaucracy, one
might begin with the presidents and vice-presidents of the provinces.
In 1861 President von Kotze of the province of East Prussia and Landrat von Spiess travelled through Mohrungen County and ordered lower
officials to warn the population, mostly peasants, against the Progressive party. IS The next year the superior president in East Prussia
sent the following communication to his subordinate officials:
The Royal officials will be the best organs to explain in the
election meetings the aims and goals of the government. For
this purpose there should especially be used the meetings of
election officers and their deputies for the discussion of the
execution of the election regulations.
It is self-evident that only such men are to be named as election officers and their deputies about whose reliability and
conservative views there is absolutely no doubt. ... 19
Since the officials toured their districts at government expense, the
Conservative party needed almost no party funds. It had the state budget as a party campaign treasury, a sizable war chest which the liberals
could not equal. Neither the government nor the Conservatives saw
anything wrong about using the taxpayers' money to force them into
agreeing with the views of the government. The holdover of absolut-

Die lnnere Politik, p. 241.
Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 29, 1861.
,. Abg. H., St. B., July 4, 1862; I, 478-79.
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ism was still too strong for these Conservatives to recognize anything
incongruous about employing public money to defeat the will of the
public. The liberals knew that the procedure was wrong. To them
it was one more example of the kind of political behavior which they
wished to abolish. 20
For the election of 1863 Minister Eulenburg's instructions gave the
officials a free hand, and the Conservative ones applied all the pressure
that their position afforded. Typical were the orders which the police
president of Berlin sent to his subordinates, October 6, 1863. He requested his officials not to vote for government opponents and
threatened to use the power of the law against those who ignored these
instructions. "I expect," he continued, "not only this but also that they
will actively work to the best of their ability in behalf of the election
of men who are ready to support His Majesty the King and the Royal
government."21
The presidents of the provincial administration and the police
president of Berlin filled intermediate positions. They rarely came
into direct contact with the public in the same way that their subordinates did. The official who entered most fully into the rough
battle with groups and individuals was the Landrat, and most of the
work affecting elections was organized and directed by him. While
the evidence showed that a very small number of Landrats refused to
execute the government's orders or assumed a passive attitude or at
most one of advising without threatening voters, the overwhelming
majority of them went into the campaign with crusading fanaticism.
Even in 1861 Count Schwerin as Minister of Interior had been unable to curb all the Landrats from violating the freedom of electiom.
Thus, Landrat von Brauchitsch had sent a number of copies of the
program of the Pruss ian Volksverein to a Schulze near Danzig with
instructions to distribute them and to collect names of persons willing
to join the Verein. An evangelical pastor in Guttland had been used
for the same purpose. Von Brauchitsch was seeking election to the
Lower House as a Conservative, and in writing to electors to ask for
their vote he had described the Progressive party's election material
as containing "deceptive lies and insinuations of mistrust."22
By the time of the election in the next year and with von Jagow as
minister, the Landrats began to act as they had longed to do. Accord-

.0 Ibid.
·'Ibid., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, p. 609 .
•• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 15, Dec. 11, 1861.
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ing to a report from Minden, Landrat von Horst referred in official
business to the opponents of the ministry and of the Conservative party
as "scoundrels."23 Another Landrat declared: "And who are the
leaders of the majority in the dissolved Lower House? Democrats of
the purest kind, against whom in the end only soldiers have been and
will again be effective." Another one stated his constitutional views
as follows:
To our dear Friends and Comrades of Goldapp County:
The deputies should be Royal advisers; the King wishes to hear
not only his ministers and officials but also men from other
classes. They should help him in the formulation of beneficial
laws; they should support him in economical use of the taxes
of his subjects; they should report to him when bad conditions
obtain in the country and something useful is to be accomplished.
Then the Landrat denounced the Lower House liberals for seeking to
usurp the powers of the King, for having accomplished nothing, for
having proposed unchristian, godless laws about marriage, the schools,
usury and community government. "I could bring before you many
other godless and foolish laws that are advocated in the Lower House,
but those given above will suffice." He blamed not the King but the
liberals for wasting funds; and he denounced the latter as democrats
like those of the "shameful year 1848," and warned the public not to
vote for them. He said he knew that many wished the King to rule
alone and the elections to be abolished; but, he added, the King had
ordered them to vote, and they must obey. "Forward into the election," he cried, "with God for King and Fatherland!"
The Landrats called meetings of Schulzes and other officials to
instruct them on how they should vote. They frequently prohibited
the distribution of campaign literature by the liberal opposition and
cautioned all innkeepers to be vigilant against anyone's distributing
leaflets, pamphlets and the like without a permit. Since the Conservatives lacked an adequate number of newspapers to spread their views,
the Landrats used the official county paper for that purpose. They
threatened to cancel the permit of tavern keepers who allowed oppositional meetings to be held in their quarters or literature to be posted
or distributed. 24
The election instruction of Count Eulenburg in 1863 spurred the
Landrats on to bolder and more efficient deeds than ever. They could
·'Ibid., June 13, 1862-.
•• Abg. H., St. B., July 4, 1862; I, 464-74, 481-83. Volksteitung, April 23, 1862.
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now threaten any recalcitrant officials, they thought, with government
approval and aid; and, as it turned out, they interpreted the minister's
instruction correctly. Landrat von Gayl in Teltow County ordered the
Schulzes to have themselves chosen as electors so that they could vote
for candidates for the Lower House selected by their bureaucratic
superiors. He threatened them with punishment and dismissal in case
of disobedience. The same Landrat ordered teachers to vote Conservative or be dismissed. In Osterburg County Landrat Count von der
Schulenburg wrote to the Schulzes on October 15, 1863, "You are immediately to call a community meeting and in it to read aloud the
enclosed statement by His Majesty the King to the Steingrund community .... " They were to say that those voting against the will of the
King would be treated as "enemies of the King." His colleagues in
other counties issued similar warnings. Landrat von Lattorff in
Gardelegen sent a printed statement to all Schulzes demanding that
they actively oppose the election of members of the Progressive party
and support those candidates loyal to the government. He threatened
disciplinary action against any official who did not follow this order.
His colleague, Landrat von Puttkamer in Demmin, acted in the
same way. "Whoever ... votes for the Progressive party is an enemy
of the King," he declared, and would be punished. In many cases the
Landrat threatened to dismiss Schulzes who voted against the government and to force them to pay the costs of persons appointed in their
place. In many others the official was faced with the prospect of having to pay a fine. At Schievelbein the Landrat von der Golz threatened
the hereditary Schulzes that in case they disobeyed the King by voting
for the Progressive party he would initiate proceedings against them to
deprive them of their office and to force them to pay the salary of their
successors.25
In the towns and cities the official pressure was exerted on big and
little, on persons of importance and those made significant to the
president and the Conservatives only by their power to vote. In 1862
the president of the administration in Pomerania assembled all the
members of the magistracy in Regenswalde and asked them to work for
the election of candidates favorable to the government. When one
merchant member refused, the president dropped the effort and left.
In the next year he would not have been so mild, as a sampling of the
evidence showed. Thus, Landrat von Goerten of Saarbriicken County

36 Ibid., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, pp. 620-21, 623. Nov. II, 1863; I, 22·23. Nov. U,
1863; I, 45·46. 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, pp. 614-15, 643-45, 619.
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spoke to Burgomaster Schmidborn of Saarbriicken and Burgomaster
Karcher of St. Johann as follows: He understoood that they were
liberal candidates for election as electors. He announced that he was
a Conservative candidate for election as deputy in the neighboring
county, and he warned them to vote as the government ordered or they
would lose their positions. At G6rlitz City Councillor Halberstadt, who
served without compensation, was fined twenty Reichsthalers even
prior to the election for being a member of the liberal election committee. His appeal to the Ministry of the Interior against the sentence had
not been replied to when the new Lower House commission submitted
its report on election irregularities. In Brieg a similar instance occurred,
with the city councillors being censured rather than fined. Government pressure in Berlin seems not to have been as heavy as elsewhere,
but the following report revealed that it was far from being absent.
According to the testimony of Edward Ludwig, a very minor
official, the director of his office had called a meeting of his subordinates on October 11 or 12 and said that each could vote as he
pleased. A few days later the director called them together again, read
the instructions of the Minister of Interior, and declared that any
one voting in opposition to the government or not voting at all would
be dismissed. Each official was given the name of a person to consult
about the candidate for whom he should vote. 26
Landrat von Koppy thought it necessary to force the Conservative
views upon a meeting of liberals at Gross-Mahlendorf called by the
retired Cavalry Captain von Reuss of Sonnenberg to select candidates
for the position of electors. The sponsors of the meeting had fulfilled
all legal requirements necessary to hold it. When it opened under
the chairmanship of von Reuss, the Landrat appeared in official uniform accompanied by a gendarme to oversee the meeting. The Landrat, von Koppy, soon asked permission to speak and gave a lecture on
the position of the government and the situation of the country. At
a convenient point the chairman interrupted him and closed the meeting with cheers for the King. Then von Reuss left, but the Landrat
and others remained and the discussion became heated. The Landrat
declared to a liberal teacher that he had acted like a cobbler. He denounced the liberal legislation and threatened that if the county voted
liberal the government would cut off poor relief and other forms of
financial aid. He threatened to suspend two teachers if they voted

.6 Volkszeitung, April 23, 1862; Abg. H., St. B., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, esp. pp.
623, 646-47, 639.
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against the government, called von Reuss "a bad official who forgot
his duty." and said that if von Reuss voted as before he would be dismissed from the police administration. Of the townsmen he said that
their votes, alas, would be again decisive. He blamed the popular
meetings held in those centers; the meetings, he said, were mostly
composed of loafers who paid no taxes and were only waiting for
revolution as in 1848. He declared that when there had been no parliament and the King alone had made the laws, things had been much
better than at present. 27
In its search for votes the government did not neglect a single source.
For example, in some areas the renters of public land were very numerous, and they in turn could exercise control over peasants and workers.
Even in 1862 in the administrative district of Stralsund the pressure
had been applied to them under threat of material loss. In the next
year the pressure was increased throughout the state. Renters of
public property were everywhere warned to vote for government candidates and were subjected to the usual threats. In Garlitz railway
employees and laborers were told by Privy Counsellor Costenoble to
vote as the government wished or to lose their positions. Government
financial aid in such matters as road building and bridge building was
to be given or withheld according to the way a district voted. Rector
Marcus, editor of a liberal paper published in Gumbinnen for the
country people, the Biirger-und Bauernfreund, was warned by the
administration that he had to give up the editorship or his concession
to conduct a school would be revoked. Doctor Senftleben, a physician,
was dismissed from an engagement with an agricultural academy in
Waldau because he was a democrat. 28
The government dominated three institutions which it particularly
wished to keep clean of liberalism, the schools, the church, and the
army. It proceeded to use the excellent facilities which it had for
exerting influence on them. As early as 1861 Landrat von Brauchitsch
of Danzig County had written to a teacher requesting him to cease supporting and reading the Volkszeitung, accusing the paper of being
hostile to the King and to the Christian religion, and saying that it
aroused criticism when an official of a Christian church and an educator of the youth set a bad example by supporting such a journal.29 The
following year von Kotze, one of the highest officials in East Prussia,
27 Ibid., pp. 617-18.
"Ibid., p. 613; Kolnische Zeitung, Oct. 20, 1863; Ibid., April 17, May 1, 10, 1862;
Volkszeitung, Dec. 21, 23, 1862; KOinische Zeitung, Nov. 4, 1863 .
•• Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Sept. 22, 1861.
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spoke to the teachers of West Preussisch-Holland in the presence of
Superintendent Erdmann, Pastor Tackmann, Landrat von Schroter
and Burgomaster Gisevius:
It is unfortunately true that the teachers in the towns mostly
incline toward the Progressive party; the young teachers cultivate being enthusiastic about liberalism. . . . The inevitable
result of democracy (for the Progressive party is nothing else
than that) is the republic, and that this leads to inner decay and
in the end opens the door to foreign enemies is evident from the
old Greek republics and also from the example of North America. . . . The question is whether we have government by the
King or by the people. That a parliamentary regime is something very deficient we see from the example of England, where
everything is based on bribery. Elections demoralize the people;
therefore I am altogether opposed to a system of government
with elections, although conditions are not nearly as bad here
as in England. . . . At the preceding election the unfortunate
principle was established that officials should not be influenced
in voting. . .. The democratic interpretation of the official's
oath, that an official is committed only for his directly official
activity but otherwise may work against the government, is very
wrong. The official's oath lays upon him the obligation to be
active for the government even outside his office.... The press
causes an enormous harm; it spews poison among the people
and causes the present epidemic movement. Liberalism is nothing but an epidemic. I speak to you in this fashion not only because I have been ordered to do so and as a government official
I am obligated to; I do so much more because it is my innermost
conviction that I express. Under the previous ministry I dared
not so speak.•••
Then he urged those present to work for the election of Conservatives
and to vote Conservative; and he declared that any official unable to
support that party should resign. At about the same time School
Counsellor Wantrup in Elbing, a notorious reactionary, told an election meeting of his party that the word Volk (folk) was derived from
Folgen (to follow), that therefore the folk had the duty to follow the
princes. A liberal commented on this piece of etymological wisdom
by asking whether the word Wantrup was not derived from Wahn
(madness) and Trop! (a drop).3o
The campaign of 1863 brought the teachers into the focus of government attention on a wide scale. In Glatz the president of the regional
administration said to the director of the gymnasium as well as to the
burgomaster, "Either vote for the Conservatives or resign." Hegewalt

8. Ibid., April 30, 1862; Kolnische Zeitung, April 17, 1862.
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of the regional administration in Stettin threatened to discipline the
teachers if they opposed the government. Regional President N aumann in Koslin issued an instruction on October 5, 1863, to about the
same effect. The president of the administration at Magdeburg set
forth the educational ideal that should be reflected in the election.
"You will agree with me," he wrote the teachers, "that it is absolutely
incompatible with the duties of a teacher and trainer of the youth,
whose sacred duty includes awakening and cultivating in the youth
under his care the feelings of piety and respect for the authority of our
King and His Government through word and example, to participate
in political agitation against the government and to vote against the
King's will." Men of higher culture, he said, knew the difference
between the government and the Progressive party.S1
It would be difficult to conceive of further exertions of loyalty and
obedience to the Conservative way of life which could have been demanded of the teachers. Every abuse of patriotism in favor of one
political and social group in the state, every violation of freedom of
instruction, every manifestation of the subservience of education to
politics, every kind of violation of the right of the teacher as an individual were exemplified in these instructions.
The Catholic priesthood could hardly be coerced by the government into following the Conservatives, but the Protestant pastors were
ordered to toe the line. In numerous cases these pastors shared the
government's views with such devotion that they needed no urging.
Even in 1861 and 1862, not to go further back, they had fulfilled their
traditional function of maintaining civil obedience. In 1862, for
example, a bookbinder wished to name his child "Waldeck," manifestly in honor of one of the most vigorous liberal leaders. The pastor
refused to baptize the child under that name, and when the father
appealed the case to the church consistory in Berlin, the latter upheld
the pastor, replying "that in the evangelical church the giving of only
those baptismal names is permitted which have been customary among
Christians or at least have a deeper meaning and signify nothing objectionable."S2 It was offensive to the church for a child to be named
for a liberal. In April of that year a pastor in Rummelsberg County
declared in a sermon that "the Lower House ... which was composed of
pardoned persons [that is, former criminals] had the aim to eradicate
Christianity in Prussia. . . . Stupid boys wished to make laws." A

.. Abg. R., St. B., Nov. 23, 1863; I, 132. Ibid., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, pp. 610-12 .
•• Volhszeitung, Oct. 5, 1862.

398

/

Prussia 1858-1864

pastor in one of the rural election districts near Lyck spoke to the
assembled peasants to the same effect. At the opening of the Landtag
in May, 1862, the Superior Court Pastor von Hengstenberg surpassed
all his colleagues. He preached a sermon to the Landtag which consisted of a denunciation of the liberals. According to a deputy who
was present, the pastor said that "many of the deputies have the mark
of Cain on them" and accused the liberals of supporting lies. The
sermon was delivered in the presence of the King. 33
General-Superintendent Moll in East Prussia issued an election
statement in the same year which should rank with the finest examples
of political piety.
In the name of God the Father. of the Son and of the Holy
Ghost. .Amen. Dear brothers in Jesus Christ. There is going
through our land at present a movement the noise of which is
great. Nonetheless. I should not speak to you about it at this
time of preparation for Easter if nothing else than the roar of
political election excitement were manifest in it. But I hear a
roar not merely as of wild water but of the spirits of destruction
which entice the excited people to great errors along the way of
destruction. I hear with sorrow and shudders the brazen, sarcastic speeches with which godless people in widely-read daily
papers deride the pious minds of loyal men who seek the will of
God even in state affairs, place their faith in the Lord even in
the present confusion, and exhort the Christian dwellers of our
country to devoted prayer about the results of the election according to the heart of God. And I mourn deeply for our poor
people that it still does not turn away from these evil tongues
with abhorrence and revulsion, but that in part it is even eager
for such bad food. I hear with concern and with painful
astonishment what reception the false teachings of the sovereignty
of the people find among the inexperienced. what secret satisfaction the half-concealed, half-open attacks on the monarchy
by divine right arouse among those already uncertain in their
loyalty. And I cannot rid myself of the thought that those cannot be the true friends of His Majesty the King who take offence
that He took his hereditary Crown from God's altar and who
cannot forgive Him for not having acce£ted the German imperial Crown out of the hands of unjustIfied party leaders and
. for not having raised it out of the stream of fraternal blood with
the point of his sword and set it on His gracious head by force. 34
The statement continued in the same vein.
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Since churchmen expressed such views in 1861 and 1862, one can
imagine the thoroughgoing participation expected of them in the
elections of the next year, and further evidence scarcely needs to be
given. Landrat von Lattorff of Gardelegen County instructed the
superintendent of the church in October to have the pastors inform
the elementary school teachers of their orders to assist in securing the
victory of Conservatives in the election. Since the local pastors exerted
considerable power over the schools as well as over the populace, the
Landrat had chosen one of the most effective means for bringing
morality to the aid of political pressure. In another case after the
election Pastor Nothig of the Jakobi Church openly rebuked an
elector who had voted liberal. The good pastor did so in church just
before the Lord's Supper in front of the entire congregation. When
the liberals requested an investigation, the consistory took a month to
reply and saw no reason to discipline the pastor.35
How many of the leading pastors felt about the political conflict
was manifested again in June, 1865, when they signed a petition to the
King condemning the Lower House in the name of Jesus Christ for
violating the fourth commandment. They declared that hate and
confusion reigned in the country to an unbelievable extent and that
they found it difficult further to follow the requirement of praying
for the Landtag when the latter misbehaved in such an unchristian
way. They regarded as "one of the most sacred duties of the clergy
to maintain old and young in the congregation in obedience to the
ruler," and they warned that the wrath of God would descend upon
a people that no longer walked in the ways of humility before not
merely its Heavenly but its earthly master. 36
In 1863 the military were not permitted by the government to participate in politics as much as before for fear of an undermining of
discipline. The feelings of many or most officers were clear, however,
from the behavior of these men in the previous election. They employed somewhat different phrases and tones from the teachers and
pastors but achieved the same effect, and as became men of valor ,they
occasionally used physical force. A favorite technique was for the
commanding officer to call the Landwehr soldiers together before
election time and deliver a speech to them, of which the following
examples will suffice. Herr von Schmeling, Landwehr lieutenant in
Heiligenbeil: "Comrades, you will see from the publication given you

·'Ibid., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, pp. 622, 654.
3' Spenersche Zeitung, June 23, 1865.
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for whom you are to vote. Nonetheless, I will in short order make
your position clear. It is a question of only two things-either the King
continues to rule or the Jews. The democrats wish the latter. Dismissedl" In Seehausen Major von Bohn declared to the reserve on
March 29, 1862, "The previous elections are a disgrace to Pruss ian
history. They have hardened the heart of the King.... This disgrace
must be made good; everyone must contribute to doing so.... Whoever does not is a scoundrel." At Lautenburg and Rheden the commanding officer said to the Landwehr men, "It would be best if the
army took its weapons, went from one end of the state to the other and
trampled everything in the mud!" The election at Herford was edified by the commanding officer's marching the soldiers to the voting
place, where they voted Conservative in a body. At the previous election the soldier vote had been cast for liberals, and their officer was
taking no chance on a repetition of this offence. As the major left the
voting place, he met a Landwehr man, the son of a local liberal merchant, and said, "You should be ashamed to vote with the democrats.
You have been a soldierl" A battalion commander wrote to a reserve
officer "that . . . because of agitation for the democratic Progressive
party and thereby the violation of your duties as officer toward the
King's Majesty and because of your forsaking the honor of a Royal
Prussian officer, a court-of-honor investigation has been initiated
against you." In another town two women who received a small sum
to help bring up children by their former soldier-husbands found
themselves deprived of these sums because their present husbands,
ordinary burgers, had voted for the liberals.31
The pressure by officials in 1863 continued into the voting place.
Deputy von Bernhardi reported in the Lower House on December 3
of that year that where trouble occurred at the elections it was caused
by the election commissioners and that in almost every case these were
Landrats.38 Thus, at Warmbrunn the election commissioner Burghard, a librarian in the service of Count Schaffgotsch, made a long proConservative speech to the voters. When one voter complained about
it to the Landrat as a violation of the election law, the latter replied
that he fully approved of the speech, that the election law forbade dis-

., Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 10, 1863; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, April 13, 9, 12, 1862; Kolnische Zeitung, April 30, 1862; Abg. H., St. B., July 4,
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cussion and the voting on resolutions, but that the holding of a serious,
patriotic speech just before the act of voting was both legal and commendable.39
Serving as election commissioner in the ninth Oppeln district,
Landrat Baron von Koppy devised a more effective technique than
that of the Schaffgotsch librarian. According to a report given the
commission of the Lower House by County Judge Wagener, EstateOwner Lorentz, and two other liberals of the district, the following
incident occurred. The Landrat election commissioner declared at
the beginning of the voting that he would allow no discussion. During
the balloting the rural voters who did not support the Conservatives
had to come directly to the table and at the request of the commissioner
repeat the names of their candidates two or three times. Naturally
some of them became frightened and on the second balloting a few
stayed away or changed their vote. When a Conservative vote was
cast the election commissioner could hear the name from any place in
the room, no matter how softly spoken or badly enunciated. He allowed the Conservative voters in the room to converse among themselves,
to make remarks to the voters, to talk with the voting officials, to look
over the records, even to spill a pot of ink over the lists. If a nonConservative voter made any comment, the commissioner threatened
to have him removed by force, and several policemen were stationed
outside for that purpose. Such was the moral quality of Conservatism:~o

The results of the election of 1863 proved to be almost as disappointing to the government and the Conservatives as the previous
ones had been. The disgust of Landrat Freiherr von Massenbach,
election commissioner in the third election district of Posen, expressed
itself in the manner in which he notified one of the winning candidates
of his election. "At the elections for the Lower House held today in
Birnhaum and Samter Counties," the Landrat wrote Doctor Langerhans, "the majority composed mainly of Poles and Jews chose you as
deputy."41
The government immediately began to punish the higher officials
who had disobeyed its orders; loyal higher officials in turn punished
subordinates; and, wherever they could, officials and officers began
to take vengeance on civilians who had ignored their dictates. The
government's relations to the election contrasted sharply with those

Ibid., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95, p. 616.
Ibid., Dec. 9, 1863; I, (1864), 357-58.
AI Ibid., Dec. 3, 1863; I, 303-04.
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after the elections in the preceding two years; the behavior surpassed
the worst excesses of the Manteuffel regime. Village Schulzes were
disciplined right and left. They were personally censured, fined or dismissed from office. 42 Judicial officials suffered treatment similar to
that given administrative personnel. Legal defence was in the main
ignored. In one way or another the offenders were punished.
One Landrat felt impelled to take direct action against a liberal
Schulze in Olbersdorf. In a letter to Deputy Berndt, the Schulze, Robert Kuschel, described the interview, which lasted two and a half hours.
The Landrat accused him of having, against orders, violated his oath
of loyalty to the King by voting for liberals. He had also been disobedient, the Landrat continued, in that "after leaving the voting
place you said to the county messenger Nowack, 'Victory, we have in
spite of all put them through,' and you laughed scornfully. You have
also been disobedient in that you laughed at the policeman Weniger
in the market place and ten steps farther on you clapped two men
on the shoulder." During the interview the Schulze stood firmly on
his right to vote according to his conception of what was best for the
state. The Landrat tried to dictate into the report on three occasions
remarks by the Schulze which were not true; and when the latter objected the official became angry, hit him on the chest so hard that he
knocked him over. The Schulze became frightened and tried to flee,
but the Landrat held the door and shouted for the police. The secretary tried to calm the Landrat, who finally did quiet down enough to
finish the interview. At the end the Schulze refused to sign the protocol because he had not been properly treated. The Landrat imposed
a fine upon him for misbehavior.43
The vengeful hand of the government reached into the lives of persons who had only an indirect connection with it. In Guben the owner
of a factory, C. Lehmann, had been elected to the unpaid position of
town representative, and Langner, another burgher of the town, to
that of town councillor. The administration at Frankfort on the Oder
at first confirmed Langner's election, but after the state elections for
deputies to the Lower House it refused to confirm the election of either
man. The two municipal officials-to-be had voted for liberals. In
Frankfort on the Oder, Master Chimney Sweeper Kiinzel, town councillor, member of the poor commission and of the local liberal committee of long standing, learned after the election the disadvantages of be-

.. See the evidence in ibid., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 95.
··Ibid., Nov. 23, 1863, pp. 133-34.
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ing a liberal. The government cancelled his rental of a piece of public
land; the government director of the railway and a number of government agencies ceased employing him and gave the work to another
master who had voted Conservative. On December 2 Kunzel was apprehended by the police over the question of the size of the area within
which he could operate his business. It appeared that the government
would reduce the extent of it.44
The military participated in the disciplinary action with full loyalty.
Upon being called back to active duty an officer who had voted liberal
found that his superior had imposed a social boycott upon him. No
officer was allowed to associate with him. From Potsdam a number
of town officials reported the following action by the military stationed
there. Soldiers were forbidden to trade with anyone who had voted
liberal or who had failed to vote; and since many merchants depended
upon this trade for their livelihood, the prohibition meant their ruin.
On the list were two barbers, three bakers, a flour merchant, a butcher,
a forage dealer, and a brewer, along with many others. A widow had
been told by an official that she would have to move out of a government-owned apartment unless she persuaded her son not to vote for
liberals. She had refused and had moved. The military had been
given the names of the offending tradesmen by the public officials.
One could see why it was useful for Conservatives to hold the position
of election commissioners.45
When the new Landtag convened in the autumn of 1863, the
liberals soon brought up for discussion in the Lower House the whole
question of the behavior of the government in the election. The debate focused upon certain fundamental problems of government in the
state and revealed clearly once more the issues in the constitutional
conflict. What role or function did the ministry have, how much
authority resided in the King, what powers did the Landtag possess
over the ministry and over the bureaucracy, what rights as voters did
the officials have under the constitution, what authority did the government possess over the officials, what part should the government play
in an election, in what sense should the articles of the constitution
be interpreted? The arguments were concerned primarily about these
questions, for all of them were involved in the question of free elections.
The liberals knew that their existence as a political force was at
stake and that the sympathetic population expected them to act. In
"Ibid., 1864; Vol. IV, No. 95, p. 643.
··Ibid., pp. 640-42.
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a superb speech in the House, on November 28, Schulze-Delitzsch
stated the full significance of the conflict: "We have the duty toward
our voters that when they are restricted by the officials in the exercise
of their most sacred rights, we must step in and fight for them with all
the constitutional means at our disposal. Only thereby will they be encouraged; and if we do nothing, we only cause discouragement throughout the country." This was the old constitutional conflict in a new
form. Its meaning was brought home to the people to its fullest extent, he said, for the behavior of the government in the elections showed that the conflict involved the most intimate of all civil rights, the
right to vote. Addressing the Conservative deputies,he said:
You must not feel entirely secure since you actually request
the government to support your influence illegally by means of
the officials. A genuine aristocracy does not think and act in
this way.... Such behavior could rather destroy the aristocracy
than strengthen it .... The gentlemen [the Conservatives] who
already have such a favorable position through their important
social standing display a testimonial of poverty and show that
something must be rotten about their position because they do
not trust this legitimate influence and evoke another force for
their support, that of illegality....
Schulze-Delitzsch accused the government and the Conservatives of
relying on what was low and vulgar in human nature, on venality, as
the basis of their system of rule. And he said,
That is a system which arouses against itself the most terrible hate that one can think of among those whom one forces
under control. It is the most awful humiliation, the worst affront, which one commits when one forces a man to admit this
before his fellow men. The coerced one thinks of wife and
child, of his miserable situation, of hunger and sorrow-but
nonetheless he will not be free of the feeling that he appears to
all his associates as a wretched person .... More than one has
come to me in burning shame and with the bitterest complaints.46
Deputy Assman was equally bitter:
Whoever speculates on revolutionary conditions should allow things to continue as they are and not oppose this activity
of the Landrats. Like a poisonous fungus bitterness and pessimism are quickly and secretly spreading and are consuming the
foundations of our state, while the state craftsmen are concerned only to preserve the outer polish of the ornaments .

•• Ibid., Nov. 28, 1863, Vol. I, (1864), p. 185.
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We face, in fact, a bad calamity for the state. To avoid it
exceptional measures are necessary, for these are not merely
single excesses of individual officials which lie before us, but
everything points to organized pressure. 47
Freiherr von Vincke, a right-wing liberal of the highest social standing and usually a severe critic of Schulze-Delitzsch, directed terms of
equally strong condemnation against the government. He called the
government's compulsion on the voters "unheard of" and not in harmony with the moral sense of the people. "Among the simple country
folk, who are the most loyal supporters of the Royal House," he said,
"there prevails the greatest bitterness. They are deeply angered over
the offence against their personal rights." Von Vinke urged the
government not to continue along this path. "If the Lower House is
dissolved another time or two and such election pressure is again
exerted as this time, no one can say what will happen. God defend
our Fatherland against thatl"48
The liberals were especially concerned about the position of officials
with respect to the government. Many of them were or had been
officials themselves and comprehended the full seriousness of the problem from personal experience. Freiherr von Vincke stated that no
one demanded that the government remain silent during an election.
It should use all legal means to inform the public about the issues,
and the officials should be loyal to their superiors. Nonetheless, the
officials must have freedom to follow their own political views. Very
many officials who at present were considered loyal had formerly
opposed the liberal Hohenzollern-Auerswald ministry, von Vincke
added, without finding that attitude one of hostility to the King. 49
Deputy Wachler, a county judicial official elected on the Progressive ticket and now serving as chairman of the commission of the Lower
House investigating the violations of freedom of election, revealed to
the Lower House the situation of the bureaucrat from personal experience. Landrat von Knebel-Doberitz of his county had warned all
officials, Schulzes and others, against voting for him and his Progressive colleague, Knight's Estate-Owner von Gablenz. As an official he
had taken the oath of loyalty to three kings and had served the monarchy for almost forty years; yet the Landrat called him hostile to the
government. Wachler emphasized how subversive of official prestige
it was when a peasant or a townsman one day received a governmental
.. Ibid., p. 168.
··Ibid., Nov. 13, 1863; I, 47.
•• Ibid., pp. 53-54.
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instruction signed "Wacbler" and the next day a statement from the
Landrat that Wachler was hostile to the government, "a highly
dangerous subject," and should not be supported at the election. If
this was the way things were done, Wacbler continued, it would be
better to abolish the constitution, abolish the Lower House, create a
Tax Council and replace the Upper House by a Court Assembly which
would be obedient.50
Deputy Faucher condemned the government's action for another
reason.
If we had all the Schulzes as electors and only Landrats as
deputies, the same administrative officials would serve as popular representatives who should be warned by the popular representatives. Then the government, misled by a sham constitutionalism, would allow itself to commit acts which it would later
greatly regret and we would all have to say to ourselves that it
would have been better if Prussia had remained an absolutistic
state. 51

Deputy Waldeck, a liberal of 1848, a judge who had withstood
government pressure many times, expressed further the dilemma of the
official.
Who is responsible for the present situation, that the constitution is violated, that there is no budget, that expenditures are
made for the army organization which the Lower House has reduced? The ministry is responsible. The official took the oath
of allegiance to the constitution, and if upon being elected deputy he finds the government violating the constitution, what
should be do?
Waldeck blamed the government for putting the official in this dilemma. The liberals gladly approved political agitation by the Conservative party, he said, and claimed for themselves the same right. They
disapproved putting the officials in disciplinary investigation because
of their vote. One cannot call voting, Waldeck concluded, political
agitation. 52
What should be the relation between the official and the government? The arguments chiefly revolved around this question. Deputy
Virchow, the famous professor of medicine, declared that once a person
was definitely appointed to an official position and once he was expected to fulfill his duty under all ministries, "you must allow him a

•• Ibid., pp. 49-50.
·'Ibid., Nov. 23. 1863; I. 129.
··Ibid., Nov. 13. 1863; I, 51-52.
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certain neutral area within which he can move freely according to his
own conscience. You must normalize precisely his official duties." Without this precise statement of obligations, he said, the Prussian state
in its present form could not exist. Virchow considered the constitutional rights of the individual as composing that area which the government should not violate. 53 Count Schwerin, the former Minister of
Interior and a friend of the King's, a member of the highest nobility,
a liberal of the most moderate kind, condemned the government's
treatment of officials as completely as any left-wing democrat. In the
Lower House on November 13 he denounced the government for having forced officials to put themselves at the head of "a certain party."
This is "the worst thing that could happen to the Prussian state," he
said, "for it damages the respect which in a state like Prussia the
official must have." As minister, he stated, his rule had been that
"as long as an official did his official duty and obeyed his superior, I
did not ask about his political views." He had disciplined those who
had agitated for any political party, whether liberal or Conservative.
The present government should have been "more careful" in its instructions to officials. He feared that if present policies were continued,
the country might be split between those who were loyal to the King
and those who were not. He stated that no worse service could be done
the Landrats than to make them the leaders of a certain political party,
for thereby they would lose the general confidence on which their
prestige depended. He accused the government of bringing them into
this unfortunate position.54
Deputy Twesten referred to Paragraph 315 of the code of criminal
law in which an official "who abuses his official power to force someone illegally to an act, a sufferance or an omission should be punished
by imprisonment of not less than a month's duration." The liberals
could not at present initiate such proceedings, he said, because the
ministry monopolized the authority to bring suit. But "misdemeanors
of this kind are not cancelled for five years, and I think there will later
be an opportunity to use this paragraph."~5
On the Conservative side, the statements were equally blunt and
problems were raised which the liberals had not actually handled.
Since the Conservatives were few in the House and, with the exception
of Deputy Wagener, not particularly vocal, their arguments came forth
.a Ibid., Nov. 28, 1863; I, 175.76 .

•• Ibid., Nov. 13, 28, 1863; I, 52, 48, 183•
•• Ibid., Nov. 23, 1863, p. 130. Compare Schwerin's statement to the Lower House,
March 23, 1860. Ibid., 1860; II, 605.
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mainly as fiats. Deputy von Blanckenburg demanded to know: "When
the officials work in their offices as state officials in the name of the
government and then in the evening as citizens agitate in clubs against
the same government-does not that violate the moral conscience of the
people more than when an official is simply forced back into doing
his duty?"56 Deputy Wagener asked the liberals tartly whether the
officials were only to be allowed to agitate against the government.
He saw no difference between a Conservative Landrat's influencing a
peasant and a liberal county judge's behaving in the same way. If the
prestige of the one was damaged- by such action, the same held true
for the other official. He preferred the prohibition of any political
agitation on the part of the officials, a view, however, which his Conservative colleagues manifestly did not share.57
For the government, Minister of Interior Count Eulenburg, who
should have carried the burden of defence, proved at first to be rather
tame and somewhat apologetic. He even acknowledged that some
officials had gone too far in pressing their subordinates and said that
he had given instructions to correct the excesses. Nonetheless, he
denied that free elections were possible in a time of political excitement like the present. At every election, he said, influence was exerted;
every person was influenced and should be. Where different views
existed and the government was convinced that its views were correct,
it should use all legal means to influence the public in favor of them.
He defended his election decree as constitutional and necessary, for a
part of the bureaucracy had been getting out of hand and ignoring its
official responsibility to the King. Without obedience such as he had
demanded, there could be no orderly administration. He admitted
that an independent bureaucracy no longer existed, and he blamed
the loss upon the introduction of a representative legislative body.
The two were incompatible, he said; to rule as before with an independent bureaucracy was completely out of the question. 58
Minister President Bismarck knew the weakness of his colleague
Eulenburg, and in one brief, frank and cool speech in the Upper
House he expressed warm approval of the most extreme action of the
Landrats and other officials and of the Conservatives in the recent
election:
You may be certain that the government has not been spoiled
by an excess of loyal zeal to the extent that when this zeal is
•• Ibid., Nov. 28, 1863; I, 174.
13, 1863.; I (1864), 51.
I. Ibid., Nov. 13, 23, 1863; I, 46, 50, 130.
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manifested it does not esteem the honorable source of it. The
government knows how to distinguish such an excess from the
careful reserve which washes its hands in innocence and does not
come into the position of seriously asking itself whether the
limits which I described are touched or transgressed.59
Thereby Bismarck described the actual situation without trying to
cover up realities by piety and legalism. He criticized the moderate
and fair officials, the ones who had tried to make possible the freedom
of election. He calmly disavowed much of what the Minister of
Interior said about the elections and reassured his supporters that the
government stood behind them.
The sharp difference in interpretation of the constitution between
the government and the liberal majority of the Lower House showed
itself in details at every point. The one wished to draw the limits to
the power of the other as tightly as possible; the other sought to expand its authority as far as it could. An example arose in connection
with the investigation of election irregularities. The House appointed
a commission to conduct the investigation; and since most of the
evidence concerned officials, the commission tried to obtain information directly from lower officials. The government prohibited the
latter from supplying any data except that which the ministry was
willing to give. The government based its position on the constitution
and asserted that by the provision for the separation of powers the
legislative branch had no authority to consult private citizens or
officials except by way of the executive. The Lower House was inclined in general to accept this view, certainly an extraordinary sign
of inexperience on its part; but it believed that while the Lower House
itself could not carry out an investigation of the sort proposed a committee of the House could do so. When the government forbade
officials to appear before the committee, the House was compelled to
acquiesce. 6o The government won again because it had the power.
It succeeded for the time being at least in making the House dependent
upon the administration for all official investigatory work involving
public hearings. It set up another barrier to effective relations between
the House and the public.
Constitutional or legal arguments had slight bearing on the conflict. Each side claimed legal authority for its action and views, for
each referred to a different article of the constitution or a different

•• Herrenhaus, St. B., Nov. 19, 1863; I, 48.
00 See the discussion in Abg. H.,. St. B., 1864, Vol. IV, No. 90, pp. 554-57; No.
95, pp. 625, 56.
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law. In the stage of development in which Prussia found itself, the
controversy could be resolved only by force; no court or Landtag could
do so. The outcome depended upon whether the Lower House or
the King and his government had the power to gain its way, and, as
has already been seen, Bismarck knew this fact. The liberals brought
forth excellent legal arguments, all of which were undoubtedly valid,
if one accepted them as valid. So did the Conservatives. 61 The gap
theory could be applied to this question as easily as it could to that
of the financial authority. The entire issue became one of brute power.
This was a crucial period in the history of the relations of the
officials and the government. In the pre-parliamentary era of absolutism, particularly in the Stein-Hardenberg period, the officials had
considered themselves in many cases as representatives of the people
and had defended law and order against autocracy. Protected by administrative law, they had enjoyed a degree of independence in judgment and action which had enabled them at times to defy and block
arbitrary measures. After the introduction of parliamentary institutions they attempted to maintain their attitude of independence, even
though conditions had changed. Formerly their opposition to the
government had been held within the confines of the ruling group.
Little or no public activity or expression of support had been involved.
Under a parliamentary regime they extended their claim to independence to the right to engage in political party conflicts and to appeal to the public. Thereby they tended to violate the rules of the
closed corporation of the, governing group. They undermined discipline by appealing to the public, a new power, against their own
superiors. They claimed the right to participate in political party life
while preserving the security of tenure of the Old Regime of bureaucratic absolutism. The Conservatives' demand that the officials follow the orders of the absolute monarch was equally inappropriate.
Misunderstanding the situation created by the introduction of parliamentary institutions, the government claimed that the officials tlhould
be active politically in its favor. Thereby it forced the latter into the
position either of losing their rights as citizens to vote according to
their conscience or of disobeying their superiors. Although in contrary directions, both liberals and conservatives were claiming more
power with respect to the officials than was justified.
The issue was critical because of the high importance of the officials
in the political life of the Prussian state. Far more so than in a
U

See the Conservative view of 1856 as formulated by Minister von Westphalen.

Ibid., Feb. 8, 1856; I, 354; also Deputy Heise's remarks. Ibidl, Feb. 8, 1856; I, 364-65.
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country like England, the officials continued to provide much of the
political leadership. Recognizing that fact, Bismarck and his colleagues determined to break the political independence of the bureaucrats once and for all. By winning the constitutional conflict they
were to succeed in reducing the officials to political silence or to active
support of the government. This system was subsequently introduced
into the unified Germany and lasted as long as the Second Reich. It
offered one more example of how Bismarck and the Conservatives
imposed upon a government with parliamentary institutions an autocratic conception of the Old Regime. Their policy provided no solution, but it worked, that is, until eliminated by the same means by
which it was introduced-sheer power.

12 / The Elections of 1862 and 1863

IN

Ap,i1-May, 1862, and Oaobe,-Novembcr, 1863,
elections were held for the Lower House of the Landtag. Of the 350
deputies to be elected, the results according to party were as follows:
Name of Party
LIBERAL

Number of Deputies
Elected
1862
1863

284

CONSERVATIVE
CATHOLIC
POLISH

10'
33

258
36
30

23

26

In each election the liberals won by an overwhelming majority. Since
all the Polish deputies and on most issues the Catholic Center Party
opposed the Conservative program, the government enjoyed the support in the Lower House of only a very small band of Conservative
faithful.
Statistical data on the party vote in the two elections were not available at the time except in scattered form. No official figures on the
results were published; and not even the liberals provided an unofficial tabulation. The government's compilation of the statistics
was kept secret, reposing in the Prussian State Archives, where it was
discovered by the present author. 2 Although the compilation is not
quite complete, it does provide figures for both elections on the vote
of the electors for the four major political groups, the liberals, the Con-

• Deputy Hoffman, a Landrat of Oppeln II, IS regarded not as a Conservative but
as a member of the Constitutional party.
• Statistics on the Prussian Elections of 1862 and 1863, edited by Eugene N.
Anderson (University of Nebraska Press, 1954).
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servatives, the Catholic Center, and the Poles. The statistics analyze
the vote by county and by urban and rural categories. They also supply
the figures, by party, on the voters' vote in 1863 for each county, for
each of the three classes of voters and for the urban and rural population. These data make it possible for the first time to analyze the
statistical evidence on the political attitude of the Prussian population
in the crucial period of the constitutional conflict. They will be used
as the basis for the discussion in this chapter.
The size of the total vote cast was certainly not impressive. In the
election of 1863, of 90,790 eligible to vote in Class I in the entire state,
only 57 per cent voted; of 202,709 in Class II, 44 per cent voted; of
803,954 in Class III, 27.3 per cent voted; of a total of 1,097,453 eligible
voters in all three classes, only 30.9 per cent cast a ballot. The percentages were lowest in the two Western provinces (20.6 for Westphalia and 18.1 for the Rhineland), highest for the province of Posen
(53.3 per cent) . For the other provinces the figures ranged from 38.9
per cent in the province of Brandenburg to 29 per cent in the province
of Silesia. Frequently a candidate for the position of elector won in
an election at which fewer than a dozen voters cast a ballot. In the
towns the percentage in all classes participating in the election was
usually greater than that in the rural districts.
Since the statistics on the popular vote are available for the election
of 1863, the number of popular votes necessary to elect a deputy for
each party can be calculated. The following table contains the pertinent data:
Liberal
Total popular vote
566,000
Number of popular votes per deputy 2,193
Percentage of total popular vote
52.8
Percentage of total number
73.4
of deputies

Conseroative
Catholic

Polish

327,000
9,083
30.5

48,000
1,600
4.4

131,000
5,038
12.0

10.3

8.5

7.4

The Catholics manifestly fared best under the election system, the
liberals next best, and the Poles and Conservatives suffered heavily.
The party with the smallest popular vote seated proportionally far
more deputies than any other party. If one were to judge the election
system by the standards of equal, universal suffrage or by a system of
proportional representation. one would have to conclude that the
Catholics were greatly over-represented, the liberals considerably so,
and the Poles and especially the Conservatives were greatly underrepresented.
In the administrative district of Koslin, where the Conservatives
won seven out of nine seats, on a proportional basis they did better
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than the liberals in the same area. Their popular vote was 3,100 per
deputy, that of the liberals 5,500 votes. They won about two-thirds
of the popular votes and seated 77 per cent of the deputies. The
liberals received the rest-one-third of the popular vote and 23 per
cent of the deputies. In other administrative districts, like Breslau and
Oppeln, where the Conservatives returned several deputies but far
fewer than the liberals, they fared well or ill in proportion to the number of deputies they were able to return. The more deputies they
elected, the lower the number of Conservative voters per deputy
and the narrower the gap between the percentage of popular vote
they received and of deputies they elected. In those administrative
districts in which they seated no deputies and yet polled a large vote,
the disparity was greatest. In the administrative district of Konigsberg,
for example, the Conservatives polled 20,000 popular votes to 32,000
for the liberals and did not seat a single deputy while the liberals returned sixteen. The system of voting favored the party with concentrated strength in an election district, irrespective of whether or not
that party had a large following in all or most parts of the state. The
Conservatives formed a large minority throughout the state, but they
could muster enough votes in 1863 to win in only twenty-one out of
176 election districts. The results of the three-class system of voting
proved to be similar to those obtained under any system based upon
the returns from a single election district. A majority won; the
minority, no matter how large, was unable to seat a representative. The
Conservatives were not under-represented any more than a minority
party is in England or the United States. They had a large popular
following, and they showed that the Conservative government was not
lacking in popular support; but they could not muster enough votes
in the crucial places, the election districts, to win very many seats.s
Although all parties entered the elections on equal terms, one
should exercise great caution in drawing conclusions about the political attitude of the Prussian people from the total vote polled by each
party. The three-class system acted as a deterrent to voting, especially
in Class III where most eligible voters were to be found. When for
the entire state an average of 132 voters in Class III had the same voting
power as 19.1 voters in Class II and as 7.1 in Class I, the masses saw
little inducement to express their political opinions by balloting. During the decades in the first half of the century when the Stein Municipal
Law had allowed equal suffrage in the towns and cities of the Eastern

• Cf. Dr. J. Jastrow, Das Dreiklassensystem (Berlin, 1894) , pp. 89-90.
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provinces, the public had participated in the local elections to an overwhelming extent. It was to do so again when the Reich election law
permitted equal and secret suffrage. The three-class system imposed
such a handicap upon popular participation that it would be wrong to
gauge the results of the elections by a yardstick which is inappropriate
for that system of voting. Since the system did not allow equality of
suffrage, one should not attempt to interpret the results by a standard
that assumes equality of votes. A basis of judgment must be formed
which is in keeping with the nature of the election system-a fact
which neither the Conservatives and the liberals at the time nor subsequent students of these elections have taken into account. The total
figures reveal the political attitude of those who took the trouble to
vote, of those who felt so strongly or were under such heavy pressure
from other forces that they cast a ballot. The data do not indicate
that those failing to vote were either uninterested in politics or were
content with the status quo.
The three-class system divided the voters in each election district
according to the amount of direct taxes paid. The framers of the
election law had assumed that the distribution of rich and poor would
be about the same in each locality, an assumption that proved to be
false, particularly as modern industrialism spread. In some precincts
no individuals were eligible for the first class or even the first and
second classes, and a few persons had to be arbitrarily assigned to these
categories. 4 In wealthy districts like Berlin the average direct tax paid
by a member of the first class was 225.8 Reichsthalers, that of the
second class 64.1, and that of the third, 6.38. In Heydekrug County in
East Prussia the comparable figures were 20.0, 8.5, and 1.71 Reichsthalers. For the entire state they were 53.7, 16.9, and 2.55 Reichsthalers. The amount of taxes paid by individuals within each class
varied widely. In Stuhm County in the province of Prussia the amount
for voters in the first class ranged from 26 to 1,054 Thalers, in the
second class from 9 to 129 Thalers, and in the third class from 2 to 37
Thalers. The greatest disparity in voting power was found in the
large towns and the cities, where differences in wealth were most pronounced.
In spite of the lack of state-wide uniformity it appears to have been
generally true that the system roughly corresponded with the natural
divisions of society at the time. In anyone district the leaders would
usually be found in the first or the first and second classes and the

• See Abg. H., St. B., May 26, 1862; I, 41 (speech by Deputy Neide) •
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masses in the third. Regardless of whether one district was industrial
and urban and another was agricultural and rural, the three-class system represented grades of comparable social and economic importance
within each district. A merchant of some wealth who was in Class III
in an urban district would have far more income than persons in
Class I in other districts. Nonetheless, in his district he occupied a
social and economic position of third class; and an individual of much
less wealth in a rural district might enjoy a position of first class. The
voters represented definite social and economic interests according to
the class in which they were placed. Exceptions occurred mainly in
two cases. The first concerned intellectuals, who were frequently or
usually leaders but on economic grounds were normally found in
Class III. The second concerned two groups: wealthy individuals,
some of whom, in certain areas, had to be relegated to Class II or Class
III, and others where the extent of economic equality was such that
persons for Class I or even Class II had to be chosen arbitrarily.5
An adequate standard for judging the results of the three-class
system of voting would take into account the fact of comparability of
social and economic position in each district, irrespective of the diversity of wealth, occupation, and social background. Instead of adding
up total figures on the number of persons voting for each party throughout the state, one should use total figures on the number of counties.
The figures for each county should then be broken down according
to voting class and according to whether they referred to urban or to
rural areas. The vote should be tabulated for each county regardless
of whether the party was able to return a deputy. If a party won in a
county or in one or more classes or in the urban or rural areas even
without being able to carry the election district, that fact should be
recorded so that the size of the party's following can be shown. By
using this method one is able to compile the following table on the
liberals and the Conservatives.6
In preparing the table the author has confronted the problem of
what to do in case an election district returned members of two parties.
In these instances it is impossible to learn the exact vote of each winning party. The official compiler has recorded the vote of only one;
that of the other party will vary from it according to class and according
to the distribution of the vote between urban and rural areas. Where• Cf. von Gerlach, op. cit., pp. 29-34; R. B&kh, "Statistik der Urwahlen fUr das
preussischen Abgeordnetenhaus vom 19. Nov. 1861," Zeitschrift der Preuss. Statistischen Bureaus, 1862, II, 77-121.
• A similar table on the Catholic and the Polish vote is given later in this chapter.

The Voters' Vote 1863 by County Showing a Majority by Class
'C'
~.~

IN FAVOR ~LIBERALS

Admin.
C ~!
Total
District
r... '"' I II III Tot'l
Konigsberg
20 14 14 II II
Gumbinnen
16 15 12 14 15
8
Danzig
4 2 2 2
7 766
Marienwerder 13
Potsdam
15 12 13 II 12
4
444 4
City of Berlin
17 14 15 II 13
Frankfurt
13 12 10 8 7
Stettin
10
3
4
0
0
K&lin
4
Stralsund
3 3 3 3
Breslau
24 16 19 6 8
16
Oppeln
4 4 4 4
19 17 17 13 13
Liegnitz
18
I
I
0 0
Posen
Bromberg
444 4
9
Magdeburg
15 13 14 13 13
17 15 17 14 14
Merseburg
Erfurt
345 5
9
II
Miinster
4 4 3 5
6 5 3 3
Minden
10
14 12 12 13 13
Arnsberg
Cologne
II
887 7
18 15 14 13 13
Diisseldorf
Coblenz
12 10 II II 10
II
Aachen
8
7
8
8
Trier
13 13 13 13 13
4
4 4 4 4
Sigmaringen
Total
351 241 242 204 210

IN
"

-; ;: I

FAVOR

OF

THE

CONSERVATIVES

A-.

I

~

Rural
Rural
Total
I
Urban
II III Tot'l I
II III Total
1 II III Tot'l 1 II III Tot'l I
II III Tot'll I
1
I
1
6
2 2 5 5
I
788
15 14 14 14
9 877
1 4
2
1
1
I
1
1
2
534
13 13 13 13 14 II 13 12
I 2 2 2
0 o 2 0
I
1
I
2 222
5 5
I
3
2
2 2 3 2
0 o 3 2
3 233
9 9 6 7
6 7 (j 6
3 2 4 3
2
1 0
0
8
3 5
3 II
9
13 14 15 15
6 II
o 0 0 0 0 000
4 444
3 2 6 4
0 000
8
8 15 14
8
8
I
2
17 17 17 17
I
3 5 6
0 000
6 7 8 8
6 5 4 4
13 13 13 13
7 6 10 10
3 443
8
8 10 10
2 2 0 0
766 7
1
1
I
1
0
000
223 3
4 444
2 2 I
1
8 5 18 16
6 3 4 4 II 10 20 18
17 20 19 19 12 13 3 5
8 8 8 8
6 666
888 8
3 3 3 3
5 5 5 5
2 2 6 6
0 020
6
5 13 11
19 19 17 19 13 14 6 8
o 0 0 0 5 2 I 0 5 300 4 3 I 2
4
3
I
I
o 0 0 0 0 000 o 0 0 0
4 4 4 4
4
4
'i
4
2 1 2 2
3 222
3 2 6 5
12 13 13 13 10 12 8 9
1
1
2 0 3 3
1 I
3 2 6 4
16 16 16 16 13 14 10 12
4 3 2 2
I 212
644 4
I
3 3 3
6 565
o 0 0 0 0 000 o 0 0 0
3 3
3 4
564 5
1 244
I
I
2 2
0 000
6 5
I
I
9 6 5 5
o 0 0 0 0 000 I I I I
12 12 13 13 12 II 12 13
o 0 I I
I
I
I
0
o 0 I 0
566 6
7 7 6 6
o I 2 2 I o 2 I ,I I 2 2 2
14 15 13 14 II II II II
2
I
I
2
0 000
2 2 3 2
9 9 9 9 10 10 9 10
o 0 0 0 0 000 o 0 0 0
6 4 6 6
996 7
I
I
2
I
I
1
1
1
2
000
9II II II 12 12 II 12
o 0 0 0 0 000 o 0 0 0
4 4 4 4
4 4 4 4
259 262 245 253 182 185 136 149 56 49 85 79 33 25 30 23 92 86 134 123
Urban
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ever a Conservative won, the compiler most likely tabulated his vote,
for the government was most interested in the size of the vote for its
supporters. In those cases where a Catholic and a liberal, or a Pole
and a liberal, won, it is usually impossible to tell to which one the
recorded vote pertains. In order to learn the maximum strength of
the Conservatives the author has for this table regarded as Conservative
the vote in the three election districts where a candidate of that party
was returned along with a member of another party. The one exception to this rule, Erfurt II, is explained by the fact that the official
compiler credited the victory to the Catholics. Where a liberal won
along with one or two Catholics (in six election districts) or one or
two Poles (in five election districts) , the author has included the vote
not in the liberal columns but in those of the other winning party.
By this method he has manifestly underestimated the strength of the
Catholics by the three election districts in which they won along with
a Conservative, and he has diminished the liberal showing even more
by ignoring in this table their winning vote in eleven election districts
comprising twenty-three counties. If the figures on the liberals were
increased by the number of these counties, the results would be more
nearly correct than those given in the above table. In that case the
total figures for the liberals would be:
Total

Urban

Rural

I

II

III

Total

I

II

III

Total

I

II

III

Total

264

275

227

233

282

285

268

276

205

208

159

172

The tables reveal that in Class I the liberals won over four times
as many counties as the Conservatives, in Class II nearly five times as
many, in Class III about two and one half times as many. In the urban
areas the liberals won eight times as many in Class I and from ten to
eleven times as many in Classes II and III and in the total. In the
rural districts the liberals won twice as many in Classes I and II and
gained a majority in Class III and in the total.
The evidence shows that the overwhelming majority of the voters
favored one of the liberal parties. Rural as well as urban population
voted for the liberals. Counties that were entirely rural cast as high
a percentage of ballots in favor of them as did the urban areas. Although not as a rule in such large numbers, the voters of the Masurian
and Lithuanian regions, of a few Polish counties and of many Catholic
ones favored the liberals as staunchly as the solidly German Protestant
districts. The Conservative strength among the voters was concentrated
in very few areas. The party was able to win a majority of the popular
votes in one half or more of the counties in only three administrative
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districts, Breslau, Oppeln, and especially Koslin, though it also did
well in Stettin and Liegnitz. If it had not been strong in the third
class and among the rural voters, it would not have been so successful
even in these five administrative districts, for the liberals or the other
parties easily gained a majority of the total vote in the first two classes
in three of these (Breslau, Stettin, and Liegnitz) and reduced the
Conservative showing in Koslin. The urban voters greatly favored the
liberals in everyone of these administrative districts.
The liberals were able to win a seat in six election districts along
with a member of the Catholic party, and in a few instances the Conservatives and the Catholics returned a deputy from the same district.
In five cases a liberal won alongside a Pole; but with the one exception
of those in Merseburg II the voters were too well informed to commit
the mistake of imagining that a Conservative and a liberal could
represent their district with equal accuracy.
The percentage of the voters casting ballots in the counties that
went Conservative in 1863 was about the same as that for the liberal
counties. The degree of participation varied with the amount of influence of the vote, highest in the first class and lowest in the third,
with the second class ranking not far behind the first and well above
the third. The percentage of voters participating in the election in
1862 was higher in the great majority of counties and classes than it
was in 1863. The Conservatives polled as a rule a much larger vote
in the rural areas than in the towns and cities. They showed the
greatest strength in the third class and least in the second. They won
most of their seats in counties of solidly German population in which
Protestantism predominated to an overwhelming extent; but they likewise were able to return deputies from a few counties in Silesia where
the population was largely Catholic or both Catholic and Polish. The
increase in the number of Conservative deputies from 1862 to 1863 is
only explicable by the effectiveness of governmental and social pressure.
Wherever the local upper class remained Conservative and the general
cultural conditions had scarcely felt the effects of new ideas and of
commerce and industry, the population tended to follow traditional
ways and to acquiesce in Conservative leadership.
The urban vote did not predominate in the elections. The urban
population in Prussia remained as yet a minority, and the percentage
of voters casting ballots was not much larger in the towns than in the
rural areas. The statistics show that the rural vote alone for the
liberals by county and class was much greater than the combined urban
and rural vote for the Conservatives. While the urban voters over-
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whelmingly supported the liberals, the rural population likewise gave
them sufficient strength to win by a large majority over their main
rival.
The electors' vote reveals a similar disproportion in favor of the
liberals. The data contained in the following table are divided into
two sections. The upper part contains the results in those counties
in which the conflict was fought between liberals and Conservatives or
in which a liberal or a Conservative victory under one of the rubrics
was manifest. The lower part contains the results in those counties in
which a liberal or a Conservative won along with one or two members
of another party.7

Number of Counties in Which the Majority of Electors Voted
Liberal or Conservative
CONSERVATIVE

LIBERAL
Admin.
District
Konigsberg
Gumbinnen
Danzig
Marienwerder
Berlin
Potsdam
Frankfurt
Stettin
Koslin
Stralsund
Breslau
Oppeln
Llegnitz
Posen
Bromberg
Magdeburg
Merseburg
Erfurt
Miinster
Minden
Arnsberg
Cologne
Diisseldorf
Coblenz
Trier
Aachen
Sigmaringen
Total
Koni~sberg

DatlZlg
Marienwerder
Oppeln
Posen
Bromberg
Merseburg
Miinster
Minden
Arnsberg
Cologne
Aachen
Total
TOTAL

Urban

Total

'INo.ot'l
I Coun-

Rural

I

Total

Urban

Rural

ties 1862 186J 1862 186J 1862 1186J
1862 186J 1862 186J 1862 186J
16
16
13
U
13
9
20
0
3
0
I
2
6
16
16
15
15
15
15
16
0
I
0
0
o
I
4
2
5
4
2
18
1200
2
2
8
6
13
I
3
0
0
9
6
10
9
2
3
4
4
0040000
4
4
o
0
12
7
15
I
4
0
0
14
II
15
15
2
7
14
7
17
0
3
0
0
17
14
17
17
2
9
9
5
13
0
4
0
0
13
9
n
13
II
7
2
0
10
6
8
I
2
4
2
8
10
9
8
2
140
I
00
4
4
4
3
2
3
15
9
24
5
10
3
3
8
14
19
14
21
20
2
11
16
2
5
I
5
2
5
2
II
3
5
17
14
19
19
15
9
19
2
5
0
0
4
10
2
0
18
lOIS
4
3
1
3
I
o
2
4
4
4
4
4490000
o
0
14
II
15
0
I
0
0
15
14
15
15
o
3
17
14
17
13
12
13
17
0
I
0
2
4
I
7
4
7090302
7
5
o
7
1
1
I
1
I
I
II
0
0
0
0
o
0
3
11
10
I
0
0
0
5
5
8
4
2
0
8
12
14
I
0
0
0
9
9
12
12
2
0
8
8
6
6
7
7
II
0
0
0
0
o
0
II
10
18
I
I
I
0
13
14
II
14
I
2
10
10
12
12
12
0
0
0
0
12
12
o
0
II
II
13
I
4
I
0
10
II
I
I
12
12
3
6
II
0
0
0
0
6
8
6
10
o 0
344
1020
I
0
3
4
2
4
351
24
59
14
19
48
93
253 223 257 260 209 168
2

2

6

2

2

~

3

2

3
24
277

2

2

3
6

1
2

II
21
244

2

9

2
2

2
2
3
I
3

26
283

2
2

2

3

5
2
3

3
22
282

2
2
2
II

2
5
I
2

4

2

2

2
3
2
3
22
2111

4

o

5

3

5
1

5
2

2

II
18
186

I

o

2g

I 6~

1

1 l~ 1 2~ 1 5~ 1106

• In case of a tie the author credits the victory to the Conservatives. Since the
official compiler gave to the Catholics the entire Conservative vote in the administrative district of Aachen in 1863, it is assumed that the same allocation occurred
in the election of 1862.
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The data indicate the effectiveness of governmental pressure in reducing the size of the liberal electors' vote in 1863, especially in the
rural regions. The town voters were better organized and had more
means of self-protection against the government than the rural population. The number of counties in which a majority of urban electors
favored the liberals remained practically the same in 1863 as in the
previous year, whereas in the rural areas it declined by nineteen per
cent. For both urban and rural electors the liberal vote declined only
twelve per cent from 1862 to 1863. In any case the Conservatives could
scarcely derive much consolation from these figures. The electors
proved to be much more liberal than the voters.
The disparity in the number of counties in which the voters' vote
gave a majority to the liberals and that in which the electors' vote did
so arises from the system of indirect elections. In the voters' balloting
the majority was established not by adding up the total vote as one
sum for the election district but by counting the vote within each
class. A party might win a majority of the total vote and still lose a
majority of the electors. Usually a victory in two classes meant a
majority for the party in the entire district; but it was possible for a
narrow margin of victory in two classes to be offset by a large majority
in the other class. Thus, in some twenty counties the Conservatives
won a majority in two or more classes or in the total vote in the voters'
election, but a majority of the electors favored the liberals. In three
other counties the reverse occurred; the liberal voters' vote was turned
by the electors into a Conservative victory. It was also possible for
candidates to be non-committal about their party affiliation during
the campaign and after being chosen as electors to cast their ballot
for the party they personally preferred. The statistics reveal that a
number did so, particularly in the rural areas. Again the liberals
profited from the change.
The relative strength of the liberals and the Conservatives can be
seen most realistically from a comparison of the total number of elecTable I
Total number of election districts
Total number of counties
Number of election districts returning liberal deputies
Percentage of election districts returning liberal deputies
Number of counties in these election districts
Percentage of counties in these election districts
Number of election districts returning Conservative deputies
Percentage of election districts returning Conservative
deputies
Number of counties in these election districts
Percentage of counties in these election districts

1862
176

1863

351
151

351

85.8
300
85.0
6
3.4
12

U

176
137
77.8
271
77.0
21
12.0
41
11.6
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tion districts and the inclusive counties from which each party elected
one or more representatives. The figures given in the table below contain the data on those districts and counties in which the parties were
able to win all seats and also on those in which they divided the representation with a second party.
These gross figures may be broken down in order to reveal the geographic concentration of the Conservative following. The following
table lists the election districts and the counties in which the party
was able to seat one or more deputies.
Election District
Danzig I
Marienwerder VIII
Potsdam VIII
Frankfurt V
Stettin V
Stettin VI
Koslin I
KOIilin II
Koslin III
Koslin V
Breslau I
Breslau II
Breslau III
Oppeln I
Oppeln IV
Oppeln VI
Oppeln VII
Oppeln IX
Liegnitz IV
Merseburg II
Erfurt V

Table II
Name of County won in
1862
1863
Elbing
Marienburg
Flatow
Deutsch-Krone
Jiiterbogk
Sternberg
Naugardt
Regenwalde
Greifenberg
Kammin
Lauenburg
Lauenburg
Biitow
Biitow
Stolp
Stolp
Rummelsburg
Schlawe
Schievelbein
Dramburg
Belgard
Belgard
Neustettin
Neustettin
Guhrau
Guhrau
Steinau
Steinau
Wohlau
Wohlau
Militsch
Trebnitz
Wartenberg
Namslau
Oels
Kreuzburg
Kreuzburg
Rosenberg
Rosenberg
Tost-Gleiwitz
Tost-Gleiwitz
Pless
Rybnick
Ratibor
Ratibor
Neustadt
Falkenberg
Bunzlau
Lowenberg
Schweinitz
Wittenberg
Schleusingen
Ziegenriick

The evidence from the electors' balloting confirms that gained from
the analysis of the voters' vote. The Conservatives had most influence
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in the administrative districts of Koslin, Breslau, and Oppeln and to
a less extent of Stettin. ~n 1862 all ten of their deputies came from
the first three of these districts; in 1863 twenty-two out of thirty-five
were elected from the three districts and four more were seated from
Stettin. Apart from the administrative district of Koslin the liberals
returned more deputies from each of these areas than the Conservatives.
Liberal political power spread over the entire state; that of the Conservatives was decidedly localized.
Although in 1862 the Catholic Center party and the Polish party
each elected over twice as many deputies as the Conservatives, the
campaigns of these two parties were much less significant for the fate
of Prussia than those of the other antagonists. Their vote will be
analyzed here primarly as an aid to estimating the size of the popular
hostility to the Conservatives and the government. As we have seen,
the Polish party opposed the latter on all counts. Catholic opinion
was divided; but by 1863 it almost completely aligned with the liberals
against the government. While disliking the program of the liberals
for national unity, the Catholic party staunchly participated in the
fight against militarism and absolutism and condemned Bismarck as
thoroughly as the liberals. What strength did these two minor parties
have in the population?
In 1864 the Prussian state contained 5,200,000 adherents to the
Catholic church, excluding the two million Poles, in a total population of nineteen million. s The Catholic party was able to elect thirtythree deputies in 1862 and thirty in 1863, or one deputy in 1862 to
every 157,575 members of the Church. In the case of the Protestants
the ratio in that year was one to 41,320. One would infer from these
figures that the Catholic party was unable to monopolize the vote of
all the adherents to its religion, and the further evidence in the table
given below substantiates that view. Even in the predominantly
Catholic counties and election districts where the Catholic party won,
it was not able to keep all its followers in line. Where Catholics constituted over ninety per cent of the population and a liberal or a
Conservative as well as a Catholic party member was elected, one must
conclude that Catholics had voted for a liberal or a Conservative.
Since, as we have seen, a Catholic won in the same election district
with a Conservative in only three cases and with a liberal in six, one
must conclude that more Catholic voters preferred liberals than Conservatives.

• Meitzen.

op. cit.,

I, 326.
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Konigsberg V
Konigsberg VIII
Oppeln I
Oppeln II
Oppeln III
Oppeln VI
Oppeln VII
Oppeln VIII
Oppeln IX
Erfurt II
Miinster II
Miinster UI
Miinster IV
Miinster V
Minden III
Minden IV
Arnsberg II
Arnsberg VII
Cologne IV
Dusseldorf VI
Dusseldorf VII
Diisseldorf IX
Aachen IV
Total

t
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=:
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Braunsberg
Heilsberg
Allenstein
ROssel
Kreuzburg
Rosenberg
Oppeln
Gr.·Str.ehlitz
Lublinitz
Pless
Rybnik
Ratibor
Kosel
Leobschiitz
Neustadt
Falkenberg
Heiligenstadt
Worbi.
Steinfurt
Ahaus
Munster City
Munster County
Koesfeld
Borken
Recklinghausen
Liidinghausen
Beckum
Warendorf
Wiedenbriick
Paderborn
Buren
Warburg
Hoxter
OIpe
l\feschede
Lippstadt
Armberg
Brilon
Sieg
Miilheim
WIpperfUrth
Rees
Kleve
Geldern
Kempen
Geilenkirchen
Heinsberg
Erkelenz
48

i:!::~

Menzel
Rehaag (by·election)
Stock
Siebert
Funke
Osterrath
Biernacki
v. Renard
Wanjura
( by-election)
Strzybny
Wolff
l\ftinzer

v. Oppersdorf

Zehrt
Ellering
Rohden
Ziegler
Froning
Scheffer-Boichorst

~

.f~

1'1,-<:00

P. Marquardt
Austen
Stock

90.4
93.4
92.9
88.9
26.1
85.2
85.7 .
94.8
94.0
89.1
94.5
96.4
95.6
91.6
91.4
70.1
92.2
77.6
89.3
96.9
90.8
97.5
98.4
95.7
98.0
98.6
98.1
98.7
76.1
95.0
96.8
92.0
88.4
96.4
95.8
89.2
95.6
95.8
88.9
91.1
91.1
66.9
88.6
95.1
96.4
97.6
97.7
94.5

Foitzick
Engelbrecht
v. Renard
Jaensch
Schnapka
Weitzel
Wolff
. Miinzer
Mader
Frantz
Ellering
Rohden
Steinmann
Froning

v. Kleinsorgen

Schultz

Hobbeling
A. Reichensperger

Hobbeling

Schmidt
v. M"lJinckrodt

Schmidt
Kleinschmidt

Evers

Weber
Albers

Plassmann
Reinhardt
Giitzloe
Krebs
P. Reichensperger
Franol1x

Blnm

33

t",<>
_...

tt~

Schultz

Bender

-"
ti,,_Oi ....

Reinhardt

Krebs
P. Reichensperger
Haanen
Blum
Osterrath
30

.Q,
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-..:.::
"0
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73.9
20.6
73.0
88.0
74.2
88.4
89.7
88.9
88.4
44.6
84.1
2.3
49.4
11.1

...

"'''
.
~~
2
2
2
2
2

11
2

3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

2

2

3
I
I

2
2

While the table discloses the relation between Catholic religious
affiliation and political attitude in those election districts from which
a Catholic representative was elected, further evidence is supplied by
a study of those predominantly Catholic districts which did not return
party members as deputies. The administrative district Breslau con-

• Statistics on Poles from Zeitschrift des Kgl. Preuss. Statistischen Bureaus, 1871
(Berlin, 1871), pp. 359 If. Statistics on Catholic percentages taken from Meitzen,
op. cit., IV, 200 If.
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tained five counties overwhelmingly Catholic in religion, but it did
not return a single deputy of the Catholic party in either election. In
the eighth election district, composed of three counties overwhelmingly
Catholic in religion, three liberals won, all members of the Progressive
party. In the ninth district, composed of two counties also overwhelmingly Catholic in religion, two liberals of the Left-Center party
won. In the administrative district of Dusseldorf eleven counties out
of seventeen had a majority belonging to the Catholic Church. The
table shows how meager was the success of the party in winning seats
in that district. In the administrative district of Cologne the party
was even less effective. Nine out of eleven counties were overwhelmingly Catholic in religion; yet only one Catholic deputy was returned
at either election. The administrative district of Aachen (eleven
counties) was almost entirely Catholic in religion. It elected one
Catholic party member in 1862 and two in 1863. In the administrative
district of Coblenz where nine out of twelve counties were predominantly Catholic (seven of them overwhelmingly so), the party
seated no one in either 1862 or 1863. The neighboring administrative
district of Trier (fourteen counties) was almost totally Catholic in
religion, but did not elect a single Catholic party member in either
year; and the same conditions were true for Hohenzollern (four
counties). Although the Catholic party depended upon the Church
for its support, religious affiliation did not determine party affiliation.
It remained for Bismarck's political conduct to align the Catholics
almost solidly in one party. The liberals of the period under discussion successfully appealed to Catholic as well as to Protestant voters.
The counties of Catholic faith consistently manifested slight interest in the elections. The percentage of participation was cons}derably lower in Catholic counties than in neighboring Protestant ones;
and in the Rhineland and Westphalia, where Catholicism predominated, the percentages were from twenty to forty points below
those in most of the state. In these two provinces the third class of
voters excelled in remaining at home on election day. It was common
for less than ten per cent to cast ballots; the second class appeared to
the extent of twenty to thirty per cent, and the first class, thirty to fifty
per cent. The Catholics manifestly found satisfaction for their needs
and wishes in some other way than politics. The rural population
participated in general less than half as much as the urban.
In the voters' vote for 1863 the results by class and by the urbanrural distinction for the Catholic party were as follows:
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CATHOLIC

Admin. No. of i
District Counties
Konigsberg
Oppeln
Erfurt
Munster
Minden
Arnsberg
Cologne
Dusseldorf
Aachen
Total

20
16
9
11
10
14

11
18
11
120

--J-

I
4
5
2
7
3
2
3
3
3
32

Total
Urban
Rural
II III Total I
II III Total I
II III Total
4 4 4
1 2 2 2
4 4 4 4
5 5 5
5 5 5 5
5 5 5 5
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
8 6
7
6 5 7 6
7
6
7
7
4 5 5
1 4 5 5
3 3 5 5
2 1 1
2 2 1 1
1
1
1 2
3 3 3
3 2 2 3
3 3 3 3
3 3 3
3 3 3 3
3 2 2 2
4 3 3
1 4
1
4 6 4 4
3
34 34 32
24 26 31 30
32 34 33 32

The results show a greater homogeneity of political views among all
three classes, rural and urban, than was the case even among the Poles.
The urban voters manifested somewhat less loyalty to the party than
the rural inhabitants. They were more exposed to liberal influence
than the latter, and with the movement of population into the towns
and cities already under way the urban population in Catholic regions
was no longer as solidly Catholic as that of the country districts. Nonetheless, wherever the Catholic party showed political strength it usually
did so in all three classes, rural and urban alike.
The Polish population in Prussia numbered about two millions in
1864, or 77,000 to each of the twenty-six deputies elected in 1863. It
was mainly concentrated in the administrative districts of Danzig,
Marienwerder, Posen, Bromberg, Oppeln, and, to a much less extent,
Breslau. 10 The political attitude of the Poles in these districts depended upon cultural conditions, especially upon whether a Polish
landholding aristocracy or a Polish middle class was present to provide
leadership. In the districts of Oppeln and Breslau the Poles lacked
direction. They formed the economically dependent and culturally
backward mass of the working people and served under German overlords, many of them old established noble houses with vast estates. In
these two administrative districts the Polish party did not win a single
seat, in spite of the fact that in one election district in A-Dll Breslau
they constituted a majority of the population and in AD Oppeln they
amounted to fifty-eight per cent of the population, with ten out of
sixteen counties being seventy-three per cent or more Polish. In these
two administrative districts the Poles had to vote for other parties,
and each of the other three parties succeeded in winning sufficient

10 The Poles in Konigsberg and Gumbinnen districts were referred to as Masurians
and had become too thoroughly incorporated into German life for them to be interested in Polish nationality politics. They are excluded here from consideration.
11 Administrative District.
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support from them to return some deputies. The effective political
activity of the Poles was therefore restricted to the administrative districts Danzig, Marienwerder, Posen, and Bromberg, where the presence
of Polish leaders in town and country enabled the population to
organize for political action.
The following table shows the distribution of Polish political
strength:
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In A-D Danzig the Poles were numerous in four counties, which
with proper respect for justice the liberal election districting law of
1860 had organized into two election districts. Karthaus (63.8 per cent
Polish) and Neustadt (42.1 per cent Polish) formed election district III
and returned two Polish deputies in the elections of both 1862 and
1863. Stargard (49.1 per cent Polish) and Berent (52.1 per cent
Polish) did not contain quite enough Poles to assure victory. When
.. Statistics on the Polish population are taken from "Versuch einer Statistik der
NationalWiten im Preussischen Staate fUr das Jahr 1867. Zeitschrift des Kgl. Preull6.
Statistischen Bureaus, 1871 (Berlin, 1871), pp. 1159 ff.
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the Germans all held together, as they did in 1862, they were able to
win both seats for that election district (IV).13 When they became
somewhat negligent and the percentage of those casting ballots declined, as was the case in Berent in 1863, the Germans lost one seat to
the Polish party.
The situation in A-D Marienwerder resembled that in Danzig. The
Poles made up a substantial majority of the population in the two
counties (Lobau, 79.2 per cent Polish, and Strassburg, 63.8 per cent
Polish), each of which formed an election district. The party won in
Lobau in both elections, but it failed in Strassburg in 1862. In election district VII, containing the counties Konitz (54.3 per cent Polish)
and Schlochau (13 per cent Polish) the party was able to return one
deputy out of two at each of the elections. In some four other counties
in Marienwerder (Stuhm, Thorn, Kulm, and Schwetz) the Poles
formed between forty per cent and fifty per cent of the population
but failed to return a single deputy from them in either election.
Five counties in A-D Bromberg had a majority of Polish inhabitants.
Organized into two election districts (III and IV) the Poles won four
out of five seats in 1862 and made a clean sweep in the next year. In
four other counties where the population was from twenty per cent
to thirty-five per cent Polish, they were unable to gain a single place.
The Poles constituted 58.9 per cent of the population in A-D Posen.
They had a majority.of seventy-five per cent or more in eight counties
and one of fifty-five to sixty-nine per cent in five others. In only five
counties did they amount to forty per cent or less of the inhabitants.
The vote went along straight nationality lines. In the election districts
where they had a large majority (II, V, VII, VIII, and IX) the Poles
voted overwhelmingly for their own candidates and won every seat in
each election. In election districts III, IV, and VI the Polish population formed a large minority_ Two of these districts were composed
of a county with a Polish majority and one with a large German
majority. The Poles were unable to win more than one seat at either
election in any of the three districts. The Germans gained the other
place. In election district I the Polish people were clearly outnumbered and each time lost to a German.
In the voters' balloti~g in 1863, the Polish party won in election
districts comprising thirty counties. A analysis by class of the total
vote and of the urban and rural vote reveals the following results:

,. Kolnische Zeitung, May':lO, 1862.

A.J,
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POLISH

Admin. No. of
District Counties

-.A--

f

I

8
Danzig
Marienwerder 13
18
Posen
9
Bromberg
Total

3

Total
II III Total

4
4 4
11 13

4
4

4
4

15 15
5 5 5 5
23 26 28 28

I

Urban
II III Total

1 1 3 2
4 4 4 4
6 8 14 14
5 5 5 5
16 18 26 25

I

Rural
II III Total

3 4 4 4
4 4 4 4
12 13 16 15
5 5 5 5
24 26 29 28

Although not to the same extent, the Polish party was strong in
the urban centers as well as in the rural areas. It was almost as powerful in the second class as in the third, and its showing in the first class
was not far behind that in the second, particularly in the country.
These results can be explained on the grounds that wherever it is able
to win at all, a party representing a culturally backward national
minority should make a good showing in all three classes. The party
should be, as it was, relatively weakest in the first class where the influence of the Germans should be greatest, and strongest in the third
class, where numerically speaking the Poles should predominate. The
Germans and some Poles formed the upper, wealthy social groups in
these areas, but the Poles made up the mass of the population. While
Polish numbers in the third class were unable to win an election, with
leadership and voting aid from upper-class Poles in one or both the
other voting classes, they could and did win.
An analysis of the statistics for the elections of 1862 and 1863 reveals
that in those election districts in which the Poles won, the voters iIi
all three classes, urban and rural, participated in the balloting consistently to a greater extent than the Germans did in districts of purely
German nationality. Government pressure in 1863 did not succeed in
reducing appreciably the Polish participation in any class. In thos~
districts where the Poles won, the percentage was highest in Class l in the large majority of counties between sixty per cent and eighty-four
per cent; it was almost as high in Class II; and it was some ten to
twenty points lower in Class III. Few solidly German counties could
show such a record.
The interpretation of the election results varied according to the
interests, the wishes, and the party affiliation of the individual. To
the liberals the evidence -seemed so overwhelming that they scarcely
bothered to argue the magnitude of their victory. They took it for
granted that the country supported them. Deputy von Unruh acknowledged in the Lower House that the liberals had won with the support
of a majority in the first and second classes arid that the participation
of the third class in the election had been small. He defied the gov.ern-
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ment, however, to change the election law so as to induce the third
class to vote in larger number than at present. "The present election
law has not developed out of our principles," he said, "and we have
nothing against changing it so that the homeopathic share for the third
.:-lass is made the proper amount."14 In every case the liberals maintained that they represented at least the educated and propertied
groups in the population, but they also declared that they spoke for
the vast majority of the others. They claimed the support of both the
voters and the non-voters and challenged the government to submit
the issues to another election.
The King never could understand why the public acclaimed him
so enthusiastically and at the same time elected his enemies to the
Landtag. It lay beyond his comprehension that a monarch with
powers actually limited by the constitution could also be popular, and
that his popularity rested upon his reputation for being loyal to that
document. He was deeply touched by the deputations of loyal peasants
and pastors led by a local Junker which the Conservative party
organized and sent to court. They typified the Prussian folk as he
wished them to be, and he was readily convinced that these few
thousand carefully controlled groups represented the country far better than the liberal Lower House. Hi
Of the two ministers, von Roon and Bismarck, the former asserted
to the Lower House quite frankly that he regarded the development
of the system of political parties since 1848 as a "great misfortune."
He claimed that many very respectable and honorable persons were
not interested in political parties; they belonged, he said, to "the
party of order, the peace-loving party," the party undisturbed by
political problems and tasks. They were loyal to the King, his government and the constitution, he said, and did not vote because of the
terror employed by the liberals. If the government could stir them
to vote, it would have an "overwhelming majority" of supporters in the
Landtag; in the absence of this overt support, von Roon inferred, the
government would continue to act on the assumption that this majority
did favor it over the liberals. 16
Bismarck denied the basis of representation. How do you know,
he asked the Lower House, that the population supports you? According to the constitution, he continued, both houses represent the entire
people. The fact that the Lower House was composed of elected repre.. Adress-Debatte, pp. 264-65; K61nische Zeitung, May 9, 1862.
J,II See Zechlin, op. cit., p. 207; Die Inn ere Politik, pp. 128-111, 149.
18 A dress-De batte, pp. 159-60.
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sentatives gave it, according to the constitution, no higher right than
the House of Lords. Furthermore, he said, only a small percentage
of the population was sufficiently interested to vote for the liberals.
It was doubtful whether this small percentage actually followed the
House's activity with full understanding and knew where this activity
was leading the country. In June, 1865, he asserted to the Lower
House:
Most voters scarcely bother to form a personal opinion
whether or not an army can exist with one less year of service,
whether the state can get along with somewhat less or more
taxes. At any rate they would be glad if it were possible. If
an educated gentleman superior to them in insight and a Royal
official in addition comes forth as election candidate and says
to them: they deceive you dreadfully on that matter; an excellent army is possible with two years of military service; the
state can exist with much less taxes; you are overburdenedthen the ~ople would agree and say: the gentleman speaks
sensibly, our vote costs us nothing, let us try it. If what he says
succeeds; then well and good; if he cannot do it, he will come
again and say: it has not yet succeeded, but you must have the
two years' service. The confidence of the people in the King ~s
so great that they say to themselves: the Kmg would not permit
them to ruin the country or put it in debt. As a result of former
traditions the people underestimate the significance of the constitution. I am convinced that the confidence which they place
in the wisdom of the King will not cause them disappointmentP
Leaving no loophole for the validity of statistical evidence, Bismarck asserted that numbers of votes or signatures 6f loyalty addresses
had "no great value," for "we live not under the regime of general
suffrage but under the rule of the King and the laws." "You do not
feel and think like the Prussian people," he said to the Lower House
liberals in January, 1864. "If the Prussian people felt like you, one
would simply have to say that the Prussian state had. lived beyond its
term, and the time had come in which it must give way to another
historical creation. But we have not yet come so farl"18 Bismarck
expressed the belief of his Conservative colleagues and of the King that
on crucial issues votes must be not counted but weighed. In his view
the King and a handful of Conservatives were right; everyone else was
wrong.

pp. 278-;~.
pp. 260-61; Rothfels, op. cit., pp. 26, 209-10.

" Rothfets, op. cit.,
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U. .NG the Y"'" of the New E<a and the tom ti tutional conflict was the Pruss ian population Conservative or liberal, or
was it indifferent to the entire conflict? The data analyzed in the preceding chapters have been taken from a variety of aspects of Prussian
life and should enable certain conclusions to be drawn. Consideration
of the issues, of the organization of political groups and of the actions
taken by the government, by the Conservatives and by the liberal
parties leads to the view that the Pruss ian people overwhelmingly opposed the preservation of the vestiges of the Old Regime and desired
reform.
The most telling evidence was supplied by the government itself,
particularly in 1863. The ministry and King used every possible form
of pressure to insure an election in favor of the Conservatives. They
requested the people actively and positively to vote for those candidates who supported the government. When the voters remained
about as hostile to Conservatism as before and the percentage of nonvoters as large, the government claimed that the election results were
relatively insignificant and that the non-voters were satisfied with the
existing order of affairs. The inconsistency of ministerial action and
ministerial words could hardly have been greater. With all the power
of coercion at its disposal the government was unable to secure the
active political support of the people.
The statistics show that a vast majority of those casting ballots
favored the liberals; but what about those who failed to go to the
polls? Does the fact that the non-voters did not actively support the
government indicate that they opposed the existing regime and favored
liberalism? In view of the size of this element of the population one
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must find ways to provide an answer. One possible way of doing so is
to consider the nature of the issues at stake in the election. These
were of state-wide significance; they dealt with general problems of
the character of government, national and local, the abolition of
privilege, the limitation of military burdens and of public financial
costs, and the unification of the German nation. Everyone, irrespective
of geographic area or social and economic position, was to be more or
less affected by the outcome of these issues. The problems concerned
general ideals and did not appeal to the politics of special interests.
They dealt with the character of the total culture: should it be liberal
or should it be that of the society of the Old Regime? From the politics
of those active in public affairs and voting one should be able to draw
some inferences about the attitude of the non-voting members of the
groups in Prussian society with similar interests.
The validity of the method of inference is subject to two major
conditions, the extent of understanding of the issues and the amount
of compulsion which the government and the Conservatives were able
to exert on the people. Not all the areas of economic and social
stagnation voted Conservative: many of them turned liberal because,
through various means, usually the presence of a few liberal leaders
in the area, the population had learned to judge the status quo by
liberal ideals. Even in districts subject to intense governmental and
Junker coercion liberal ideas and hopes were able to withstand the
pressure.
Subject to the conditions stated above, a significant basis for an
over-all analysis of political attitude may be had in the social classesnobility, bourgeoisie and middle class, and peasantry (the proletariat
was still too small and too lacking in class consciousness to count)and in the occupations. Of less importance were religion and nationality. Some, but far from all, Catholics voted with the Catholic.
party. Most Poles, the only large national minority, supported candidates of their own nationality and a program for the ultimate restoration of an independent Poland.
In all parts of the state some nobles chose liberalism. Most of those
doing so resided in East Prussia and in the two Western provinces, and
the fewest in Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Silesia. The economic
interests of the liberal nobility and of the Conservative nobility were
usually similar. As a rule, the latter were found in agriculture, with
some having industrial interests as well, but the liberal nobility in East
Prussia was likewise interested almost entirely in agriculture and in
small industries, like distilleries, for processing some of its products.

434

/

Prussia 1858-1864

In the Western provinces and in Silesia, especially Upper Silesia; certain nobles were becotning heavily involved in tnining and the iron
and steel industry. S<Ulie belonged to families recently ennobled; while
others traced their aristocratic lineage to earlier centuries. An accurate
statistical estimate cannot be given. Contemporaries, both middleclass and aristocratic, regarded the nobility as predominantly Conservative; but one cannot infer that the conflict between Conservatism and
liberalism altogether expressed a struggle between the noble and the
middle classes. Even apart from the presence of many liberal nobles
in the Lower House, many others actively supported liberalism in
their own districts. Nor wete they confined to the most moderate wing;
nobles were found in each liberal party. A few examples of liberal
aristocrats may suffice: in Silesia, Count Henckel von Donnersmarck,
Prince Hatzfeldt, Count Dohna of Katzenau, Count York, Count
Conrad DJhrn, Prince Carl Schonaich-Carolath; in Nieder-und Ober
Barnim Baron von Eckardstein and Count von Hacke. In East
Prussia they were too numerous to name, but the von Saucken family
may be cited as an 'example.!
The bourgeoisie and middle class accepted almost entirely the liberal
ideals. Wherever industrialism had developed, one could expect
liberalism to keep pace with it; and commerce on other than a purely
local scale meant usually the support of the same point of view. Iron
and steel, textiles, banking, railroads, wholesale commerce, construction-these and many lesser economic enterprises meant as a rule that
the participants voted liberal. Irrespective of geographic location,
these interests normally wished change in the direction of freedom and
national unity. One is entitled to agree with the liberals that the
owners of movable property belonged to their side. Whereas the
land owners were divided in their affiliation, some being liberal,
especially those of middle-class origin, and others being Conservative,
in the case of industrialists and merchants only the rare exceptions
were Conservative. Although any copy of a contemporary newspaper
near election time will provide all the evidence one can wish, a few
examples may be chosen. In late autumn, 1862, about a hundred
merchants and industrialists in the Rhineland and Westphalia signed
a petition to the King to dismiss the Bismarck ministry. It was estimated that the signers represerited a taxed wealth of 300,000,000
1 Kolnische Zeitung, April 19, 1862; von Bernhardi, op. cit., III, 62, 66; National
Zeitung, Oct. 27, ~863; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, May 27. 1862; v~n Bernhardi, op. cit., III, 45-46, 69-73; Poli%ei-Bericht, Breslau, Nov. 6, i863; National
Zeitutig, Nov. 24. 1861; Parisius; von Hoverbeck, II, 65.
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Thalers. In April, 1863, a hundred iron ind\l$trialists p{ the Rhineland
and Westpha,li.. sent ;t mess;tge of fu~l suppprt to the Lower House. In
Memel, Gorlitz, Halle, Breslau. in every town and city, the local merchants, bankers, and industrialists supported the liberals. 2
The handworkers were divided in their political affiliation. In
Breslau, for example, the police reporte~ that they voted for the Progressive party, a,nd from the list of electors in Konigsberg returned in
April, 1862, it is evident that that party found many loyal supporters
among them. s Three master bakers, fifteen master cabinetmakers, a
worker in leather, a master tailor, two master masons, seven master
cobblers were selected alongside seventy merchants, nine factory·owners,
sixteen doctors of philosophy, and a sprinkling of nearly every occupation in the city. In Minden the handicraftsmen voted in 1862 almost
without exception for liberals. 4 The smaller towns and the rural areas,
however, remained strongholds of guild sentiment, and insofar as they
were politically active, the handicraftsmen usually voted Conservative. 5
Many persons who called themselves handicraftsmen had become capitalistic entrepreneurs employiflg other craftsmen as wage-earners.
Since the guilds had been disintegrating for at least half a century, it
would be impossible on the basis of present evidence to state who was
a bona fide craftsman and who had risen economically into the
bourgeoisie or declined into the status of factory worker or day laborer.
It is nonetheless clear from the newspaper reports that the extent to
which the handworkers voted liberal depended upon the degree of
their understanding of the value of freedom of occupation and of their
courage in facing a new type of economic life.
Equally complicated was the political attitude of the peasantry.
The peasant's political behavior was decided by the degree of his understanding of the issues and the extent of his economic independence.
The peasants who owned their land were most likely to be liberal.
The rural laborers usually followed the politics of their master, who,
if a Conservative, marched them to the voting place and observed how
they voted. In many areas the peasant popUlation was indifferent
from sheer ignorance. The Volkszeitung published a story from the
province of Posen about a local pastor's having persuaded the peasants
• "Der Preussische Landtag von 1863," Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift (Stuttgart,
1863), N o.3, p. 124; National Zeitung, April 1, 1863; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Dec. 29, 1861.
• Polizei-Bericat, Br.eslau, May 31, 1862; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, April
. 29, 1862.
• Kolnische Zeitung, April 30, 1862.
• See Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Sept. 19, Oct. 24, 1861.
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of a village to subscribe to the Preussiches Volksblatt, a Conservative
paper, only to learn subsequently that the postman by mistake had
subscribed instead for the Volkszeitung, a Progressive paper. The
peasants expressed themselves as very content with this journal and
proceeded to vote liberal. In some districts the peasants even belonged to the National Verein. 6 That they were capable of acting
in their own interest when adequately informed and encouraged was
attested to by the Conservative political leader, Moritz von Blanckenburg, who wrote to Minister von Roon after the election of 1861 as
follows:
The outcome of the elections in Pomerania was decided by
the peasants, who, excited by county judges and Jews, take an
attitude most decidedly against us. They were persuaded that
we were against the King! They believed this all the more easily
because the administration here often went against us. Then
one dangled before them the prospect of a new law on county
government by which they would have the majority and would
be able to throw off all communal burdens. The meetings were
everywhere stormy; they scarcely listened to me, they were so
entrancedF
Von Blanckenburg's realistic estimate was confirmed by a writer in
Die Zeit at the time of the election of 1862. The peasantry, the latter
stated, knew that the interests of the King were not identical with
those of the nobility. Except for a tiny minority the peasantry had
learned to distinguish between royalty and Junkerism and was ready
to defend its interests even against the former. It understood, he continued, that the liberal reform of county government had nothing to
do with the rights of the crown, that this reform was in harmony with
the size of the contributions, especially in the form of taxes, made to
the state. He concluded that the feudal party had already lost the
natural basis of its power, the agreement of views between itself and
the peasantry, and he was very hopeful about the prospects of reform. s
Even though the writer in Die Zeit was too optimistic, by and large
the peasant frequently showed as much independence of spirit about
voting against the wishes of the authorities a.:; any townsman. Even

• See Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 27. 1861; KOlnische Zeitung, May 2.
1862; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, May 2. 1862; Regierungs-Bezirk. Breslau.
Zeitungs-Bericht fUr Jan.-Febr., 1861; Tagesbericht, No. 42. Feb. 19. 1861. citing
Volkszeitung, No. 41; Volkszeitung, April II. 1862.
• Von Roon, op. cit .• II. 55-56.
8 KOlnische Zeitung, April 26. 1862.
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at the risk of losing their positions, many Schulzes voted liberal.9 The
encouragement of a liberal large landowner or the proximity to a
town from which liberal ideas could spread was enough to win them
to the liberal party. Nonetheless, the land population of the lower
class suffered most from cultural backwardness and was least inclined
of any of the social groups to participate in the elections. Its indifference in large part accounted for the small vote in the third class.
It tended under pressure not to vote at all; or, as one Schulze did, it
signed a petition supporting the Lower House and another supporting
the King.1° That its interests lay with liberalism and that if informed
and freely allowed to, it would have voted liberal seem beyond question.
Apart from the higher personnel, the Landrats and certain categories that were kept under strong government observation, government officials supported the liberal parties to such an extent that the
Conservatives became furious and the Bismarck government determined to regain political control of them. The justice officials, being
more independent of the government than the ones in the administrative branches, participated most aggressively in the liberal cause;
but the great majority of officials in all lines of service was actively or
passively liberal. Many preferred to be passive because of the ruthless
policies of control applied by the Bismarck government.
The teachers and professors aligned themselves in the main with
the officials and businessmen. The university professors enjoyed
sufficient independence by virtue of their tenure to act openly in support of the liberal parties. The teachers, especially in the villages,
were like the peasants subject to discipline and pressure; but many
instances are known of their open defiance of the injunctions of their
Conservative superiors. Although as in the case of the other occupational groups the teaching profession showed many Conservative members, a notorious example being the anti-Semitic, vituperative and
vulgar Wantrup of Elbing, this profession as a whole sided definitely
with liberalism. Accustomed to thinking and acting in terms of

9 See Parisius' statement in Abg. H., St. B., Nov. 11, 1863; I, 22·23. Ibid., 1864, Vol.
IV, No. 95, pp. 619-21. Ko{nische Zeitung, April 30, 1862; and all issues of newspapers at election time.
10 Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 15, 1862. See also the story of the village of Steingrund. Fifteen members of the community had signed the petition of
loyalty to the King referred to above. At the election in 1863 out of ninety-six
who were eligible only fourteen actually voted. Of these fourteen, seven were for
and seven were against the Conservathes. See Abg. H., St. B., Nov. 28, 1863; I,
199·200.
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ide~ls,

it felt most at home in the camp of those who looked toward
the future. l l
ReHgiou~ ~ffiliation played an important role in influencing the
political action of Catholics and Jews but not of Protestants. The
Catholics with political interests usually voted for their own Catholic
Center party, ahhough especially in the election of 1863 many of them,
inch.\ding mew.bers of the regular clergy, transferred their vote from
right-wing Catholic candidates to liberals. The Jews, a minority
group l1till suffering from social and some legal restrictions, were consistently liberal; put the Mennonites around Elbing voted in 1863 for
Conservatives. Both liberals and Conservatives were found among
the Protestants, with the pastors being predominantly Conservative
and active in !,!upport of that party.12
.
Even the military personnel was divided in its affiliation. Officers
and soldier!,! stood under such rigid control that few were able to do
other than follow government orders; but occasional reports appeared in the press of soldiers and officers voting liberal. Especially
reserve officers tended to do so, to the anger of the regular army
officers; and retired officers, many of whom had left the army at an
early date in order to go into the civilian pursuits of agriculture and
business, frequently voted liberal. The fact that Major General von
Syburg in Berlin and Lieutenant Colonel von 8tosch, chief of the
general staff in Posen, voted liberal, that the non-commissioned
officers in 1861 were instructed to vote for Minister of War von Roon
and cast their ballots instead for the liberal Kiihne, that the leaders in
Gumbinnen in support of the re-election of two liberal deputies were
almost all military and officiaI$-this kind of evidence shows that the
army itself contained at all levels personnel of liberal viewS. 13
By way of summary, the contemporary analysis of votes by occupation in a few areas may be given. A correspondent from Swinemiinde
to the Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung (May 16, 1862) reported the
following distribution of the votes in the election of that year. "For
the Conservative candidate voted all noble estate-owners, all pastors,

11 The evidence may be found in the contemporary press, especially at election
time. One example m<!.y be offered. The Ostpreussische Zeitung, a Conservative paper
of Konigsberg, published in November, 1863, a list of 131 royal officials aTid teachers
in Konigsberg Who vot~ for the Progressive party. See Kolflische Zeitung, Nov. 7,
1863.
" See the evideTl~~ in the contemporary press.
,. Von Bernhardi, op. cit., IV, 16, 166; Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 16,
1861; AugsbuTg Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 25, 1863; Kolnische Zeitung, April 30,
1862.
.
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all military, all country school teachers, a number of inspectors, rOY'll
and noble foresters, a few so-called petty rural persons, and very few
peasants. For the candidates of the liberal party vqted all judges and
attorneys, all merchants and factory-owners, all Jews, almost all mi~dle
class large land owners and peasant owners, almost all handworkers,
hotel and restaurant proprietors, town officials, in general the electors
of the towns with scarcely any exception." For the election of 1861 it
was reported to the same paper (April 2, 1862) that the distribution
of votes among the three partie!!, Progressive, Constitutional, and Conservative, in the town district of Danzig was 30:3:7, and in the rural
district 14:4:20. The towns were notqriously liberal. Practically every
one with a population above 20,000 voted in opposition to the government. 14 One Conservative deputy in the Landtag as early as March,
1861, felt called upon to question the assertion that only the liberals
represented the towns. He claimed that all four towns in his district
cast a majority for him.15 The small number of the towns in his district reveals why they did: they were scarcely to be distinguished from
the rural areas around them. In the rural communities of the West
Havelland district the vote in 1861 went two-thirds for liberals and
one-third for Conservatives.16
What explanations were offered for the small participation in the
elections? First of all, the left-wing liberals who favored universal manhood suffrage blamed the three-class system of voting. It scarcely
seemed worthwhile to cast a ballot in the third class. The open ballot
kept many away, especially those who might suffer material hardship
as a result of revealing their political affiliation. Concern for earning
a living prevented others from taking a day off to vote. The long
distance to the polling place discouraged many. Where political
agitation had not penetrated, the population tended to remain indifferent to politics, especially in rural areas. Some employers would
not release their workers to vote, and some peasants, particularly the
landless rural workers, when ordered by their lord to vote Conservative, preferred not to vote at all rather than to go against their liberal
views. In certain areas the liberals felt so sure of victory that they
failed to be very active and lost some votes. Since the representative
system was new many had not yet become accustomed to voting; they
preferred to continue their pre-1848 political habits. All in all, under

1~ J'C)~;eitung,

May 2, 1862.
Abg. H., St. B., March 8, 1861; 1,419.
.. See Konigsberg Uartungsche Zeitf,lng, Nov. 21, 1861.
~9
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the circumstances the great extent ot the participation in the elections
is surprising,11
The evidence, in sum, substantiates the following conclusions: that
the urban population, irrespective of occupation, was overwhelmingly
liberal and hostile to the government, that the rural people were more
Conservative but that, irrespective of whether they voted or did not
vote, they were largely hostile to the government; that the relatively
small percentage of those actually casting a ballot does not detract
from the facts that the vast majority of the Prussian population who
understood the situation actively opposed the government and supported reform, and that the vast majority of the others would have
done so if they had understood their own stake in the conflict.
Whether Protestant or Catholic, rural or urban, Prussia was actually or
potentially-and to an overwhelming extent-in favor of liberal reform
within the country. The people usually split along religious lines on
the question of national unity; but except for a handful of supporters
of the Old Regime they wished liberal reforms and were unanimously
opposed to the Conservative government.
The liberals and the general public were much more able to comprehend issues than they were to know how to implement policies.
They lacked experience in self-government and were timid about taking
steps which might lead to the use of physical force by either side. The
fact that the Prussian people did not take up arms and rebel or refuse
to pay taxes in no way implies approval of government action. The
population expected that time would help in solving these problems
and did not think that extreme measures against the handful of leaders
which had the instruments of physical coercion at its disposal would
assist in introducing reforms.
The liberals made their mistake in failing to be thoroughly liberal.
They remained bound by a class prejudice of superiority over the
masses and did not perceive the possibility of the peaceful organization
of the population against the government. They missed opportunities during the New Era for developing popular support which could
be used in an emergency. A new election law based on equal and
universal manhood suffrage and the secret ballot was indispensable
in order to provide the masses with an incentive to become politically
active. An election under such conditions would have enabled the
17 See Konigsberg Hartungsche Zeitung, Nov. 23, Dec. 12, 1861; July 5, 1862;
Volkszeitung, May 8, 1862; National Zeitung, Nov. 26, 1861; Zeitungs-Bericht fur
Okt.-Nov. 1861; Regierungs-Bezirk, Aachen, Dec. 6, 1861; Augsburg Allgemeine
Zeitung, Oct. 22, 1863; Kolnische Zeitung, Oct. 30, Nov. 3, 1863.
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opposition to supply convincing evidence to the King and the Conservatives about the extent of the latter's unpopularity. As long as
the class system of voting persisted, as long as public organizations, like
political parties, the National Verein, and many others, remained instruments largely of a middle-class elite, the liberals lacked open mass
support, and the Conservatives could deny that the general public
disapproved of the existing order of things. In this situation the only
evidence capable of convincing the Conservatives of their widespread
unpopularity would have had to be that of physical action, something
to which the liberals and the masses were averse. When the crisis
struck them, the liberals were unprepared. They had no resources
beyond those of the New Era to throw into the fray. The King and the
Conservative government controlled all the instruments of organized
political power in the state. With a loyal army and with a bureaucracy
shaped and trained during nearly two centuries of absolutism, they
possessed the means for continuing to govern in spite of verbal resistance.
The outcome of the constitutional conflict lies beyond the scope
of this work; but the historical significance of the events must be indicated. Although the struggle dragged on for another two and a half
years, a disinterested observer must have concluded at the beginning
of 1864 that the liberals were defeated. They had no plan and no
means of winning against the government. Bismarck continued in
power; the administrative apparatus functioned as usual; the people
paid their taxes; the government expended the public money; the
soldiers remained loyal; and as a crowning act the hated ministry
successfully participated in the war against Denmark. The denunciation of all these deeds by the liberals handicapped the hated government very little and failed utterly to block or even to delay its actions.
The march of industrialism continued vigorously, and the people were
more prosperous than they had ever been. The liberals were so successful in their private economy that they eased the government's road
to victory with mounting tax returns. Although Bismarck knew too
little economics to be aware of the fact, he enjoyed the blessing of
coming to power during an upswing of the business cycle. He was
not merely powerful, he was fortunate.
The liberals did not surrender until Bismarck won the AustroPrussian War and set about unifying Germany in the klein-deutsch
sense. They had held out during two wars, in itself an almost unparalleled achievement; but when the second war gained one of their
major objectives, German unity, they succumbed along with the
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Austrians. The liberals had opposed the King, the military reforms
and Bismarck partly because they had fe<ired a repetition of the defeat
of 1806. They had not believep ~ll~t an unreformed, increasingly
militaristic Prussia could wuster the resources and arouse the patriotic
spirit neces~afY to protect itself. They saw their moral and political
assumptions being wrecked, and they calDe to believe in the superior
efficiency of Realpolitik.
The solution to the pruss ian and German conflicts which Bismarck
imposed had facets that affected the Hohenzollern King, the Conservatives, and the liberals, each in a different way. The r~ler preserved as
much absolutism as one could possibly command under a free constitution. The King remained in Prussia a sovereign by the grace of God,
and ill the German Reich his authority was scarcely less impressive.
Bismarck retained the military reorganizatio ll, and by his use of the
army in three wars of national unification he assured in the German
Reich the popular as well as the legal continuation of Prussian militarism. For the King and the Conservatives he succeeded in keeping
the social and political system of the Old Regime in local government
and imparted to a declining agrarian nobility a new political vigor
which kept that group in authority for two generations. With respect
to the constitution he made the gap theory valid and kept it as an
ultimate sanction for a governDlent that remained to a large degree
irresponsible. He transferred the legal position of the ministry in
Prussia to the chancellorship in the Reich. In each case the governm~nt, declared nominally responsible in law, actually wielded authority
out of harmony with the fact of constitutionality. To the liberals
Bismarck gave national unity and a considerable amount of free economic legislation, although not all that they wished. The King on
the whole was satisfied with the results. Many Conservatives disliked
intensely German unification and the liberal economic legislation.
The liberals remained disgruntled with the vestiges of absolutism and
caste. The remarkable fact was, however, that this political master,
Bismarck, made it impossible for anyone of these forces fundamentally
to change the system which he proposed to introduce. Bismarck had
wop. not merely over the liberals but in different respects over the Conservatives and the King as well.
The political and moral effects of the victory of Realpolitik were
scarcely felt by the King and the Conservatives. The ruler and his
Conservative supporters believed in power politics and practiced them
in internal as well as international affairs. They continued as they
always had to pursue Interessenpolitik under the guise of moral prin-

Prussia-Conserllatille or Liberal? /

443

ciples. Bismarck's victory meant the dominance of these metHods in
Germany in an. age in which Western peoples were seeking to introduce universal principles of liberal conduct.
In the case of the liberals the success of Realpolitik destroyed the
moral foundations of their beliefs. Wrong had proved to be effective;
right had failed. Most of them swung to the side of Bismarck and
joined the host of his adorers. The irreconcilable ones were doomed
to continue a life of frustration. Until the end of the Second Reich
in 1918 the pro-Bismarck liberals could not be depended upon to
support a principle in a crisis; the anti-Bismarck ones could talk little
but principles. Deprived of the opportilhity to learn responsibility
in government and faced with the reality of living in an anti-liberal
society, the latter continued to defend generalities. Germany became
a country largely of doctrinaires and believers in Machtpolitik a la
Bismarck.
Did Bismarck settle the constitutional conflict in Prussia? The
answer can only be thai: he did not, that he glossed it over by nationalism and by success in international relations. He solved none
of the crucial internal social and political problems; he only postponed a settlement. The evidence for this conclusion is found in the
fact that within less than three generations the Bismarckian Reich
was destroyed, the Junker Conservatives were ruined, and the HohenzoUerns had lost their throne. The predictions of the liberals during
the Constitutional conflict have proved to be basically accurate. In
the case of Germany, history has substantiated the belief in the
validity of moral principles in public life.
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APPENDIX A

Population Increase, 1849-1861, in Twenty Leading Prussian Cities'"
No.
Name of City
Berlin
Breslau
Cologne
Konigsberg
Magdeburg
Danzig
Aachen
Stettin
Posen
Potsdam
Elberfeld
Krefeld
Barmen
Halle
Erfurt
Frankfurt
Dusseldorf
Coblenz
Munster
Elbing

df Population

1849

1861

Percentage Increase
1849-1861

423,902
1l0,702
94,789
75,240
70,488
63,917
50,533
47,202
44,963
39,864
38,663
36,134
35,989
33,848
32,224
29,969
26,463
25,318
24,664
21,637

547,571
145,589
120,568
94,579
86,301
82,765
59,941
64,431
51,232
41,824
56,307
50,584
49,787
42,976
37,012
36,557
41.292
28,525
27,332
25,539

29.17
31.51
28.95
25.70
22.43
29.48
18.61
36.50
13.94
4.91
45.63
39.99
38.33
26.96
14.85
21.98
56.03
12.66
10.81
18.03

• Zeitschrift des Kgl. Preussischen Statistischen Bureaus, 1863, pp. 236-39.
APPENDIX B

Distribution of Railroad Mileage, 1862'"
Administrative
District
Konigsberg
Gumbinnen
Danzig
Marienwerder
Posen
Bromberg
Potsdam
Frankfurt
Stettin
Koslin
Stralsund
Breslau
Liegnitz
Oppeln
Magdeburg
Merseburg
Erfurt
Munster
Minden
Arnsberg
Cologne
Dusseldorf
Coblenz
Trier
Aachen
Total

Miles of
Railroads
21.3
12.6
16.9
10.2
26.1
30.2
58.1
49.3
23.5
13.6
42.6
37.5
73.5
46.8
46.4
01.3
19.4
22.9
52.7
22.5
52.7
29.7
21.8
13.7
745.5

Miles per sq.
Mile of Area
0.05
0.04
0.11
0.03
0.08
0.14
0.15
0.14
0.09
0.05
0.17
0.15
0.30
0.22
0.24
0.02
0.14
0.23
0.37
0.31
0.52
0.27
0.16
0.18
0.14

Miles per
1000 Population
0.02

O.oI
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.07
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.02
0.04

• Zeitschritf des Kgl. Preussischen Statistischen Bureaus (1863), pp. 213-14. A mile was redoned as 7,532.5 meters.
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APPENDIX C

Data on the Deputies in Five Prussian Political Assemblies·
Occupational Groups

Prussian Nat.
Assembly, 1848
Deputies (398)

Agrarians
Merchants, industrialists
Officials, excluding
justice and teachers
Justice officials
Retired officials and officers
Officers
Community and
corporation officials
Teachers and intellectuals
Protestant clergy
Catholic clergy
Lawyers
Private officials
PhYSicians
Writers and journalists
Rentiers
Handworkers, laborers,
employees
Others
No occupation or
indefinite occup.

Lower House of Landtag
VI
IX
IV
1862
1866
1849
1855
(347)
(348)
(350)
(350)
I

77·19.3% 61-17.4% 78-22.3% 82-23.6% 83·23.9%
30- 7.5% 24- 6.9% 15- 4.3% 25- 7.2% 28- 8.1%
38- 9.5% 56-16.0% 118-33.7% 45-12.9% 71-20.5%
78-19.6% 73-20.9% 56-16.0% 93-26.7% 54-15.6%
1-0.25% 7- 2.0% 18- 5.1% 17- 4.9% 25- 7.2%
3- 0.9% 9- 2.6% 1- 0.3% 1- 0.3%
27232228172·
15-

6.8%
5.8%
5.5%
7.0%
4.3%
0.5%
3.8%

1-0.25%
22- 5.5%
6· 1.5%

2525111719-

7.1% 14- 4.0% 9- 2.6% 20· 5.8%
7.1% 2- 0.6% 13- 3.7% 10- 2.9%
3.1% 4- 1.1% 8- 2.3% 2- 0.6%
4.9% 17- 4.9% 14- 4.0% 2- 0.6%
5.4% 6· 1.7% 14- 4.0% 12- 3.5%
2- 0.6%
10- 2.9% 2- 0.6% 6- 1.7% 9- 2.6%
1- 0.3%
3- 0.9% 4- 1.2%
4- 1.1% 5- 1.4% 7- 2.0%
3- 0.9%
8- 2.3%

11- 2.8% 10- 2.9%

1- 0.3%
6- 1.7% 10- 2.9%

1- 0.3%
16- 4.6%

• The first figure gives the actual number of deputies, the second, the percentage of the
total representation. Gertrud Beushausen, Zur Strukturanalyse parlamentarischen Reprasentation
in Deutschand vor der Griindung des Norddeutchen Bundes (Hamburg Dissertation 1926) pp.
88·89. Beushansen adds that the number of middle and lower officials was very small.

